United States v. Saenz , 10 F. App'x 701 ( 2001 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 8 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 00-1350
v. (D. Colorado)
ABEL SAENZ, (D.C. No. 99-CR-317-M)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE , ANDERSON , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
Abel Saenz pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute or possess
with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. He was sentenced to 159
months imprisonment. He appeals that sentence. We affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
BACKGROUND
Mr. Saenz and three others were indicted in September 1999 on a two count
indictment. The first count charged them with conspiracy to distribute or to
possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(ii). The second count charged them
with distributing or possessing with the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(ii), and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2.
On November 19, pursuant to a Plea Agreement, Mr. Saenz pled guilty to
the first count of the indictment and the government dismissed the second count
of the indictment. The terms of the Agreement stated that it was made pursuant to
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(B). 1
The Agreement included the following:
6. The parties understand that sentencing – and any departure
from the applicable guideline range and the statutory
mandatory minimum – is solely within the sound discretion of
the Court.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(B) provides that the attorneys for the government
1
and the defendant may agree that, after the defendant pleads guilty, the
government attorney will:
recommend, or agree not to oppose the defendant’s request for a
particular sentence or sentencing range, or that a particular provision
of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing
factor is or is not applicable to the case. Any such recommendation
or request is not binding on the court.
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....
The statement of facts herein does not preclude either party
from presenting and arguing, for sentencing purposes, additional
facts or factors not included herein that are relevant to the guideline
computation or to sentencing in general. Nor is the Court or
Probation precluded from considering such facts.
....
The parties understand that the Court may impose any
sentence, up to the statutory maximum, regardless of any guideline
range computed, and that the Court is not bound by any position of
the parties. The Court is free . . . to reach its own findings of fact
and sentencing factors considering the parties’ stipulations, the
presentence investigation, and any other relevant information.
. . . New facts that arise or are discovered may cause a party to
change its position with regard to guideline computation or
sentencing.
Plea Agreement at 3, 4, 7, Appellant’s App. Tab D (citations omitted). The Plea
Agreement further provided, with respect to Mr. Saenz’s criminal history, as
follows:
The parties understand that the defendant’s criminal history
computation contained herein is tentative, that Probation will further
investigate his criminal history, and that the final criminal history
category will be determined by the Court.
Id. at 7. The Agreement then listed five criminal convictions or offenses,
including the present one, and concluded “at this time it appears that defendant
has 8 criminal history points and, therefore, a tentative criminal history category
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IV.” Id. at 8. The Agreement also stated, “[t]he career offender/career livelihood
adjustments do not apply.” Id.The Agreement further provided:
The guideline range resulting from the estimated offense level
set forth . . . above, and the tentative criminal history category . . .
above, is 70-87 months. However, in order to be as accurate as
possible, with the criminal history category undetermined at this
time, the estimated offense level set forth . . . above could
conceivably result in a range from 46-57 months (bottom of Category
I), to 92-115 months (top of Category VI). However, based upon the
net weight of the controlled substance involved, the statutory
minimum mandatory is 60 months, and the statutory maximum
sentence is 40 years.
Id. at 8-9. The Agreement contained another paragraph explicitly setting forth the
maximum statutory penalty of 40 years. Id. at 3.
At the change-of-plea hearing, the district judge advised Mr. Saenz that the
mandatory minimum sentence was five years and that there was “a possibility of
up to 40 years.” Tr. of Change of Plea Proceedings at 9, Appellant’s App. Tab L.
After reviewing various aspects of the Plea Agreement with Mr. Saenz, the
following colloquy occurred:
THE COURT: But the sentencing is to be decided, the particular
sentence applicable to you, under a set of guidelines. And this
document that we’re looking at deals with those guidelines.
Now, admittedly, they’re kind of complex, and it involves a
scoring system, points on, points off. And a lot of what this
document talks about is what your lawyer, Mr. Lozow, and Mr.
Troyer, the government’s lawyer, think would be the guideline
computation for you. Do you understand that?
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THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. I read it.
