Wight v. State of Utah ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 14 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________ PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
MICHAEL LEE WIGHT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-4086
(D. Utah)
STATE OF UTAH; UTAH STATE TAX (D.Ct. No. 98-CV-793)
COMMISSION; MURRAY CITY, UTAH;
THIRD DISTRICT COURT; FOURTH
DISTRICT COURT; MURRAY CITY POLICE
DEPARTMENT; HONORABLE JOHN C.
BACKLUND; HONORABLE MICHAEL K.
BURTON; HONORABLE FRATTO; UTAH
COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT;
CARSTAR & KEARNS TOWING; CITY OF
OREM, UTAH,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Michael Lee Wight, a litigant appearing pro se, appeals the
district court’s decision dismissing his complaint against Appellees for allegedly
violating his civil rights in connection with various traffic infractions. We
exercise our jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
In his complaint, Mr. Wight raised a host of general allegations, including
claims that Appellees: (1) violated his constitutional rights; (2) “acted as a
[f]oreign [s]tate”; (3) did not “use [g]old and [s]ilver [c]oin”; and (4) committed
double jeopardy, conspiracy to defraud, false arrest, kidnaping, libel, breach of
contract, abuse of force and unnecessary rigor, and fraud by wire, in connection
with state charges brought against him for multiple traffic infractions and the
towing and impoundment of his vehicle. Mr. Wight’s traffic and other infractions
included driving with an expired registration and suspended license, failure to
maintain insurance, crossing a highway divide, improper display of license plates,
failure to appear five times for a scheduled hearing resulting in a bench warrant,
and arrest for failure to appear at two other judicial proceedings. All state
-2-
proceedings against Mr. Wight have concluded, except for the outstanding state
warrant and the state charge concerning his lack of proof of insurance, which are
still pending. Mr. Wight did not file direct or post-conviction actions in state
court concerning his traffic or criminal cases.
Following motions to dismiss filed by the State of Utah, Orem City and
Murray City, the district court dismissed Mr. Wight’s complaint against all
Appellees. On appeal, Mr. Wight alleges the district court improperly dismissed
his complaint by applying principles of comity and Eleventh Amendment
immunity. He renews his argument that impoundment of his vehicle constituted
double jeopardy, and suspension of his driver’s license violated his due process
rights because he “was [d]eprived of a total of [f]ive [d]ays of [l]iberty” without a
hearing or counsel, and because “the [j]udge was switched without [notice] ... in
[violation] of the 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th Amendments.”
In reviewing Mr. Wight’s appeal, we take instruction from our decision in
Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 1996), in which we set forth the
appropriate standard in reviewing a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Accordingly, we review the dismissal of Mr. Wight’s complaint for failure to
state a claim de novo. Id. at 1201. His complaint should not be dismissed under
-3-
Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears beyond doubt he can prove no set of facts
supporting his claim for relief. Id. In reviewing the sufficiency of the complaint,
we presume all of Mr. Wight’s factual allegations are true and construe them in
the light most favorable to him. Id. at 1202. Because Mr. Wight is proceeding
pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally and hold his pleadings to a less
stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Id. However, a
broad reading of his complaint does not relieve him of the burden of alleging
sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim can be based. Id. Conclusory
allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim
on which relief can be based. Id.With these standards in mind, and after a careful review of the record, we
determine the district court properly dismissed Mr. Wight’s complaint. The
district court correctly applied the well-established doctrines of Eleventh
Amendment immunity in dismissing the complaint against the State, comity in
dismissing Murray City and Orem City, and absolute immunity in dismissing the
state district courts and judges acting in their judicial capacity. In addition, the
district court properly determined Mr. Wight failed to sufficiently allege violation
of his due process or other constitutional rights. In fact, Mr. Wight’s complaint
consists of a plethora of incoherent, unsupported constitutional and other
-4-
allegations arising out of sundry traffic infractions and the towing and
impoundment of his vehicle. While Mr. Wight is obviously disgruntled with the
traffic infractions for which he was charged, a careful reading of his complaint
and other pleadings establishes he has provided no facts in support of his claim
for relief. In sum, his complaint is based solely on conclusory allegations with no
supporting factual averments sufficient to state a claim or cause of action.
Accordingly, the district court’s decision dismissing Mr. Wight’s complaint
is AFFIRMED.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
-5-