Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Department , 717 F.3d 760 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS June 5, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
MISTI LEE SCHNEIDER,
Plaintiff-Appellant/
Cross-Appellee,
v. Nos. 12-1086 & 12-1115
THE CITY OF GRAND JUNCTION
POLICE DEPARTMENT, an agency of
the City of Grand Junction; BILL
GARDNER; JOHN CAMPER;
WILLIAM D. BAKER; JOHN A. ZEN;
RICK DYER,
Defendants-Appellees/
Cross-Appellants,
and
JOHN AND JANE DOES, 3-10, in their
official and individual capacities,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 1:10-CV-01719-MSK-KLM)
Clayton E. Wire (Elizabeth A. Starrs and Elizabeth L. “Booka” Smith with him on
the brief), of Starrs Mihm LLP, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-
Appellee.
Thomas S. Rice (Monica N. Kovaci with him on the brief), of Senter Goldfarb &
Rice, L.L.C., Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants.
Before KELLY, Circuit Judge, HOLLOWAY, Senior Circuit Judge, and
MATHESON, Circuit Judge.
MATHESON, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Misti Lee Schneider alleged in her complaint that Glenn Coyne, a
Grand Junction Police Department (“GJPD”) officer, responded to her 911 call about
an altercation with her teenage son and, during a visit to her home late the next night,
raped her. Shortly thereafter, Officer Coyne was arrested and fired, and a few days
later committed suicide.
Ms. Schneider sued Officer Coyne’s supervisors and the GJPD under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of her substantive due process right to bodily
integrity. She alleged that inadequate hiring and training of Officer Coyne,
inadequate investigation of a prior sexual assault complaint against him, and
inadequate discipline and supervision of him caused her to be raped.
In district court, the defendants did not contest Ms. Schneider’s allegations
about Officer Coyne’s conduct. They moved for summary judgment on the grounds
that Officer Coyne did not act under color of state law and that Ms. Schneider could
not prove, as § 1983 law requires, that they caused the rape or were deliberately
indifferent to the risk that it would happen.
The district court denied summary judgment on the first ground, holding that a
reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Coyne acted under color of state law. It
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granted summary judgment on the second ground, concluding that Ms. Schneider
could not prove essential facts to establish § 1983 liability. She appeals that ruling.
The defendants cross-appeal the color of state law ruling.
The events alleged in this case are tragic, and Officer Coyne’s alleged conduct
was a terrible crime. The state cannot prosecute Officer Coyne because he is dead,
and Ms. Schneider is left with suing his supervisors and employer. As explained
below, to hold them liable for Officer Coyne’s actions, she faces stringent proof
requirements under § 1983 law, proof she is unable to muster. Although the police
department’s handling of Officer Coyne could and should have been better, we are
bound to follow the law, apply it to the evidentiary record before us, and affirm the
district court.
Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the district court’s
decision in Ms. Schneider’s appeal (No. 12-1086), and we dismiss the defendants’
cross-appeal (No. 12-1115) as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
We construe the facts underlying the grant of summary judgment in the light
most favorable to Ms. Schneider as the non-moving party, Ribeau v. Katt, 681 F.3d
1190, 1194 (10th Cir. 2012), and recount those facts as follows.
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1. Officer Coyne’s Response to Ms. Schneider’s 911 Call
In the early evening of September 27, 2009, Ms. Schneider called 911 to report
an altercation with her teenage son. Officer Coyne and another officer responded
around 7:00 p.m. While at Ms. Schneider’s home, they discovered that her son was
making and detonating bombs and recording the explosions on his cell phone.
Officer Coyne explained to Ms. Schneider that, far from a slap on the wrist for a
teenage prank, her son could be facing very serious charges. Had her son been an
adult, he said, the seriousness of his offense would be a class 4, falling somewhere
between Charles Manson as a class 1 and the head of a methamphetamine ring as a
class 6. Officer Coyne returned to the station, but he came back to Ms. Schneider’s
house two more times that night — first, at around 11:00 p.m., to collect more
evidence; and second, around midnight, to return some property (his shift schedule
was from 3:00 p.m. until 1:00 a.m.).
The next day, September 28, Officer Coyne called Ms. Schneider with some
questions for his investigation. She asked him to update her on the case, telling him
that she was very concerned. Officer Coyne said he was aware that she was having
issues with her son, and he offered to stop by and check on him later. Ms. Schneider
accepted the offer. She and Officer Coyne exchanged calls multiple times throughout
the day, and she spoke with him once more in an after-dinner conversation about her
son.
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2. Officer Coyne’s Rape of Ms. Schneider
Although Officer Coyne was scheduled to work until 1:00 a.m. on
September 29, he signed off-duty at 11:49 p.m. on September 28. He then went to
Ms. Schneider’s house.1 She was awake and packing for a move; the doors were
unlocked and open. Wearing a sweatshirt with his uniform pants and boots, but not
wearing a badge or carrying a weapon, Officer Coyne entered the house without
knocking or asking permission. He startled Ms. Schneider because she was not
expecting him to visit that night. He began talking with her about her son and the
case investigation.
