Wagnon v. State Farm Fire ( 1998 )

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES WAGNON and LORALEE
WAGNON, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellees-
Cross-Appellants,
v. Nos. 96-5012, 96-5013, 96-5213
STATE FARM FIRE AND
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant-
Cross-Appellee.
ORDER
Filed June 19, 1998
Before TACHA, EBEL, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Appellant-cross-appellee’s motion to publish the order and judgment filed
on April 24, 1998, is granted. The published opinion is attached to this order.
Entered for the Court
Patrick Fisher
Clerk
F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
APR 24 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES WAGNON and LORALEE
WAGNON, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellees-
Cross-Appellants,
v. Nos. 96-5012, 96-5013, 96-5213
STATE FARM FIRE AND
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant-
Cross-Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
(D.C. No. 94-C-972-B)
Submitted on the briefs:
Steven L. Sessinghaus, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-
Appellants.
Neal E. Stauffer, Kent B. Rainey, Paul B. Harmon, Valery Bedingfield-Christmas,
of Stauffer, Rainey, Gudgel & Harmon, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-
Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
Before TACHA, EBEL, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
In appeal No. 96-5012, defendant-appellant State Farm Fire & Casualty
Company (State Farm) appeals the district court’s judgment in favor of plaintiffs-
appellees Charles and Loralee Wagnon on their breach of contract claim. State
Farm also appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment
based on the statute of limitations. In appeal No. 96-5013, plaintiffs-cross-
appellants Charles and Loralee Wagnon appeal the district court’s limitation of
their recovery to actual cash value instead of the replacement cost of the stolen
items. In appeal No. 96-5213, defendant-appellant State Farm appeals the award
of costs and attorneys fees to plaintiffs. Because we conclude that Mr. Wagnon’s
misrepresentations to State Farm were material and intentional as a matter of law,
voiding the insurance policy, we reverse the district court’s judgment in favor of
plaintiffs and the resulting award of fees and costs. 1
I. Background
On January 3, 1992, State Farm issued a one-year renters’ insurance policy
to plaintiffs, insuring their property against fire and other perils, including theft.
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9.
The cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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The policy contained a provision voiding coverage if any insured “intentionally
concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance relating to this
insurance, whether before or after a loss.” Appellant’s App. II, doc. 22, p. 379.
On April 4, 1992, plaintiffs’ home was burglarized. On April 10, 1992,
they filed a proof of loss with State Farm, claiming the loss of personal property
in the amount of $21,176.84, including the loss of tools worth approximately
$4,300. In the proof of loss, Mr. Wagnon made a claim for eighty-five tools or
sets of tools (totaling 527 individual pieces), and indicated he had acquired sixty
of these tools or sets four years earlier. Mr. Wagnon did not submit any receipts,
canceled checks, or pictures to support his claim of ownership.
During State Farm’s initial interview of Mr. Wagnon on April 20, 1992, he
again stated that he acquired the tools approximately four years earlier, and that a
“lot of em my dad and I had when I was living at home and ah I just collect em,
you know, like that and then on I just kept gradually getting um.” Id., doc. 25, at
391. Later, when asked whether his father bought the tools for him, Mr. Wagnon
replied “Yes, ah he acquired them you know, and he had so many of them I just
kind of picked and choose and he just let me take whatever . . . .” Id. at 396.
During Mr. Wagnon’s first examination under oath on June 8, 1992, State
Farm asked whether Mr. Wagnon purchased a ten-drawer tool chest, to which he
replied, “No, my dad had it, my dad had had it, and he just gave it to me.” Id.,
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doc. 28, at 458. State Farm then asked him whether he acquired all of the tools
listed on the proof of loss from his father, to which Mr. Wagnon replied, “Not all
of them; I bought a few of them here and there. I can’t remember exactly which
ones I bought and which ones he gave me though.” Id. at 460. Mr. Wagnon went
on to identify more than sixty-six tools or sets of tools which he received from his
father, including multiple power saws, drills, wrecking and extension bars, a tool
cart and chest, an air compressor and assorted components. See id. at 460-77. He
testified that most of the tools were given to him at one time in a large tool box.
He also identified fifteen items or sets which he purchased himself, and indicated
he could not remember whether he obtained one other item from his father.
Toward the end of the examination, Mr. Wagnon testified he did not know his
father’s address and that he would not give State Farm his father’s phone number,
even after being reminded that his claim could be denied for failure to give
material information. Although Mr. Wagnon later made several changes to his
sworn testimony, he did not change his statements that most of the tools were
given to him by his father.
On August 17, 1992, Mr. Wagnon’s father, Olen Wagnon, wrote a
statement that he had given his son “some tools,” including an open end wrench
set and a box end wrench set. He denied giving his son a tool cart, a socket set,
or an adjustable wrench set. See id., doc. 33, at 517. On October 14, 1992,
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plaintiff Wagnon underwent a second examination under oath, in which he
initially affirmed his earlier statements regarding the tools. State Farm then asked
him if he was aware that his father had said he did not give his son the majority of
the tools, and didn’t know where his son had acquired them. Mr. Wagnon replied:
I was going to, after we got done with going over all them tools, say
the reason that I told you that my father gave them to me just the
simple fact is that I didn’t want to complicate, I couldn’t remember
exactly where I got them from. I went to, like, flea markets, garage
sales, and acquired the tools from there, but I can’t tell you where I
got them from exactly.
Id., doc. 35, at 572. When State Farm asked whether Mr. Wagnon was testifying
that he lied in the first examination, he replied, “Yes, you can say I lied, yes. I
was just trying --- ” before his sentence was interrupted by State Farm’s attorney.
Id. at 573.
