United States v. Enriquez ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 28 1997
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 96-6185
(D.C. No. CR-96-15-L)
ENRIQUE ENRIQUEZ, (Western District of Oklahoma)
Defendant-Appellant.
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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Submitted on the Briefs:
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Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, PORFILIO, Circuit Judge, and MURPHY, Circuit
Judge.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law
of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Defendant Enrique Enriquez was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute and to distribute marihuana under 21 U.S.C. § 846 and extortion under
18 U.S.C. § 894. He was sentenced to two concurrent terms of 104 months. Defendant
appeals, raising issues relating to the sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing. We
affirm.
The critical evidence against the defendant was presented essentially through the
testimony of Kirby Kyles, a former confederate in the drug business, and tape recordings
of telephone conversations between them. Mr. Enriquez contends the evidence of his
participation in the charged conspiracy was insufficient because the government failed to
prove when the defendant became a member of the conspiracy, with whom he conspired,
and when he possessed marihuana with intent to distribute. He maintains the evidence of
extortion was devoid of proof that his extortionate acts were committed to collect an
extension of credit as required by § 894(a)(1). Our review of the record indicates these
arguments are without foundation.
Kirby Kyles testified he had purchased marihuana from the defendant and a
“Mexican organization here in Oklahoma City” since the summer of 1995. Kyles stated
the organization was headed by “a Mexican male, Raymond, last name unknown.” When
arrested, Kyles owed the organization $120,000 for marihuana he purchased from the
Mexican organization and sold.
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Kyles obtained marihuana from the organization under a practice he identified as a
“week to two week front.” Kyles would receive from 50 to 200 pound shipments of
marihuana which he would package and sell to others. Those customers would, in turn,
sell the contraband and pay Kyles at a later date. Within one to two weeks after receiving
his shipment, Kyles would pay Raymond the money he owed on the “front.” Kyles
defined “the front” as “buy[ing] on credit.”
After Kyles’ arrest for dealing in marihuana, defendant visited him in his place of
business to collect the $120,000. On that occasion, Mr. Enriquez was driving a vehicle
Kyles had seen driven by Raymond and known to Kyles as an automobile “the
organization used for some time.”
In telephone conversations between Kyles and defendant, Mr. Enriquez made
efforts to get Kyles to pay the $120,000 debt he owed Raymond. In one such
conversation, after Kyles asked for some forbearance on payment, defendant said
Raymond might be agreeable, but “there’s somebody top of him and then somebody top
of that other guy and ah, you know how it goes, it [sic] a big old chain that ah . . . never
finish [sic].”
We are satisfied from this evidence the government established defendant
conspired with Kyles, Raymond, and others to possess for sale and to sell marihuana and
that defendant was a knowing and voluntary participant in the conspiracy. This
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sufficiently established his guilt. United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 7 F.3d 1506, 1510
(10th Cir. 1993).
Next, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of extortion. Although
the original intent of Congress in passing 18 U.S.C. § 894 may have been to deter loan
sharking, the language employed in the law reaches beyond that nefarious conduct.
Indeed, the statute makes illegal the knowing participation in the use of extortionate
means to collect “any extension of credit.” (Emphasis added.) An extension of credit is
defined to include “any agreement . . . whereby the repayment or satisfaction of any debt .
. . may . . . be deferred.” 18 U.S.C. § 891(1). The explicit language of this statute makes
clear the debt itself does not have to be valid because the essential aspect of the offense is
the use of extortionate means of collection. United States v. Briola, 465 F.2d 1018, 1021,
(10th Cir. 1972).
Mr. Enriquez admits the evidence demonstrated he exercised extortionate conduct,
but he maintains it failed to show he did so to force payment of an extension of credit. He
suggests Kyles merely received the marihuana “on consignment,” and no credit was
extended to him. Notwithstanding there is no evidence in the record to support that
suggestion, there is ample evidence of defendant’s guilt.
First, there was Kyles’ own testimony that goods were shipped to him under terms
of what he specifically defined as a credit transaction. Next, although the telephone
conversations between defendant and Kyles were semi-cryptic, there is enough said
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between the two from which the jury could infer the existence of a debt owed by Kyles to
Raymond arising from the shipment of marihuana. Finally, during those conversations,
defendant several times set deadlines for payment which he later postponed, demanding
payment after the expired deferred date. We believe these constituted sufficient evidence
showing the existence of an extension of credit within the meaning of the statute. United
States v. Goode, 945 F.2d 1168, 1170 (10th Cir. 1991).
Defendant next argues the district court erred by using a prior uncounseled
conviction in Texas for driving while intoxicated to enhance his sentence in this case. He
contends even though the offense was a misdemeanor, he was entitled to counsel because
he was sentenced to seven days’ incarceration. Citing Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S.
738 (1994), defendant argues the enhancement was invalid.
After Nichols, we held: “prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions that are
themselves constitutional may be used to enhance punishment for subsequent
convictions.” United States v. Lockhart, 37 F.3d 1451, 1454 (10th Cir. 1994). Once the
government establishes the existence of a conviction, “the defendant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the conviction was constitutionally infirm.” United
States v. Windle, 74 F.3d 997, 1001 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Johnson,
973 F.2d 857, 862 (10th Cir. 1992)). Moreover, a record indicating counsel was waived
in the predicate misdemeanor case is sufficient, in the absence of contrary allegations, to
make the conviction constitutionally valid for enhancement purposes. Id.
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In this case, the record includes documentation of defendant’s written and sworn
waiver of counsel. In the statement, the defendant swears he knows “the dangers and
disadvantages of representation of himself . . . that he knows what he is doing, and that he
does this after full explanation of his rights . . . [to] an attorney in all proceedings herein,”
and certifies that he is “financially able to employ counsel and is not indigent.” Yet,
defendant now argues under Texas law at the time of his conviction he was not entitled to
appointed counsel; therefore, he could not waive a right he did not have.
Although that argument is irrelevant in light of defendant’s own sworn statement
he was not indigent and was able to employ counsel, we believe defendant has not shown
the waiver invalid or that the conviction was constitutionally infirm. The Sixth
Amendment right about which the constitutional issue here revolves is the right of an
indigent accused to the appointment of counsel. No violation of the Sixth Amendment
occurs when a well informed defendant who can afford to do so elects not to retain
counsel and enters a plea without representation. We believe defendant’s argument is
without substance, and the district court did not err by using the misdemeanor conviction
to enhance the sentence.
Finally, defendant argues the counts of conviction should have been grouped for
the purpose of sentencing under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2. Because both counts were part of “a
common criminal objective”; the extortion count was an overt act cited in the conspiracy
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count; and there was only one victim, defendant maintains the district court erred by
refusing to group the counts.
The guideline mandates grouping when there is but one victim and all criminal
transactions are “connected by a common criminal objective” or are part of a “common
scheme or plan.” First, as the government points out, Kyles was not a victim of the
conspiracy, he was one of the conspirators. Kyles, however, was the victim of the
extortion. Therefore, the first step of § 3D1.2 is never reached, and the offenses of
conviction did not require grouping.
AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
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