United States v. Haslip ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
NOV 24 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-3205
STEPHEN G. HASLIP,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Kansas
(D.C. No. 96-10071-01)
Debra L. Barnett (Jackie N. Williams, United States Attorney, with her on the
brief), Assistant United States Attorney, Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Roger L. Falk, Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before PORFILIO, BRORBY and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
BRORBY, Circuit Judge.
Mr. Steven G. Haslip appeals his conviction for bank robbery, use of a
firearm during the commission of that bank robbery, and possession of a firearm
after a prior felony conviction. He asserts (1) there was insufficient evidence to
sustain the jury’s verdict, (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of a prior
conviction for impeachment purposes, and (3) the trial court erroneously
instructed the jury. Mr. Haslip also appeals the 322-month prison sentence
imposed as punishment for those crimes, claiming he is not an “armed career
criminal” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4. We exercise
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm both the conviction and
sentence.
BACKGROUND
The Fall River State Bank in Fall River, Kansas, was robbed on the
morning of October 17, 1996. Two men entered the bank; one approached Alicia
Ashenfelter, the teller stationed closest to the front door, and requested two rolls
of dimes. The second man approached tellers Peggy Anderson and Christine Burt
at the next teller window. As Ms. Ashenfelter turned to Ms. Anderson to request
two rolls of dimes, she noticed the second man, later identified as Mr. Haslip, was
pointing a gun at Ms. Anderson. Brandishing the gun and causing it to “click”
twice, Mr. Haslip instructed Ms. Anderson to “[g]ive [him] all of the money.”
Ms. Anderson put money from her station, including the bank’s bait money
into a white or clear plastic bag Mr. Haslip provided. Mr. Haslip then forced Ms.
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Anderson and Ms. Burt toward the vault. He forced Ms. Burt to go into the vault
to retrieve more money and instructed Ms. Anderson to attend to a customer who
appeared in the drive-up lane. After the customer left, Mr. Haslip ordered Ms.
Anderson and Ms. Burt into the vault.
In the meantime, Mr. Haslip’s co-defendant, Mr. Jimmy T. Davis,
instructed Ms. Ashenfelter to place all the money from her teller station into a
blue plastic bag. After she had done so, he ordered her into the vault with Ms.
Anderson and Ms. Burt. The two men then closed and latched the vault door so it
could not be opened from the inside. While in the vault, the tellers activated the
silent alarm and prepared a description of the two robbers. They were released
from the vault when customers entered the bank ten to fifteen minutes later. The
total loss to the Fall River State Bank, a federally insured institution, was
$13,909.00. Ms. Burt, who was conducting a personal financial transaction at the
time of the robbery, also lost $100.00.
Shortly after the robbery, the Wilson County Sheriff placed a roadblock at a
main junction outside Fall River. Approximately one minute after establishing
the roadblock, a Ford Probe crested the hill and approached the roadblock. As
law enforcement officers watched, the car abruptly stopped, turned around, and
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drove away from the roadblock. The Sheriff noticed two people were inside the
car.
The Sheriff and his officers immediately pursued the Ford onto the property
of Mr. Wayne O’Dell. After losing sight of the car for a short time, they found it
abandoned in a brushy area, down the side of an embankment. The car’s engine
was running, the transmission was in drive, the driver’s window was down, and
the passenger door was open. Mr. O’Dell ultimately spotted Mr. Haslip lying
along a fence row. When directed by a Kansas Highway Patrol trooper to stand
up and move toward him, Mr. Haslip stated he was alone, “was just hitchhiking,”
and “wanted to get out of the way” when he saw the police.
Mr. Davis was arrested nearly two hours later, after a Highway Patrol
trooper and K-9 unit found him hiding in trees and bushes on the O’Dell property.
Law enforcement personnel continued to search the property, but found no other
cars or suspects. They discovered the Ford Probe had been stolen from the
driveway of Ms. Teresa Flynn, who lived in a small community outside Fall
River. After getting Ms. Flynn’s consent, officers searched the car and found a
blue plastic bag containing a loaded Smith and Wesson Silver 9mm and a loaded
Dan Wesson .357 magnum revolver. The white plastic bag contained $13,009.00,
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including all the bank’s bait money. The remaining $1,000.00 was never
recovered.
