United States v. Ferguson ( 2010 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 13, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 09-3136
DARREL LEE FERGUSON, (D.C. No. 6:08-CR-10229-WEB-1)
(D. Kan.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, ANDERSON, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is,
therefore, submitted without oral argument.
Defendant-Appellant Darrel Lee Ferguson entered a plea of guilty to one
count of possession with the intent to distribute 120 grams of a substance
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
containing methamphetamine. Experiencing a change of heart, Ferguson later
moved to withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion, and
subsequently sentenced Ferguson to 150 months’ imprisonment. Ferguson argues
on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to
withdraw his plea. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We agree
with the government’s argument that Ferguson has waived his right to appeal, and
therefore dismiss this appeal. 1
I
A grand jury empaneled by the United States District Court for the District
of Kansas issued a three-count indictment against Ferguson and a co-defendant,
charging Ferguson with one count of possession with the intent to distribute 120
grams of a substance containing methamphetamine, one count of possession of
several firearms after conviction of a felony, and one count of unlawful
possession of two unregistered destructive devices. Evidence in support of the
indictment was found during the execution of a search warrant at Ferguson’s
residence. During the search, Kansas law enforcement officers located Ferguson
inside the first floor bedroom of his residence, and within that bedroom the
officers found approximately 100 grams of a mixture containing
1
Although it is preferred that the government file a motion to enforce an
appeal waiver before briefing commences, failure to file such a motion “does not
preclude a party from raising the issue in a merits brief.” See Tenth Cir. R.
27.2(A)(1)(d), (2), (3).
2
methamphetamine, approximately 38 grams of which was located in a bag
hanging around Ferguson’s neck. The officers also found Ferguson’s social
security card inside the bedroom, and inside a bedroom safe the officers found
personal documents relating to Ferguson’s children. 2 The officers found more
methamphetamine throughout the house, as well as several firearms.
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Ferguson entered a plea of guilty to
the possession of methamphetamine count. For the factual basis underlying his
plea, Ferguson admitted to possessing with the intent to distribute “approximately
120 grams of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine (there was
more than 35 grams pure methamphetamine in that mixture).” R. Vol. I at 28.
The agreement also contained a waiver of the right to appeal and the right to
collateral attack, which read as follows:
The defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives
any right to appeal or collaterally attack any matter in
connection with this prosecution, the defendant’s
conviction, or the components of the sentence to be
imposed herein including the length and conditions of
supervised release. The defendant is aware that Title 18,
U.S.C. § 3742 affords a defendant the right to appeal the
conviction and sentence imposed. By entering into this
agreement, the defendant knowingly waives any right to
appeal a sentence imposed which is within the guideline
range determined appropriate by the court. The defendant
also waives any right to challenge a sentence or otherwise
attempt to modify or change his sentence or manner in
2
The officers also found the wallet and driver’s license of an individual
named Joe Ramsey inside the bedroom.
3
which it was determined in any collateral attack, including,
but not limited to, a motion brought under Title 28, U.S.C.
§ 2255 [except as limited by United States v. Cockerham,
237 F.3d 1179, 1187 (10th Cir. 2001)], a motion brought
under Title 18, U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and a motion brought
under Fed. Rule of Civ. Proc. 60(b). In other words, the
defendant waives the right to appeal the sentence imposed
in this case except to the extent, if any, the court departs
upwards from the applicable sentencing guideline range
determined by the court. However, if the United States
exercises its right to appeal the sentence imposed as
authorized by Title 18, U.S.C. § 3742(b), the defendant is
released from this waiver and may appeal the sentence
received as authorized by Title 18, U.S.C. § 3742(a).
Id. at 32-33. The agreement also acknowledged that Ferguson understood “that if
the court accepts this plea agreement but imposes a sentence with which
[Ferguson] does not agree [he] will not be permitted to withdraw this plea of
guilty.” Id. at 32.
