Pruitt v. Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 3 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
MARTIN PRUITT, LUCRETIA
PRUITT, DAVID ELGIN, DANIEL
LLEWELLYN and CHERYL
LLEWELLYN,
No. 03-1297
Plaintiffs-Appellants, (Colorado)
(D.Ct. No. 00-N-1250)
v.
COMCAST CABLE HOLDINGS,
LLC,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, Circuit Judge, BRORBY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
O'BRIEN, Circuit Judge.
Former and current subscribers of Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC’s
(“Comcast”) 1 digital cable service filed suit claiming Comcast violated the 1984
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1
During the pendency of this action, Appellee changed from AT&T Broadband,
LLC, to Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC.
Cable Communications Privacy Act (“Cable Act”), 47 U.S.C. § 551, et. seq., by
retaining personally identifiable information in its cable converter boxes without
notice or consent. In addition, two subscribers brought related state law claims
alleging Comcast charged them for a service not supplied. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of Comcast on the federal claims, holding the
information in the converter boxes was not personally identifiable information
and dismissing the state law claims without prejudice. Exercising jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
Background
Martin Pruitt, Lucretia Pruitt, David Elgin, Daniel Llewellyn and Cheryl
Llewellyn (“Appellants”) are past or present subscribers of Comcast’s digital
cable service. To receive such service, subscribers must have a special converter
box installed and attached to their telephone line. The converter boxes,
manufactured by Motorola, transmit and store (1) pay-per-view purchase
information, (2) system diagnostic information and (3) settop bugging
information. Each converter box contains a code displayed in hexadecimal format
indicating the date of a pay-per-view purchase and a source identifier for the pay-
per-view channel. The converter box stores a maximum of sixty-four purchases.
When total purchases exceed that number, the newest purchase information
overwrites the oldest purchase. The converter box also contains a code (again
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displayed in hexadecimal format) signifying the total number of purchases and
payments generated through that particular box. Individual subscriber
information is not contained within the converter box, but an identifying number
known as a “unit address” allows Comcast to match the subscriber’s purchases to
its billing system. The billing system contains the name and address of the
household member responsible for payment.
Appellants filed suit claiming Comcast violated the Cable Act by (1)
storing personally identifiable information (47 U.S.C. § 551(e)) and (2) storing
that information longer than necessary (47 U.S.C. § 551(a)). After reviewing
cross motions for summary judgment, the district court held the coded information
in the converter boxes was not “personally identifiable,” and therefore declined to
consider whether Comcast retained that information longer than necessary.
Finding the federal questions resolved, the district court dismissed the Pruitts’
state law claims without prejudice. This appeal followed.
Discussion
1. Cable Act Claims
We review summary judgment de novo applying the same legal standard
used by the district court. Scofield v. TeleCable of Overland Park, 973 F.2d 874,
878 (10th Cir. 1992).
Summary judgment is appropriate 'if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
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affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact.' . . . [We] draw all inferences in favor of the party
opposing summary judgment, [recognizing] credibility
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of
legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a
judge.
Jones v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 1260, 1265 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)). This Court’s role “is simply to determine whether the evidence proffered
by plaintiff would be sufficient, if believed by the ultimate fact finder, to sustain
[the] claim.” Id. at 1265-66.
“In 1984, Congress enacted the Cable Act to establish national policy and
guidelines for the cable television industry.” Scofield, 973 F.2d at 876. The
Cable Act creates a nationwide standard for the protection of subscriber privacy
by regulating the collection, use, and disclosure by cable operators of personally
identifiable information regarding cable subscribers. In particular, 47 U.S.C. §
551 “establishes a self-contained and privately enforceable scheme for the
protection of cable subscriber privacy.” Id. This section responds to “Congress’
observation that: [c]able systems, particularly those with a ‘two-way’ capability,
have an enormous capacity to collect and store personally identifiable information
about each cable subscriber.” Id. (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 29 (1984)). “Subscriber records from interactive systems,” Congress noted,
“can reveal details about bank transactions, shopping habits, political
contributions, viewing habits and other significant personal decisions.” Id.-4-
Although § 551 regulates cable company practices involving personally
identifiable information, exceptions are provided where such information is
necessary to render service to the subscriber, § 551(b)(2)(A), or to detect
unauthorized reception of cable communications. 47 U.S.C. § 551(b)(2)(B).