Mr. Haslip and Mr. Davis were tried together on a superseding indictment
charging each with (1) bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (2) using
or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), and (3) possession of a firearm after being previously
convicted of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
Each of the three tellers working at the bank on the day of the robbery
testified at trial. Both Ms. Ashenfelter and Ms. Anderson positively identified
Mr. Haslip. Ms. Burt testified she could not say if Mr. Haslip was one of the
robbers or not.
Mr. Haslip testified he did not rob the Fall River Bank, or possess a gun on
the day of the robbery. He claimed he was riding through Kansas with a “Ms.
Parks, or Ms. Parker,” when he bumped into Mr. Davis, an old friend, at a cafe in
Fredonia. According to Mr. Haslip, he and Mr. Davis agreed to go look for a
marijuana field outside of Fredonia, near the O’Dell property. Before Ms. Parks
returned to pick him up, Mr. Haslip heard police radios and voices. He decided to
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walk along the fence line of the O’Dell property close to the highway, and at one
point, laid down next to the fence hoping the police would leave and he could go
home. On cross-examination, Mr. Haslip admitted that although he was looking
for marijuana, he had no gloves, coat, tools or packaging materials. He further
stated he was not going to call “Ms. Parks” to testify on his behalf.
The jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged on both defendants. The
court subsequently sentenced Mr. Haslip to 262 months imprisonment for bank
robbery, 262 months imprisonment for the use of a firearm during the commission
of bank robbery (each 262-month sentence to run concurrently), and 60 months
imprisonment for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (to run
consecutively to the sentences imposed for counts one and two). Accordingly,
Mr. Haslip’s total term of confinement is 322 months.
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of Evidence
Mr. Haslip argues the government’s evidence identifying him as one of the
bank robbers was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdict. The standard
Mr. Haslip must meet to prevail on this argument is a difficult one, since we
reverse on a sufficiency of the evidence claim “only if no rational trier of fact
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could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1462-63 (10th Cir. 1995). Moreover,
when evaluating the record de novo, we must view the evidence and the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
government. See United States v. Wolny, 133 F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 1998). We
“may neither weigh conflicting evidence nor consider the credibility of
witnesses.” United States v. Pappert, 112 F.3d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 1997)
(internal citation omitted).
The evidence in this case includes the testimony of two bank tellers who
were present when the Fall River Bank was robbed. Both described the robbery
in detail and positively identified Mr. Haslip as one of the robbers. Mr. Haslip
had full opportunity to cross-examine these witnesses as to the certainty of their
identification. Further, Mr. Haslip does not contest he was arrested after being
found lying in a field near the place where law enforcement officers found a car
that had fled from a roadblock. Police retrieved the plastic bags used in the
robbery, the bank’s bait money, and two loaded handguns from that same car.
Viewing this evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the government, we conclude a rational jury easily could
have disregarded Mr. Haslip’s explanation as to why he was lying in a field near
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the getaway car, and found instead it was Mr. Haslip who robbed the Fall River
Bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Accordingly, we hold the evidence was
more than sufficient to support Mr. Haslip’s robbery conviction. 1
Admissibility of Evidence Concerning Prior Felony Conviction
Mr. Haslip next challenges the district court’s decision to allow the
prosecution, on cross-examination, to introduce evidence that he was on “life
parole” in Missouri for a first degree murder conviction. Prior to trial, the court
granted Mr. Haslip’s motion in limine to exclude evidence of his prior
convictions. As grounds for its pretrial ruling, the court stated the evidence was
not relevant to show identity, motive or plan under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), and thus
the probative value was substantially outweighed by the potential for prejudice.
At the conclusion of the government’s case, the parties presented a
stipulation to the jury that Mr. Haslip previously had been convicted of a felony
punishable by imprisonment of more than one year. Nevertheless, on cross-
examination, the prosecution asked Mr. Haslip about being on parole from the
1
Mr. Haslip’s argument focuses on the insufficiency of the government’s
evidence identifying him as one of the bank robbers. He does not address the
sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction on the two related firearm
counts. However, on careful review of the record, we nevertheless hold the
evidence was sufficient to support his conviction on those counts as well.
