United States v. Banta ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
OCT 20 1997
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 96-4030
GARY MARTIN BANTA,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
(D.C. No. 95-CR-190)
David J. Schwendiman, Assistant United States Attorney (Scott J. Thorley and Scott M.
Matheson, Jr., Assistant United States Attorneys, with him on the brief), Salt Lake City,
Utah for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Kenneth R. Brown, Salt Lake City, Utah for Defendant-Appellant.
Before BALDOCK, MCWILLIAMS, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Gary Martin Banta appeals his sentence for bank fraud and aiding and
abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2 and 1344. Our jurisdiction arises under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742. On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court incorrectly applied § 2F1.1 of
the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual (hereinafter Guidelines).
Specifically, Defendant argues that the district court miscalculated the amount of loss to
the victim, resulting in a higher total offense level. We review the district court’s factual
determination of a U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 loss for clear error, but the factors the district court
may properly consider are reviewed de novo. U.S. v. Galbraith, 20 F.3d 1054, 1058 (10th
Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Gallegos, 975 F.2d 710, 712 (10th Cir. 1992)).
Applying these standards, we affirm.
I.
In 1994, Defendant purchased two vehicles, a Jeep Cherokee Sport and an Eagle
Vision, for a total purchase price of $49,987.65. Defendant obtained these vehicles by
submitting fraudulent loan applications to the Murray, Utah branch of First Security
Bank. In August 1994, the vehicles were repossessed and resold at a loss of $17,962.62.
Subsequently, Defendant was indicted for bank fraud, and on November 16, 1995,
pleaded guilty to Count II of a nine-count indictment. On January 25, 1996, the district
court sentenced Defendant to five months imprisonment in a halfway house followed by
four months home confinement with electronic monitoring. In so doing, the district court
adopted the probation officer’s calculation of a total offense level of eleven, which
included a U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1 five-level enhancement for a loss of more than $40,000 but
less than $70,000. Defendant argues that the district court erred in adopting the five-
level enhancement based on the loss Defendant intended to inflict; and instead should
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have applied a three-level enhancement based on the $17,962.62 actual loss sustained by
the bank.1
Section 2F1.1 increases the base offense level for a fraud offense to account for
the loss caused by the defendant. The increase is based on either the actual or intended
loss, whichever is greater. United States v. Haddock, 12 F.3d 950, 963 (10th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Smith, 951 F.2d 1164, 1166 (10th Cir. 1991); U.S.S.G § 2F1.1, comment.
(n. 7(b)). Here, the district court concluded that Defendant intended to inflict a loss in the
amount of the total purchase price of the vehicles, or $49,987.65. Because this amount
was greater than the actual loss of $17,962.62, the district court used the intended loss to
determine the appropriate increase to the base offense level. Defendant contends that the
district court should have used actual loss because it more accurately reflects “economic
reality.” However, the Guidelines clearly authorize the use of intended loss under these
circumstances. See Haddock, 12 F.3d at 963 (holding that intended loss may be used if it
is greater than actual loss and can be determined). Therefore, the only question we must
address is whether the record supports the district court’s determination that Defendant
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Defendant also argues that the district court erred in failing to grant a downward
departure in fixing his loss enhancement level. Although the Guidelines provide that if
the § 2F1.1 loss valuation overstates the seriousness of the offense, a downward departure
may be warranted, see U.S.S.G § 2F1.1, comment. (n. 7(b)), a discretionary decision not
to depart downward is not reviewable unless the record shows that the district court
erroneously believed that the Guidelines did not permit a departure. U.S. v. Nelson, 54
F.3d 1540, 1544 (10th Cir. 1995). In this case, nothing in the record indicates that the
district court thought it lacked discretion to depart downward. Therefore, we lack
jurisdiction to review this claim. See U.S. v. Belt, 89 F.3d 710, 715 (10th Cir. 1996).
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did in fact intend to inflict a loss in the amount of $49,987.65. United States v.
McAlpine, 32 F.3d 484, 488 (10th Cir. 1994) (district court’s factual findings will not be
disturbed unless they are without support in the record). We conclude that it does.
The record strongly suggests that Defendant did not intend to repay the loans.
Defendant provided the bank with a false social security number, and an incorrect
address, telephone number and place of employment, making it difficult for the lender to
locate the vehicles. While Defendant had the vehicles in his possession, he accumulated a
total of 13,000 miles, and failed to make any legitimate payments on the loans. The only
payment received by the bank was a $550 check drawn on an account which Defendant
knew had insufficient funds. From this evidence, the district court could conclude that
Defendant intended to permanently deprive the bank of the vehicles, resulting in an
intended loss in the amount of the entire loan amount. See United States v. Johnson, 16
F.3d 166, 173 (7th Cir. 1994).
Finally, Defendant argues that use of intended loss was improper because
collateral secured the fraudulently obtained bank loans. Because these loans were
collateralized, Defendant argues that he could not have intended a loss for the face value
of the loans because it would have been impossible for him to inflict such a loss. We
agree that if it was impossible for Defendant to inflict a loss in the full amount of the
loans, then he cannot be punished for that amount. Smith, 951 F.2d at 1169. In this case,
however, Defendant could have inflicted a loss in the amount of the face value of the
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loans if he intended to permanently deprive the bank of the collateral by concealing the
vehicles. Therefore, the district court did not improperly hold Defendant accountable for
the full amount of the loans.
Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the district court’s application
of the Guidelines was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the judgment of the district
court is
AFFIRMED.
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