THE COURT: Okay. Now, included in that scoring system is prior
offenses, other crimes that you’ve been found guilty of. Do you
understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Uh-huh. Yes.
THE COURT: And it’s expected here that that might put you in
what’s called a Category 4, and that the guideline range there would
be 70 to 87 months.
THE DEFENDANT: Uh-huh.
THE COURT: Okay. Now, you know, we’re not here to decide what
the sentence would be exactly, because if you go ahead with the plea
of guilty, what will happen is the matter will be put over. It takes
about ten weeks for the whole process. The probation officer gets
assigned, does some checking of records, gathers information,
including any information from you, and prepares what’s called a
presentence report, which you get to read in advance, and to which
you can state any objection that you have through your lawyer, he’ll
go over it with you, and the government, too, and then we’d have a
hearing, at which time I would decide the exact sentence that would
be imposed on you. It’s my responsibility to do that. Understand?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.
Id. at 9-10. After further colloquy, the judge stated, “[s]o, like I say, there’s no
way for you to know this morning the exact sentence that would be imposed, and
you have to think about it in terms of maybe you’re going to spend five years in
prison.” Id. at 12.
Mr. Saenz’s attorney stated, “I don’t see any defense in this case, either
legal or factual. The district attorney has indicated they’d make a non-binding
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recommendation for 60 months in this case.” Id. at 19. The judge then concluded
that “the plea of guilty to Count 1 has been entered knowing[ly], voluntarily and
intelligently.” Id. The court did not advise Mr. Saenz that he would not be
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea even if the court did not accept the sentencing
recommendation contained in the Plea Agreement. This latter advisement is
required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(e)(2) for plea agreements entered under Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(e)(1)(B).
Prior to the scheduled sentencing date, Mr. Saenz was informed that, in the
course of preparing its presentence report, the probation department had
discovered that he had an additional felony drug conviction that qualified as a
controlled substance offense under the career offender guideline. Based upon this
discovery, the presentence report classified Mr. Saenz as a career offender and
calculated the applicable guideline range as 188-235 months.
On January 4, 2000, Mr. Saenz filed a motion to clarify, seeking a status
hearing, and a motion to continue sentencing. He essentially sought to have the
Plea Agreement enforced so that he would receive a five-year sentence. The
government responded that the presentence report’s classification of Mr. Saenz as
a career offender and its corresponding guideline range calculation of 188-235
months was correct and that Mr. Saenz “should be sentenced to 160 months ( i.e. ,
the bottom of that range less 15% pursuant to the government’s agreement to file
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a motion under Section 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines [for substantial
assistance]).” Government’s Resp. to Presentence Investigation Report at 4,
Appellant’s App. Tab I. The government filed a motion for downward departure,
as the Plea Agreement provided, based upon Mr. Saenz’s substantial assistance.
Mr. Saenz’s attorney, Donald Lozow, then filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel, citing Mr. Saenz’s request that Mr. Lozow no longer represent him. At
the first sentencing hearing, held on January 28, 2000, the court stated, “[y]ou
know, the man ought to withdraw his plea if this is a shock that he—this isn’t a
voluntary plea because he didn’t realize the extent of his exposure, and we’ll go
to trial.” Tr. of Sentencing Proceedings at 8, Appellant’s App. Tab M.
Mr. Saenz’s attorney responded to that “invitation,” as follows: “If we do that,
Your Honor, and believe me, I’ve spent some sleepless nights over this, if the
Court does that . . . he loses his three level credits [for acceptance of
responsibility]. Id. Mr. Saenz did not at that time seek to withdraw his guilty
plea. The judge continued the sentencing proceeding to permit the probation
department to gather more information about the cases upon which it based Mr.
Saenz’s criminal history.
The continued hearing occurred on May 5, 2000, at which time the court
reviewed the probation department’s latest information on Mr. Saenz’s prior
convictions and considered Mr. Saenz’s attorney’s request to withdraw from the
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case. Mr. Saenz’s attorney, Mr. Lozow, stated that Mr. Saenz wished to withdraw
his guilty plea and proceed to trial with a different attorney, although no formal
motion to withdraw the plea was made at that time. When Mr. Lozow referred to
the court’s observation at the January 28, 2000, hearing that Mr. Saenz ought to
withdraw his plea “if this [the discovery that he qualified for career offender
status] is a shock,” the court characterized its prior statement as “thinking out
loud.” Tr. of Sentencing and Hr’g on Mot. to Withdraw at 4, Appellant’s App.