Then Officer Coyne made the conversation more personal, mentioning her
estranged husband. Further, he made remarks to the effect of “‘you never want to
talk about the police because they have so many connections’ or ‘know so many
people,’” Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 307, and “how he was ‘doing [Ms. Schneider’s] son a
1
Ms. Schneider contends there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Officer Coyne was on-duty or off-duty when the rape occurred because he was
scheduled to work until 1:00 a.m. on September 29 and his time sheet reflects that he
was paid for that time. But GJPD’s unit log for Officer Coyne shows that he signed
off-duty at 11:49 p.m. on September 28. Officer Coyne’s supervisor, Sergeant
William Baker, testified that Officer Coyne asked to leave an hour early to go home
and get more sleep before he left on vacation. The sergeant granted the request
because Officer Coyne had worked an extra hour earlier in the week. Further, when
Officer Coyne arrived at Ms. Schneider’s home, he was not in full uniform, not
wearing a badge, and not carrying a weapon. Even viewing the facts in the light most
favorable to Ms. Schneider, we cannot conclude that a reasonable jury could find that
Officer Coyne was on-duty after 11:49 p.m. on September 28.
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favor,’ or ‘doing [her] a favor with [her] son,’” id. at 308.2 He next overpowered
Ms. Schneider and raped her multiple times. Before leaving, he told her, “‘[N]obody
can know about this. My wife can’t know about this. You do not want to mess with
my life.’” Id. at 310. Ms. Schneider interpreted these remarks as a threat of
retaliation, either against her or through her son’s case.
Despite feeling threatened, Ms. Schneider reported the rape later that same
day. The Mesa County Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”) began an investigation, and a
medical examination corroborated that she had suffered trauma. Officer Coyne was
arrested on October 1, 2009, and his employment with GJPD was terminated. He
was released on bond, and within days he committed suicide.
3. Previous Complaints Against Officer Coyne for Sexual Assault
The attack on Ms. Schneider was the third incident in which Officer Coyne
was alleged to have had improper sexual contact with a woman whom he met while
working in law enforcement. One complaint was known to GJPD before the attack
on Ms. Schneider, but the other was not.
a. The January 10, 2007 A.L. Complaint
The complaint that was unknown to GJPD concerned Officer Coyne’s actions
when he was working for MCSO and just before he started working for GJPD. On
2
The defendants contend that Officer Coyne’s statements, as reported by
Ms. Schneider, are inadmissible hearsay. We disagree. The statements are not
hearsay because they are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. See Fed. R.
Evid. 801(c) (defining hearsay).
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January 10, 2007, A.L.3 complained to MCSO that on January 8, 2007, Officer Coyne
sexually abused her during a nighttime drug raid at her house. The written report of
A.L.’s complaint states that all of the men in the house were arrested, but A.L. and
her mother were not. During these events, Officer Coyne searched A.L. three times.
The first two times were pat-downs, during which Officer Coyne rubbed and groped
A.L. in her crotch area. A.L. lifted her blouse to avoid her breasts being touched.
The third time, A.L. was in her bedroom. Officer Coyne came in alone, said he
wanted to search her again, and told her to pull down her pants and underwear. Then
another officer came in and told Officer Coyne it was time to go.
GJPD learned about A.L.’s complaint only after the assault on Ms. Schneider.
GJPD’s hiring background check on Officer Coyne was completed in December 2006
and was not updated through his January 15, 2007 start date. The A.L. incident
occurred during this interim period. No one at MCSO informed GJPD about A.L.’s
complaint until after Ms. Schneider reported her assault on September 29, 2009.
b. The December 28, 2008 V.W. Complaint
The complaint that was known to GJPD occurred nearly two years into Officer
Coyne’s employment at GJPD. V.W. reported on December 28, 2008, that she had
met Officer Coyne when she sought police assistance in November 2008 because she
was intoxicated and hallucinating. She contacted him on December 19 and agreed to
3
We have chosen not to use the full names of the nonparties to this case who
complained about Officer Coyne.
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his suggestion that he visit her at home when he was off-duty. He came to her home
on that same day. They engaged in consensual sex, but he allegedly took the
encounter beyond her consent and sexually assaulted her.
After receiving V.W.’s complaint, GJPD put Officer Coyne on administrative
leave. MCSO conducted a criminal investigation. The district attorney declined to
bring charges because the evidence was equivocal. According to the deputy district
attorney, V.W. was not a reliable witness, she admitted that the encounter began
consensually, and the medical evidence was inconclusive. Further, in addition to
asserting that all the activities were consensual, Officer Coyne passed a polygraph
test to that effect. GJPD subsequently conducted an internal investigation, which was
kept confidential. As a result of the internal investigation, which also determined
that proof of sexual assault was inconclusive, Police Chief William Gardner placed
Officer Coyne on probation for at least six months and cut his pay, and Deputy Chief
John Zen issued him a written notice of discipline.
