Davis v. Newton-Embry ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                       FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    May 2, 2012
    TENTH CIRCUIT                  Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    STEPHANIE DEANN DAVIS,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    No. 12-6007
    MILLICENT NEWTON-EMBRY,
    (D.C. No. 5:11-CV-00079-W)
    Warden of the Mabel Bassett
    Correctional Center,                                  (W.D. Okla.)
    Respondent-Appellee .
    ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
    Before KELLY, TYMKOVICH, GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
    Stephanie Davis, along with a co-defendant, was tried in Oklahoma state
    court for the first degree murder of Ms. Davis’s young child and on related
    charges of neglect and abuse. Ms. Davis was convicted of the murder and
    sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. After appealing that conviction to
    the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, she brought a federal habeas petition
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    , alleging that her conviction was constitutionally invalid
    *
    This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
    the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
    persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    on the grounds that she was entitled to a trial separate from her co-defendant and
    that the prosecutor improperly commented on her Fifth Amendment right to
    remain silent. After receiving the recommendations of a magistrate, the district
    court denied the petition.
    The district court did not issue a certificate of appealability (COA) and Ms.
    Davis does not specifically request one from us. We construe the district court’s
    failure to issue a COA as a denial and, as a COA is a prerequisite of our
    consideration of Ms. Davis’s claims, we construe her appeal as a request for such
    a certificate. See United States v. Riddick, 
    104 F.3d 1239
    , 1241 (10th Cir. 1997),
    overruled on other grounds by United States v. Kunzman, 
    125 F.3d 1363
     (10th
    Cir. 1997).
    We may issue a COA only if Ms. Davis makes a “substantial showing of
    the denial of a constitutional right.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2253
    (c)(2). To meet this
    standard she must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or,
    for that matter agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
    manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
    proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 
    529 U.S. 473
    , 484 (2000) (internal
    quotation omitted). That is, she must show that reasonable jurists might disagree
    with the district court’s determination that the OCCA’s decision was not
    “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
    -2-
    Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1).
    In support of her claim that she was entitled to a separate trial, Ms. Davis
    points to Bruton v. United States, 
    391 U.S. 123
     (1968), arguing that under Bruton
    severance is required whenever co-defendant’s defenses are “mutually
    antagonistic.” But as we have previously recognized, the clear scope of Bruton
    encompasses only the situation where a co-defendant’s statement inculpating the
    defendant is admitted into evidence. See United States v. Sarracino, 
    340 F.3d 1148
    , 1160 (10th Cir. 2003). And even then, “the exception created by Bruton is
    a narrow one,” applying only “in those few contexts where the statement is so
    inculpatory as to the defendant that the practical and human limitations of the jury
    system cannot be ignored.” 
    Id.
     (quotation omitted). In this case, while the
    statements of Ms. Davis’s co-defendant may have been inferentially
    incriminating, there is no real suggestion that they were so inculpatory as to
    constitutionally require separate trials.
    Ms. Davis’s remaining claim, that the prosecutor improperly commented on
    her right to remain silent, also does not merit habeas relief. As the district court
    noted, the prosecutor’s comments were effectively invited by the defense itself,
    and any error was undoubtedly harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence
    supporting the conviction.
    -3-
    Ms. Davis’s application for a COA is denied and this appeal is dismissed.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Neil M. Gorsuch
    Circuit Judge
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-6007

Judges: Kelly, Tymkovich, Gorsuch

Filed Date: 5/2/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024