Peterson v. Sun Life Assurance Company ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                        FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 22, 2012
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    Clerk of Court
    DANA PETERSON, M.D.,
    Plaintiff–Appellant,
    No. 11-2179
    v.                                        (D.C. No. 1:10-CV-01106-BB-DJS)
    (D. N.M.)
    SUN LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY
    OF CANADA,
    Defendant–Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before LUCERO, McKAY, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
    Dr. Dana Peterson appeals from the district court’s grant of summary
    judgment dismissing his claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security
    Act (“ERISA”). Exercising jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we affirm.
    I
    Peterson began working for Southwest Medical Associates, Inc.
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
    not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
    and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
    consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    (“Southwest Medical”) as a family practice physician in 1992. In September
    2008, the New Mexico Medical Board issued an order requiring Peterson to have
    a member of his medical practice chaperone appointments with female patients
    and patients under the age of eighteen. As a result of this order and related
    events, Southwest Medical terminated Peterson on November 24, 2008.
    On December 2, 2008, Peterson applied for partial and total disability
    benefits under a Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (“Sun Life”) group
    policy for long-term disability insurance issued to Southwest Medical. Peterson
    claimed he was disabled due to ankylosing spondylitis, 1 severe stress, and
    depression. He alleged that these conditions had worsened as a result of his legal
    issues. In March 2009, Sun Life denied Peterson’s claims for disability benefits.
    In October 2009, the insurer denied Peterson’s appeal of that decision.
    Peterson then filed suit against Sun Life under 
    29 U.S.C. § 1132
    (a)(1)(B),
    the civil enforcement provision of ERISA. The district court granted summary
    judgment in favor of Sun Life, concluding that Peterson failed to establish that
    Sun Life acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner. Peterson now appeals.
    II
    In ERISA cases, “we review [the] plan administrator’s decision to deny
    1
    Ankylosing spondylitis is “[a] systemic rheumatic disorder characterized by
    inflammation of the axial skeleton and large peripheral joints.” The Merck
    Manual 445 (17th ed. 1999) (italics omitted).
    -2-
    benefits to a claimant, as opposed to reviewing the district court’s ruling.”
    Holcomb v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 
    578 F.3d 1187
    , 1192 (10th Cir. 2009).
    Because the plan at issue here “gives discretion to Sun Life in finding the facts
    relating to disability, we must uphold Sun Life’s decisions as fact finder unless
    they were arbitrary or capricious.” Nance v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can.,
    
    294 F.3d 1263
    , 1269 (10th Cir. 2002). 2 In conducting our analysis, we “may only
    consider the evidence and arguments that appear in the administrative record.”
    Flinders v. Workforce Stabilization Plan of Phillips Petroleum Co., 
    491 F.3d 1180
    , 1190 (10th Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by Holcomb, 
    578 F.3d at 1192-93
    .
    Peterson argues that Sun Life’s denial of disability benefits should be
    reversed because: (1) the medical and other evidence in the record shows that he
    2
    As we explained in Nance:
    When reviewing [a denial of disability benefits in an ERISA case]
    under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the Administrator’s
    decision need not be the only logical one nor even the best one. It
    need only be sufficiently supported by facts within [the
    Administrator’s] knowledge to counter a claim that it was arbitrary
    or capricious. The decision will be upheld unless it is not grounded
    on any reasonable basis. The reviewing court need only assure that
    the administrator’s decision falls somewhere on a continuum of
    reasonableness-even if on the low end.
    
