Smith v. Stewart ( 1997 )


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  •                                                                               F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    JUN 25 1997
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    LINCOLN A. SMITH,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                  Case No. 96-4182
    JIMMIE LEE STEWART, Director, at                    (D.C. 94 CV 773 G)
    the Iron County/Utah State                          (District of Utah)
    Correctional Facility, individually; Lee
    Hulet, Lt. Inmate Discipline Hearing
    Officer, (I.D.H.O.),
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before ANDERSON, HENRY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has unanimously
    determined that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument.
    Lincoln A. Smith, an inmate at the Utah State Prison, proceeding in forma
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally
    disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may
    be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    pauperis, brought this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officers and
    employees at the Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility. Mr. Smith,
    alleged violations of the Fifth, Fourteenth, and Eighth Amendments arising from
    the defendants’ administration of disciplinary proceedings against him. The
    district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendations that (1)
    defendants’ motion for summary judgment be granted; (2) Mr. Smith’s motion for
    summary judgment be denied; and (3) his claims be dismissed. Mr. Smith appeals
    and we affirm.
    “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
    applying the same legal standard used by the district court pursuant to Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 56(c).” Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 
    50 F.3d 793
    , 796 (10th Cir.
    1995). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the uncontroverted material facts
    establish that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See
    Russillo v. Scarborough, 
    935 F.2d 1167
    , 1171 (10th Cir. 1991). We construe the
    record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See 
    Wolf, 50 F.3d at 796
    . In addition, because Mr. Smith is proceeding pro se, we must construe his
    pleadings liberally. See Hall v. Bellmon, 
    935 F.2d 1106
    , 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
    Mr. Smith received notice of a disciplinary hearing against him arising
    from an incident involving his alleged disorderly conduct and his use of
    derogatory language toward an officer at the Utah State Prison. Based upon that
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    hearing, he claims that his due process rights were violated when he was unable
    to present witnesses or gather evidence at the disciplinary hearing held at the Iron
    County State Correctional Facility, to which he was being transferred. Mr. Smith
    was found guilty of the alleged infractions and placed in punitive isolation
    confinement for twenty days. He also claims that the nature of the resulting
    punitive confinement violated his right to be free from cruel and unusual
    punishment.
    The district court correctly concluded that under Sandin v. Conner, 
    515 U.S. 472
    , ___, 
    115 S. Ct. 2293
    , 2301 (1995), we must look to the nature of the
    alleged deprivation to determine whether a liberty interest is implicated. As to
    Mr. Smith’s placement in punitive isolation for twenty days, there is no evidence
    that this confinement is the sort of “atypical, significant deprivation” that would
    give rise to a liberty interest deserving of due process protection. 
    Id. Nor is
    there
    any indication that the disciplinary action “will inevitably affect the duration of
    [Mr. Smith’s] sentence.” 
    Id. at 2302.
    We agree that Mr. Smith’s punitive
    isolation does not implicate a liberty interest that would entitle him to procedural
    due process.
    Mr. Smith also claims that Sandin should not be applied retroactively, but
    we have held otherwise. See Talley v. Hesse, 
    91 F.3d 1411
    , 1413 (10th Cir.
    1996). Here, as in Talley, there is no evidence in this case that the “disciplinary
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    action would . . . inevitably affect the duration of plaintiff’s sentence under state
    parole regulations.” 
    Id. Thus, Mr.
    Smith was entitled to no procedural due
    process in this matter, and his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims are
    foreclosed.
    Similarly, Mr. Smith’s claim that his placement in punitive isolation
    constituted cruel and unusual punishment is unsubstantiated. There is nothing in
    the record suggesting that Mr. Smith’s segregation amounted to an Eighth
    Amendment violation. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 
    452 U.S. 337
    , 345 (1981)
    (holding that prison conditions constitute cruel and unusual punishment if they
    involve “wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain [or if they are] grossly
    disproportionate to the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment”).
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. The
    mandate shall issue forthwith.
    Entered for the Court,
    Robert H. Henry
    Circuit Judge
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