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State of Missouri. Defense counsel objected to this questioning, claiming it was
prohibited by the court’s prior ruling. The court overruled defense counsel’s
objection, concluding evidence of Mr. Haslip’s parole conditions was admissible
for impeachment purposes under Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1) – namely, to demonstrate
to the jury that Mr. Haslip was not supposed to leave Missouri without his parole
officer’s permission, and thus, it was unlikely he was casually traveling across
Kansas with a “Ms. Parks” on the day the Fall River Bank was robbed. The court
gave the jury a limiting instruction as to the use of this evidence when it ruled on
defense counsel’s objection (id. at 392-93), and again at the end of the trial.
Mr. Haslip argues that after finding the prejudice of the prior conviction
substantially outweighed the probative value under Rule 404(b), the district court
abused its discretion in admitting the same evidence under Rule 609, which
requires that the probative value of the evidence must outweigh its prejudicial
effect. He insists that because the robbery and firearm charges were entirely
unrelated to the crime for which he was on parole, the prejudicial effect of any
evidence of his prior conviction far outweighed any probative value it may have
concerning his credibility. He further argues the prejudicial effect of such
evidence was enhanced because he relied to his detriment on the court’s pretrial
ruling disallowing such evidence when he decided to take the witness stand.
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We review the district court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion.
United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1073 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514
U.S. 1088 (1995). This court has long permitted the government to impeach the
testimony of a criminal defendant who takes the witness stand in the same manner
as any other witness, including reference to prior convictions. United States v.
Smith, 521 F.2d 374, 376 (10th Cir. 1975); see also Burrows v. United States, 371
F.2d 434, 435 (10th Cir. 1967) (“When a defendant in a criminal action takes the
stand, he takes with him his character and reputation. He is supported by more
than his own testimony, for the law presumes that his reputation is good with
respect to all elements involved in the crime with which he is charged. For this
reason it has always been considered proper in cross-examination to interrogate
him as to all collateral matters which would clearly tend to disprove the legal
presumption with which he is clothed.” (Internal citation omitted.)). Mr. Haslip
has offered no persuasive authority, and we have found none, that suggests a pre-
trial 404(b) ruling precludes or restricts this practice, or otherwise forecloses
analysis in a later-presented Rule 609 question.
In fact, the only case we located on point holds that a ruling disallowing
evidence under Rule 404(b) is irrelevant to a subsequent ruling under Rule 609.
United States v. Valencia, 61 F.3d 616, 618-19 (8th Cir. 1995). In Valencia, the
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Eighth Circuit began with the premise that evidentiary rulings must be treated
independently, and then went on to discuss the fact that Rule 404(b) and Rule 609
address two very different situations:
[E]vidence offered under Rule 404(b) is substantive evidence against
the accused, i.e., it is part of the government’s case offered to prove
his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rule 609 evidence on the other
hand has to do with the accused’s ability to tell the truth when
testifying on his or her own behalf. While both rules speak of
“probative value” and “prejudice,” it is critical to note that evidence
offered under the respective rules is probative as to different matters.
The probative character of evidence under Rule 609 has to do with
credibility of a witness, while 404(b) “probativeness” essentially
goes to the question of whether or not the accused committed the
crime charged.
Id. at 619. We fully agree, and thus decline to limit the district court’s discretion
to weigh “probative value” and “prejudice” under Rule 609, independent of any
prior ruling under Rule 404(b).
Finally, we note that at oral argument defense counsel conceded that if the
jury followed the court’s instruction limiting consideration of prior conviction
evidence to credibility determinations, Mr. Haslip is “hard pressed” to identify
any prejudice from the admission of evidence pertaining to his parole status in
Missouri. “A central assumption of our jurisprudence is that juries follow the
instructions they receive.” United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 884 (10th Cir.
1998). We therefore presume the jury followed the limiting instructions the court
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gave and considered evidence regarding Mr. Haslip’s parole status in Missouri
only for the purpose of evaluating the credibility of his testimony. Given this
presumption, the circumscribed nature of the prosecutor’s questions, and the
Valencia rationale adopted herein, we hold the district court did not abuse its
discretion by allowing the limited introduction of evidence pertaining to Mr.
Haslip’s prior conviction.
Jury Instructions
Mr. Haslip contends the trial court erred by failing to give several jury
instructions he proposed. He claims the failure to give such instructions in his
proposed form “may have misled the jury and confused the issues, and in turn
prejudiced [him].” We review a district court’s decision whether to give a
particular jury instruction for abuse of discretion. We conduct a de novo review
to determine whether, as a whole, the instructions themselves correctly stated the
applicable law. See United States v. Swallow, 109 F.3d 656, 658 (10th Cir. 1997).