In a subsequent deposition, Mr. Wagnon’s father specifically denied giving
his son more than fifty of the tools attributed to him. See Appellant’s App. I, doc.
13, at 227-36, 239-44. His wife, Mr. Wagnon’s stepmother, also testified that she
and her husband had not given Mr. Wagnon more than a few tools in the previous
nine years, and expressly denied giving him a tool chest. See id. at 281-82.
In addition to Mr. Wagnon’s misstatements, State Farm knew the following
information: Plaintiffs’ renters’ insurance policy was a new one, the loss was
large, and plaintiffs were young (early twenties), with two children, working at
low income jobs, with inconsistent job histories. Except for a few items, the
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Wagnons were unable to produce any receipts or proof that they owned the
allegedly stolen items, claiming instead that such receipts had been taken in the
burglary. Plaintiffs also changed the source of the items between their first proof
of loss, which stated they purchased most items at stores, and their second proof
of loss, which stated they received many of the items as gifts from family
members. Further, there was a “considerabl[e]” discrepancy between the dollar
amounts listed by insureds for firearms, tools, and stereo equipment in their
insurance application and the amounts claimed as stolen three months later. See
Tr. at 58.
During a visit to plaintiffs’ home several days after the burglary, State
Farm’s agent noticed high priority items such as a stereo and television were not
taken, whereas heavier, bulkier items such as a file cabinet containing plaintiffs’
receipts and some jewelry, were claimed to have been stolen. He also noted there
was no electrical outlet near where the air compressor was allegedly used.
In August 1992, Mrs. Wagnon’s former brother-in-law notified State Farm
that plaintiffs’ claim was fraudulent. He informed State Farm that the burglary
had been staged by Mrs. Wagnon and her sister; that they were upset with Mr.
Wagnon for getting carried away on his claim for the tools; and that they were
upset by the home investigation because the agent had noticed there was no place
to plug something in when inspecting the garage. He also predicted that plaintiffs
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planned to set fire to their home, and, in fact, the Wagnons’ home burned in
December 1992. Although trial testimony disclosed that the brother-in-law had a
strong motive to retaliate against Mrs. Wagnon for her testimony against him in a
sexual abuse case, the insurance company was entitled to look carefully at
plaintiffs’ claim in light of this reported fraud. State Farm also knew that Mrs.
Wagnon had two juvenile felony convictions for obtaining merchandise by bogus
check, and one misdemeanor conviction for larceny of merchandise from a
retailer.
State Farm denied plaintiffs’ claim in December 1992, on the ground that
both Mr. and Mrs. Wagnon misrepresented certain facts regarding the items stolen
and the existence of lawsuits against Mrs. Wagnon. On April 4, 1994, plaintiffs
filed this lawsuit. State Farm filed two summary judgment motions, the first
seeking judgment on statute of limitations grounds, and the second arguing that
plaintiffs’ false statements voided the policy as a matter of law. The district court
denied both motions, finding the one-year property insurance statute of limitation
inapplicable because plaintiffs’ claim was a casualty claim, and finding material
issues of fact remaining as to whether the insurance contract was voided by
plaintiffs’ false statements.
At trial, Mr. Wagnon testified that he must have made a mistake when he
said the tools came from his father. See Tr. I at 104. He acknowledged, however,
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that during his examination under oath he intended State Farm to believe the tools
came from his father. See id. at 126. On cross-examination, Mr. Wagnon
admitted one of the reasons he withheld his father’s phone number was to conceal
his father’s whereabouts from State Farm because he knew they would find out
the truth about the tools. See id. at 129-30.
After the close of evidence, the district court denied State Farm’s motion
for judgment as a matter of law. Thereafter, the court found in favor of plaintiffs
on the breach of contract claim, concluding that although Mr. Wagnon
misrepresented the source of the tools to State Farm, his misstatements did not
vitiate coverage under the policy. It is unclear whether the court’s conclusion
rested on a finding that the misrepresentations were not material, or on a finding
that they were not intentional. The court limited plaintiffs’ recovery to the actual
cash value of their loss, however, because they had not replaced the stolen items
within a year as required by the policy. The court’s judgment, entered on
November 3, 1995, noted plaintiffs’ entitlement to costs and attorneys fees upon
timely application pursuant to Local Rules 54.1 and 54.2, which required them to
file for costs and fees within fourteen days after entry of judgment.
On November 13, 1995, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the judgment
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), raising the recent decision in Coblentz v.
Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 915 P.2d 938, 939-40 (Okla. Ct.
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App. 1995), which held unconscionable a policy provision limiting insureds’
recovery to actual cash value unless the property had been replaced. On
November 20, 1995, seventeen days after entry of judgment, plaintiffs filed their
bill of costs and motion for attorneys fees. State Farm moved to strike, claiming
plaintiffs had waived their right to recovery by filing after the fourteen-day
deadline.
On December 7, 1995, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion to amend. On
December 14, 1995, plaintiffs moved for a retroactive extension of time until
November 20, 1995, for filing their bill of costs and motion for fees. The district
court granted the motion and granted costs and fees, holding plaintiffs’ motion to
amend tolled the time in which to file their bill of cost/motion for attorneys fees
until fourteen days after entry of the order disposing of the post-trial motion.
On appeal, State Farm argues that plaintiffs’ cause of action should have
been barred by the statute of limitations. It also argues that Mr. Wagnon’s
misrepresentations were material and intentional as a matter of law, vitiating
coverage. Lastly, State Farm argues that costs and attorneys fees should not have
been granted because plaintiffs’ application was untimely. Plaintiffs argue they
should have been awarded the replacement cost of the stolen items, based on the
Coblentz decision.
