United States v. Ferguson , 447 F. App'x 898 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS January 6, 2012
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 11-4004
ANTHONY TERRELL RAY (D.C. No. 2:09-CR-00888-TC-1)
FERGUSON, (D. Utah)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before LUCERO, EBEL and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
*
This Order and Judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
In this direct criminal appeal, Anthony Terrell Ray Ferguson, having pled guilty to
conspiracy to distribute methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846, challenges his sentence on four different grounds, arguing in each that his
sentence was procedurally unreasonable. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
we AFFIRM.
BACKGROUND
In December 2008, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) launched an
investigation into the present offense after a traffic stop in Nevada yielded a large amount
of MDMA. The passenger in the car told authorities that the driver was a partner with
Mr. Ferguson in a MDMA-trafficking scheme that involved transporting thousands of
pills containing MDMA (commonly known as “ecstasy”) from California to Utah. Soon
thereafter, the DEA separately interviewed two confidential informants who had been
arrested with MDMA and who indicated that Mr. Ferguson was the head of an
organization that distributed MDMA to the Salt Lake City area after receiving shipments
of the pills from Nevada, California, and Washington (state). Mr. Ferguson was arrested
in Salt Lake City in November 2009 when he attempted to pick up a vehicle, registered to
him, that was in the DEA’s possession after highway patrolmen stopped the vehicle and
found thousands of pills of MDMA.
Mr. Ferguson was charged in November 2009 with conspiracy to distribute
MDMA in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count 1); distribution of N-benzylpiperazine
(BZP) in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 2); and distribution of MDMA (Count
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3). He pled guilty to Count 1 in April 2010. Mr. Ferguson’s presentence investigation
report (PSR) calculated that 97,148 MDMA pills were attributable to Mr. Ferguson for
the purposes of computing his offense level under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
(Guidelines). However, based on the testimony of DEA Special Agent Mark Bacon at
the sentencing hearing on December 8, 2010, the district court found that approximately
110,000 to 112,000 pills were attributable to Mr. Ferguson. The court determined Mr.
Ferguson’s offense level to be 37 and his criminal history category to be VI, which
rendered an advisory sentencing range of 360 months to life under the Guidelines.
However, the statutory maximum for Mr. Ferguson’s offense was only 240 months.
Ultimately, after considering the applicable sentencing factors and Mr. Ferguson’s
personal situation, the district court sentenced Mr. Ferguson to a term of 180 months’
imprisonment. This appeal followed.
Additional facts will be set forth below as necessary.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of review
As a general matter, we review the district court’s sentencing decisions for an
abuse of discretion, asking whether or not the decisions were reasonable. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007); United States v. Sayad, 589 F.3d 1110, 1116 (10th Cir.
2009). Reasonableness in sentencing contains a procedural prong as well as a substantive
prong. United States v. Friedman, 554 F.3d 1301, 1307 (10th Cir. 2009). Procedural
reasonableness “focuses on whether the district court committed any error in calculating
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or explaining the sentence.” Id. (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). Potential procedurally
unreasonable errors include “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the
Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18
U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [sentencing] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous
facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for
any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
In determining whether the district court acted reasonably, “[w]e review the
district court’s legal conclusions regarding the Guidelines de novo and its factual findings
for clear error.” United States v. Munoz-Nava, 524 F.3d 1137, 1146 (10th Cir. 2008).
Under this standard, “[w]e will not disturb a factual finding unless it has no basis in the
record.” United States v. Beltran, 571 F.3d 1013, 1021 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks
omitted). “[I]f the district court errs in applying the Guidelines, we must remand unless
the error is harmless.” United States v. Townley, 472 F.3d 1267, 1276 (10th Cir. 2007).
II. The number of pills attributable to defendant
A defendant’s base offense level varies depending on the volume of drugs
associated with his offense of conviction. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. A sentencing court’s
consideration of drug volume is not limited to amounts actually seized from defendants.
Rather, where “the amount seized does not reflect the scale of the offense, the court shall
approximate the quantity of the controlled substance,” id., cmt. n.12, estimating the
amount of attributable drugs on sufficiently trustworthy evidence. In this case, Mr.
