United States v. Maytubby ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
March 29, 2012
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 11-6291
(D.C. Nos. 5:06-CR-00136-M-1 and
MICHAEL DEWAYNE MAYTUBBY, 5:09-CV-01128-M)
(W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before KELLY, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Michael Maytubby was convicted of several drug-related offenses. In due
course, he filed a motion in the district court seeking relief from these convictions
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court, however, denied the petition as well
as Mr. Maytubby’s request for a certificate of appealability (“COA”). So it is that
Mr. Maytubby now seeks a COA from this court.
We may grant a COA only if Mr. Maytubby makes a “substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Under this
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
standard, Mr. Maytubby must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate
whether (or, for that matter agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a
different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(internal quotation omitted).
This he has not done. Mr. Maytubby argues that he is entitled to a COA on
three grounds. Two of these involve Mr. Maytubby’s claim that the district court
erred in allowing evidence of uncharged crimes and other allegedly prejudicial
evidence to be admitted at his trial. The problem is, Mr. Maytubby did not raise
this claim on direct appeal, and so it is procedurally barred. See, e.g., United
States v. Hollis, 552 F.3d 1191, 1193-94 (10th Cir. 2009).
Of course, Mr. Maytubby’s failure to present this claim on appeal may be
excused if he can show cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice. Id.And here we come to Mr. Maytubby’s third argument for a COA — that his
appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to challenge the
admission of this evidence on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Harms, 371 F.3d
1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 2004) (explaining that ineffective assistance of counsel is
not only an independent ground for relief but also constitutes sufficient cause for
excusing a procedural default). To prevail on this claim, Mr. Maytubby is
required to show two things: (1) that his appellate counsel’s representation “fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) “that there is a reasonable
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probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the [appeal]
would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694
(1984).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that all of the challenged evidence
was properly admitted at trial, and so Mr. Maytubby has failed to meet his burden
under at least the second prong of the Strickland test. The allegedly inadmissable
evidence was certainly relevant to the charges against Mr. Maytubby. Evidence
of his affiliation with the Playboy Gangster Crips was properly offered to show
the existence of a conspiracy and to explain the relationship between the co-
conspirators. See United States v. Brown, 200 F.3d 700, 708 (10th Cir. 1999).
Likewise the testimony that Mr. Maytubby was holding a gun during a shootout
formed the basis for one of the charges against Mr. Maytubby — that he used or
carried a gun in furtherance of a drug trafficking conspiracy — while the
testimony that Mr. Maytubby threatened individuals who might expose his drug
trafficking activity helped demonstrate that Mr. Maytubby was aware of and
involved in the conspiracy. Accordingly, we reject Mr. Maytubby’s claim that
this evidence was prohibited under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). See United States v.
Smith, 534 F.3d 1211, 1218 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Conduct which occurs during the
life of a conspiracy and is a part of the same is direct evidence of the conspiracy
and therefore not subject to Rule 404(b).” (quotation omitted)). And Mr.
Maytubby’s claim that the district court erred in allowing evidence of an
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unrelated murder is misleading at best. The truth is the prosecutor introduced a
hooded sweatshirt bearing the picture of a former member of the Playboy
Gangster Crips who had presumably been killed by a rival gang. This was
relevant to show Mr. Maytubby’s gang affiliation and ultimately his ties to the
drug trafficking conspiracy.
At most, then, Mr. Maytubby’s appellate counsel could have argued that the
district court should have excluded the challenged evidence under Fed. R. Evid.
403 because its relevance was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. But here he would have faced an insurmountable hurdle. In order to
successfully challenge a district court’s ruling under Rule 403, a party is required
to show that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the allegedly
prejudicial evidence to be admitted, see United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078,
1098 (10th Cir. 2009), and we can’t say that occurred here.
Because we conclude that no reasonable jurist would debate the district
court’s disposition of Mr. Maytubby’s claims, we deny his application for a COA
and dismiss this appeal. We grant his motion to proceed in forma pauperis and
remind him that he must continue making partial payments until the entire filing
fee is paid in full.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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