United States v. Dewitt , 439 F. App'x 761 ( 2011 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 25, 2011
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 11-6057
v. (D.Ct. No. 5:10-CR-00192-M-1)
(W.D. Okla.)
PAMELA JOYCE DEWITT,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, and BARRETT and BRORBY, Senior
Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant Pamela Joyce Dewitt appeals her thirty-month sentence, arguing
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
the district court erred when it determined she did not qualify for a reduction in
her sentence under United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or
“U.S.S.G.”) § 2K2.1(b)(2), known as the “sporting purpose exception,” for her
possession as a felon of a firearm. We exercise our jurisdiction pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm Ms. Dewitt’s sentence.
I. Factual Background
On October 30, 2009, at approximately 11:00 p.m., two Oklahoma game
wardens on night patrol in a rural area saw a small pickup truck with a bright
spotlight shining through the driver’s side window into fields and the tree line.
The wardens watched the pickup travel one-half mile, with the spotlight
continuing to illuminate fields and trees, before it stopped and the driver, Mr.
Vaught, exited. When one of the wardens asked if he had guns, Mr. Vaught
informed them the pickup contained a loaded gun. The other warden then
approached the passenger, Ms. Dewitt, who remained in the vehicle, and ordered
her to exit. She hesitated and refused the warden’s multiple requests to show her
hands, which were under a coat laid across her lap; her hands were also
“fidgeting” underneath the coat. When she did attempt to leave the vehicle, the
warden saw a lever-action .22 magnum caliber Winchester rifle on her lap under
the coat. The rifle contained a live round of ammunition. Later, when searching
the vehicle, wardens also found a Vector 1,000,000 candle-power spotlight and
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thirty-five rounds of .22 WMR jacketed hollow-point ammunition.
On questioning, Ms. Dewitt used her sister’s name to identify herself and
failed to produce any other identification. After the wardens checked the name of
Ms. Dewitt’s sister and determined her record was clear, they issued Ms. Dewitt
citations in her sister’s name for illegal “headlighting” and hunting by aid of
motorized vehicle and released her. However, the wardens arrested Mr. Vaught
on discovering the Oklahoma Department of Corrections had issued a warrant for
his arrest for violation of his parole and for possession of a firearm by a felon.
A few days later, on November 2, 2009, one of the game wardens received
information on Ms. Dewitt’s true identity, after which he verified she had
outstanding warrants in Cleveland County, Oklahoma, and discovered her status
as a fugitive whom the United States Marshal Service had spent numerous hours
trying to find. On November 4, 2009, deputies with the United States Marshal
Service found Ms. Dewitt and arrested her on the outstanding warrants.
II. Procedural Background
Thereafter, a federal grand jury indicted Ms. Dewitt for being a felon in
illegal possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). After Ms.
Dewitt pled guilty and the district court accepted her plea, a probation officer
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prepared a presentence report, calculating her sentence under the applicable 2010
Guidelines. The probation officer set Ms. Dewitt’s base offense level at 14
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(6)(A) for possession of a firearm by a felon. The
probation officer also recommended a two-level offense reduction for acceptance
of responsibility, for a total offense level of twelve. A total offense level of
twelve, together with Ms. Dewitt’s criminal history category of VI, resulted in a
recommended advisory Guidelines range of thirty to thirty-seven months
imprisonment. The probation officer also found no factors warranting a departure
from the Guidelines calculations or a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Ms. Dewitt filed formal objections to the presentence report, including an
objection to the probation officer’s failure to apply a reduction in her offense
level based on the “sporting purpose exception” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2). In
support, she argued she did not discharge or otherwise unlawfully use a firearm or
ammunition, Mr. Vaught had retrieved the hunting rifle from someone who had
borrowed it and he did not intend to use it to hunt that evening, and Mr. Vaught
used the spotlight only to show her raccoons along the side of the road.
At sentencing, Ms. Dewitt renewed her request for the § 2K2.1(b)(2)
sporting purpose exception, testifying Mr. Vaught used the spotlight “[j]ust to
show [her] the coons”; neither she nor Mr. Vaught intended to use the loaded rifle
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that evening; and she was aware Mr. Vaught hunted raccoons and was a member
of a “coon club” comprised of hunters, suggesting he owned the rifle for lawful
hunting purposes. In response, the government offered the testimony of one of
the wardens, who explained the use of a bright light and possession of a loaded
firearm is prima facie evidence in Oklahoma of illegal “headlighting” and that
hunting with the aid of a motorized vehicle is also illegal in Oklahoma, including
hunting for raccoons from a vehicle. He also explained that even though it is
lawful in Oklahoma to hunt raccoons on foot, it was not raccoon hunting season at
the time they stopped Mr. Vaught and Ms. Dewitt. While the warden testified he
did not hear a firearm discharge from the vehicle, he verified Ms. Dewitt had the
fully-loaded rifle concealed on her lap.
