United States v. Morgan ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 20, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 05-3091
v. (D.C. No. 04-CR-20016-01-CM)
(D. Kan.)
LAMAR A. MORGAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Lamar Morgan entered a conditional plea of guilty to
one count of knowingly possessing with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of a
substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
and 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). He was sentenced
to 154 months imprisonment followed by five years supervised release. Our
jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm the district court’s
denial of his motion to suppress.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case therefore
is ordered submitted without oral argument.
Background
When reviewing a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we accept
the district court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, and we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to those findings. United States v. Caro, 248
F.3d 1240, 1243 (10th Cir. 2001). Viewed accordingly, the record reveals the
following.
On December 6, 2003, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Officers Eric Jones and
Charles Stites of the Kansas City, Kansas, Police Department went to North 82nd
Street in Kansas City, Kansas to conduct a warrant sweep. The officers had a list
of names and addresses of persons with outstanding warrants, including that of
Curtis Morgan (“Curtis”), the brother of Defendant-Appellant, Mr. Lamar
Morgan. The officers went to 2805 North 82nd Street looking for Curtis, who
had an outstanding probation violation warrant.
Upon approaching the front door of the bi-level, duplex residence, Officer
Jones opened the screen door and knocked on the interior wooden door. When
Mr. Morgan opened the interior door, the officer immediately smelled a very
strong odor of burned marijuana. The officer asked Mr. Morgan his name and
Mr. Morgan told him. When the officers asked if Curtis was present, Mr. Morgan
replied, “no, he’s in jail.” The officer asked for Mr. Morgan’s identification and
told him that he smelled burned marijuana. In response to the officer’s question
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of whether anyone in the house was smoking marijuana, Mr. Morgan replied that
he had been previously, but he had put it out in an ashtray on the upper level. The
officer then requested permission to enter the house and speak with Mr. Morgan,
whereupon Mr. Morgan acceded to his request.
Once inside the home, Officer Jones asked Mr. Morgan if he could search
his person for any weapons or contraband, to which Mr. Morgan replied that he
could. As he patted Mr. Morgan down, the officer felt something “unusual”–not
contraband–but something like “folded up bills.” The officer reached into Mr.
Morgan’s pockets and pulled the bills out “just to see that there was a very large
amount.” He then put the money back. The officer then asked Mr. Morgan to
have a seat and informed him that he was going to apply for a search warrant for
the residence. Mr. Morgan then appeared to be starting up the stairs of the split
level home, whereupon Officer Jones grabbed him and put him in handcuffs.
Once Mr. Morgan was handcuffed, Officer Jones did a “protective sweep”
of the residence. Hearing voices on the lower level, he checked there and found
Mr. Morgan’s fourteen year old brother-in-law and the boy’s three year old niece.
He heard nothing from the upper level, but proceeded to check it. Though there
were no other people found in the residence, the officer saw a couple of suspected
partially smoked marijuana cigarettes and a baggie of marijuana on the upper
level kitchen table. The baggie subsequently weighed in at 9.2 grams.
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Officer Jones waited approximately 15 to 30 minutes for other officers to
arrive before going to the narcotics unit office to prepare an affidavit in support
of a search warrant. While he was at the police station preparing the affidavit,
another officer called with information he received from “some neighbors who
wanted to remain anonymous” that there was a large amount of traffic going at the
subject residence. The neighbors believed narcotics were being sold from that
residence and another nearby. This information was placed in the affidavit along
with the following sworn information: (1) Officer Jones smelled a strong odor of
burned marijuana coming from inside the residence, (2) Mr. Morgan stated that he
had been smoking marijuana and had just put it out in an ashtray, (3) Mr. Morgan
gave consent for the officers to come into the residence and to search his person
for weapons or contraband at which time Officer Jones discovered his pants
pockets were “full of money,” and (4) Officer Jones had observed a “baggie of
marijuana” and a couple of suspected burned marijuana cigarettes on the upper
level kitchen table. The warrant was issued.
Upon Officer Jones’ return to the residence with the warrant, police
recovered 74.6 grams of crack cocaine from a dresser drawer in the master
bedroom and 42 grams of crack cocaine from a kitchen drawer. Police also found
scales, 9.2 grams of marijuana, over $4,000 in US currency, and two firearms.
After performing the search, the officer read Mr. Morgan his Miranda rights and
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obtained his waiver thereof. At that time, Mr. Morgan admitted to possessing the
crack cocaine and firearms, but denied distributing the crack cocaine.