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II. Statute of Limitations
On March 4, 1997, we certified to the Oklahoma Supreme Court the
question whether plaintiffs’ policy should be deemed “property” insurance, with a
one-year statute of limitations, or “casualty” insurance, with a two-year statute of
limitations. On December 23, 1997, the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined
that plaintiffs’ theft claim was subject to the two-year statute of limitations
prescribed for casualty insurance, see 36 Okla. Stat. § 3617. Because plaintiffs
filed their lawsuit within two years after the date of their theft loss, the district
court did not err in denying State Farms’ motion for summary judgment based on
the statute of limitations.
III. Materiality of Misrepresentations and Concealments
The materiality of a misrepresentation is a mixed question of law and fact
that under most circumstances should be determined by the trier of fact. See
Turley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1991);
Long v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 670 F.2d 930, 934 (10th Cir. 1982). However,
materiality “can be decided as a matter of law if reasonable minds could not differ
on the question.” Long, 670 F.2d at 934; see also Claborn v. Washington Nat’l
Ins. Co., 910 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Okla. 1996) (holding court should have directed
verdict in light of undisputed evidence of material misrepresentation to insurer).
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Here, then, the question is whether reasonable minds could have differed as to the
materiality of Mr. Wagnon’s misrepresentations.
In Long, we held “a misrepresentation will be considered material if a
reasonable insurance company, in determining its course of action, would attach
importance to the fact misrepresented.” 670 F.2d at 934. Most courts have
construed materiality broadly, emphasizing that the subject of the
misrepresentation need not ultimately prove to be significant to the disposition of
the claim, so long as it was reasonably relevant to the insurer’s investigation at
the time. See Fine v. Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co, 725 F.2d 179, 182-84 (2d
Cir. 1984) (holding materiality not judged by what facts later turn out to be, but
whether a false statement “concerns a subject relevant and germane to the
insurer’s investigation as it was then proceeding,” and holding false sworn answer
material if it “may be said to have been calculated either to discourage, mislead or
deflect the company’s investigation in any area that might seem to the company,
at that time, a relevant or productive area to investigate”); Dadurian v.
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 787 F.2d 756, 759-60 (1st Cir. 1986); Clark v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 778 F.2d 242, 246 (5th Cir. 1985); Passero v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 554 N.E.2d 384, 389 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990); Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co., 582
A.2d 1257, 1262-63 (N.J. 1990).
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Here, the facts known to State Farm were sufficient to place it on notice
that the claimed loss might be fraudulent, rendering information about plaintiffs’
ownership of the stolen items material to the investigation. State Farm’s
questions to Mr. Wagnon regarding the source of the tools were calculated to
verify ownership of the allegedly stolen items, especially in the absence of any
receipts, canceled checks, warranty cards, or photographs otherwise establishing
ownership. Further, as the policy provided for either replacement or actual cash
value of the items, State Farm was entitled to investigate the age and source of
the items to determine their value when stolen. See Clark, 778 F.2d at 246(“[S]tatements about the previous owner of property and how much consideration
was paid are clearly material in a cash value policy, for these policies, dependent
on market values, are necessarily concerned with recent purchases as indicative of
such value.”).
Several courts have held that false statements about the acquisition of
insured property are material as a matter of law, when the existence of an
insurable interest or ownership is at issue. In Claflin v. Commonwealth Ins. Co.,
110 U.S. 81 (1884), the trial court instructed the jury that the insured’s answers
concerning the manner in which he paid for the insured goods was material as a
matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding:
It is quite obvious that . . . it was material to show what title and
interest [insured] had at the time of the loss in the property insured.
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. . . The object of . . . requiring the assured to submit himself to an
examination under oath . . . was to enable the company to possess
itself of all knowledge, and all information as to other sources and
means of knowledge, in regard to the facts, material to their rights, to
enable them to decide upon their obligations, and to protect them
against false claims. And every interrogatory that was relevant and
pertinent in such an examination was material, in the sense that a true
answer to it was of the substance of the obligation of the assured. A
false answer as to any matter of fact material to the inquiry, would be
fraudulent.
....
The fact whether [insured] had an insurable interest in the
merchandise covered by the policy was directly in issue between the
parties. By the terms of the contract he was bound to answer truly
every question put to him that was relevant to that inquiry. His
answer to every question pertinent to that point was material, and
made so by the contract . . . . By that contract the companies were
entitled to know from him all the circumstances of his purchase of
the property insured, including the amount of the price paid and in
what manner payment was made; and false statements, willfully made
under oath, intended to conceal the truth on these points, constituted
an attempted fraud by false swearing which was a breach of the
conditions of the policy, and constituted a bar to the recovery of the
insurance.
Id. at 94-97; see Dadurian, 787 F.2d at 759-60 (holding material, as a matter of
law, statements regarding source of funds used to purchase allegedly stolen
jewelry, because they were reasonably relevant to the insurer’s investigation of
insured’s ownership); Passero, 554 N.E.2d at 389 (holding misrepresentations
regarding how much insureds paid for stereo system and who purchased certain
video equipment were material as a matter of law because they called into
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question insureds’ ownership of the allegedly stolen items, noting that price and
identity of purchaser are relevant to ownership).
Based on the case law and the facts, Mr. Wagnon’s misstatements regarding
the source of the tools, and his concealment of the means to verify his statements,
were material as a matter of law. State Farm had every right to investigate
whether plaintiffs truly owned the items they claimed were stolen, and questions
regarding the source of the items were germane and relevant to this ownership
inquiry. On this basis, no reasonable fact-finder could conclude Mr. Wagnon’s
misstatements and concealments were not material to State Farm’s investigation
as it was then proceeding.
