United States v. Satterfield ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 16, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 09-5084
WILLIAM R. SATTERFIELD, (D.C. No. 04-CR-00123-CVE-1)
(N.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before TACHA, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
William Satterfield seeks to challenge for the fourth time his guilty plea for
conspiracy and odometer tampering, as well as his corresponding sentence of 50
months’ imprisonment and payment of $1,337,000 in restitution. The district
court denied the requested relief, and we see no basis on which to disagree with
its disposition.
After entering his guilty plea, Mr. Satterfield did not file a direct appeal.
Instead, he moved the district court to reduce his sentence and vacate the
restitution order under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court denied the motion
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
and Mr. Satterfield appealed to this court. We granted a certificate of
appealability (COA) “on the question of whether a movant may challenge the
restitution portion of his sentence” by means of a § 2255 motion, but, after
ultimately determining that he could not, and that the remaining issues in his
petition did not warrant a COA, we dismissed Mr. Satterfield’s appeal. United
States v. Satterfield, 218 F. App’x 794, 796 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished).
Mr. Satterfield then sought to present the same arguments in a motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The district court dismissed this application, too, and we
affirmed. Satterfield v. Scibana, 275 F. App’x 808 (10th Cir. 2008)
(unpublished).
Next, Mr. Satterfield applied to this court for permission to file a second
§ 2255 motion on the basis of “newly discovered evidence,” in the form of a
federal regulation he came across that allegedly exempted his cars from the
odometer-tampering law under which he was convicted. Finding the regulation
“neither evidence nor . . . newly discovered,” we denied the application. In re
Satterfield, No. 08-5089, slip op. at 2 (10th Cir. June 18, 2008).
Most recently, Mr. Satterfield filed in the district court papers styled as a
motion for relief from a final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b). The district court determined that the motion sought to
challenge the validity of Mr. Satterfield’s conviction and sentence, and therefore
was not a true Rule 60(b) motion but one more properly denominated as another
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effort to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under § 2255. D.Ct. Op. at 3.
To file a second or successive § 2255 motion, the district court noted, a petitioner
must first move the court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to
hear the motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3). Because Mr.
Satterfield had not received permission from this court to proceed with his claim,
the district court faced two options. It could transfer the action to this court to
consider whether to permit the successive § 2255 motion, or it could dismiss the
claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249, 1252
(10th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). The district court chose the latter option. D.Ct.
Op. at 4.
To appeal a district court’s dismissal of an unauthorized § 2255 motion in
these circumstances, a petitioner must obtain a COA. See United States v.
Harper, 545 F.3d 1230, 1233 (10th Cir. 2008). Mr. Satterfield has applied to this
court for a COA, which we may grant only if he has shown that “jurists of reason
would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural
ruling.” Id. (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000)). When a
district court dismisses a Rule 60(b) motion on the ground that it is actually an
unauthorized § 2255 motion, we must consider whether reasonable jurists would
find debatable the district court’s decision to construe the motion as a motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to § 2255. Id. If we conclude
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that no reasonable jurist would find the district court’s conclusion debatable, we
must deny the COA. See id. at 1234.
That is precisely the case we face. The district court’s decision to construe
Mr. Satterfield’s Rule 60(b) motion as a § 2255 motion was unquestionably
correct. As the district observed, the motion “in substance or effect . . .
reassert[ed] a federal basis for relief from the petitioner’s underlying conviction,”
United States v. Pedraza, 466 F.3d 932, 933 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Spitznas v.
Boone, 464 F.3d 1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 2006)), rather than “challenged the
integrity of the final order entered in his original § 2255 proceedings,” id. at 933-
34. Accordingly, we deny the requested COA. The appeal is dismissed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Neil M. Gorsuch
Circuit Judge
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