After the V.W. investigation, Officer Coyne was transferred to a new
supervisor, Sergeant William Baker, who was told that Officer Coyne was on
probation. When Sergeant Baker asked his commander why Officer Coyne had been
on administrative leave, he was told that the matter was confidential pursuant to
GJPD policy. In light of the policy, Sergeant Baker did not inquire further. He
therefore had no knowledge of V.W.’s complaint. He stated in an affidavit filed in
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this litigation that he supervised Officer Coyne in the same manner as the other
officers assigned to report to him.
Officer Coyne was still on probation at the time he met Ms. Schneider.
B. Procedural History
Ms. Schneider sued GJPD for municipal liability and several GJPD officials in
their individual capacities for how they discharged their superintendent
responsibilities. The individual defendants were Chief Gardner, who was the police
chief until the beginning of September 2009; John Camper, who became the interim
police chief upon Chief Gardner’s departure; Deputy Chief Zen; Sergeant Baker, who
was Officer Coyne’s direct supervisor at the time of the rape; and Rick Dyer, GJPD’s
Professional Standards Administrator (“PSA”). Ms. Schneider alleged that various
combinations of the defendants were liable for inadequate hiring, training,
investigation of the V.W. complaint, discipline, and supervision.
The defendants moved for summary judgment. They argued that (1) Officer
Coyne had not acted under color of state law; (2) the individual defendants were
entitled to qualified immunity; (3) Ms. Schneider could not prove that any of the
individual defendants caused Officer Coyne’s conduct and/or acted with deliberate
indifference to the risk of what happened to her; and (4) the City was not liable
because Ms. Schneider could not prove her claims against the individual defendants,
the City had no policy or custom that was the moving force behind Ms. Schneider’s
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injury, and the City did not act with deliberate indifference. Ms. Schneider
responded in opposition, submitting numerous exhibits.
The district court concluded that Ms. Schneider’s evidence created a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether Officer Coyne acted under color of state law, and
denied the defendants’ request for summary judgment on that ground. The court
nonetheless held that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment. It
identified two primary issues: (1) causation, and (2) the required culpable state of
mind of deliberate indifference for a substantive due process bodily integrity claim.
Analyzing each of Ms. Schneider’s five claims, the court concluded she had
insufficient evidence to show that the alleged inadequacies caused the rape and/or
that the individual defendants or the City were deliberately indifferent to the risk of
Officer Coyne’s committing a rape. Accordingly, the district court granted summary
judgment to all of the defendants.
Ms. Schneider appealed. The defendants cross-appealed on the color of state
law issue.
II. DISCUSSION
This court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Schneider. See Ribeau, 681 F.3d at 1194.
“‘The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “A fact is material if, under the
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governing law, it could have an effect on the outcome of the lawsuit. A dispute over
a material fact is genuine if a rational jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party
on the evidence presented.” Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1215 (10th Cir.
2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’---that is,
pointing out to the district court---that there is an absence of evidence to support the
nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). “[A]
party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1998) (“If the movant carries
this initial burden, the non-movant may not rest upon its pleadings, but must set forth
specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for
which it carries the burden of proof.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
A. Ms. Schneider’s Appeal, No. 12-1086
1. Legal Standards for Individual and Municipal Liability
a. Individual Liability
The individual defendants were Officer Coyne’s supervisors. We have
referred to claims against supervisors as based on “supervisory liability,” see, e.g.,
Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1527 (10th Cir. 1988), though this label can be
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misunderstood as implying vicarious liability. “Section 1983 does not authorize
liability under a theory of respondeat superior.” Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152,
1164 (10th Cir. 2011).4 For this reason, the Supreme Court has suggested the term
“supervisory liability” is “a misnomer.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009).
“Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding,
is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Id.The plaintiff therefore must show an “affirmative link” between the supervisor
and the constitutional violation. Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1195
(10th Cir. 2010). This requires, for example, more than “a supervisor’s mere
knowledge of his subordinate’s” conduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677. This notion is
embodied in the three elements required to establish a successful § 1983 claim
against a defendant based on his or her supervisory responsibilities: (1) personal
involvement; (2) causation, and (3) state of mind. As we explained in Dodds:
[T]he plaintiff must demonstrate an affirmative link between the
supervisor and the violation[.] Over time, this “affirmative link”
requirement came to have three related prongs: (1) personal
involvement; (2) sufficient causal connection, and (3) culpable state of
mind.
614 F.3d at 1195 (quotations omitted). We discuss each of these elements in turn.
4
This opinion discusses three cases that properly can be short-cited as
“Brown.” To avoid confusion, we reserve “Brown” for the Supreme Court case
discussed later in this opinion, Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, 520 U.S.
397 (1997).