Tab N.
When asked its position on any proposed motion to withdraw the guilty
plea, the government responded that it opposed such withdrawal, stating, “[t]he
plea agreement sets forth in several places clearly that sentencing is up to the
Court, it’s in the sole discretion of the Court. None of the numbers in there are
guarantees. And in two separate places, it sets forth the statutory maximum of 40
years.” Id. at 8. The government also explained its view that Mr. Saenz
presented no justification for withdrawing his guilty plea:
[a]nd I think there had been no other grounds stated other than the
surprise, as Your Honor called it, from that New Mexico conviction,
and that should not have been a surprise to the defendant himself.
He’s the one in the best position to be fully aware of the sentence
that he actually served time on.
Id. The court granted Mr. Lozow’s motion to withdraw, and continued the
sentencing proceeding to permit Mr. Saenz to obtain a new attorney.
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After several more continuances, sentencing finally occurred on August 18,
2000, with Mr. Saenz represented by new counsel. At that hearing, Mr. Saenz
sought to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that the voluntariness of his
guilty plea was conditioned upon the affirmative representation in the Plea
Agreement that he was not subject to the career offender provisions of the
guidelines. The court denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, stating:
The finding that I made at the time of the entry of the sentencing—of
the plea of guilty under the agreement that it was knowing and
voluntary is still the finding. The plea agreement is absolutely clear
that Mr. Saenz could be sentenced up to the statutory maximum, and
that what was set out here as the expectation of counsel was subject
to the modification that the Court, of course, would make the
determination of the sentencing guidelines at the time of sentencing.
Tr. of Sentencing Proceedings at 9, Appellant’s App. Tab P. The judge sentenced
Mr. Saenz to 159 months imprisonment.
Mr. Saenz appeals, arguing he should have been permitted to withdraw his
guilty plea because the government violated the Plea Agreement by agreeing with
the presentence report’s classification of him as a career offender and by
recommending a sentencing guideline range of 188-235 months. He also argues
that the district court failed to advise him, as required by Rule 11, that he could
not withdraw his guilty plea even if the court failed to follow the government’s
recommendation in the Plea Agreement.
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DISCUSSION
I. Denial of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea
We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of
Mr. Saenz’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. United States v. Siedlik , 231
F.3d 744, 748 (10th Cir. 2000). “Defendants do not have an absolute right to
withdraw a guilty plea.” Id. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(e) provides that “[i]f a motion
to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . is made before sentence is imposed, the court
may permit the plea to be withdrawn if the defendant shows any fair and just
reason.” See Siedlik , 231 F.3d at 748. The defendant bears the burden of
establishing a “fair and just reason” for withdrawal of the plea. Id.Mr. Saenz argues he should have been allowed to withdraw his guilty plea
because the government affirmatively represented to him that he would not be
classified as a career offender for sentencing purposes. Thus, Mr. Saenz argues,
when the government later agreed with the probation department’s
recommendation that he in fact be sentenced as a career offender, it violated the
Plea Agreement. We disagree.
As the government points out, and the district court noted, the Plea
Agreement was replete with references to the fact that the court had complete
discretion to ultimately determine Mr. Saenz’s sentence, notwithstanding any
position taken by any party. It also expressly contemplated the consideration by
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the court of “additional facts or factors not included herein that are relevant to
the guideline computation.” Plea Agreement at 4, Appellant’s App. Tab D.
Further, it stated that Mr. Saenz’s criminal history calculation was tentative, that
the probation department would “further investigate his criminal history,” id. at 7,
and that the Plea Agreement itself “is not conditioned on the defendant being in a
particular criminal history category.” Id. at 8. Finally, it reiterated several times
that the statutory maximum penalty was forty years. Thus, the Agreement did not
bind the government or the court to the conclusion that Mr. Saenz could never be
classified as a career offender.