We note that the district court’s materiality determination may have rested,
in part, on an incorrect finding that State Farm did not dispute “that the burglary
occurred or take issue with any of the personalty claimed to be lost or stolen.”
Appellant’s App. II, doc. 19, at 362. This finding is contradicted by the record.
In its answer, State Farm denied that insureds suffered a theft loss, and raised the
affirmative defenses that insureds misrepresented material facts concerning the
subject of the insurance and their interests therein, that they committed fraud or
false swearing in the presentment of their claim, and that they caused or procured
the theft loss. See Appellant’s App. I, doc. 2, at 7-10. In the pretrial order
signed on the day of trial, State Farm identified as disputed the factual issues
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whether the theft loss occurred, whether insureds procured the loss, and whether
the loss encompassed all the items that insureds’ claimed were stolen. See
Appellant’s App. II, doc. 18, at 337-38. At trial, claim investigator Tom Abbott
testified that State Farm questioned whether Mr. Wagnon really had all the tools
he reported stolen. See Tr. I at 51. Although it is true that State Farm did not
deny coverage on this ground, relying instead on plaintiffs’ misrepresentations,
this does not affect the materiality inquiry, which focuses on the time the
misrepresentations were made. See, e.g., Edmiston v. Schellenger, 343 So. 2d
465, 467 (Miss. 1977) (holding insurer’s failure to raise arson defense at trial did
not affect materiality of misstatements when made).
IV. Intentional Misrepresentation
Similarly, no reasonable factfinder could question whether Mr. Wagnon’s
misrepresentations were made intentionally with the intent to deceive State Farm.
Mr. Wagnon was the first to suggest that most of the claimed tools were given to
him by his father, and, in fact, he corrected State Farm’s initial assumption that
Mr. Wagnon had purchased them himself. Although Mr. Wagnon disclaimed
knowing exactly which tools his father had given him, he consistently maintained
his father had given him the vast majority of tools, testifying specifically that
most of the tools were given at one time in a large tool chest. In his sworn
testimony, Mr. Wagnon unequivocally identified sixty-six tools or sets of tools
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given to him by his father, expressing uncertainty only as to a single tool. Even if
Mr. Wagnon were mistaken as to the origin of ten or twenty of the tools, it is
unreasonable to believe he could have been mistaken as to more than fifty tools or
sets, including such large and expensive items as a ten-drawer tool chest, a
fifteen-drawer tool cart, multiple power tools, and an air compressor.
Further, Mr. Wagnon appears to have admitted that his misstatements were
made knowing that they were false. During the second examination under oath,
when confronted with his father’s statement regarding the tools, Mr. Wagnon
seems to acknowledge he knew his statements were false when made, explaining
that he gave such information to make things less complicated, and conceding that
he might have lied. Mr. Wagnon also admitted at trial that he concealed his
father’s phone number, in part, to prevent State Farm from contacting him and
learning the truth about the tools.
Certain cases indicate that Mr. Wagnon’s misrepresentations should be
found intentional as a matter of law. For example, in Tenore v. American &
Foreign Insurance Co., 256 F.2d 791 (7th Cir. 1958), the court found that an
incorrect new gun valuation of seventy-six guns, despite their poor condition,
demonstrated intentional false swearing as a matter of law, stating
Had [insured] valued five, ten or possibly twenty guns at an
excessive price, and had displayed some effort to make an honest
valuation as to the other guns, although we might disagree, we would
feel bound by the decision on valuation made by the trier of the facts.
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But here, plaintiffs gave a new-gun valuation to every one of the
sixty-six Winchesters and the ten Ithacas [despite their poor
condition].
Id. at 794. So too, in Lykos v. American Home Insurance Co., 609 F.2d 314, 316
(7th Cir. 1979), the court held a consistent pattern of inordinately excessive
claims showed they were deliberately false as a matter of law, as no reasonable
jury could find they were the product of an innocent mistake. In Dadurian, 787
F.2d at 761-62, the First Circuit reversed a jury verdict in favor of an insured,
holding the weight of the evidence overwhelmingly showed the insured knew he
was giving false testimony in his sworn examination. The court noted insured
was the first to originate the story that his cash had come from specific bank
loans, and that he had not qualified his testimony, but couched it in terms of
misleading certainty.
Further, so long as Mr. Wagnon’s misrepresentations were made knowingly
and deliberately, the intent to deceive the insurer will be implied. See Claflin,
110 U.S. at 95 (“And if the matter were material and the statement false, to the
knowledge of the party making it, and willfully made, the intention to deceive the
insurer would be necessarily implied, for the law presumes every man to intend
the natural consequences of his acts.”); Tenore, 256 F.2d at 795 (noting intent to
defraud will be inferred when false statement is knowingly made by insured with
regard to a material matter); Royal Ins. Co. v. Scritchfield, 152 P. 97, 98 (Okla.
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1915) (holding intent to deceive may be implied from willful making of material
statement that insured knows is false).
This is true even if the misrepresentations were made for a purpose other
than defrauding the insurer. See Claflin, 110 U.S. at 96-97 (holding it did not
matter that insured made misstatements for a reason other than deceiving insurer,
noting the fraud “is not lessened because the motive that induced it was
something in addition to the possible injury to [insurers] that it might work”);
Woods v. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1493, 1496 (11th Cir. 1985)
(same); Longobardi, 582 A.2d at 1262 (“The insured’s motive for lying . . . is
irrelevant. Forfeiture does not depend on proof that an insured harbored an intent
to recover proceeds to which he or she was not entitled.”).