Ferguson argues that the district court erred in finding that 110,000 to 120,000 pills of
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MDMA were attributable to Mr. Ferguson for sentencing purposes. Mr. Ferguson argues
that evidence upon which the court’s finding was based—namely, testimony by Special
Agent Bacon regarding evidence of drug quantities other than those seized directly from
Mr. Ferguson—was unreliable as uncorroborated, inconsistent, and coming from non-
credible alleged co-conspirators.
We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error. Munoz-Nava, 524
F.3d at 1146. A sentencing judge may properly consider hearsay evidence as long as
such evidence is sufficiently reliable. U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3(a) (“When any factor important
to the sentencing determination is reasonably in dispute . . . the court may consider
relevant information without regard to its admissibility under the rules of evidence
applicable at trial, provided that the information has sufficient indicia of reliability to
support its probable accuracy.”); Townley,472 F.3d at 1276 n.4. Also, “[c]redibility
determinations are within the sound discretion of the trial judge,” such that this Court will
not second guess the district court’s findings unless they were clearly erroneous. United
States v. Gobey, 12 F.3d 964, 967 (10th Cir. 1993).
At the sentencing hearing in this case, Special Agent Bacon submitted to the court
that 121,793 pills were attributable to Mr. Ferguson—the sum of multiple transactions
that the DEA had learned of principally through the three informants involved in Mr.
Ferguson’s distribution scheme. Also before the district court were the DEA’s
investigative reports, and transcripts of the informants’ grand jury testimony and of
phone calls relating to controlled purchases of MDMA from Mr. Ferguson. The court
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“found the evidence as presented by Special Agent Bacon to be credible,” emphasizing
“the degree of independence of the various [confidential informants] whose evidence
[the] special agent used to make his calculations” and finding “that there was
corroboration in the telephone calls and in the fact of grand jury testimony.” (ROA Vol.
III at 45.)
Having reviewed the record and keeping in mind the substantial deference we give
with respect to findings of fact and credibility, we cannot say that the district court clearly
erred in attributing to Mr. Ferguson the amounts to which Special Agent Bacon testified.
We disagree with Mr. Ferguson’s assertion that the informants’ information was not
reliable. Rather, we agree with the district court’s findings of sufficient credibility and
corroboration among the informants, and we determine that the “discrepancies” noted by
Mr. Ferguson in his reply brief are either non-existent (i.e., some are not inconsistent but
simply more precise) or immaterial. The district court’s findings were not “without
factual support,” and we are not “left with the definite and firm conviction” that the court
erred. United States v. Dalton, 409 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks
omitted). We therefore discern no procedural error with the respect to the number of pills
attributed to Mr. Ferguson at sentencing.
III. The amount of MDMA per pill
Since a defendant’s base offense level varies with the volume of drugs associated
with his offense of conviction, the district court at an MDMA sentencing must determine
the quantity of MDMA in each pill in order to calculate the total amount attributable to
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the defendant. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. In cases where the number of pills has been
established but their weight is unknown, the Guidelines supply a rebuttable presumption
that each pill contains 250 mg of MDMA. See id., cmt. n.11. Mr. Ferguson argues that
the district court erred by applying the 250 mg presumption to the calculated number of
pills. He asserts that one test result showed that some of the seized pills weighed only
between 49.2 mg and 131 mg. Mr. Ferguson also notes that law enforcement “would
have lab data” on the weight of confiscated pills. (Aplt. Br. at 23.) However, the only
thing rebutting the Guidelines’ 250-mg presumption was Mr. Ferguson’s attorney’s
assertion at sentencing proceedings that lab results showed that some pills weighed
between 49.2 mg and 131 mg (ROA Vol. 2 at 29); there was no actual evidence of that in
the record. Mere assertions by counsel do not constitute “more reliable . . . case-specific
information,” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, cmt. n.11, that would rebut the Guidelines’ presumption.
Cf. United States v. Atencio, 435 F.3d 1222, 1237 (10th Cir. 2007) (approving of the jury
instruction that “statements, objections, or arguments made by the lawyers are not
evidence”). Thus, it was not unreasonable for the district court to apply the Guidelines’
250-mg presumption.
