Miller v. Apfel ( 2000 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    NOV 8 2000
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    SANDRA MILLER, for her son
    Aaron Miller,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    No. 00-1056
    v.                                                (D.C. No. 99-S-811)
    (D. Colo.)
    KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner
    of Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT            *
    Before BALDOCK , KELLY , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal.   See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Plaintiff-appellant appeals from the district court’s memorandum decision
    upholding the Commissioner’s decision denying Supplemental Security Income
    benefits to plaintiff’s son, Aaron, who suffers from Attention Deficit Disorder. In
    essence, the Commissioner determined that Aaron was not disabled under the
    Social Security Act regarding children under age eighteen.      See 42 U.S.C.
    § 1382c(C). We have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C.
    § 1291, and we affirm.
    In reviewing the Commissioner’s decision, we determine whether
    substantial evidence in the record as a whole supports the factual findings and
    whether correct legal standards were applied.       See Brown v. Callahan , 
    120 F.3d 1133
    , 1135 (10th Cir. 1997). We may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our
    discretion for that of the Commissioner.    See Kelley v. Chater , 
    62 F.3d 335
    , 337
    (10th Cir. 1995).
    The focus of this appeal is whether substantial evidence supports the
    conclusion of the administrative law judge (ALJ) that Aaron did not have an
    impairment listed in or functionally equal to one listed in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
    subpart P, app. 1, Part B, § 112.11. In making this determination, the ALJ used
    the “broad areas of functioning” method.        See 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(2). To
    meet the “functionally equivalent in severity to a listed impairment” requirement,
    a child must have an “extreme” limitation in one area of functioning or a
    -2-
    “marked” limitation in two or more areas of functioning.           See 
    id. “Marked” limitation
    means “more than moderate” but “less than extreme” and may arise
    when several activities or functions are limited or if the degree of limitation
    seriously interferes with the child’s functioning.        See . § 416.926a(c)(3)(i)(C).
    “Extreme” limitation means no meaningful functioning in a given area and may
    arise when one or several activities or functions are limited.        See
    § 416.926a(c)(3)(ii)(C). The ALJ determined that Aaron had neither a “marked”
    nor an “extreme” limitation in any of the five areas of functioning of
    (1) cognition/communication, (2) motor skills (3) social skills (4) personal skills
    and (5) concentration, persistence or pace.         See § 416.926a(c)(4)(i)-(iii), (v)-(vi).
    Although appellant argues that the ALJ did not consider her claim that
    Aaron is disabled because of his behavior,      see Appellant’s Br. at 8-9, the record
    reflects the ALJ did note Aaron’s behavior problems,          see Appellant’s App. at
    20-22, but concluded they did not rise to the level of a “marked” or “extreme”
    limitation. The thrust of plaintiff’s argument is a request that this court reweigh
    the evidence, which we may not do.       See Kelley , 62 F.3d at 337. We have
    carefully reviewed the record and agree with the district court’s conclusion that
    there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s decision.
    -3-
    Accordingly, for substantially the reasons stated in the district court’s
    Memorandum Decision on Appeal filed December 13, 1999,        the judgment of the
    United States District Court for the District of Colorado is AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Bobby R. Baldock
    Circuit Judge
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 00-1056

Filed Date: 11/8/2000

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021