In light of our conclusion that Mr. Wagnon’s misrepresentations were
material and intentionally made, State Farm was entitled to declare the policy
void. Therefore, the judgment in favor of plaintiffs must be reversed. Because
plaintiffs are not entitled to recover on their claim, we need not determine
whether the policy’s replacement requirement is unconscionable. We also need
not address the timeliness of plaintiffs’ application for costs and fees as plaintiffs
are no longer prevailing parties.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma, and its order awarding costs and fees, are REVERSED.
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 24 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CHARLES WAGNON and LORALEE
WAGNON, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Appellees-
Cross-Appellants, Nos. 96-5012, 96-5013 &
96-5213
v. (D.C. No. 94-C-972-B)
(N.D. Okla.)
STATE FARM FIRE AND
CASUALTY COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant-
Cross-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before TACHA, EBEL, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
**
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cases are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
In appeal No. 96-5012, defendant-appellant State Farm Fire & Casualty
Company (State Farm) appeals the district court’s judgment in favor of plaintiffs-
appellees Charles and Loralee Wagnon on their breach of contract claim. State
Farm also appeals the district court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment
based on the statute of limitations. In appeal No. 96-5013, plaintiffs-cross-
appellants Charles and Loralee Wagnon appeal the district court’s limitation of
their recovery to actual cash value instead of the replacement cost of the stolen
items. In appeal No. 96-5213, defendant-appellant State Farm appeals the award
of costs and attorneys fees to plaintiffs. Because we conclude that Mr. Wagnon’s
misrepresentations to State Farm were material and intentional as a matter of law,
voiding the insurance policy, we reverse the district court’s judgment in favor of
plaintiffs and the resulting award of fees and costs.
I. Background
On January 3, 1992, State Farm issued a one-year renters’ insurance policy
to plaintiffs, insuring their property against fire and other perils, including theft.
The policy contained a provision voiding coverage if any insured “intentionally
concealed or misrepresented any material fact or circumstance relating to this
insurance, whether before or after a loss.” Appellant’s App. II, doc. 22, p. 379.
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On April 4, 1992, plaintiffs’ home was burglarized. On April 10, 1992,
they filed a proof of loss with State Farm, claiming the loss of personal property
in the amount of $21,176.84, including the loss of tools worth approximately
$4,300. In the proof of loss, Mr. Wagnon made a claim for eighty-five tools or
sets of tools (totaling 527 individual pieces), and indicated he had acquired sixty
of these tools or sets four years earlier. Mr. Wagnon did not submit any receipts,
canceled checks, or pictures to support his claim of ownership.
During State Farm’s initial interview of Mr. Wagnon on April 20, 1992, he
again stated that he acquired the tools approximately four years earlier, and that a
“lot of em my dad and I had when I was living at home and ah I just collect em,
you know, like that and then on I just kept gradually getting um.” Id., doc. 25, at
391. Later, when asked whether his father bought the tools for him, Mr. Wagnon
replied “Yes, ah he acquired them you know, and he had so many of them I just
kind of picked and choose and he just let me take whatever . . . .” Id. at 396.
During Mr. Wagnon’s first examination under oath on June 8, 1992, State
Farm asked whether Mr. Wagnon purchased a ten-drawer tool chest, to which he
replied, “No, my dad had it, my dad had had it, and he just gave it to me.” Id.,
doc. 28, at 458. State Farm then asked him whether he acquired all of the tools
listed on the proof of loss from his father, to which Mr. Wagnon replied, “Not all
of them; I bought a few of them here and there. I can’t remember exactly which
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ones I bought and which ones he gave me though.” Id. at 460. Mr. Wagnon went
on to identify more than sixty-six tools or sets of tools which he received from his
father, including multiple power saws, drills, wrecking and extension bars, a tool
cart and chest, an air compressor and assorted components. See id. at 460-77. He
testified that most of the tools were given to him at one time in a large tool box.
He also identified fifteen items or sets which he purchased himself, and indicated
he could not remember whether he obtained one other item from his father.
Toward the end of the examination, Mr. Wagnon testified he did not know his
father’s address and that he would not give State Farm his father’s phone number,
even after being reminded that his claim could be denied for failure to give
material information. Although Mr. Wagnon later made several changes to his
sworn testimony, he did not change his statements that most of the tools were
given to him by his father.
On August 17, 1992, Mr. Wagnon’s father, Olen Wagnon, wrote a
statement that he had given his son “some tools,” including an open end wrench
set and a box end wrench set. He denied giving his son a tool cart, a socket set,
or an adjustable wrench set. See id., doc. 33, at 517. On October 14, 1992,
plaintiff Wagnon underwent a second examination under oath, in which he
initially affirmed his earlier statements regarding the tools. State Farm then asked
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him if he was aware that his father had said he did not give his son the majority of
the tools, and didn’t know where his son had acquired them. Mr. Wagnon replied:
I was going to, after we got done with going over all them tools, say
the reason that I told you that my father gave them to me just the
simple fact is that I didn’t want to complicate, I couldn’t remember
exactly where I got them from. I went to, like, flea markets, garage
sales, and acquired the tools from there, but I can’t tell you where I
got them from exactly.
Id., doc. 35, at 572. When State Farm asked whether Mr. Wagnon was testifying
that he lied in the first examination, he replied, “Yes, you can say I lied, yes. I
was just trying --- ” before his sentence was interrupted by State Farm’s attorney.
Id. at 573.
In a subsequent deposition, Mr. Wagnon’s father specifically denied giving
his son more than fifty of the tools attributed to him. See Appellant’s App. I, doc.
13, at 227-36, 239-44. His wife, Mr. Wagnon’s stepmother, also testified that she
and her husband had not given Mr. Wagnon more than a few tools in the previous
nine years, and expressly denied giving him a tool chest. See id. at 281-82.