After considering the evidence presented and hearing the parties’
arguments, the district court found a reduction under § 2K2.1(b)(2) inapplicable
to the facts presented, stating it found Ms. Dewitt had “not shown that she
possessed the firearm at issue solely for lawful sporting purposes and did not
otherwise unlawfully use the firearm.” It then sentenced Ms. Dewitt to thirty
months imprisonment.
III. Discussion
On appeal, Ms. Dewitt presents the following issue: “Did the district court
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commit legal and factual error by denying Ms. Dewitt’s request for a reduction in
the advisory sentencing Guideline[s] offense level calculation based on the
codefendant’s possession of the firearm for lawful sporting purposes?” With
respect to the district court’s alleged “factual error,” Ms. Dewitt contends it was
reasonable for her to associate the .22-caliber Winchester rifle with hunting and
conclude Mr. Vaught would transport such a firearm in his vehicle for lawful
hunting or sporting purposes, given his history as a hunter and his association
with a hunting club. She also renews her contention Mr. Vaught used the
spotlight to show her raccoons along the road and never observed him using or
attempting to use the firearm for hunting that night, as bolstered by the warden’s
testimony he never heard a firearm discharge. She also argues she was unfamiliar
with the details of Mr. Vaught’s criminal history but the fact he was a felon in
possession should not diminish her assertion he possessed the rifle solely for
sport.
Because the facts establish Mr. Vaught possessed the firearm for lawful
sporting purposes, she contends, the district court committed legal error in not
applying a six-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2) to her offense level,
which would result in a Guidelines range of twelve to eighteen months
incarceration. Relying on United States v. Mojica, 214 F.3d 1169 (10th Cir.
2000), she also argues “[t]he district court erred by finding [she] had to show her
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possession of the firearm was for lawful sporting purposes and she did not
unlawfully discharge or unlawfully use the firearm.” She contends that because
Mr. Vaught, the owner of the rifle, possessed it for a sporting purpose, she does
not need to prove she also possessed it for a lawful sporting purpose in order to
receive the reduction.
We review sentences under a reasonableness standard, which encompasses
both the reasonableness of the length of the sentence as well as the method by
which the sentence was calculated – the latter of which Ms. Dewitt appeals. See
United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053-55 (10th Cir. 2006). As she asserts,
a sentence is unreasonable if it is based on an improper determination of the
Guidelines range. See id. at 1055. In determining if her Guidelines range was
correctly calculated, “we review factual findings for clear error and legal
determinations de novo.” United States v. Sanders, 449 F.3d 1087, 1090 (10th
Cir. 2006) (quotation marks omitted). In so doing, we give due deference to the
district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts. See United States v.
Maestas, 642 F.3d 1315, 1319 (10th Cir. 2011). “ A finding of fact is clearly
erroneous only if it is without factual support in the record or if the appellate
court, after reviewing all of the evidence, is left with a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). In
addition, we will not review on appeal a district court’s credibility determinations
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for sentencing purposes. See United States v. Hanson, 534 F.3d 1315, 1319 (10th
Cir. 2008).
Here, the contested Guidelines sporting purpose exception states: “If the
defendant ... possessed all ammunition and firearms solely for lawful sporting
purposes or collection, and did not unlawfully discharge or otherwise unlawfully
use such firearms or ammunition, decrease the offense level determined ... to
level 6.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2). Based on this provision, we have said a
defendant must show two things for the Guideline to apply: (1) she possessed all
ammunition and firearms solely for lawful sporting purposes or collection, and (2)
she did not unlawfully discharge or otherwise unlawfully use such firearms or
ammunition. See Sanders, 449 F.3d at 1090. These elements are conjunctive, and
therefore, the burden is on the defendant to show both by a preponderance of the
evidence. See United States v. Dudley, 62 F.3d 1275, 1276 (10th Cir. 1995).
In addition, commentary to § 2K2.1 provides:
Under subsection (b)(2), ‘lawful sporting purposes or collection’ as
determined by the surrounding circumstances, provides for a
reduction to an offense level of 6. Relevant surrounding
circumstances include the number and type of firearms, the amount
and type of ammunition, the location and circumstances of
possession and actual use, the nature of the defendant’s criminal
history (e.g., prior convictions for offenses involving firearms), and
the extent to which possession was restricted by local law.
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U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, cmt. n.6.
