Anderson v. Fed. Bureau Prisons ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 18 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
MELVIN ANDERSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 96-1229
(D.C. No. 94-N-2333)
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, (D. Colo.)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY and KELLY, Circuit Judges, and CAUTHRON, ** District Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
Honorable Robin J. Cauthron, District Judge, United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
Petitioner/Appellant Melvin Anderson appeals from the district court’s
order dismissing his petition, phrased in the form of a complaint, for writ of
mandamus or prohibition directed to Respondent/Appellee Federal Bureau of
Prisons. A magistrate judge recommended that summary judgment be granted for
appellee. The district court accepted this recommendation, and dismissed
appellant’s complaint.
Appellant appealed and filed, in this court, an “emergency verified
summary motion to vacate order and judgment pending appeal and remand with
instruction to resolve summary judgment motion.” In this pleading, he sought to
have this case immediately remanded to the district court for determination of
what he claimed was his own pending motion for summary judgment. He
complained, in the motion, that the district court erred in two respects: first, by
not ruling on his motion for summary judgment, and second, by not granting the
motion in his favor.
A motions panel of this court determined that the district court had in fact
denied appellant’s summary judgment motion. On this basis, the panel denied
appellant’s motion for remand, but instructed him that he could raise in his
appellate brief any issues regarding the motion for summary judgment. Appellant
thereafter moved this court to construe his motion to vacate as his opening brief.
The motion was granted.
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Although the motions panel’s determination that the district court denied
appellant’s motion for summary judgment is not binding on this panel, see Stifel,
Nicolaus & Co. v. Woolsey & Co., 81 F.3d 1540, 1543-44 (10th Cir. 1996), our
own review of the record convinces us that the motions panel was entirely correct.
The magistrate judge carefully considered appellant’s motion, and advised, in a
well-reasoned recommendation, that it be denied. R., doc. 16 at 3-4. In its order
of dismissal, the district court stated that “[a]ny pending motion not specifically
addressed herein is DENIED.” Id., doc. 35 at 2.
The motions panel did not consider the other issue appellant raises, whether
the district court properly denied the motion for summary judgment. We now
address this question. We agree with the magistrate judge that appellant’s motion
for summary judgment should be construed as a motion for default judgment. The
only ground he asserted for summary judgment was that appellee had failed to
defend the action.
Appellee filed its response to appellant’s petition thirteen days after the
deadline set by the district court. This filing occurred on the day after appellant
filed his motion for “summary judgment.” The magistrate judge recommended
that the untimely filing be excused, and that appellant’s motion for default
judgment be denied.
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A trial court is vested with broad discretion in deciding whether to enter
default judgment. See Grandbouche v. Clancy, 825 F.2d 1463, 1468 (10th Cir.
1987). Moreover, Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(e) restricts the availability of default
judgments against agencies of the United States Government. It states that “[n]o
judgment by default shall be entered against the United States or an officer or
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by
evidence satisfactory to the court.” Courts have construed this section liberally,
refusing to enter default where the government has failed timely to plead or
otherwise defend, or setting aside such default on motion by the government. See
10 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure, Civil § 2702 (2d
ed. 1983); see also Mason v. Lister, 562 F.2d 343, 345 (5th Cir. 1977) (district
court’s refusal to enter default was not abuse of discretion where government
responded promptly to motion for default judgment and plaintiff’s claim
ultimately proved unable to withstand summary judgment).
Here, appellee did file a response, indicating that it had not abandoned the
action. It also timely responded to appellant’s motion for summary judgment.
Moreover, appellant’s claim did not survive summary judgment on the merits.
Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to enter default judgment for appellant.
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The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Robin J. Cauthron
District Judge
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