In addition to Mr. Wagnon’s misstatements, State Farm knew the following
information: Plaintiffs’ renters’ insurance policy was a new one, the loss was
large, and plaintiffs were young (early twenties), with two children, working at
low income jobs, with inconsistent job histories. Except for a few items, the
Wagnons were unable to produce any receipts or proof that they owned the
allegedly stolen items, claiming instead that such receipts had been taken in the
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burglary. Plaintiffs also changed the source of the items between their first proof
of loss, which stated they purchased most items at stores, and their second proof
of loss, which stated they received many of the items as gifts from family
members. Further, there was a “considerabl[e]” discrepancy between the dollar
amounts listed by insureds for firearms, tools, and stereo equipment in their
insurance application and the amounts claimed as stolen three months later. See
Tr. at 58.
During a visit to plaintiffs’ home several days after the burglary, State
Farm’s agent noticed high priority items such as a stereo and television were not
taken, whereas heavier, bulkier items such as a file cabinet containing plaintiffs’
receipts and some jewelry, were claimed to have been stolen. He also noted there
was no electrical outlet near where the air compressor was allegedly used.
In August 1992, Mrs. Wagnon’s former brother-in-law notified State Farm
that plaintiffs’ claim was fraudulent. He informed State Farm that the burglary
had been staged by Mrs. Wagnon and her sister; that they were upset with Mr.
Wagnon for getting carried away on his claim for the tools; and that they were
upset by the home investigation because the agent had noticed there was no place
to plug something in when inspecting the garage. He also predicted that plaintiffs
planned to set fire to their home, and, in fact, the Wagnons’ home burned in
December 1992. Although trial testimony disclosed that the brother-in-law had a
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strong motive to retaliate against Mrs. Wagnon for her testimony against him in a
sexual abuse case, the insurance company was entitled to look carefully at
plaintiffs’ claim in light of this reported fraud. State Farm also knew that Mrs.
Wagnon had two juvenile felony convictions for obtaining merchandise by bogus
check, and one misdemeanor conviction for larceny of merchandise from a
retailer.
State Farm denied plaintiffs’ claim in December 1992, on the ground that
both Mr. and Mrs. Wagnon misrepresented certain facts regarding the items stolen
and the existence of lawsuits against Mrs. Wagnon. On April 4, 1994, plaintiffs
filed this lawsuit. State Farm filed two summary judgment motions, the first
seeking judgment on statute of limitations grounds, and the second arguing that
plaintiffs’ false statements voided the policy as a matter of law. The district court
denied both motions, finding the one-year property insurance statute of limitation
inapplicable because plaintiffs’ claim was a casualty claim, and finding material
issues of fact remaining as to whether the insurance contract was voided by
plaintiffs’ false statements.
At trial, Mr. Wagnon testified that he must have made a mistake when he
said the tools came from his father. See Tr. I at 104. He acknowledged, however,
that during his examination under oath he intended State Farm to believe the tools
came from his father. See id. at 126. On cross-examination, Mr. Wagnon
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admitted one of the reasons he withheld his father’s phone number was to conceal
his father’s whereabouts from State Farm because he knew they would find out
the truth about the tools. See id. at 129-30.
After the close of evidence, the district court denied State Farm’s motion
for judgment as a matter of law. Thereafter, the court found in favor of plaintiffs
on the breach of contract claim, concluding that although Mr. Wagnon
misrepresented the source of the tools to State Farm, his misstatements did not
vitiate coverage under the policy. It is unclear whether the court’s conclusion
rested on a finding that the misrepresentations were not material, or on a finding
that they were not intentional. The court limited plaintiffs’ recovery to the actual
cash value of their loss, however, because they had not replaced the stolen items
within a year as required by the policy. The court’s judgment, entered on
November 3, 1995, noted plaintiffs’ entitlement to costs and attorneys fees upon
timely application pursuant to Local Rules 54.1 and 54.2, which required them to
file for costs and fees within fourteen days after entry of judgment.
On November 13, 1995, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend the judgment
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), raising the recent decision in Coblentz v.
Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 915 P.2d 938, 939-40 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1995), which held unconscionable a policy provision limiting insureds’
recovery to actual cash value unless the property had been replaced. On
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November 20, 1995, seventeen days after entry of judgment, plaintiffs filed their
bill of costs and motion for attorneys fees. State Farm moved to strike, claiming
plaintiffs had waived their right to recovery by filing after the fourteen-day
deadline.
On December 7, 1995, the court denied plaintiffs’ motion to amend. On
December 14, 1995, plaintiffs moved for a retroactive extension of time until
November 20, 1995, for filing their bill of costs and motion for fees. The district
court granted the motion and granted costs and fees, holding plaintiffs’ motion to
amend tolled the time in which to file their bill of cost/motion for attorneys fees
until fourteen days after entry of the order disposing of the post-trial motion.
On appeal, State Farm argues that plaintiffs’ cause of action should have
been barred by the statute of limitations. It also argues that Mr. Wagnon’s
misrepresentations were material and intentional as a matter of law, vitiating
coverage. Lastly, State Farm argues that costs and attorneys fees should not have
been granted because plaintiffs’ application was untimely. Plaintiffs argue they
should have been awarded the replacement cost of the stolen items, based on the
Coblentz decision.
II. Statute of Limitations
On March 4, 1997, we certified to the Oklahoma Supreme Court the
question whether plaintiffs’ policy should be deemed “property” insurance, with a
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one-year statute of limitations, or “casualty” insurance, with a two-year statute of
limitations. On December 23, 1997, the Oklahoma Supreme Court determined
that plaintiffs’ theft claim was subject to the two-year statute of limitations
prescribed for casualty insurance, see 36 Okla. Stat. § 3617. Because plaintiffs
filed their lawsuit within two years after the date of their theft loss, the district
court did not err in denying State Farms’ motion for summary judgment based on
the statute of limitations.