Ferguson’s plea hearing was scheduled for March 17, 2009. That morning,
after discussions with his counsel in the United States Marshal’s lockup, Ferguson
expressed a desire to proceed to trial. However, when Ferguson arrived in court
for the hearing, he had decided to enter a plea of guilty. Sensitive to Ferguson’s
hesitation, the district court continued the hearing and reminded Ferguson that
“the Court has nothing to do with what this – what your agreement with the
Government is.” R. Vol. III at 6. When the hearing reconvened approximately
forty-five minutes later, Ferguson’s counsel indicated that the parties had
resolved their concerns, and Ferguson entered a plea of guilty to possession with
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the intent to distribute approximately 120 grams of a substance containing
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
After Ferguson entered his plea, a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR)
was prepared which calculated Ferguson’s sentencing range at 97 to 121 months’
imprisonment. Following receipt of this report, Ferguson filed a motion to
withdraw his plea, claiming he was only guilty of possessing “the one ounce in
the bag around his neck which he possessed for personal use.” R. Vol. I. at 37.
Ferguson claimed that the remaining amount of methamphetamine that law
enforcement uncovered at his residence was “left in his house by another person,
also known to law enforcement, without Mr. Ferguson’s knowledge.” Id. In
response to Ferguson’s motion to withdraw his plea, the probation office filed a
revised PSR. Because the allegations contained in Ferguson’s motion directly
contradicted his sworn affirmation during the plea colloquy that he possessed 120
grams of a substance containing methamphetamine, the revised PSR
recommended applying a two-level adjustment for obstruction of justice under
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, and recommended withdrawing the three-level adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility Ferguson was previously entitled to receive. These
revisions increased Ferguson’s sentencing range to 168 to 210 months’
imprisonment.
The district court scheduled a May 11, 2009 hearing on Ferguson’s motion
to withdraw his plea and for sentencing, should the motion be denied. During that
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hearing, the district court received testimony from Ferguson and also from two of
the Kansas law enforcement officers who were present during the search.
Ferguson testified that he did not use the first floor bedroom, that “basically
anybody that came over” used that bedroom, and that an individual named Joey
Ramsey was occupying that bedroom the day that the officers executed the search
warrant. R. Vol. III at 55, 58. Ferguson also explained why he was hesitant to
enter a plea of guilty on March 17, 2009. He testified that during the morning of
his plea hearing he had initially decided to proceed to trial, but after a United
States Marshal allegedly told him that the rate of conviction was “98 percent,”
Ferguson wanted his counsel to ask the government to “give us an exact time span
that he would sentence me to if I were to accept a plea.” Id. at 62. Even though
the government refused to provide any sentence estimate, Ferguson proceeded to
enter his plea of guilty.
Following the conclusion of Ferguson’s testimony, the district court denied
Ferguson’s motion to withdraw his plea. The district court granted Ferguson a
downward variance from his guideline range of 168 to 210 months, and sentenced
him to 150 months’ imprisonment. Ferguson then filed this appeal contending the
district court erred in denying his motion to withdraw his plea.
II
We enforce a criminal defendant’s waiver of appellate rights when (1) “the
disputed appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights;” (2) the
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defendant’s waiver of appellate rights was knowing and voluntary; and (3)
enforcing the waiver will not result in a miscarriage of justice. United States v.
Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004).
A. Scope of Waiver
“‘An appeal of a denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is an attempt
to contest a conviction on appeal and thus falls within the plain language of an
appeal waiver provision.’” United States v. Leon, 476 F.3d 829, 832 (10th Cir.
2007) (quoting United States v. Elliott, 264 F.3d 1171, 1174 (10th Cir. 2001))
(alterations omitted). Ferguson concedes that his appeal, which challenges the
district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, falls within the scope of
the appellate waiver that he signed. See Aplt.’s Reply Br. at 1 (“Notwithstanding
the discomfort associated with the fact that enforcement of the waiver to a
challenged agreement means all lower court decisions denying a motion to set
aside the agreement are insulated from appellate review, that is clearly the law.”).
Given that Ferguson waived his right to appeal “any matter in connection with
this prosecution, the defendant’s conviction, or the components of the sentence to
be imposed,” R. Vol. I at 32, we agree that his challenge to the district court’s
denial of his motion to withdraw his plea falls within the scope of the appellate
waiver that he signed. We next address whether the waiver is enforceable.
B. Knowing and Voluntary Waiver
We examine two factors to determine whether a waiver of appellate rights
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is knowing and voluntary. “First, we examine whether the language of the plea
agreement states that the defendant entered the agreement knowingly and
voluntarily.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325. “Second, we look for an adequate Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 colloquy.” Id. The defendant bears the burden of
establishing that “he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into his plea
agreement.” Id. at 1329.