    Id.
     (quotation omitted).
    -3-
    was disabled prior to his termination by Sun Life on November 24, 2008; 3 and (2)
    Sun Life’s denial was the result of an arbitrary and capricious review process.
    As a starting point, we agree with the district court that “[t]here is no
    evidence that [Sun Life] acted out of a conflict of interest when denying benefits
    to Plaintiff; rather, the record shows that there was a sufficient basis to find that
    Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Policy.” Although the record
    indicates that Peterson suffered from ankylosing spondylitis, a doctor retained by
    Sun Life to review Peterson’s medical record concluded that Peterson “had the
    physical capacity to continue to perform his profession until the date of his
    termination.” Further, Peterson never claimed that he was unable to work during
    his employment with Southwest Medical. Even Peterson’s treating physician
    reported that Peterson was capable of “light capacity” work. Sun Life’s
    conclusion that Peterson’s ankylosing spondylitis was not disabling is reasonable
    in light of this evidence.
    The same is true as to Peterson’s claimed depression. A reviewing
    physician stated that Peterson’s degree of mental illness was “not consistent with
    impairment.” We acknowledge that the district court failed to address two
    relevant records. First, on November 20, 2008, Southwest Medical received a
    3
    As the district court correctly noted, “Plaintiff’s employment, and thus his
    insurance coverage from Defendant, ceased on November 24, 2008. In order to
    qualify for either partial or total disability benefits, his disabling condition would
    [therefore] have had to exist before November 24, 2008.”
    -4-
    letter from Peterson’s physician recommending he take two weeks’ medical
    leave. 4 Second, on December 8, 2008, Peterson’s physician completed a
    statement in which she: (1) diagnosed Peterson as suffering from acute stress and
    anxiety/depression; and (2) assessed a Global Assessment of Functioning
    (“GAF”) score of 30. 5 This score indicates that Peterson’s “[b]ehavior [was]
    considerably influenced by delusions or hallucinations OR serious impairment in
    communication or judgment (e.g., sometimes incoherent, acts grossly
    inappropriately, suicidal preoccupation) OR inability to function in almost all
    areas (e.g., stays in bed all day; no job, home, or friends).” DSM-IV at 32 (bold
    print omitted). These omissions do not render Sun Life’s decision arbitrary or
    capricious, however, because Sun Life addressed the GAF score and because the
    insurer had a reasonable basis for disregarding both of the documents submitted
    by Peterson’s treating physician.
    Peterson’s treating physician referred Peterson for professional mental
    health counseling. His first counseling session occurred the same day Southwest
    Medical terminated him. The mental health doctor diagnosed Peterson as
    4
    Although the letter was dated January 18, 2009, we will assume, without
    deciding that this is a clerical error and that the letter was actually sent on or
    before November 20, 2008. The letter has a “Received” stamp indicating that
    Southwest Medical received it on November 20, 2008.
    5
    A GAF score measures an individual’s overall functioning level in terms of
    “psychological, social, and occupational functioning on a hypothetical continuum
    of mental health-illness.” Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical
    Manual of Mental Disorders (“DSM-IV”) 32 (4th ed. 1994).
    -5-
    suffering from an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depressed mood,
    and assessed a GAF score of 65. This score indicates “[s]ome mild symptoms
    (e.g., depressed mood and mild insomnia) OR some difficulty in social,
    occupational, or school functioning (e.g., occasional truancy . . .), but generally
    functioning pretty well, has some meaningful interpersonal relationships.”
    DSM-IV at 32 (bold print omitted). In both its initial and appeal letters, Sun Life
    relied on this GAF score as more accurate. Because Peterson’s treating physician
    referred him to the mental health doctor for treatment, favoring the latter’s score
    was reasonable.
    As to the additional mental health evaluations that were prepared after
    Peterson was terminated, we conclude that Sun Life set forth reasonable and
    convincing grounds in its appeal letter to support its finding that Peterson’s
    mental health problems did not prevent him from performing his job as a family
    practice physician at the time he was terminated by Southwest Medical. 6 As Sun
    Life explained, Peterson’s treating mental health doctor assessed a GAF score of
    6
    The district court held that these evaluations show only that Peterson was
    unable to work after he was terminated. However, in its letter denying Peterson’s
    appeal, Sun Life did not reject the opinions of these psychologists based on this
    rationale. We are therefore precluded from relying on the district court’s stated
    reason, because this court has held that “when reviewing a plan administrator’s
    decision to deny benefits, we consider only the rationale asserted by the plan
    administrator in the administrative record and determine whether the decision,
    based on the asserted rationale, was arbitrary and capricious.” Flinders, 
    491 F.3d at 1190
    .
    -6-
    65 on the day Peterson was terminated. This score indicates mild symptoms
    rather than impairment.
    Finally, Peterson argues that Sun Life acted in an arbitrary and capricious
    manner because it ignored the fact that other insurance companies determined that
    Peterson was disabled during the relevant time period. But Peterson has not cited
    any legal authority to support his argument that Sun Life was required to address
    these entirely separate benefit awards in its denial letters. Nor has Peterson
    established that the definition of disability in these other policies was identical to
    that in Sun Life’s policy.
    III
    We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
    Sun Life.
    Entered for the Court
    Carlos F. Lucero
    Circuit Judge
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-2179

Judges: Lucero, McKay, Gorsuch

Filed Date: 3/22/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024