Banks v. McFarland , 12 F. App'x 873 ( 2001 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUN 13 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ROY DALE BANKS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 01-3052
(FNU) MCFARLAND; (FNU) SIX; (District of Kansas)
(FNU) ALLEGRUCCI; (FNU) (D.C. No. 01-CV-3021-GTV)
FROMME; (FNU) LOCKETT; (FNU)
MILLER; JOHN DOE, Kansas
Supreme Court Justices,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY, BRISCOE, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Roy Dale Banks, an inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights
complaint. In his complaint, Banks named as defendants various justices of the
Kansas Supreme Court who had participated in handing down the following three
decisions: State v Colbert, 769 P.2d 1168 (Kan. 1989); State v. Davis, 605 P.2d
572 (Kan. 1980); and State v. Robertson, 592 P.2d 460 (1979). Banks alleged that
these judicial decisions imposed an unconstitutional subjective standard for
evaluating the dangerous-weapon element of aggravated robbery. He sought a
declaratory judgment that this test violated clearly established constitutional
rights and an injunction to prevent further usage of the subjective standard to the
offense of aggravated robbery.
The district court dismissed Banks’ complaint as frivolous pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To the extent that Banks’ complaint stated a freestanding
challenge to the decisions listed above, none of which involved Banks, the district
court noted that it lacked Article III jurisdiction to consider the complaint. On
the other hand, to the extent that Banks was instead contending that the
application of these decisions caused him to be unconstitutionally convicted of
aggravated robbery, the district court noted that Banks’ remedy lies in a petition
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for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Preiser v. Rodriquez,
411 U.S. 475, 489 (1973) (holding that § 2254 habeas corpus petition is the
exclusive remedy where a state prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his
confinement).
On appeal, Banks merely reasserts the same arguments he advanced in the
district court. It is absolutely clear, however, that Banks lacks standing to lodge a
generalized challenge to the defendants’ application of a subjective standard to
the dangerous-weapon element of aggravated robbery. See Schaffer v. Clinton,
240 F.3d 878, 882 (10th Cir. 2001) (setting forth elements of standing). Banks
does allege in his appellate brief that the “‘subjective test’ had a direct
infringement to plaintiff’s aggravated robbery conviction.” This assertion of
injury in fact merely serves to demonstrate the district court’s conclusion that
Banks’ sole remedy lies in a § 2254 habeas corpus petition. See Preiser, 411 U.S.
at 489.
In light of the district court’s clear explanation of the controlling law in its
order of dismissal, this court concludes that Banks’ appeal is frivolous. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Both the district court’s dismissal of the complaint
and this court’s dismissal of the appeal count as strikes under § 1915(g). See
Jennings v. Natrona County Det. Ctr., 175 F.3d 775, 780 (1999). Banks is hereby
warned that if he accrues one more strike, he will be precluded from proceeding
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in forma pauperis in any further civil proceedings unless he is under “imminent
danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Banks is further
notified that despite this court’s dismissal of his appeal, he remains obligated to
continue making partial payments until his appellate filing fee is paid in full. See
id. § 1915(b).
For those reasons set out above, this appeal is hereby DISMISSED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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