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i. Personal involvement
“Individual liability under § 1983 must be based on [the defendant’s] personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional violation.” Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d
1416, 1423 (10th Cir. 1997). Before the Supreme Court’s decision in Iqbal, this
circuit allowed a plaintiff to establish personal involvement in several ways, for
example, “by demonstrating [a defendant’s] personal participation, his exercise of
control or direction, or his failure to supervise.” Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1195 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “A defendant supervisor’s promulgation, creation,
implementation, or utilization of a policy that caused a deprivation of plaintiff’s
rights also could have constituted sufficient personal involvement.” Id. (citing
Meade, 841 F.2d at 1528).
Iqbal, however, articulated a stricter liability standard for this first element of
personal involvement. See Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1199. In Iqbal, the Supreme Court
explained that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a
plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s
own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” 556 U.S. at 676.
“[W]e have not yet had occasion to determine what allegations of personal
involvement . . . meet Iqbal’s stricter liability standard.” Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1199.
We have discussed this question in several recent cases. See Wilson v. Montano, __
F.3d __, No. 12-2051, 2013 WL 1848138, at *6-*8 (10th Cir. May 3, 2013); Keith v.
Koerner, 707 F.3d 1185, 1188 (10th Cir. 2013); Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d at
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1164-66; Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1328 (10th Cir. 2010); Dodds, 614 F.3d at
1198-1201.
None of those cases, however, presented us with the occasion to address the
precise contours of this standard. And neither does this case. None of the claims
against the individual defendants turns on the question of personal involvement. The
district court’s summary judgment conclusions were based on the second and third
elements, causation and state of mind, and the parties’ arguments also are focused on
these latter elements. We therefore assume without deciding that Ms. Schneider has
presented sufficient evidence of the individual defendants’ personal involvement
under Iqbal’s stricter liability standard.
ii. Causation
The second element requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s alleged
action(s) caused the constitutional violation. As we said in Dodds, nothing in Iqbal
“altered the Supreme Court's previously enunciated § 1983 causation . . . analysis.”
Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1200. “A plaintiff [must] establish the ‘requisite causal
connection’ by showing ‘the defendant set in motion a series of events that the
defendant knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive the
plaintiff of her constitutional rights.” Id. at 1185 (quoting Poolaw v. Marcantel,
565 F.3d 721, 732-33 (10th Cir. 2009)); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1218
(9th Cir. 2011) (“The requisite causal connection can be established [] by setting in
motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know
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would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2101 (2012).
For example, in Poolaw, a plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim against two police
supervisors involving a police search of the plaintiff’s home. 565 F.3d at 726-27.
We determined that the search was not supported by probable cause and therefore
violated plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 732. The police supervisors
were not present during the search, but they ordered the search and swore out the
affidavit in support of the search warrant. Id. at 733. We concluded that the
supervisors’ actions “set in motion a series of events” they reasonably should have
known would result in the search. Id. The plaintiff therefore satisfied the causation
element for summary judgment purposes. Id.iii. State of mind
The third element requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant took the
alleged actions with the requisite state of mind. Precisely what state of mind is
required for individual liability depends on the type of claim a plaintiff brings. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1204-05. Ms. Schneider asserts a
violation of her right to bodily integrity, which is a substantive-due-process claim.
See Abeyta ex rel. Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 19, 77 F.3d 1253,
1255 (10th Cir. 1996). In the district court, the parties agreed that the applicable
state of mind for a substantive due process claim is deliberate indifference, and the
district court employed that standard.
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On appeal, no one challenges the use of the deliberate-indifference standard.
We therefore assume without deciding that deliberate indifference is the applicable
state of mind. This is consistent with our approach in Dodds, which also concerned a
substantive due process § 1983 claim, where we declined to consider whether
deliberate indifference was the correct standard because neither party challenged the
district court’s use of that standard. 614 F.3d at 1205. We assumed without
deciding, as we do here, that deliberate indifference is the standard for a claim of
violation of substantive due process. Id.“‘[D]eliberate indifference’ is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that
a municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997). Deliberate indifference can be
satisfied by evidence showing that the defendant “knowingly created a substantial
risk of constitutional injury.” Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1206. “[A] local government
policymaker is deliberately indifferent when he deliberately or consciously fails to
act when presented with an obvious risk of constitutional harm which will almost
inevitably result in constitutional injury of the type experienced by the plaintiff.”
Hollingsworth v. Hill, 110 F.3d 733, 745 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
b. Municipal Liability
In contrast to individual supervisor liability, we have explained that nothing in
Iqbal changed the “longstanding interpretation” of § 1983’s standards for imposing
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municipal liability. Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1202. That interpretation dates back to
Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691-92, 694 (1978), which
held that a plaintiff must identify “a government’s policy or custom” that caused the
injury. In later cases, the Supreme Court required a plaintiff to show that the policy
was enacted or maintained with deliberate indifference to an almost inevitable
constitutional injury. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 403; see also City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). We briefly discuss each of the three elements: (1) official
policy or custom, (2) causation, and (3) state of mind.
i. Official policy or custom
In Monell, the Supreme Court stated that “Congress did not intend
municipalities to be held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of
some nature caused a constitutional tort.” 436 U.S. at 691. “[I]t is when execution
of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those
whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury
that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Id. at 694.