Moreover, the reason for the government’s and the court’s initial
misapprehension as to whether Mr. Saenz qualified for career offender status was
because a prior felony drug conviction was omitted from the recitation in the Plea
Agreement of Mr. Saenz’s criminal history. We must assume that only Mr. Saenz
was aware of the omission. Thus, the erroneous conclusion that Mr. Saenz did
not qualify for career offender status was the result of his implicit
misrepresentation to the government and the court.
Additionally, as we have stated before:
this circuit looks to seven factors in deciding whether a defendant
has met the burden of showing that the district court, in denying a
motion to withdraw a plea, acted unjustly or unfairly: (1) whether
the defendant has asserted his innocence; (2) whether the government
will be prejudiced if the motion is granted; (3) whether the defendant
has delayed in filing the motion; (4) the inconvenience to the court if
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the motion is granted; (5) the quality of the defendant’s assistance of
counsel; (6) whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; and (7)
whether the granting of the motion would cause a waste of judicial
resources.
Siedlik , 231 F.3d at 749. Consideration of these factors weighs against permitting
the withdrawal of Mr. Saenz’s guilty plea.
First, Mr. Saenz has never asserted his innocence. Indeed, his counsel
conceded he had no defense, “either legal or factual.” Tr. of Change of Plea
Proceedings at 19, Appellant’s App. Tab L. Second, withdrawal “likely would
prejudice the government by forcing it to undergo much of the same process it
already has completed.” Siedlik , 231 F.3d at 749. Third, Mr. Saenz delayed
seeking to withdraw his plea and only, finally, moved to withdraw orally right
before sentence was imposed, some seven months and several hearings after the
career offender issue arose. 2
Cf. United States v. Rhodes , 913 F.2d 839, 845
(10th Cir. 1990) (noting that defendant failed to satisfy third factor where he
“orally moved to withdraw his plea when the sentencing hearing was already
underway, with no explanation as to why a motion to withdraw the guilty plea had
not been submitted earlier”). Fourth, the court would undoubtedly be
inconvenienced by permitting a knowing and voluntary plea to be withdrawn right
As his attorney at one point acknowledged in court, there would be some
2
measurable risks to Mr. Saenz involved in withdrawing his guilty plea. He would
lose the three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility and his substantial
assistance reduction could also be at risk.
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before sentencing. Fifth, although Mr. Saenz asked to have his first attorney
released, there is no evidence that he was ineffective in any way. Sixth, the plea
was knowing and voluntary, in the sense that Mr. Saenz had read and understood
its terms and was not coerced into making it, although the court, as discussed
below, failed to give part of the advice required under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11.
Finally, allowing the plea to be withdrawn at this point would waste judicial
resources.
In sum, while Mr. Saenz was surely disappointed when he realized his
sentence would be 159 months rather than 60 months, such a sentence was
permissible and possible under the terms of the Plea Agreement. It is neither
unfair nor unjust to prevent Mr. Saenz from taking advantage of a factual
omission in the Plea Agreement of which he alone was aware. We therefore find
no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea.
II. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 Advice
Mr. Saenz also argues his acceptance of the Plea Agreement was
involuntary because neither the Agreement nor the court gave him the full
advisement required by Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. The Plea Agreement expressly stated
that it was a Rule 11(e)(1)(B) agreement. The government concedes it was such
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an agreement. We therefore assume that it was. 3
As such, the court was required
by Rule 11(e)(2) to “advise the defendant that if the court does not accept the
recommendation or request the defendant nevertheless has no right to withdraw
the plea.” As the government agrees, the court failed to give that advisement, nor
did the Agreement itself contain any such advisement. In that situation, “the issue
for this court to determine is whether such failure was harmless error.” United
States v. Vaughn , 7 F.3d 1533, 1535 (10th Cir. 1993). “Harmless error” is
defined as follows: “Any variance from the procedures required by this rule
which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(h). “The issue of whether a district court has substantially complied with rule
11, including an analysis under subsection 11(h), before accepting a guilty plea, is
a question of law subject to review de novo.” Vaughn , 7 F.3d at 1535.