Even so, such subscriber information must be destroyed when it is no longer
necessary for the purpose for which it was collected. 47 U.S.C. § 551(e).
Further, § 551(a) of the Cable Act “establishes a set of subscriber notice
requirements designed to inform subscribers of . . . the operator’s information
practices that affect subscriber privacy . . . .” Scofield, 973 F.2d at 876.
The heart of this dispute is whether the information stored within
Comcast’s converter boxes is personally identifiable information. “While the
term is not affirmatively defined by the Act, § 551(a)(2)” defines what it is not.
Id. It provides: “for purposes of this section, the term ‘personally identifiable
information’ does not include any record of aggregate data which does not
identify particular persons.” 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(2). “In addition, legislative
history [suggests] that personally identifiable information would include specific
information about the subscriber, or a list of names and addresses on which the
subscriber is included . . . .” Scofield, 973 F.2d at 876 (quotation and citation
omitted).
Appellants concede the information in the converter boxes does not
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contain the name, address or any information regarding the customer. However,
they maintain the unit address enables Comcast to identify a customer's viewing
habits by connecting the coded information with its billing or management
system. Because the information in any given converter box is not eradicated
when it is recycled to another customer, they conclude the converter boxes
contain personally identifiable information which may never be purged.
In granting summary judgment to Comcast, the district court distinguished
the information in the converter boxes from that contained in the billing system.
It noted the converter box code—without more—provides nothing but a series of
numbers. We agree. Without the information in the billing or management
system one cannot connect the unit address with a specific customer; without the
billing information, even Comcast would be unable to identify which individual
household was associated with the raw data in the converter box. Consequently,
it is the billing system that holds the key to obtaining personally identifiable
information, not the converter box. Appellants made no claim in their briefs or at
oral argument that the collection of information in the billing system violates the
Cable Act. Moreover, Comcast’s privacy notice to subscribers clearly states the
retention policies related to information in the billing system:
Accounting and billing records are retained for ten years for tax and
accounting purposes or until the relevant income tax years for which
the document was created has been closed for income tax purposes
and/or all appeals have been exhausted. Routine paper records
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necessary to render or conduct legitimate business activities . . . are
kept in accordance with the local cable company’s voluntarily
adopted document retention program. Paper records such as work
orders and records of technical maintenance and service . . . are
retained for three years. Subject to applicable law, records relating
to involuntary disconnects are kept indefinitely by us or [our]
affiliates . . . to facilitate collection and evaluation of
creditworthiness and are updated as new information is added.
(Appellants' App. at 95.) Absent any allegation that the retention of data in the
billing or management systems violates the Cable Act, we agree with the district
court that the converter boxes contain no personally identifiable information and
Comcast's privacy notice to subscribers adequately states its billing information
policies. Because we conclude the converter boxes contain no personally
identifiable information, we need not consider whether Comcast retained such
information longer than otherwise necessary. See 47 U.S.C. § 551(e).
2. Dismissal of State Law Claims
With regard to Pruitts’ assertion that the district court erroneously
dismissed their state law contract claims, we find it to be without merit. When
the district court correctly dismisses a plaintiff’s federal law claims, we review its
decision to refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over that plaintiff’s state
law claims for an abuse of discretion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Gold v. Local
7 United Food & Commercial Workers Union, 159 F.3d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir.
1998), overruled on other grounds by Styskal v. Weld County Comm’rs., 365 F.3d
855 (10th Cir. 2004). While
the federal courts’ original jurisdiction over federal questions carries
with it jurisdiction over state law claims that derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact, . . . district courts are statutorily authorized
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to decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or
claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling
reasons for declining jurisdiction.
Gold, 159 F.3d at 1310 (quotations and citations omitted); see 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a). The district court’s actions were clearly authorized under § 1367(c)(3).
For the foregoing reasons, the district court's judgment in favor of Comcast
is AFFIRMED.
Entered by the Court:
Terrence L. O’Brien
United States Circuit Judge
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