“The ‘official policy’ requirement was intended to distinguish acts of the
municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that
municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually
responsible.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986). A
challenged practice may be deemed an official policy or custom for § 1983
municipal-liability purposes if it is a formally promulgated policy, a well-settled
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custom or practice, a final decision by a municipal policymaker, or deliberately
indifferent training or supervision. See Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation
Claims & Defenses, § 7.06[A] (2013), available at Westlaw SNETLCD.
As with the personal involvement element of the claims against the individual
defendants, we do not rely on the element of a municipal policy or custom to resolve
Ms. Schneider’s claims against the City. The district court assumed without deciding
that this element was met, and based its summary judgment decisions in favor of the
City on the second and/or third elements – causation and state of mind. We similarly
assume without deciding that Ms. Schneider has presented sufficient evidence of a
municipal policy or custom for her claims against the City.
ii. Causation
To establish the causation element, the challenged policy or practice must be
“closely related to the violation of the plaintiff’s federally protected right.”
Schwartz, at § 7.12[B]. This requirement is satisfied if the plaintiff shows that “the
municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” Brown, 520 U.S. at
404.
Ms. Schneider must therefore “demonstrate a direct causal link between the
municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.” Id. As with so-called
supervisory liability discussed above, municipal liability in a § 1983 case cannot be
established on a theory of vicarious liability. “Where a plaintiff claims that the
municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an
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employee to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to
ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee.”
Id. at 405. “The causation element is applied with especial rigor when the municipal
policy or practice is itself not unconstitutional, for example, when the municipal
liability claim is based upon inadequate training, supervision, and deficiencies in
hiring.” Schwartz, at § 7.12.
iii. State of mind
“[A] plaintiff seeking to establish municipal liability on the theory that a
facially lawful municipal action has led an employee to violate a plaintiff’s rights
must demonstrate that the municipal action was taken with ‘deliberate indifference’
as to its known or obvious consequences.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 407; see also City of
Canton, 489 U.S. at 389.
The deliberate indifference standard may be satisfied when the
municipality has actual or constructive notice that its action or
failure to act is substantially certain to result in a constitutional
violation, and it consciously or deliberately chooses to disregard
the risk of harm. In most instances, notice can be established by
proving the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct. In a
narrow range of circumstances, however, deliberate indifference
may be found absent a pattern of unconstitutional behavior if a
violation of federal rights is a highly predictable or plainly
obvious consequence of a municipality’s action or inaction[.]
Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).5
5
In the present case, the state-of-mind element is deliberate indifference for
both the individual defendants and the City. This may not always be the case. For
individual defendants, the applicable state of mind will depend on the type of
(continued)
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2. Analysis of Ms. Schneider’s Claims
Ms. Schneider alleged inadequacies in hiring, training, investigating the V.W.
complaint, discipline, and supervision. We address each claim in turn, keeping in
mind that we assume for the sake of discussion that the individual defendants all
meet the post-Iqbal personal involvement element for liability.
a. Hiring
Ms. Schneider asserted her hiring claim against PSA Dyer and the City,
arguing that Officer Coyne would not have been hired had there been an adequate
background investigation.6 She identified two deficiencies.
First, she complained that the background investigation was completed and
submitted in December 2006 and did not continue through Officer Coyne’s January
15, 2007 start date with GJPD. If it had continued, PSA Dyer would have discovered
the A.L. complaint. Chief Gardner made the ultimate hiring decision, and he testified
constitutional violation at issue. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Dodds, 614 F.3d at
1204-05; Schwartz, at § 6.02[A]. In contrast, the prevailing state-of-mind standard
for a municipality is deliberate indifference regardless of the nature of the underlying
constitutional violation. See Schwartz, at § 6.02[C] (“Since the decision in City of
Canton [adopted deliberate indifference for training claims], deliberate indifference
has become the prevailing standard for other types of municipal liability claims as
well . . . . [W]hen a § 1983 claimant seeks to impose municipal liability she must
normally show deliberate indifference.”); id. at § 7.07 (“The deliberate indifference
standard has . . . played a pervasive role in the law of § 1983 municipal liability.”).
6
Even though Chief Gardner made the hiring decision, Ms. Schneider did not
assert her hiring claim against him.
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at his deposition that if he had known about the A.L. complaint, he would have
delayed and/or terminated Officer Coyne’s hiring.
Second, Ms. Schneider complained that the investigation did not secure
Officer Coyne’s records from his previous employment at the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection (FDEP). She asserted that those records show that he was
the subject of an internal investigation for “Conduct unbecoming a public employee,”
with a finding of “Not Sustained.” Aplt. App., Vol. 4 at 642.
This claim against both defendants fails for lack of evidence sufficient to
establish deliberate indifference.
i. Individual Defendant
In Brown, the Supreme Court discussed the standards for evaluating whether a
policymaker’s hiring decision reflects deliberate indifference:
A plaintiff must demonstrate that a municipal decision reflects
deliberate indifference to the risk that a violation of a particular
constitutional or statutory right will follow the decision. Only where
adequate scrutiny of an applicant’s background would lead a reasonable
policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the
decision to hire the applicant would be the deprivation of a third party’s
federally protected right can the official’s failure to adequately
scrutinize the applicant’s background constitute “deliberate
indifference.”