Mr. Morgan filed a pretrial motion to suppress the evidence seized during
the search of his home and the statements he made shortly thereafter. After an
evidentiary hearing, the district court denied Mr. Morgan’s motion, finding that
(1) the officers’ entrance onto Mr. Morgan’s property and their knock at his door
was lawful, (2) when Mr. Morgan opened the door, the officers had probable
cause to believe that a crime had been committed based on the fact that the
officers smelled burned marijuana and Mr. Morgan admitted that he had just
smoked marijuana, (3) Mr. Morgan consented to the search of his person, (4) the
protective sweep was justified by exigent circumstances, and (5) the information
set forth in the affidavit provided probable cause for the search warrant to issue.
Mr. Morgan filed a second suppression motion, citing additional legal authority in
support of the issues raised in the previous motion. Relying on the factual
findings made in the prior suppression hearing, the district court denied the
second motion.
Discussion
On appeal, Mr. Morgan argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because (1) the search of his person exceeded the limited
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scope of his consent, and (2) the protective sweep of the upper level of his home
was unjustified. He further contends that there was insufficient probable cause
for a search warrant to issue when the following information is excised from the
affidavit: (1) the money found during the search of his person, (2) the marijuana
recovered during the protective sweep, and (3) the uncorroborated information
provided by the anonymous neighbors. He in turn argues that all evidence seized
pursuant to the improperly issued search warrant and the admissions he made
should have been suppressed as “fruits of the poisonous tree.”
We need not address whether the search of Mr. Morgan’s person exceeded
the scope of his consent or if the protective sweep was justified. We hold that,
even without the contested information, the affidavit in support of the warrant
established sufficient probable cause to issue the warrant and the warrant
provided an adequate basis for the search and seizure of the evidence in question.
As such, having determined that the search of Mr. Morgan’s residence was not
unconstitutional, his “fruit of the poisonous tree” argument is unavailing. There
was no poisonous tree.
While we review the district court’s factual determinations for clear error,
our review of an ultimate Fourth Amendment question is de novo. See United
States v. Souza, 223 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2000). The existence of probable
cause is a “common-sense standard.” United States v. Wicks, 995 F.2d 964, 972
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(10th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). An affidavit establishes probable cause for a
search warrant to issue if the totality of the information contained therein
establishes a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found
in a particular place. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983) (noting
this is a flexible standard). An affidavit containing erroneous or
unconstitutionally obtained information invalidates a warrant if that information
was crucial to establishing probable cause. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705,
719 (1984). If, however, the affidavit contained sufficient accurate or untainted
information, the warrant is nevertheless valid. Id.In the instant case, even absent the contested information, the affidavit in
support of the warrant contained sufficient information to establish probable
cause. The affidavit contained statements by Officer Jones that he smelled burned
marijuana coming from inside the residence and recounted Mr. Morgan’s
admissions that he had been smoking marijuana and had put it out in an ashtray
just minutes prior. These facts certainly establish a fair probability that
contraband—marijuana—was present inside the residence.
Drawing on this court’s precedents in the area of warrantless vehicle
searches, Mr. Morgan contends that the smell of burned marijuana, standing
alone, is insufficient to establish probable cause to search a residence. See, e.g,
United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
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odor of burned marijuana in the passenger compartment of a vehicle does not,
standing alone, establish probable cause to search the trunk; rather, an officer
obtains probable cause to search the trunk of a vehicle once he smells burned
marijuana in the passenger compartment and finds corroborating evidence of
contraband). Authority contrary to Mr. Morgan’s position is not hard to find. See,
e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948) (recognizing that the odor
of a burning controlled substance “might very well be found to be evidence of
most persuasive character” in finding probable cause to issue a search warrant);
United States v. Cephas, 254 F.3d 488, 495 (4th Cir. 2001) (suggesting that the
odor of burning marijuana emanating from inside an apartment alone would
almost certainly have given an officer probable cause to believe
contraband—marijuana—was present in an apartment); Gompf v. State, 120 P.3d
980, 986 (Wyo. 2005) (explaining that once officers smelled burned marijuana in
the residence, they had probable cause to justify issuance of the search warrant);
State v. Hughes, 607 N.W.2d 621, 627 (Wis. 2000) (“When the strong smell of
marijuana is in the air, there is a ‘fair probability’ that marijuana is present. This
is common sense.”); State v. Beeken, 7 Neb. App. 438, 448-49 (1998) (holding
that the strong odor of burning marijuana coming from a within a residence
provided sufficient probable cause to issue a search warrant); State v. Decker, 580
P.2d 333, 335-36 (Ariz. 1978) (noting that even if the smell of burned marijuana
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has a lingering effect, as was urged, the court felt that a man of reasonable
prudence, upon smelling the odor, would believe that marijuana is probably
present). We need not decide, however, whether the smell of burned marijuana
coming from a residence would, standing alone, establish sufficient probable
cause for a search warrant. Here, the smell was accompanied by Mr. Morgan’s
admission that he was smoking and had just extinguished it. This provided
sufficient probable cause for the warrant to issue.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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