Sebree v. Apfel ( 1999 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    NOV 4 1999
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    DAVID E. SEBREE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                    No. 99-7035
    (D.C. No. 98-CV-288-S)
    KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner,                       (E.D. Okla.)
    Social Security Administration,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT            *
    Before ANDERSON , BARRETT , and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Claimant David E. Sebree appeals from    the district court’s order affirming
    the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security. In that decision, the
    Commissioner denied claimant’s applications for disability insurance benefits and
    supplemental security income benefits made under Titles II and XVI of the Social
    Security Act. See 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 423
    , 1382. We exercise jurisdiction under 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g) and 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , and affirm.
    Claimant asserts that he has been disabled since September 28, 1993
    because of back pain caused by spondylolysis, stomach pain, headaches, and high
    blood pressure. His past work includes truck driving, laying sheetrock, and
    working as a dishwasher and cook. After a hearing held in December 1995, the
    administrative law judge (ALJ) found that claimant has spondylolysis that does
    not meet a listed impairment, but that he was unable to perform his past relevant
    work. See Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 33. At step five of the sequential
    evaluation, see generally Williams v. Bowen , 
    844 F.2d 748
    , 750-52 (10th Cir.
    1988), the ALJ determined that claimant has the residual functional capacity
    (RFC) to perform light work, reduced by an inability to repetitively push or pull
    arm and leg controls, or to do more than occasional repetitive overhead reaching,
    bending, stooping, crouching, or climbing, or to be exposed to unprotected
    heights, or to balance.   See Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 33. He found claimant’s
    testimony regarding disabling pain not to be credible, but he did believe claimant
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    had some pain that limited him to doing no more than light work.          See id.
    at 30-31.
    The ALJ elicited vocational expert testimony as to the jobs claimant could
    do in the national economy given his limitations. In his first hypothetical, the
    ALJ described claimant as able to do sedentary to light work restricted by the
    above-noted limitations and as having mild to moderate chronic pain and taking
    medications that did not preclude him from carrying out work assignments or
    remaining reasonably alert.       See id. at 234. He gave the expert an alternative
    scenario in which claimant needed to be able to alternate sitting and standing
    every hour. See id. at 237. The vocational expert opined that, under the first
    hypothetical, claimant could work as a taxi starter; food assembler; parking lot,
    self-service gas station, arcade, car wash, or counter sales attendant; escort driver
    and surveillance monitor; and that he could also do miscellaneous hand-working
    jobs like polishing and taping.      See id. at 235-37. Under the second hypothetical,
    he opined that claimant could perform some of the attendant jobs and the
    surveillance monitor and taxi starter positions.        See id. at 237. After considering
    the medical record, hearing testimony, and social security regulations, the ALJ
    concluded that claimant was not disabled.          See id. at 34.
    Claimant raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the ALJ’s RFC
    determination was improperly based on an absence of evidence; (2) whether his
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    credibility findings are supported by substantial evidence; and (3) whether he
    gave the vocational expert hypothetical questions based upon claimant’s abilities
    and limitations. Our review is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s decision
    is supported by substantial evidence on the whole record and comports with
    relevant legal standards.   See Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.     , 
    933 F.2d 799
    , 800-01 (10th Cir. 1991).
    Dr. Charles Harris prepared an RFC assessment for the agency based on the
    medical records of claimant and concluded that claimant could occasionally lift
    fifty pounds, frequently lift twenty-five pounds, and stand and sit for six hours
    each during an eight-hour workday, and that pain did not limit his RFC.        See
    Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 61. He found no other significant limitations except
    for occasional stooping.    See id. at 62-64. Claimant argues that the ALJ
    apparently rejected this assessment because he concluded that claimant’s RFC
    was in fact limited in certain areas, and that the ALJ’s assessment is therefore not
    supported by medical evidence. We conclude that the medical assessment
    supports the ALJ’s general RFC determination that claimant can do light work
    and that the ALJ properly imposed further limitations after considering claimant’s
    testimony and other medical records.
    “Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact,
    and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial
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    evidence.” Diaz v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs.    , 
    898 F.2d 774
    , 777 (10th
    Cir. 1990). The ALJ supported his determination that claimant’s complaints of
    disabling pain were not credible by noting that (1) claimant had successfully
    worked for several years with spondylolysis and his x-rays had not changed
    during that time to indicate that it had worsened; (2) claimant’s statements in the
    record regarding his activities were inconsistent with disabling pain; (3) claimant
    had suffered injuries after falling out of duck blinds and contracting poison ivy
    rashes, which the ALJ believed resulted from continued hunting activities and not
    from wandering around his mother’s back yard, as claimant alleged; (4) the
    medical record indicated that claimant’s hiatal hernia was mild and medically
    treatable; (5) the medical record was inconsistent with claimant’s allegations of
    disabling pain; and (6) claimant’s demeanor and inconsistent statements at the
    hearing suggested that he was not completely credible.   See Appellant’s App.
    Vol. II at 28-31. We conclude that the ALJ’s credibility finding is supported by
    substantial evidence.
    Citing Bastian v. Schweiker , 
    712 F.2d 1278
    , 1282 n.5 (8th Cir. 1983),
    claimant argues that the ALJ’s hypothetical question to the vocational expert was
    improper because the ALJ allegedly told the expert that claimant could perform
    light and sedentary work, thereby eliminating the usefulness of the expert.
    Claimant’s argument is without merit because the ALJ specifically limited
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    claimant’s RFC in both hypotheticals and then properly inquired whether there
    were sufficient jobs in the national economy claimant could perform given these
    limitations. Claimant’s assertion that the ALJ erred by failing to include
    claimant’s headaches, hiatal hernia, depression, and high blood pressure in the
    hypotheticals is also without merit because the ALJ’s findings that these
    conditions were either controlled or did not significantly limit claimant’s capacity
    to perform work is supported in the record. Complaints are considered to be
    severe nonexertional limitations only when they “     significantly limit [the] ability
    to perform the full range of work in a particular RFC category on a sustained
    basis.” Williams , 
    844 F.2d at 752
     (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). Because
    the ALJ determined that claimant’s testimony as to the extent of his limitations
    was neither completely credible nor supported by objective medical evidence, he
    was not required to include all complaints in the hypothetical questions.      See
    Decker v. Chater , 
    86 F.3d 953
    , 955 (10th Cir. 1996) (hypothetical questions need
    only reflect impairments and limitations supported by the record).
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    The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
    Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Stephen H. Anderson
    Circuit Judge
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