520 U.S. at 411. Brown addressed the proof necessary to show deliberate
indifference when the background investigation was inadequate. See id. at 401, 411.
Here, however, the record does not support a finding that the background
investigation of Officer Coyne was inadequate.
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The investigation addressed Officer Coyne’s professional and personal
background. On the professional side, the investigating sergeant contacted MCSO.
He spoke with three employees there who were familiar with Officer Coyne, and he
reviewed Officer Coyne’s personnel file. He also contacted two former employers,
the Santa Rosa County (Florida) Sheriff’s Office and the FDEP. The Santa Rosa
County Sheriff’s Office gave a favorable report of Officer Coyne, while the FDEP
did no more than verify Officer Coyne’s employment, stating that the FDEP’s
employment information was confidential.
On the personal side, the sergeant conducted a home visit, reviewed Officer
Coyne’s personal history statement, and contacted his personal references. The one
reference who responded gave a positive report of Officer Coyne. Further, the
sergeant performed a criminal-history check, which showed no criminal history or
law enforcement contacts, and he reviewed a psychological suitability report. The
sergeant concluded that Officer Coyne was eligible for employment.
Neither of the faults alleged by Ms. Schneider made the investigation
inadequate. First, as to concluding the background investigation before
Officer Coyne’s start date, some lag time between the completion of the investigation
and a candidate’s start date is not unreasonable. Here, the gap was three weeks, and
the investigation stated that “it appear[ed] that Coyne has generally been a good,
dependable employee.” Aplt. App. Vol. 4 at 639. In the absence of any information
to the contrary (such as actual notice of the A.L. complaint), it was not deliberate
- 22 -
indifference for PSA Dyer to conclude the investigation shortly before Officer
Coyne’s start date.
Second, regarding the FDEP records, the sergeant contacted the FDEP and was
told that its records were confidential. It was not deliberate indifference for
PSA Dyer to abide by the FDEP’s decision not to provide its records.
For these reasons, we agree with the district court that no reasonable jury
could conclude that PSA Dyer was deliberately indifferent to the risk that Officer
Coyne would violate an individual’s constitutional right to bodily integrity.
ii. The City
The Supreme Court has emphasized:
Cases involving constitutional injuries allegedly traceable to an
ill-considered hiring decision pose the greatest risk that a municipality
will be held liable for an injury that it did not cause. In the broadest
sense, every injury is traceable to a hiring decision. Where a court fails
to adhere to rigorous requirements of culpability and causation,
municipal liability collapses into respondeat superior liability.
Brown, 520 U.S. at 415.
The evidence indicates that PSA Dyer was not a policymaker or decisionmaker
for the City with regard to hiring Officer Coyne. He did not make the hiring
decision—Chief Gardner did. Consequently, the hiring claim against the City must
be based on Chief Gardner’s actions or inactions. As discussed above, the
background investigation was not inadequate, and, as with PSA Dyer, there is no
evidence that Chief Gardner was deliberately indifferent. See id., 520 U.S. at 415-16(stating that the county was not liable for the sheriff’s hiring decision because the
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plaintiff had not shown that the sheriff acted with deliberate indifference).
Moreover, no evidence suggested that the City had actual or constructive notice of
the need for any additional background investigation. See Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307(“The deliberate indifference standard may be satisfied when the municipality has
actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is substantially certain to
result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or deliberately chooses to
disregard the risk of harm.”). Accordingly, we agree with the district court that no
reasonable jury could find that the City acted with deliberate indifference in its
decision to hire Officer Coyne.
b. Training
The defendants named in the training claim were Chief Gardner, Interim Chief
Camper, Deputy Chief Zen, Sergeant Baker, and the City. Ms. Schneider argues that
GJPD should have trained its officers not to have sexual relationships with women
they meet in the course of doing their jobs.
The claim against the individual defendants is waived and the claim against
the City fails for a lack of evidence of deliberate indifference.
i. Individual Defendants
Ms. Schneider provided no argument in her opening brief as to how the
district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the individual
defendants on this claim. “[W]e routinely have declined to consider arguments that
are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant’s opening brief. . . .
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Stated differently, the omission of an issue in an opening brief generally forfeits
appellate consideration of that issue.” Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104
(10th Cir. 2007). We therefore decline to address the issue here. That leaves the
City as the only remaining defendant for the training claim.
ii. The City
“[T]here are limited circumstances in which an allegation of a ‘failure to train’
can be the basis for [municipal] liability under § 1983.” City of Canton, 489 U.S. at
387. “[T]he inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability
only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom the police come into contact.” Id. at 388. A municipality can be
liable where “the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the
inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the
policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent
to the need.” Id. at 390.
