Springfield v. FCI Englewood ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 3 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
FRANCIS EDWARD SPRINGFIELD,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 02-8063
v. (D. Wyoming)
FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL (D.C. No. 02–CV-63-B)
INSTITUTE ENGLEWOOD
WARDEN, WYOMING ATTORNEY
GENERAL,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , HENRY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the record and the appellant’s brief, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C). The case is
therefore submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
I. BACKGROUND
Francis Edward Springfield was convicted after a jury trial of various drug
and firearms violations. 1
On direct appeal, this court affirmed Mr. Springfield’s
convictions, but remanded for resentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), the Armed
Career Criminal Act (ACCA). See United States v. Springfield , 196 F.3d 1180(10th Cir. 1999). We agreed with the government that Mr. Springfield:
qualifies as an armed career criminal because he previously
has been convicted of at least three violent felonies: (1)
escape from a prison honor camp, (2) involuntary
manslaughter and use of a firearm during and in relation to
a crime of violence, and (3) assault and battery while armed
with a dangerous weapon.
Id. at 1185. We rejected Mr. Springfield’s argument that he did not have three
prior violent felony convictions because he had been convicted under a Wyoming
statute concerning nonviolent escape from custody. We reasoned that “under the
ACCA and the United States Sentencing Guidelines, escape is always a violent
crime. It is irrelevant whether the escape actually involved any violence or
1
In particular, the jury convicted Mr. Springfield of: (1) possession with
intent to distribute methamphetamine and aiding and abetting in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, (2) carrying a firearm during
a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), (3) being a
felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and (4)
being a felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
See United States v. Springfield, 196 F.3d 1180, 1182 (10th Cir. 1999).
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whether defendant was convicted under a state statute that defines escape as a
nonviolent offense.” Id.After resentencing, Mr. Springfield filed the instant habeas corpus petition
challenging the 1973 Wyoming escape conviction that had been used (along with
other state court convictions) to enhance his sentence under the ACCA. Mr.
Springfield asserted that his guilty plea to the escape charge was not knowing and
voluntary because neither his attorney, nor the prosecutor, nor the judge informed
him that escape could constitute a violent felony. According to Mr. Springfield,
he “was expressly informed that the offense to which he tendered his plea was a
non-violent offense.” Rec. vol. I, doc. 1, App. at 2 (“Petitioner’s Br. in Support of
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Brought Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 et seq.”)
The district court dismissed Mr. Springfield’s petition with prejudice. The
court held that “if a prior conviction used to enhance a federal sentence is no
longer open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant
failed to pursue those remedies while they were available, or because the
defendant did so unsuccessfully, then that defendant may not collaterally attack his
prior conviction through a motion under [28 U.S.C. §§] 2254 or 2255.” Rec. vol.
I, doc. 2, at 2 (Order Dismissing Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed April
24, 2002).
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I. DISCUSSION
In order to prosecute this appeal, Mr. Springfield must obtain a certificate of
appealability. He may do so by making “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). Mr. Springfield may make this
showing by demonstrating that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s
assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” See Slack v.
McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
Upon review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that Mr.
Sprinfield is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. As the district court
noted, the Supreme Court has held that:
once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or
collateral attack in its own right because the defendant
failed to pursue those remedies while they were available
(or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the
conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid. If that
conviction is later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the
defendant generally may not challenge the enhanced
sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the ground that
the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.
Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss , 532 U.S. 394, 404-05 (2001) (internal
citation omitted); see also Daniels v. United States , 532 U.S. 374, 381 (2001)
(holding that, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a petitioner may not challenge a prior
conviction used to enhance a federal sentence if the prior conviction “is no longer
open to direct or collateral attack in its own right because the defendant failed to
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pursue those remedies while they were available (or because the defendant did so
unsuccessfully)”).
There are two narrow exceptions to this general rule: (1) when there was a
failure to appoint counsel in the prior proceeding (a violation of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel pursuant to Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335(1963)); and (2) when a defendant cannot “be faulted for failing to obtain timely
review of a constitutional claim.” Lackawanna , 532 U.S. at 405. However, Mr.
Springfield has failed to establish that either exception is applicable here.
In particular, Mr. Springfield does not allege that he was without counsel in
the prior proceeding. Indeed, in his petition, Mr. Springfield refers to the conduct
of his counsel in that proceeding. See Rec. vol. I, doc. 1, App. at 2 (referring to
advice that Mr. Springfield received from his attorney prior to the plea hearing).
As to the second exception, we note that the Supreme Court has indicated
that it may apply when “a state court [has], without justification, refused to rule on
a constitutional claim that has been properly presented to it” and when, “after the
time for direct or collateral review has expired, a defendant [obtains] compelling
evidence that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, and
which he could not have uncovered in a timely manner.” Lackawanna , 532 U.S. at
405.
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Those circumstances are not present here. There is no indication that the
state court refused to rule on a properly presented constitutional claim or that Mr.
Springfield has uncovered evidence demonstrating actual innocence.
In his appellate brief, Mr. Springfield does argue that he “never had an
opportunity to raise his claims in the state court because the claims did not accrue
until this court held that all escapes were “violent felonies” under 18 [U.S.C.] §
924(e).” Aplt’s Br. at 2. It is true that this court’s decisions holding that “‘an
escape always constitutes ‘conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical
injury to another,’ for the purposes of the [ACCA] as well as for the career
offender provisions of the sentencing guidelines,’” Springfield , 196 F.3d at 1185(quoting United States v. Moudy , 132 F.3d 618, 620 (10th Cir. 1998)), were
decided well after Mr. Springfield pleaded guilty to the Wyoming escape charge in
1973. Nevertheless, these subsequent developments in federal law construing the
sentencing provisions in the ACCA do not provide Mr. Springfield with a fresh
opportunity to challenge the Wyoming charge in state court. Because Mr.
Springfield had the opportunity to challenge the conviction on direct appeal and
collateral review, he may not advance another challenge here. See Lackawanna ,
532 U. S. at 406 (indicating that a petitioner may be able to challenge under §
2254 a prior conviction used to enhance a sentence if the § 2254 proceeding is
“the first and only forum available for review of the prior conviction”).
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III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we DENY Mr. Springfield’s application for a certificate of
appealability and DISMISS this appeal.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
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