III. Materiality of Misrepresentations and Concealments
The materiality of a misrepresentation is a mixed question of law and fact
that under most circumstances should be determined by the trier of fact. See
Turley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 669, 672 (10th Cir. 1991);
Long v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 670 F.2d 930, 934 (10th Cir. 1982). However,
materiality “can be decided as a matter of law if reasonable minds could not differ
on the question.” Long, 670 F.2d at 934; see also Claborn v. Washington Nat’l
Ins. Co., 910 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Okla. 1996) (holding court should have directed
verdict in light of undisputed evidence of material misrepresentation to insurer).
Here, then, the question is whether reasonable minds could have differed as to the
materiality of Mr. Wagnon’s misrepresentations.
In Long, we held “a misrepresentation will be considered material if a
reasonable insurance company, in determining its course of action, would attach
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importance to the fact misrepresented.” 670 F.2d at 934. Most courts have
construed materiality broadly, emphasizing that the subject of the
misrepresentation need not ultimately prove to be significant to the disposition of
the claim, so long as it was reasonably relevant to the insurer’s investigation at
the time. See Fine v. Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co, 725 F.2d 179, 182-84 (2d
Cir. 1984) (holding materiality not judged by what facts later turn out to be, but
whether a false statement “concerns a subject relevant and germane to the
insurer’s investigation as it was then proceeding,” and holding false sworn answer
material if it “may be said to have been calculated either to discourage, mislead or
deflect the company’s investigation in any area that might seem to the company,
at that time, a relevant or productive area to investigate”); Dadurian v.
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 787 F.2d 756, 759-60 (1st Cir. 1986); Clark v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 778 F.2d 242, 246 (5th Cir. 1985); Passero v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 554 N.E.2d 384, 389 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990); Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co., 582
A.2d 1257, 1262-63 (N.J. 1990).
Here, the facts known to State Farm were sufficient to place it on notice
that the claimed loss might be fraudulent, rendering information about plaintiffs’
ownership of the stolen items material to the investigation. State Farm’s
questions to Mr. Wagnon regarding the source of the tools were calculated to
verify ownership of the allegedly stolen items, especially in the absence of any
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receipts, canceled checks, warranty cards, or photographs otherwise establishing
ownership. Further, as the policy provided for either replacement or actual cash
value of the items, State Farm was entitled to investigate the age and source of
the items to determine their value when stolen. See Clark, 778 F.2d at 246(“[S]tatements about the previous owner of property and how much consideration
was paid are clearly material in a cash value policy, for these policies, dependent
on market values, are necessarily concerned with recent purchases as indicative of
such value.”).
Several courts have held that false statements about the acquisition of
insured property are material as a matter of law, when the existence of an
insurable interest or ownership is at issue. In Claflin v. Commonwealth Ins. Co.,
110 U.S. 81 (1884), the trial court instructed the jury that the insured’s answers
concerning the manner in which he paid for the insured goods was material as a
matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding:
It is quite obvious that . . . it was material to show what title and
interest [insured] had at the time of the loss in the property insured.
. . . The object of . . . requiring the assured to submit himself to an
examination under oath . . . was to enable the company to possess
itself of all knowledge, and all information as to other sources and
means of knowledge, in regard to the facts, material to their rights, to
enable them to decide upon their obligations, and to protect them
against false claims. And every interrogatory that was relevant and
pertinent in such an examination was material, in the sense that a true
answer to it was of the substance of the obligation of the assured. A
false answer as to any matter of fact material to the inquiry, would be
fraudulent.
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....
The fact whether [insured] had an insurable interest in the
merchandise covered by the policy was directly in issue between the
parties. By the terms of the contract he was bound to answer truly
every question put to him that was relevant to that inquiry. His
answer to every question pertinent to that point was material, and
made so by the contract . . . . By that contract the companies were
entitled to know from him all the circumstances of his purchase of
the property insured, including the amount of the price paid and in
what manner payment was made; and false statements, willfully made
under oath, intended to conceal the truth on these points, constituted
an attempted fraud by false swearing which was a breach of the
conditions of the policy, and constituted a bar to the recovery of the
insurance.
Id. at 94-97; see Dadurian, 787 F.2d at 759-60 (holding material, as a matter of
law, statements regarding source of funds used to purchase allegedly stolen
jewelry, because they were reasonably relevant to the insurer’s investigation of
insured’s ownership); Passero, 554 N.E.2d at 389 (holding misrepresentations
regarding how much insureds paid for stereo system and who purchased certain
video equipment were material as a matter of law because they called into
question insureds’ ownership of the allegedly stolen items, noting that price and
identity of purchaser are relevant to ownership).
Based on the case law and the facts, Mr. Wagnon’s misstatements regarding
the source of the tools, and his concealment of the means to verify his statements,
were material as a matter of law. State Farm had every right to investigate
whether plaintiffs truly owned the items they claimed were stolen, and questions
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regarding the source of the items were germane and relevant to this ownership
inquiry. On this basis, no reasonable fact-finder could conclude Mr. Wagnon’s
misstatements and concealments were not material to State Farm’s investigation
as it was then proceeding.
We note that the district court’s materiality determination may have rested,
in part, on an incorrect finding that State Farm did not dispute “that the burglary
occurred or take issue with any of the personalty claimed to be lost or stolen.”
Appellant’s App. II, doc. 19, at 362. This finding is contradicted by the record.