Ms. Schneider has failed to show, as the law requires, that “the need for more
or different training [was] so obvious” that a violation of her constitutional right to
bodily integrity was likely to result from not providing it. She argues that “the GJPD
fostered a culture where officers commonly engaged in sexually oriented contact with
women who the[] officer met while on duty.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 51. Some of the
conduct Ms. Schneider points to, however, occurred in consensual relationships,
which would not amount to constitutional violations.
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As for non-consensual sexual misconduct by GJPD officers, the record reflects
that before the assault on Ms. Schneider, and besides the V.W. complaint, there was
only one other report of non-consensual sexual misconduct. That officer was placed
on administrative leave and resigned before the investigation process was completed.
Although this report of police misconduct along with the V.W. complaint are
troubling, they were not enough to make it obvious to GJPD that officers were likely
to engage in non-consensual sexual conduct unless they were trained not to engage in
any sexual relationship with women whom they met while on the job. As we stated
in analogous circumstances, “[s]pecific or extensive training hardly seems necessary
for a jailer to know that sexually assaulting inmates is inappropriate behavior.”
Barney, 143 F.3d at 1308; see also Andrews v. Fowler, 98 F.3d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir.
1996) (“In light of the regular law enforcement duties of a police officer, we cannot
conclude that there was a patently obvious need for the city to specifically train
officers not to rape young women.”).
Moreover, Officer Coyne was, in fact, instructed against relationships with
women he met on duty. As discussed below in connection with Ms. Schneider’s
discipline claim, the notice of discipline he received as a result of the V.W. complaint
told him that it was unacceptable to engage in sexual relationships with women
whom he met through his job. Given that he acted in violation of this direct warning,
it is unclear how the training advocated by Ms. Schneider would have prevented the
assault on her. Indeed, the directive issued to Officer Coyne was the opposite of
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deliberate indifference. See Porro, 624 F.3d at 1328-29 (given that officer
knowingly acted contrary to policy, “any reasonable fact finder would have to
conclude that—far from exhibiting deliberate indifference . . . or causing his injury—
the county actively sought to protect [plaintiff’s] rights and it was (only)
[defendant’s] improper actions, taken in defiance of county policy, that caused
[plaintiff’s] injuries”).
We agree with the district court that Ms. Schneider cannot show that the City
acted with deliberate indifference to the risk of what happened to her in the manner it
trained its officers.
c. Investigation of V.W. Complaint
The defendants named in this claim were Chief Gardner, Deputy Chief Zen,
PSA Dyer, and the City. PSA Dyer conducted the internal investigation of V.W.’s
complaint alleging that Officer Coyne sexually assaulted her following consensual
sex. Ms. Schneider alleged that the internal investigation was inadequate because
PSA Dyer did not update the background check from when Officer Coyne was hired.
She argues that, had he updated the hiring background check and/or obtained
MCSO’s complete personnel file, the A.L. complaint would have been revealed. In
turn, Chief Gardner testified at his deposition that if he had learned of the A.L.
complaint during the V.W. investigation, he would have dismissed Officer Coyne.
Therefore, Ms. Schneider contends, if PSA Dyer had performed a more thorough
investigation, Officer Coyne would not have been in a position to attack her. She
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further asserts that Chief Gardner ratified PSA Dyer’s decision not to update the
earlier background investigation.
The claim against Deputy Chief Zen is waived, and the claims against the
other individual defendants and the City fail for lack of evidence of deliberate
indifference.
i. Individual Defendants
Ms. Schneider has not argued on appeal how the district court erred in granting
judgment in favor of Deputy Chief Zen on this claim, and thus we do not consider the
allegations against him. See Bronson, 500 F.3d at 1104. That leaves the allegations
against Chief Gardner and PSA Dyer.
PSA Dyer communicated numerous times with the MSCO officer in charge of
the criminal investigation into V.W.’s allegations of sexual assault against Officer
Coyne. He also did other preliminary work, such as reviewing Officer Coyne’s e-
mail messages and telephone calls for anything relevant to the V.W. complaint, and
he sat in on the MSCO officer’s interview of Officer Coyne. By the time he did the
internal investigation, PSA Dyer had a copy of the entire criminal file compiled by
MSCO and had been briefed by the investigating officer and deputy district attorney
regarding their analyses of the criminal investigation. PSA Dyer also separately
interviewed Officer Coyne.
Consistent with our analysis of the hiring claim, PSA Dyer’s failure to update
the 2006 background investigation did not make the internal investigation of the
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V.W. complaint inadequate. The MSCO conducted the criminal investigation
regarding the V.W. complaint, yet the A.L. complaint did not come to light even
though MCSO had the A.L. complaint in its files. Neither PSA Dyer nor
Chief Gardner had information indicating any need to update the background
investigation, much less know that an obvious consequence of not updating the
background investigation created a substantial risk of constitutional injury.