We reverse only if we have a substantial doubt the jury instructions properly
guided the jury in its deliberations and we find prejudice. United States v. Voss,
82 F.3d 1521, 1529 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 226 (1996). Mr. Haslip
fails to meet this standard.
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First, Mr. Haslip claims the trial court should have given a separate
instruction cautioning jurors that the testimony of law enforcement officials and
other government employees should not be given any greater weight and their
credibility is subject to impeachment. We agree with the trial court that these
issues were adequately covered by the general instructions pertaining to witness
credibility and impeachment. Mr. Haslip is not entitled to have his specific
instruction given so long as the substance of the proposed instruction was
contained in the charge given to the jury. See Wolny, 133 F.3d at 766.
Second, Mr. Haslip claims he was entitled to an instruction that combined
the presumption of innocence afforded a criminal defendant with the
government’s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. He contends
the trial court erred by bifurcating these two issues into separate instructions.
This claim is frivolous. Mr. Haslip utterly fails to show how the two relevant
instructions were erroneous or inadequate, or how he was prejudiced by the
instructions given, particularly since the jurors were instructed they were not to
“single out one instruction alone as stating the law, but must consider the
instructions as a whole.”
Third, Mr. Haslip claims he was prejudiced because the trial court refused
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an instruction to the effect a defendant cannot be “found guilty merely by the fact
that he associated himself with someone else who the jury finds guilty of criminal
conduct.” He makes a similar argument concerning the trial court’s refusal to
instruct the jury that the Defendant’s mere presence at the scene of a crime does
not indicate the Defendant’s guilt. The trial court concluded these issues were
adequately covered by the “aiding and abetting” instruction. We agree.
Moreover, notwithstanding Mr. Haslip’s conclusory statement the “aiding and
abetting” instruction is “misleading and confusing,” he failed to show how he was
in any way prejudiced by the instruction given.
Fourth, Mr. Haslip claims it is necessary in a joint trial to instruct the jury
to the effect the conduct and statements of one defendant cannot be considered in
regard to the other defendant. He argues if such an instruction is not given, the
jury “possibly” is misled into improperly attributing one defendant’s conduct to
the other. The trial court correctly determined that Mr. Haslip’s proposed
instruction was unnecessary. The instructions as a whole made clear the jury
could not attribute the statements or conduct of one defendant to the other
defendant. Mr. Haslip’s concern the jury is “possibly” misled absent his proposed
instruction is pure conjecture and fails to demonstrate prejudice.
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Fifth, Mr. Haslip challenges the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury that
possession of a firearm is a lawful activity. The trial court properly concluded
such an instruction would confuse the jury given the fact Mr. Haslip was charged
with the unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The evidence presented at
trial in no way supported Mr. Haslip’s proposed instruction. His argument to the
contrary is frivolous.
Mr. Haslip next complains the trial court gave an instruction on eyewitness
testimony that was substantially different from his proposed instructions and thus,
failed to draw adequate attention to his theory of the case. Here again, Mr. Haslip
was not entitled to a separate instruction on the theory of the defense so long as
the instruction given contained the substance of the proposed instruction. Wolny,
133 F.3d at 766. On review, we conclude the court’s instruction regarding
eyewitness testimony accurately stated the law and did not differ substantively
from Mr. Haslip’s proposed instruction. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by refusing Mr. Haslip’s proposed instruction.
Finally, Mr. Haslip claims he was prejudiced by the trial court’s refusal to
instruct the jury that an exemplar of his fingerprint may be placed into evidence
and used to compare to fingerprints which are in dispute. He claims this was an
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appropriate instruction because of discussion in the record concerning the fact
there was no fingerprint evidence implicating him. The trial court appropriately
concluded there was no issue before the jury concerning fingerprint identification.
Indeed, Special Agent Robert Beckham testified that none of the fingerprint
evidence collected was consistent with the known fingerprints of either defendant.
Mr. Haslip’s proposed instruction would only have caused confusion in light of
this evidence.
In sum, the jury instructions, read as a whole, accurately stated the
governing law and gave the jury ample understanding of the issues and applicable
standards. Mr. Haslip’s arguments to the contrary must fail.
