United States v. Aguilar-Bautista , 49 F. App'x 855 ( 2002 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 30 2002
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 02-4028
D.C. No. 2:01-CR-269-ST
JOEL AGUILAR-BAUTISTA, (D. Utah)
also known as Joel Aguilar,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Judge, ANDERSON and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Defendant-appellant Joel Aguilar-Bautista pled guilty to illegal re-entry of
a deported alien in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Pursuant to the United States
Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, (USSG) § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C),
Mr. Aguilar-Bautista was subject to an eight-level sentencing enhancement based
on a prior conviction for an aggravated felony. He was given credit for
acceptance of responsibility and sentenced to thirty-three months of imprisonment
followed by a three-year term of supervised release.
Mr. Aguilar-Bautista raises two issues on appeal. He uses several theories
to raise the broad argument that his state misdemeanor conviction for attempted
aggravated assault cannot be characterized as an aggravated felony for purposes
of enhancement under the guidelines. We review questions of law related to the
application or interpretation of the sentencing guidelines de novo and the district
court’s factual findings regarding sentencing for clear error. United States v.
Maldonado-Acosta, 210 F.3d 1182, 1183 (10th Cir. 2000). He also argues that
the district court should have found that his prior conviction for attempted
aggravated assault was outside the heartland of other serious aggravated felonies
and that a downward departure was warranted.
I.
Mr. Aguilar-Bautista’s argument that a state misdemeanor conviction
cannot be considered an aggravated felony for purposes of sentencing under
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USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) and 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) runs contrary to circuit
precedent. “[A]n offense need not be classified as a felony to qualify as an
‘aggravated felony’ as that term is statutorily defined in § 1101(a)(43).” United
States v. Saenz-Mendoza, 287 F.3d 1011, 1014 (10th Cir. 2002), petition for
cert. filed (U.S. July 25, 2002) (No. 02-5568). In looking at the plain language
of the statute, the court explained that “[a]ll § 1101(a)(43)(F) requires is a crime
of violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year.” Id.
Mr. Aguilar-Bautista must show that his state conviction was not properly
classified as an aggravated felony or that the term of imprisonment was less
than one year.
Mr. Aguilar-Bautista tries to carve out an exception to Saenz-Mendoza by
arguing that his conviction for attempted aggravated assault cannot be classified
as an aggravated felony because USSG § 2L1.2, comment. (n.1.(B)(iv)) states
“‘Felony’ means any federal, state, or local offense punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year.” (emphasis added). He argues that since his
conviction was for 365 days, it did not exceed one year. The definition in the
commentary applies to a felony. Mr. Aguilar-Bautista was sentenced under
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), which applies to a conviction for an aggravated felony. His
state conviction was considered an aggravated felony because for purposes of
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(C), “aggravated felony” has the meaning given that term in
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8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43). Section 1101(a)(43)(F) defines aggravated felony as:
“a crime of violence (as defined in section 16 of Title 18, but not including a
purely political offense) for which the term of imprisonment [is 1] at least one
year.” Therefore, the definition of “felony” in the commentary does not apply.
Mr. Aguilar-Bautista argues alternatively that he should be sentenced under
USSG § 2L1.2(b)(1)(E). Section 2L1.2(b)(1) instructs that the sentencing court
is to apply the greatest of its five subsections which is applicable. Since
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) clearly applies, it was the subsection properly used for
sentencing.
Mr. Aguilar-Bautista contends that his state conviction is not an aggravated
felony because he was sentenced to 365 days in jail and 365 days is not
technically a year. The district court correctly found that circuit precedent
contradicts this argument. This court has held that for purposes of sentencing
when an inmate is incarcerated for a term of years, it makes no difference whether
the year is 365 days or 366 days. Yokley v. Belaski, 982 F.2d 423, 425 (10th Cir.
1992). Conversely, 365 days is a year for sentencing purposes.
Finally, Mr. Aguilar-Bautista argues that his state conviction should not be
considered a felony because he received a suspended sentence and his actual time
1
Congress mistakenly omitted the word “is” from the definition of
aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101, n.2 (1995).
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served was less than a year. This court has held that a “term of imprisonment”
is the sentence actually imposed, not actually served. United States v.
Chavez-Valenzuela, 170 F.3d 1038, 1039 (10th Cir. 1999). This is in agreement
with the statute which provides, “[a]ny reference to a term of imprisonment or
sentence with respect to an offense is deemed to include the period of
incarceration or confinement ordered by a court of law regardless of any
suspension of the imposition or execution of that imprisonment or sentence in
whole or in part.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48). The district court properly
characterized Mr. Aguilar-Bautista’s “term of imprisonment” as 365 days.
Although Mr. Aguilar-Bautista might have it otherwise, a term of
imprisonment is the term ordered by a court, 365 days is still a year, § 2L1.2(b)(1)
mandates that the greatest of its subsections must apply, an aggravated felony is
a crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment is at least one year, and
a state misdemeanor conviction for a crime of violence can be classed as an
aggravated felony for sentencing purposes. From any angle, his argument cannot
prevail.
II.
Mr. Aguilar-Bautista’s second argument is that the district court erred in
denying a downward departure in his sentencing. “[T]he courts of appeals cannot
exercise jurisdiction to review a sentencing court’s refusal to depart from the
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sentencing guidelines except in the very rare circumstances that the district court
states that it does not have any authority to depart from the sentencing guideline
range for the entire class of circumstances proffered by the defendant.” United
States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 887 (10th Cir. 1998).
At the sentencing hearing, the district court stated that this case was not
outside of the heartland of cases, and that there were insufficient grounds for
granting a downward departure. R., Vol. II, at 24.
Therefore, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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