United States v. Nipper , 3 F. App'x 882 ( 2001 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 8 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 00-5057
(D.C. No. 98-CV-526-K)
TIMOTHY LEE NIPPER, separately (N.D. Okla.)
and as trustee for the Proprietor
Property Trust; THOMAS EUGENE
NIPPER, as trustee for the Proprietor
Property Trust and as nominee of
Timothy Lee Nipper,
Defendants-Appellants,
and
MELLON MORTGAGE COMPANY,
as mortgagee,
Defendant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY , KELLY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellants challenge the district court ’s rulings in favor of the government,
plaintiff below. The government brought suit in district court on income tax
assessments against Timothy Nipper for tax years 1981 through 1986, seeking to
set aside certain real property conveyances and foreclose on the property pursuant
to pending tax liens. Timothy and Thomas Nipper each answered the suit
individually, but no answer was filed on behalf of the Proprietor Property Trust.
The district court granted default judgment against the trust, declaring its interest
in the property foreclosed. The government also moved for summary judgment
against the Nippers, but the Nippers failed to respond. After the district court
granted summary judgment to the government, the Nippers filed a motion
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 to vacate that ruling, arguing that the government
had not provided sufficient evidentiary support for its tax assessments against
Timothy Nipper under an unreported income exception. The district court denied
the Rule 59 motion largely on the basis that the Nippers had failed to respond to
the government’s summary judgment motion, and without acknowledging the
exception. This appeal followed.
-2-
We have jurisdiction over this appeal by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The
standards of review applicable here depend on the basis of the district court ’s
ruling. Although the government argues that the district court deemed the matter
confessed because the Nippers failed to respond to the government’s motion for
summary judgment , we disagree. While noting its apparent authority under its
own local rules to enter the relief requested where a party fails to respond to a
motion, the district court stated that it had “nevertheless conducted an
independent inquiry,” concluding that the government’s motion for summary
judgment “must be granted.” Rec. Vol. I, doc. 33, at 2. We conclude this ruling
was a grant of summary judgment on the merits, a decision which is reviewed de
novo, applying the same standards as would the district court pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). See Bullington v. United Air Lines, Inc. , 186 F.3d 1301, 1313 (10th
Cir. 1999). The district court ’s denial of the Nippers’ Rule 59 motion, however,
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Adams v. Reliance Standard Life Ins.
Co. , 225 F.3d 1179, 1186 n.5 (10th Cir. 2000).
On appeal, the Nippers contend that, contrary to a recognized exception to
the usual presumption of correctness afforded tax assessments, the government
prevailed despite its failure to present the required minimal evidentiary
-3-
foundation for the assessments. 1
This evidentiary foundation “may consist of
evidence linking the taxpayer with an income-producing activity such that it can
be inferred that the taxpayer received income from the activity, or it may consist
of evidence showing an ownership interest in assets possessed by the taxpayer.”
Sundel v. Comm’r , 75 T.C.M. (CCH) 1853, 1856 (1998) (citations omitted). Our
review of the evidence supporting the government’s tax assessments convinces us
that the Nippers are correct; the government has not met this minimal burden to
satisfy the unreported income exception.
The totality of the evidence supporting the assessments against Timothy
Nipper are statements which appear in two schedules attached to the Notice of
Deficiency underlying the assessments. The first is: “Based on information
gathered concerning Uptown Trash Service during 1985 and 1986, it has been
1
This court has summarized the exception as follows:
In a suit brought by the government to collect taxes resulting
from unreported income, the government generally establishes a
prima facie case when it shows a timely assessment of the tax due,
supported by a minimal evidentiary foundation, at which point a
presumption of correctness arises. A presumption of correctness
attaches to the Commissioner’s assessment, once some substantive
evidence is introduced demonstrating that the taxpayer received
unreported income.
United States v. McMullin , 948 F.2d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 1991) (citation
omitted).
-4-
determined that your 1985 self-employment income was $42,000. Using 1985 as
the base year, income was calculated for all other years . . . .” Suppl. Rec. Vol. I,
Ex. 9, Schedule B. 2
The second statement is: “Based on information gathered
concerning Uptown Trash Service during 1985 and 1986, it has been determined
that you had business expenses related to self-employment income. These
expenses for 1985 were calculated to be $12,000. Using 1985 as a base year,
expenses were calculated for all other years . . . .” Id. , Schedule C. No evidence
supporting these statements was attached to the Notice of Deficiency or presented
to the district court , either in connection with the government’s motion for
summary judgment or in response to the Nippers’ Rule 59 motion.
On appeal, the government first contends that the assessments should be
given the usual presumption of correctness based on the government’s production
of the Certificates of Assessment. This argument ignores the unreported income
exception which has been recognized in this court, see McMullin , 948 F.2d at
1192. Without openly disavowing the exception, the government also argues that
the Nippers “could not avoid the entry of judgment against them by merely resting
on general denials of tax liability or the claim that the Commissioner’s
assessments were arbitrary.” Appellee’s Br. at 18. Again, this argument ignores
2
This court has supplemented the original record on appeal with the
government’s motion for summary judgment and attached exhibits.