IV. Conversion of MDMA to marijuana under the Guidelines
Under the Guidelines, quantities of many drugs, including MDMA, are converted
into “equivalent” quantities of marijuana for the purpose of calculating a defendant’s
offense level. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. The conversion ratio for MDMA is 1:500, such
that the Guidelines consider 1 gram of MDMA to be equivalent to 500 grams of
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marijuana for the purpose of establishing drug quantity with respect to offense levels.
Id., cmt. n.10(E).1 Mr. Ferguson argues that the district court’s application of the 1:500
ratio was unreasonable in light of empirical data suggesting that the ratio is unduly harsh
and otherwise lacks justification. However, while Mr. Ferguson is correct that a
sentencing judge who disagrees with the policy or harshness of the Guidelines’ advisory
conversions may deviate from them without necessarily abusing his or her discretion, by
no means does it follow that it is an abuse of discretion for a judge to adhere to the
equivalency table, policy critiques notwithstanding. Indeed, “a sentence is not rendered
unreasonable merely because of a district court’s refusal to deviate from the advisory
[G]uideline range based on disagreements with the policies underlying a particular
Guideline provision.” United States v. Wilken, 498 F.3d 1160, 1172 (10th Cir. 2007)
(quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Alvarez-Bernabe, 626 F.3d 1161,
1166 (10th Cir. 2010). We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
application of the Guidelines’ advisory 1:500 MDMA-to-marijuana conversion ratio in
this case.
V. Calculation of defendant’s criminal history category
Finally, Mr. Ferguson challenges the district court’s determination that his
criminal history category was VI under the Guidelines. More specifically, he argues that
he should not receive three criminal history points for each of his two convictions for
1
Under the current version of the Guidelines, the drug equivalency table is subsection D
of Application Note 10 to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. Mr. Ferguson was sentenced under the 2010
Guidelines.
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separate armed robberies at age sixteen, reasoning that the two offenses were essentially
the same crime spree. Mr. Ferguson notes that had he received a total of only three
criminal history points for those two convictions, his total number of criminal history
points would have twelve, rather than fifteen, and his criminal history category would
have been V instead of VI.
Mr. Ferguson never raised this objection before the district court. First, in his
sentencing memorandum, Mr. Ferguson argued that he was not a career offender under
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) but failed to argue that his PSR had incorrectly counted his criminal
history points with respect to his former convictions. (ROA Vol. I at 27-38.) Likewise,
at his sentencing hearing, in the context of addressing the application of the career-
offender guideline, he conceded that his criminal history category was, as the judge put it,
otherwise “already” category VI. (ROA Vol. II at 13.) Mr. Ferguson thus either has
waived this objection, if by his endorsement of the district court’s conclusion he
“intentionally relinquished or abandoned” the issue below, in which case this Court will
not review it at all; or he has forfeited it, if the theory merely “wasn’t raised” below, in
which case it is subject to review for plain error on appeal. See United States v.
Vasquez-Alcarez, 647 F.3d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 2011).
Mr. Ferguson arguably waived the issue when his counsel agreed with the
sentencing judge that his criminal history category was already VI, independent of the
career-offender guideline. However, assuming arguendo that the issue was only
forfeited, Mr. Ferguson’s objection clearly fails our plain error standard, under which he
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must show “(1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4)
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id.
(quotation marks omitted). In this case, no plain error occurred because the district court
was correct to count separately Mr. Ferguson’s two robbery convictions. The Guidelines
instruct that where, as with Mr. Ferguson’s two robberies, there was no intervening
arrest, “prior sentences are counted separately unless (A) the sentences resulted from
offenses contained in the same charging instrument; or (B) the sentences were imposed
on the same day.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2). In this instance, Mr. Ferguson’s two robbery
convictions were not charged in the same instrument (they were different cases in
different state courts), and the respective sentences were imposed roughly six months
apart. (ROA Vol. 3 at 95-96.) Accordingly, the district court committed no error in
determining Mr. Ferguson’s criminal history category.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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