In determining whether the failure to give the full advisement was harmless
error, we have held that such error “warrants reversal only if it had a significant
The government at oral argument characterized the Agreement as a “soft”
3
Rule 11(e)(1)(B) agreement because it does not contain a specific sentence or
even a specific sentencing range which the government agreed to recommend to
the court. Rather, different parts of the Agreement refer to different sentencing
ranges and options. And, although the Agreement states that the career offender
guideline is inapplicable, the Agreement also clearly states that the criminal
history calculation is tentative and subject to revision. The Agreement as a whole
makes it clear that the court would ultimately determine Mr. Saenz’s exact
sentence and additional information would be gathered about Mr. Saenz’s
criminal history and could be used.
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influence on appellant’s decision to plead guilty.” Id. “We will not hold a Rule
11 defect harmless where the plea is a product of a ‘material misrepresentation’
relied on by the defendant.” United States v. Gigot , 147 F.3d 1193, 1197 (10th
Cir. 1998). “Nor will we find harmless error where ‘[t]here is a reasonable
possibility that [defendant] was confused in a way that compliance with Rule 11
could have remedied.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Theron , 849 F.2d 477, 481
(10th Cir. 1988)).
Because each case is so fact-specific, our prior cases finding a Rule 11
violation either harmless or not harmless are instructive. In Theron , the district
court, as here, failed to advise the defendant under Rule 11(e)(2). We held the
error was not harmless and accordingly vacated the defendant’s conviction and
sentence. In Vaughn , we reached the opposite conclusion, finding the Rule
11(e)(2) violation harmless. The factual differences between the two cases are
significant: in Theron , the defendant was a South African, “not familiar with
American criminal procedure, and his counsel was in the process of
unsuccessfully attempting to withdraw from the case.” Theron , 849 F.2d at 481.
Moreover, the defendant was confused as to what the plea agreement stated
“because of the language barrier and the difference in customs.” Id.Furthermore, we found the timing of the defendant’s motion to withdraw
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significant: as soon as he realized he might not get the recommended sentence,
he filed a motion to withdraw his plea.
In Vaughn , by contrast, we were “convinced that Vaughn understood the
contents of the plea agreement. He knew that the court was not bound by
anything contained in the agreement.” Vaughn , 7 F.3d at 1536. In that case, the
plea agreement “neither guaranteed nor even mentioned a specific length of
sentence. . . . Vaughn had no guarantees even as to the applicable base offense
level or criminal history category because neither could be reasonably calculated
until after the presentence investigation .” Id. (emphasis added). Furthermore, we
noted that “Vaughn does not allege that he would not have entered a guilty plea if
the court had given the proper warning, which is relevant and important to a
harmless error analysis.” Id.While we agree with the government that this is a close case, we conclude,
on balance, that the error was harmless. First, Mr. Saenz has never argued that he
would not have entered a guilty plea had the court given him the full advisement.
Indeed, the record contains various references to both Mr. Saenz’s and his
attorney’s awareness of the fact that he would have faced a real risk of an even
greater sentence than the one he ultimately received had he gone to trial and been
found guilty. And the likelihood of his being found guilty was significant.
Second, although the possibility of his withdrawing his guilty plea was
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mentioned, he never actually moved to do so until right before sentencing, some
seven months after the issue of Mr. Saenz’s career offender status arose. Third,
although the Plea Agreement mentioned 60 months, the Agreement as a whole
made it abundantly clear that Mr. Saenz’s criminal history was tentative and
subject to revision, that the court would make the final decision on sentencing,
and that the maximum statutory sentence possible was forty years. As we were
with the defendant in Vaughn , we are convinced Mr. Saenz understood the
contents of that Agreement. In sum, we conclude that the error in failing to
specifically advise Mr. Saenz that he could withdraw his guilty plea if the court
did not accept the recommendations in the Plea Agreement did not substantially
affect his decision to plead guilty, and was, accordingly, a harmless error.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM Mr. Saenz’s sentence and
conviction.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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