In its answer, State Farm denied that insureds suffered a theft loss, and raised the
affirmative defenses that insureds misrepresented material facts concerning the
subject of the insurance and their interests therein, that they committed fraud or
false swearing in the presentment of their claim, and that they caused or procured
the theft loss. See Appellant’s App. I, doc. 2, at 7-10. In the pretrial order
signed on the day of trial, State Farm identified as disputed the factual issues
whether the theft loss occurred, whether insureds procured the loss, and whether
the loss encompassed all the items that insureds’ claimed were stolen. See
Appellant’s App. II, doc. 18, at 337-38. At trial, claim investigator Tom Abbott
testified that State Farm questioned whether Mr. Wagnon really had all the tools
he reported stolen. See Tr. I at 51. Although it is true that State Farm did not
deny coverage on this ground, relying instead on plaintiffs’ misrepresentations,
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this does not affect the materiality inquiry, which focuses on the time the
misrepresentations were made. See, e.g., Edmiston v. Schellenger, 343 So. 2d
465, 467 (Miss. 1977) (holding insurer’s failure to raise arson defense at trial did
not affect materiality of misstatements when made).
IV. Intentional Misrepresentation
Similarly, no reasonable factfinder could question whether Mr. Wagnon’s
misrepresentations were made intentionally with the intent to deceive State Farm.
Mr. Wagnon was the first to suggest that most of the claimed tools were given to
him by his father, and, in fact, he corrected State Farm’s initial assumption that
Mr. Wagnon had purchased them himself. Although Mr. Wagnon disclaimed
knowing exactly which tools his father had given him, he consistently maintained
his father had given him the vast majority of tools, testifying specifically that
most of the tools were given at one time in a large tool chest. In his sworn
testimony, Mr. Wagnon unequivocally identified sixty-six tools or sets of tools
given to him by his father, expressing uncertainty only as to a single tool. Even if
Mr. Wagnon were mistaken as to the origin of ten or twenty of the tools, it is
unreasonable to believe he could have been mistaken as to more than fifty tools or
sets, including such large and expensive items as a ten-drawer tool chest, a
fifteen-drawer tool cart, multiple power tools, and an air compressor.
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Further, Mr. Wagnon appears to have admitted that his misstatements were
made knowing that they were false. During the second examination under oath,
when confronted with his father’s statement regarding the tools, Mr. Wagnon
seems to acknowledge he knew his statements were false when made, explaining
that he gave such information to make things less complicated, and conceding that
he might have lied. Mr. Wagnon also admitted at trial that he concealed his
father’s phone number, in part, to prevent State Farm from contacting him and
learning the truth about the tools.
Certain cases indicate that Mr. Wagnon’s misrepresentations should be
found intentional as a matter of law. For example, in Tenore v. American &
Foreign Insurance Co., 256 F.2d 791 (7th Cir. 1958), the court found that an
incorrect new gun valuation of seventy-six guns, despite their poor condition,
demonstrated intentional false swearing as a matter of law, stating
Had [insured] valued five, ten or possibly twenty guns at an
excessive price, and had displayed some effort to make an honest
valuation as to the other guns, although we might disagree, we would
feel bound by the decision on valuation made by the trier of the facts.
But here, plaintiffs gave a new-gun valuation to every one of the
sixty-six Winchesters and the ten Ithacas [despite their poor
condition].
Id. at 794. So too, in Lykos v. American Home Insurance Co., 609 F.2d 314, 316
(7th Cir. 1979), the court held a consistent pattern of inordinately excessive
claims showed they were deliberately false as a matter of law, as no reasonable
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jury could find they were the product of an innocent mistake. In Dadurian, 787
F.2d at 761-62, the First Circuit reversed a jury verdict in favor of an insured,
holding the weight of the evidence overwhelmingly showed the insured knew he
was giving false testimony in his sworn examination. The court noted insured
was the first to originate the story that his cash had come from specific bank
loans, and that he had not qualified his testimony, but couched it in terms of
misleading certainty.
Further, so long as Mr. Wagnon’s misrepresentations were made knowingly
and deliberately, the intent to deceive the insurer will be implied. See Claflin,
110 U.S. at 95 (“And if the matter were material and the statement false, to the
knowledge of the party making it, and willfully made, the intention to deceive the
insurer would be necessarily implied, for the law presumes every man to intend
the natural consequences of his acts.”); Tenore, 256 F.2d at 795 (noting intent to
defraud will be inferred when false statement is knowingly made by insured with
regard to a material matter); Royal Ins. Co. v. Scritchfield, 152 P. 97, 98 (Okla.
1915) (holding intent to deceive may be implied from willful making of material
statement that insured knows is false).
This is true even if the misrepresentations were made for a purpose other
than defrauding the insurer. See Claflin, 110 U.S. at 96-97 (holding it did not
matter that insured made misstatements for a reason other than deceiving insurer,
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noting the fraud “is not lessened because the motive that induced it was
something in addition to the possible injury to [insurers] that it might work”);
Woods v. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1493, 1496 (11th Cir. 1985)
(same); Longobardi, 582 A.2d at 1262 (“The insured’s motive for lying . . . is
irrelevant. Forfeiture does not depend on proof that an insured harbored an intent
to recover proceeds to which he or she was not entitled.”).
In light of our conclusion that Mr. Wagnon’s misrepresentations were
material and intentionally made, State Farm was entitled to declare the policy
void. Therefore, the judgment in favor of plaintiffs must be reversed. Because
plaintiffs are not entitled to recover on their claim, we need not determine
whether the policy’s replacement requirement is unconscionable. We also need
not address the timeliness of plaintiffs’ application for costs and fees as plaintiffs
are no longer prevailing parties.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma, and its order awarding costs and fees, are REVERSED.
Entered for the Court
David Ebel
Circuit Judge
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