United States v. Starr ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 1 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 98-2065
v.
(D.C. No. CR-97-420)
(District of New Mexico)
DANIEL NATHAN STARR,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BALDOCK, HENRY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Daniel Nathan Starr appeals his jury conviction for aggravated sexual abuse
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a) and 2246(2). This court has jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
On June 24, 1997, appellant and the victim, residents of the Mescalero
Apache Reservation in New Mexico, attended an outdoor party at the
reservation’s feast grounds. Appellant took the victim to a wooded area near the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
party where he hit her, slashed her face and finger with broken glass, forced her
to perform oral sex, and forcibly penetrated her genitalia with his fingers. The
victim escaped to a nearby road after appellant passed out, and she was picked up
and taken to the reservation medical clinic by a passing motorist. As a result of
the assault, the victim sustained injuries including a lacerated face, a deep cut to
her ring finger, bruises, and a broken ankle. Appellant was convicted of four
counts of assault and aggravated sexual abuse by a jury and sentenced to twenty
years in prison.
Appellant raises three claims on appeal. He argues that his conviction
should be reversed because 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) is unconstitutionally overbroad
and underbroad resulting in a denial of his due process rights. 1 He also claims
that 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) is unconstitutionally vague, resulting in a denial of due
process. Finally, he asserts that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally
ineffective assistance by failing to object to the constitutionality of § 2241(a) and
by failing to request a jury instruction regarding lack of consent. We examine
these arguments in turn.
1
Appellant’s argument that the statute is unconstitutionally underbroad is wholly
without merit. Appellant himself devotes only one sentence to this argument, claiming
that the statute fails because “a person who did not consent to a sexual act, but who was
not forced or threatened . . . has no recourse against their assailant.” Appellant’s Br. at
20. Even if appellant’s claim were true, exclusion of such a crime would not render the
statute unconstitutional. See United States v. Ransom, 942 F.2d 775, 777-78 (10th Cir.
1991).
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I
Given appellant’s conceded failure to raise his constitutional challenges to
18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) before the district court, the court reviews this matter for
plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Orr, 864 F.2d 1505,
1508-09 (10th Cir. 1988). Plain error is error that “seriously affect[s] the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v.
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (citation omitted).
To determine whether a statute is unconstitutionally overbroad, we consider
“whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected
conduct.” Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455
U.S. 489, 494 (1982). “If it does not, then the overbreadth challenge must fail.”
Id.
To determine whether a statute is void for vagueness, we consider whether
the statute provides a defendant with fair warning of the particular conduct that it
prohibits. See United States v. Walker, 137 F.3d 1217, 1219 (10th Cir. 1998).
The statute must define the prohibited conduct with sufficient specificity so that
ordinary people can understand the law’s requirements and so the law does not
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). Where a vagueness challenge does not implicate the
First Amendment, we review the statutory challenge only with respect to the
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particular conduct charged. See Flipside, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7 (citations omitted);
Walker, 137 F.3d at 1219. “A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is
clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the
conduct of others.” Flipside, 455 U.S. at 495.
The statutory language at issue in this case provides as follows:
§ 2241. Aggravated sexual abuse
(a) By force or threat.—Whoseoever, in the special maritime
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal
prison, knowingly causes another person to engage in a sexual
act—
(1) by using force against that other person;
or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned for
any term of years or life, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2241. Forcible fellatio and forcible penetration of the genitalia by
the hand or finger of another constitute “sexual acts” under the statute. See 18
U.S.C. § 2246(2).
II
We reject appellant’s contention that 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) is overly broad.
Appellant argues that § 2241(a) is unconstitutional because absent a lack-of-
consent element, it prohibits all violent sex, even consensual violent sex. We
must consider, as an initial matter, whether the statute reaches a substantial
amount of constitutionally protected conduct. See Flipside, 455 U.S. at 494-95.
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We conclude that it does not; the statute prohibits sexual abuse and rape. There is
no support for the theory that such conduct is protected by the Constitution. Even
assuming the right to engage in sexual relations is constitutionally protected,
appellant has no right to engage in sexual assault. That is what the statute
prohibits, and that is what the record indicates occurred in this case.
Moreover, the statute is not constitutionally infirm because it contains no
explicit lack-of-consent element. “[T]he legislature has wide latitude to declare
what constitutes an offense against society and to define the elements that
constitute such an offense.” Ransom, 942 F.2d at 776. The statute’s requirement
of force or threat of force is sufficient to exclude from its ambit constitutionally
protected conduct.
III
We also reject appellant’s assertion that this statute is unconstitutionally
vague. Here, again, appellant points to the absence of a “lack of consent”
element in the statute in support of his claim. Appellant argues that the absence
of this element deprives citizens of sufficient guidance regarding the prohibited
conduct and will lead to arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the statute.
This argument, too, lacks merit. Assessing the statute in light of its application to
this case, see Flipside, 455 U.S. at 495 n.7 (citations omitted), it is clear that the
statute adequately informed appellant that the conduct at issue here was illegal,
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and provided sufficient guidance for law enforcement officers. See Walker, 137
F.3d at 1219.
IV
Finally, we reject appellant’s claim that he was denied constitutionally
effective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to challenge the
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a) and failure to request a jury instruction
on the element of “lack of consent.” “Ineffective assistance of counsel claims
should be brought in collateral proceedings, not on direct appeal. Such claims
brought on direct appeal are presumptively dismissible, and virtually all will be
dismissed.” See United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995)
(en banc). This principle is intended to permit development of the factual record
by the district court and to give this court the benefit of the district court’s views.
See id. Accordingly, we DISMISS appellant’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claims without prejudice.
AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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