The appellate waiver contained in Ferguson’s plea agreement stated that
Ferguson “knowingly and voluntarily waives any right to appeal,” R. Vol. I at 32;
the agreement further acknowledged that Ferguson had “sufficient time” to
discuss the agreement with his counsel; Ferguson read the agreement, understood
it, and agreed that it was true and accurate; and Ferguson was entering his plea of
guilty “freely and voluntarily,” id. at 34-35. Accordingly, the language of the
plea agreement supports the conclusion that Ferguson’s waiver of appellate rights
was knowing and voluntary.
The district court’s Rule 11 colloquy also supports this conclusion. Before
his counsel presented the terms of the plea agreement to the court, Ferguson
acknowledged that he “may be giving up any right to challenge [his] conviction
on appeal.” R. Vol. III at 13. After the presentation of the terms of the plea
agreement, the district court specifically addressed the appellate waiver and
Ferguson confirmed his understanding that he was “giving up any right to appeal
[the] conviction or sentence” that the district court imposed. Id. at 22.
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Conceding “no evidence of a failed colloquy,” Ferguson contends that “this
case presents circumstances which invite looking beyond the spoken words.”
Aplt.’s Reply at 4. Ferguson contends that his vacillation between first insisting
on a trial that morning, then changing his mind after the United States Marshal
allegedly informed him that the rate of conviction was 98 percent, and then again
vacillating while in open court “until he finally stood before the [c]ourt and
entered a plea of guilty,” place the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea
“genuinely in question.” Id. We reject this argument because the record
presented does not indicate that Ferguson’s final decision to enter a plea of guilty
was not a knowing and voluntary decision. Ferguson was afforded time to review
his options; when the district court became aware of Ferguson’s initial hesitation
to enter a plea, the court continued the proceedings to allow the parties time to
address and resolve any existing concerns. We also note that none of Ferguson
answers during the subsequent Rule 11 colloquy call into question the knowing
and voluntary nature of his plea. Under oath, Ferguson affirmed that he and his
attorney had thoroughly reviewed the plea agreement, he was entering his guilty
plea freely and voluntarily, no one had used any force or made any threats to
coerce Ferguson to plead guilty, and that the only promises made to Ferguson
were those contained in the plea agreement. When the district court concluded
the colloquy by asking Ferguson if he knew of “any reason why [the court]
shouldn’t accept [his] plea of guilty,” Ferguson said “[n]o.” R. Vol. III at 25.
9
These “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity,”
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977), and Ferguson has offered nothing
to erode the force of his statements made in open court and in the written plea
agreement he and his counsel signed. Accordingly, Ferguson has not satisfied his
burden of demonstrating that his waiver was not knowing and voluntary.
C. Miscarriage of Justice
Finally, our enforcing an appellate waiver will result in a miscarriage of
justice only when (1) “the district court relied on an impermissible factor such as
race,” (2) the defendant receives ineffective assistance of counsel in connection
with the negotiation of the waiver, thus invalidating the waiver, (3) “the sentence
exceeds the statutory maximum,” or (4) “the waiver is otherwise unlawful.”
Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327 (citations and quotations omitted). Ferguson concedes
that the first three scenarios do not apply, but argues that his waiver is otherwise
unlawful. To satisfy this scenario, the error alleged “must seriously affect the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (citations,
quotations, and alterations omitted). In this regard, Ferguson argues that his
waiver is unlawful because he “is left with an empty but burning desire to
exercise his constitutional right to a trial . . . . [and] there is much more to be
gained in allowing [him] to exercise his constitutional right than in avoiding
inconvenience to the Court and the parties.” Aplt.’s Reply at 4-5. Ferguson’s
argument does not identify any error. Given the knowing and voluntary nature of
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his plea, Ferguson is simply expressing his subsequent misgivings about his guilty
plea. As such, enforcing the appellate waiver in this case will not result in a
miscarriage of justice.
III
Ferguson executed an enforceable waiver of his appellate rights. His
appeal, which challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his
plea, falls within the scope of his waiver and is therefore DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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