Here, the record supports the district court’s determination Ms. Dewitt failed to
carry her burden in showing she possessed the firearm at issue solely for a lawful
sporting purpose. To begin, it is clear the district court considered the
circumstances presented, including the fact Mr. Vaught and Ms. Dewitt were
observed in a pickup late at night using a 1,000,000 candle-power spotlight out of
the window to search fields and the treeline in a rural area while Ms. Dewitt held
a loaded rifle on her lap and the vehicle contained thirty-five rounds of .22 WMR
jacketed hollow-point ammunition. While Ms. Dewitt claims Mr. Vaught merely
retrieved the gun from someone who borrowed it from him and they were not
hunting at that time, she fails to explain why she held the rifle on her lap, why the
rifle was loaded, and why the vehicle contained such a large number of rounds of
ammunition. In addition, it is evident the district court found incredible Ms.
Dewitt’s testimony that they only used the spotlight to look for raccoons and
credited the warden’s testimony that use of a bright light and possession of a
loaded firearm is considered prima facie evidence of illegal “headlighting.” We
will not review such credibility determinations on appeal. Because the district
court’s finding Ms. Dewitt and Mr. Vaught were hunting has factual support in
the record, we cannot say it is clearly erroneous nor are we left with a definite
and firm conviction a mistake has been made.
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Having concluded the district court did not err in finding Ms. Dewitt and
Mr. Vaught were hunting, we further conclude, as did the district court, that they
were hunting illegally in violation of Oklahoma’s prohibition against
“headlighting,” 29 Okla. Stat. § 5-203.1(A), and hunting by aid of motorized
vehicle, 29 Okla. Stat. § 5-203.1(D), as evidenced by the citations issued to Ms.
Dewitt – albeit in another name. To the extent Mr. Vaught and Ms. Dewitt were
hunting for the very raccoons Ms. Dewitt claims they were looking for, they were
also illegally hunting out-of-season, as explained by the warden who testified at
the sentencing hearing.
Having determined Ms. Dewitt and Mr. Vaught were hunting illegally, and
giving due deference to the district court’s application of the Guidelines to the
facts, we conclude the district court did not err in determining § 2K2.1(b)(2) did
not apply for the purpose of giving Ms. Dewitt an offense-level reduction.
Instead, the district court reasonably concluded such a reduction applies only
when a defendant possesses ammunition and firearms solely for lawful sporting
purposes. See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(2). Given Ms. Dewitt and Mr. Vaught
possessed the rifle for an unlawful sporting purpose at the time the wardens
spotted them, not only does § 2K2.1(b)(2) not apply, but it is irrelevant under the
circumstances presented whether Mr. Vaught belonged to a coon hunting club or
previously possessed or used the rifle for the purpose of lawfully hunting
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raccoons and other animals. Accordingly, we reject Ms. Dewitt’s contention Mr.
Vaught possessed the rifle at the time of his arrest for a lawful sporting purpose
and that she does not need to prove she possessed it for a lawful sporting purpose
in order to receive a reduction.
We also reject Ms. Dewitt’s contention our holding in Mojica applies here.
In that case, we assumed, as did the district court, that the defendant-felon was
returning an unloaded shotgun and ammunition to their owner after use by his
brother for a lawful sporting purpose. Id. at 1172-73. Under those circumstances,
we held the constructive and benign possession of a firearm used solely for
another’s lawful sporting purpose may be a mitigating factor when considering a
reduction and remanded the case to the district court for such consideration. Id.
at 1173-74. Here, it is clear Ms. Dewitt possessed the loaded rifle on her lap at
the time in question for the purpose of illegally hunting, and therefore, the
circumstances presented are unlike those in Mojica.
While Ms. Dewitt claims she did not know Mr. Vaught was a felon, such a
claim is also irrelevant because Ms. Dewitt herself was a felon who was
prohibited from possessing a firearm except for a lawful sporting purpose. She
clearly possessed the firearm when she had it on her lap, and the illegality of her
activities is demonstrated, not only by the facts previously cited, but by her
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compulsion to conceal the weapon and her hesitation when ordered to exit the
vehicle – regardless of whether her companion, Mr. Vaught, was more
forthcoming in admitting the vehicle contained a loaded gun.
Because Ms. Dewitt failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the
first conjunctive element required for a § 2K2.1(b)(2) reduction, i.e., possession
of all ammunition and firearms solely for lawful sporting purposes or collection,
we need not consider the other conjunctive element required for application of
§ 2K2.1(b)(2), i.e., whether she carried her burden in showing she did not
unlawfully discharge or otherwise unlawfully use such firearms or ammunition.
See Sanders, 449 F.3d at 1090. For these reasons, the district court did not err in
failing to apply such a reduction, and Ms. Dewitt’s thirty-month sentence is not
procedurally unreasonable.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, we AFFIRM Ms. Dewitt’s sentence.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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