Sentencing as an “Armed Career Criminal”
As a result of being sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18
U.S.C. § 924(e), Mr. Haslip’s sentence was more than doubled from a maximum
of 147 months to 322 months. He challenges the district court’s application of
that Act, claiming his 1969 burglary conviction does not meet the definition of a
“violent felony.” Relying on United States v. Barney, 955 F.2d 635 (10th Cir.
1992), Mr. Haslip asks us to delve beneath the face of the information and
complaint charging him with burglary, to conclude the government failed to prove
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by a preponderance of the evidence that the facts of his particular conviction fall
within the definition of burglary as a “violent felony” set forth in Taylor v. United
States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990).
We review issues regarding the interpretation and application of the Armed
Career Criminal Act de novo. United States v. Romero, 122 F.3d 1334, 1340
(10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1310 (1998). Mr. Haslip is correct the
government must support the propriety of a § 924(e) enhancement by a
preponderance of the evidence. However, it is well-established we use a “formal
categorical approach” when determining whether a prior conviction constitutes a
“violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act. We can look “‘only to the
statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts
underlying those convictions.’” Romero, 122 F.3d at 1341 (quoting Taylor, 495
U.S. at 600). Applying Taylor, we uphold a § 924(e) sentence enhancement based
on a prior burglary conviction if either (1) the statutory definition of burglary
substantially corresponds to “generic” burglary, or (2) the charging paper and jury
instructions actually required the jury to find all the elements of generic burglary
prior to convicting the defendant. 495 U.S. at 602; see also Barney, 955 F.2d at
639.
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Applying this test to the present facts, we conclude the Missouri statute, by
including places other than buildings (i.e., tent, boat, railroad car, vessel), defines
burglary more broadly than does Taylor. See United States v. Phelps, 17 F.3d
1334, 1341 (10th Cir.) (pre-1975 Missouri burglary statute defined burglary in
broader terms than Taylor), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 844 (1994). Under these
circumstances, Taylor requires that we proceed to consider whether the charging
paper and jury instructions nevertheless actually required the jury to find all the
elements of generic burglary prior to convicting Mr. Haslip. Where, as here, the
defendant enters a guilty plea, thus providing no occasion to instruct a jury, we
have held it is appropriate for the sentencing court to “look to the underlying
indictment or information and the text of the guilty plea to determine whether the
defendant was charged with and admitted conduct which falls without question
within the ambit of Taylor’s generic definition.” Barney, 955 F.2d at 639-40.
The wrinkle in this case is the unfortunate fact many of the records
pertaining to Mr. Haslip’s 1969 burglary conviction and guilty plea were
destroyed by fire. Among the court documents destroyed were the actual
judgment of conviction and, presumably, any plea colloquy. However, the
available records contain, among other things, an authenticated copy of the
complaint charging Mr. Haslip with breaking and entering a building (the
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Trucker’s Inn) with intent to steal, and a journal entry of judgment showing Mr.
Haslip pleaded guilty to the burglary of a building. 2 These documents are
distinguishable from those we determined would not support an enhancement in
Barney. The two convictions that could not be counted toward enhancement in
Barney were based on informations which themselves were unclear as to whether
the defendant’s entry into the building was unlawful or unprivileged, or rather, his
entry into a back room, which is neither a building nor a structure, was unlawful.
955 F.2d at 640-41. Here, Mr. Haslip was clearly charged with “unlawfully ...
break[ing] and enter[ing] a certain building, to wit: Trucker’s Inn ... with the
felonious and burglarious intent to steal.” Mr. Haslip’s reliance on Barney
therefore is misplaced.
Under these circumstances, we are confident Mr. Haslip’s 1969 burglary
conviction actually represented conduct within the Taylor definition of burglary;
we cannot and will not look at the facts underlying Mr. Haslip’s particular
conviction as he proposes. Accordingly, we hold the district court did not err in
relying on the available documents pertaining to Mr. Haslip’s guilty plea and
judgment to conclude the 1969 offense was indeed a “violent felony” under the
2
We note these documents were not included in the record on appeal;
however, Mr. Haslip does not challenge the district court’s characterization of the
relevant documents.
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Armed Career Criminal Act.
For all the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Mr. Haslip’s conviction and
sentence.
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