-5-
the threshold burden placed on the government by this exception. Without the
required minimal evidentiary foundation, the government’s assessments “may not
be supported even where the taxpayer is silent.” Erickson v. Comm’r , 937 F.2d
1548, 1551 (10th Cir. 1991). We fail to see how the Nippers’ failure to respond
to the government’s motion for summary judgment can excuse the government’s
initial burden in district court to come forward with evidence in support of its
claim that Timothy Nipper received unreported income before a presumption of
correctness is afforded its assessments.
The government seeks to distinguish the cases on which the Nippers rely so
as to narrow or even eliminate the unreported income exception. It cites other
authority in support of its contention that, once it has identified a “likely source
for the income,” the government’s burden to come forward with a minimum
evidentiary foundation has been established. See Appellee’s Br. at 20 n.10.
Those cases on which the government relies, however, are distinguishable, and do
not establish either the inapplicability of the unreported income exception to this
case or the government’s satisfaction of the exception’s standards. These cases
involve more specific evidence in support of the tax assessments, a taxpayer’s
failure to raise the unreported income exception until appeal, and a failure to
deny, even in general terms, the receipt of unreported income. The government
-6-
here acknowledges Timothy Nipper’s general denial of any involvement with
Uptown Trash Service or receipt of income from it. See id. at 8. 3
Unlike the information upon which other courts have concluded that the
government satisfied the required evidentiary foundation in unreported income
cases, the information before the district court in this case fails to meet even that
minimal standard. The statements in the Notice of Deficiency do not link
Timothy Nipper with an income-producing activity or ownership of an asset
which produced income. 4
They do not reveal or describe any supporting
substantive evidence, nor is such evidence attached. They fail to demonstrate any
rational basis for the imputation of unreported income to years before and after
the alleged 1985 income and expense figures. Cf. Senter v. Comm’r , 70 T.C.M.
(CCH) 54, 58 (1995) (holding failure to present predicate evidence supporting
receipt of alleged unreported income required ruling that government’s deficiency
determination was arbitrary). Without specific evidence connecting Timothy
Nipper to income or assets associated with Uptown Trash Service, the government
3
We do not address the government’s arguments in support of its use of
Consumer Price Index (CPI) statistics as a calculation tool. The Nippers did not
challenge use of the CPI, only the basis for the alleged 1985 unreported income.
4
The government’s averment in response to the Nippers’ Rule 59 motion that
the assessments were based on Timothy Nippers “ownership of Uptown Trash
Service,” Rec. Vol. I, doc. 38 at 6, and its later contention on appeal that Timothy
received income from Uptown Trash Service, see Appellee’s Br. at 14, are not
supported by the statements in the Notice of Deficiency.
-7-
is, in essence, forcing the taxpayer to prove a negative. See Weimerskirch v.
Comm’r , 596 F.2d 358, 361 (9th Cir. 1979).
Although the district court did not have the benefit of briefing on the
unreported income exception in its initial determination of the government’s
summary judgment motion, it is clear that the government was not entitled to
“judgment as a matter of law” in light of the exception and the failure of the
government to present the required minimal evidentiary foundation. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c); Carmona v. Toledo , 215 F.3d 124, 134 n.9 (1st Cir. 2000). The grant of
summary judgment to the government was legal error requiring reversal. For
those same reasons, we hold that the district court ’s subsequent denial of the
Nippers’ Rule 59 motion was an abuse of discretion, see Phelps v. Hamilton , 122
F.3d 1309, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating manifest legal error is a proper basis for
Rule 59 relief), and we reject the government’s implicit argument that the Nippers
have waived their arguments about the unreported income exception because they
failed to respond to the government’s motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, we remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings, wherein the burden will be on the government to prove its tax
assessments. See Erickson , 927 F.2d at 1550 (“Where it lacks a rational basis the
presumption evaporates.”); cf. McHan v. Comm’r , 71 T.C. M. (CCH) 1724, 1726
(1996) (noting, in similar case before the Tax Court that, on remand, the burden is
-8-
on the government to come forward with evidence to support its tax deficiencies).
We reject the Nippers’ argument that, because the government has not satisfied
the minimal evidentiary burden of the unreported income exception, they should
be granted summary judgment. The Nippers have not demonstrated that they are
entitled to judgment as a matter of law; they have established only that the
presumption of correctness does not attach to the government’s tax assessments.
In light of our remand of this case for further proceedings on the validity of
the tax assessments, we decline to address the parties’ arguments about the
ownership of the property in question or the government’s claim to foreclose on
its liens. We do note, however, that the district court ’s grant of a default
judgment against the Proprietor Trust and subsequent foreclosure against the trust
were not appealed to this court.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
-9-