United States v. Williams ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 21, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 08-5044
(D.C. No. 4:99-CR-00033-HDC-5)
DRICK EUGENE WILLIAMS, (N.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, PORFILIO, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Drick Eugene Williams, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,
appeals the district court’s denial of his motion filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2) to modify his sentence based on Amendment 706 to the United
States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”). We take jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Background
A jury convicted Mr. Williams and several codefendants of conspiracy to
possess cocaine and more than fifty grams of cocaine base with intent to
distribute. Mr. Williams was sentenced to the statutory maximum of 240 months’
imprisonment under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). His conviction and sentence were
affirmed on appeal. United States v. Williams, 44 F. App’x 362, 365 (10th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1142 (2003).
Mr. Williams filed his motion for sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2)
based on Amendment 706 of the Guidelines. “The Guidelines, through
Amendment 706, generally adjust downward by two levels the base offense level
assigned to quantities of crack cocaine. Amendment 706 took effect November 1,
2007 and was made retroactive as of March 3, 2008.” United States v. Sharkey,
___ F.3d ___, 2008 WL 4482893, at * 1 (10th Cir. Oct. 7, 2008).
It is undisputed that under the former Guidelines regime, Mr. Williams’
base offense level was 38, with a two-level enhancement for a supervisory role,
and a two-level increase for use of persons under age eighteen in the commission
of the offense, for a total offense level of 42. With his criminal history
category II, this resulted in a Guideline range of 360 months to life. But the
statutory maximum for Mr. Williams’ conviction was 240 months, so the district
court sentenced him to 240 months.
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Application of Amendment 706 results in a base offense level of 36. With
the two-level enhancement for a supervisory role and a two-level increase for use
of persons under age eighteen in the commission of the offense, the total offense
level is 40, with a Guideline range of 324 to 405 months. This Guideline range is
still higher than the statutory maximum of 240 months. Accordingly, the district
court denied the § 3582(c)(2) motion.
Mr. Williams appeals. He relies on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) and
application note 3, which provide that if the original term of imprisonment was
less than the term indicated by the then-applicable Guideline range, a comparable
reduction under the Amendment 706 Guideline may be appropriate. He argues
that because his original sentence of 240 months (the statutory maximum) was
less than the then-applicable Guideline range of 360 months to life, a comparable
reduction should be made to his new Guideline range of 324 to 405 months to
reach an appropriate sentence. He contends that an appropriate sentence would be
216 months. He also contends that in denying his §3582(c)(2) motion, the district
court failed to consider the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
In addition, he maintains that the district court’s refusal to impose a new,
reduced sentence ran afoul of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),
because the district court merely re-imposed the original sentence without
recognizing that the Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory. Finally, he claims
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that two of his codefendants received reconsideration of their sentences, so he is
also entitled to reconsideration.
Legal Standards and Analysis
“We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of a statute or the
sentencing guidelines.” United States v. Smartt, 129 F.3d 539, 540 (10th Cir.
1997) (quotation omitted). “We review for an abuse of discretion a district
court’s decision to deny a reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C.§ 3582(c)(2).”
Sharkey, 2008 WL 4482893, at * 2. We construe liberally pleadings filed by
pro se litigants. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
Amendment 706 lowered the base offense level for drug offenses involving
crack cocaine. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (Nov. 1, 2007); U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C,
Amend. 706. When, as here, a “motion for sentence reduction is not a direct
appeal or a collateral attack under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the viability of [the] motion
depends entirely on 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).” Smartt, 129 F.3d at 540 (quotation and
brackets omitted). As applicable to Mr. Williams’ situation, § 3582(c) allows the
court to modify a sentence only if the sentencing range is subsequently lowered
by the Sentencing Commission.
Contrary to his argument that Amendment 706 entitles him to a reduction
of his statutory-maximum sentence, Mr. Williams does not fall within the
situation covered by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B). That section does not address a
sentence to the statutory maximum. Rather, “[p]ursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(a),
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if a statutory maximum sentence is less than the minimum of the applicable
Guideline range, the statutory maximum sentence shall constitute the
recommended sentence under the Guidelines.” Unites States v. Benally,
541 F.3d 990, 993 (10th Cir. 2008). Because Mr. Williams’ minimum Guideline
sentence, even after Amendment 706, was more than the statutory maximum
sentence, he is not entitled to a sentence reduction. Cf. Sharkey, 2008 WL
4482893, at * 2 (holding a reduction in defendant’s sentence as a career offender
not authorized under § 3582(c)(2) because Amendment 706 did not lower his
applicable Guideline range under career-offender Guidelines). Therefore, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the § 3582(c)(2) motion.
Mr. Williams also contends that the district court’s denial of his
§ 3582(c)(2) motion violates Booker. This court has held that § 3582(c)(2)
motions may not be used to present Booker claims seeking resentencing simply
because Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory. See United States v. Price,
438 F.3d 1005, 1007 & n.2 (10th Cir. 2006). In addition, the policy statement in
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 provides:
In determining whether, and to what extent, a reduction in the
defendant’s term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and
this policy statement is warranted, the court . . . shall substitute only
the amendments listed in subsection (c) for the corresponding
guideline provisions that were applied when the defendant was
sentenced and shall leave all other guideline application decisions
unaffected.
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U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b) (Supp. 2008) (emphasis added). Thus, § 3582(c)(2) permits
the court to consider only whether Mr. Williams is entitled to a two-level offense
reduction under Amendment 706, not to reevaluate his sentence under the
Guidelines.
Finally, we must reject Mr. Williams’ argument that because two of his
codefendants received reduced sentences pursuant to Amendment 706, his
sentence must be reduced to avoid a disparity in sentencing. A sentencing court
must consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). “But § 3553(a)(6) does not require the sentencing court
to compare the sentences of codefendants; rather, it looks to uniformity on a
national scale.” United States v. Ivory, 532 F.3d 1095, 1107 (10th Cir. 2008).
Mr. Williams has not made a showing that his sentence is more severe than those
of similarly-situated defendants on a national scale, or even that his situation is
similar to that of his codefendants. Therefore, we conclude that he is not entitled
to relief on this claim.
The district court’s order denying Mr. Williams’ § 3582(c)(2) motion is
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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