Goff v. Hackett Stone Co. ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 17 1999
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JARROD GOFF,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 98-7137
(D.C. No. 98-CV-85-P)
HACKETT STONE COMPANY; (E.D. Okla.)
EUGENE IBISON, SR., Individually
and as Owner of Hackett Stone
Company,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before PORFILIO , McKAY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Jarrod Goff brought this diversity action against his former employer,
Hackett Stone Company, and its owner, Eugene Ibison, Sr., for wrongful
termination. After the parties agreed to proceed before a magistrate judge
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, improper venue, and failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), (3), (6). Because the parties submitted
materials outside the pleadings, the district court converted the motion to dismiss
to one for summary judgment, and granted judgment in defendants’ favor on
personal jurisdiction and venue grounds. Plaintiff appeals. We conclude that the
district court correctly determined that venue was improper, and that the case was
not appropriately brought in that court; we therefore need not address the personal
jurisdiction question. 1
Because subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s action is founded solely
on diversity, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) governs venue in this case. Plaintiff asserts that
venue could lie in the Eastern District of Oklahoma only under subsection (2) of
that statute, which requires that “a substantial part of the events or omissions
1
The only other appropriate federal venue is in Arkansas, not one of the
other Oklahoma districts.
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giving rise to the claim occurred” in that district. The underlying basis for his
wrongful termination claim is that defendants terminated him because he was
subject to an income assignment executed for enforcement of child support, which
he contends was an improper reason. The order for child support was issued by
the county court of LeFlore County, Oklahoma, which is in the Eastern District.
Plaintiff bases his claim of venue in the Eastern District on the issuance of this
order.
There are no facts in dispute, and we therefore review the district court’s
venue decision de novo. See Pierce v. Shorty Small’s of Branson Inc. , 137 F.3d
1190, 1191 (10th Cir. 1998); Hooker v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs. , 858 F.2d 525, 528 n.2 (9th Cir.1988). All aspects of plaintiff’s
employment, including his discharge, occurred in Arkansas, as he admits. The
issuance of the order from an Oklahoma court that allegedly led to the discharge
is simply too tangential to be considered a substantial part of the events giving
rise to the claim. Moreover, venue statutes are generally designed for the benefit
of defendants, and in determining what events or omissions give rise to a claim,
the “focus [is] on relevant activities of the defendant, not of the plaintiff.”
Woodke v. Dahm , 70 F.3d 983, 985 (8th Cir. 1995). Issuance of the court order
cannot be considered an activity of defendants; if anything, it would be
considered an activity of plaintiff, since it apparently resulted from his
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nonpayment of child support. We thus agree with the district court that venue
was not proper in the Eastern District of Oklahoma.
We do, however, disagree with the district court’s disposition of this case.
It converted defendants’ entire motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment
because materials were submitted outside the pleadings. That is appropriate for a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), see Rule 12(b)
(“If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) . . . , matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment . . . .”), but it is not appropriate for motions
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or improper venue under
Rules 12(b)(2) and (3). Dismissals for these reasons should be without prejudice.
See Rule 41(b). In contrast, dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) or entries of summary
judgment are with prejudice and may preclude any subsequent action in another
district. See Sherman v. American Fed’n of Musicians , 588 F.2d 1313, 1314 (10th
Cir. 1978); EF Operating Corp. v. American Bldgs. , 993 F.2d 1046, 1048-49 (3d
Cir. 1993) ; see also 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure , § 2713 (“In general, courts have ruled that
summary judgment is an inappropriate vehicle for raising a question concerning
the courts[’] subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction or venue . . . .”).
The court therefore should have dismissed this case, whether for lack of personal
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jurisdiction or improper venue, without prejudice rather than granting summary
judgment to defendants.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is VACATED, and the case
is REMANDED to the district court for entry of an order dismissing the case
without prejudice.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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