Accordingly, we agree with the district court that a rational jury could not find that
PSA Dyer or Chief Gardner acted with deliberate indifference.
ii. The City
As was the case with PSA Dyer and Chief Gardner, the City had no notice of
any reason to update Officer Coyne’s background investigation. The individual
defendants were not deliberately indifferent, so judgment in favor of the City on a
claim predicated on their decisions also was appropriate. See Brown, 520 U.S. at
415-16; see also Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d 1278, 1289 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that to
proceed with municipal liability claim, “the plaintiff must show that a policymaker,
which could be the chief of police, among others, was deliberately indifferent”).7
7
In addition, PSA Dyer is not a policymaker for the City. In seeking to
impose municipal liability, Ms. Schneider contends that Chief Gardner ratified PSA
Dyer’s decision not to update the background investigation. “However, a
municipality will not be found liable under a ratification theory unless a final
decisionmaker ratifies an employee’s specific unconstitutional actions, as well as the
basis for these actions.” Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 790 (10th Cir.
2010). Given that PSA Dyer’s actions were not unconstitutional, Chief Gardner’s
alleged ratification of those actions does not impose liability on the City.
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d. Discipline
Ms. Schneider asserted her discipline claim against Chief Gardner,
Deputy Chief Zen, PSA Dyer, and the City.
After the criminal investigation and internal investigation of the V.W.
complaint, Chief Gardner met with Deputy Chief Zen and PSA Dyer to consider
appropriate discipline of Officer Coyne. Chief Gardner was the final decisionmaker.
In his affidavit submitted in this litigation, he explained:
16. Although it was an extremely difficult decision, I
ultimately decided that Coyne’s conduct reflected bad judgment and he
should be disciplined for engaging in conduct unbecoming of a police
officer and that reflected unfavorably on the GJPD, and for failing to
obey all City and Department regulations. . . .
17. I decided that the appropriate discipline was to place
Coyne back on probationary status, rather than terminate him. This
would allow Coyne to be terminated for any questionable conduct, in
other words, he could be terminated for no cause. . . .
Aplt. App., Vol. 1 at 123. In addition, he cut Officer Coyne’s pay by ten percent.
Ms. Schneider contends that instead of imposing this intermediate discipline,
Chief Gardner should have dismissed Officer Coyne and that the failure to do so led
to her rape.
The claims against Deputy Chief Zen and PSA Dyer are waived, and the
claims against Chief Gardner and the City fail for lack of deliberate indifference.
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i. Individual Defendants
On appeal, Ms. Schneider has failed to challenge the judgment in favor of
Deputy Chief Zen and PSA Dyer on the discipline claim, so we need not discuss the
allegations against them. See Bronson, 500 F.3d at 1104.
Turning to Chief Gardner, the district court gave Ms. Schneider the benefit of
the doubt regarding causation. But it held there was no showing that Chief Gardner
was deliberately indifferent because “Chief Gardner was presented with Officer
Coyne’s apparently clean record and a single off-duty incident with both parties
admitting to some consensual sexual contact, disputed non-consensual sexual
activity, ambiguous physical evidence and a polygraph test showing no deception
with respect to the disputed facts.” Aplt. App., Vol. 5 at 1083. We agree that Chief
Gardner’s disciplinary decision did not reflect deliberate indifference.
As the district court noted, the evidence regarding the V.W. complaint was
equivocal. The court explained that the medical evidence was inconclusive, V.W.
was an unreliable witness who admitted that the encounter began consensually, and
the deputy district attorney determined there was insufficient evidence for a criminal
conviction. Officer Coyne maintained that the entire encounter was consensual, and
he passed a polygraph test to that effect. It is only in hindsight, with knowledge of
the assaults on Ms. Schneider and A.L., that the scales may have tipped in favor of
V.W.’s version of events. Whether Chief Gardner acted with deliberate indifference
must be based on what he knew then, not what is known now.
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Other circuits have held that disciplinary decisions in similar circumstances
were not made with deliberate indifference. See DiRico v. City of Quincy, 404 F.3d
464, 469 (1st Cir. 2005) (a city’s decision not to take action against an officer based
on one unsubstantiated allegation of excessive force did not constitute deliberate
indifference); Rogers v. City of Little Rock, 152 F.3d 790, 800 (8th Cir. 1998) (police
chief responded adequately to two incidents of prior misconduct by imposing
suspension in the one case that was sustained, so he was not deliberately indifferent
to future risk); Jones v. Wellham, 104 F.3d 620, 626-27 (4th Cir. 1997) (where
evidence was insufficient for criminal prosecution in prior incident, chief’s
disciplinary decisions were “clearly unfortunate,” perhaps “imprudent,” or even
“legally negligent,” but not deliberately indifferent); Gonzalez v. Ysleta Indep. Sch.
Dist., 996 F.2d 745, 762 (5th Cir. 1993) (school board was not deliberately
indifferent in transferring teacher rather than terminating employment, where teacher
was accused of molestation but there was no corroborating evidence).
Further, as the district court also noted, Chief Gardner took the V.W.
complaint seriously. He disciplined Officer Coyne with a pay cut and probation, and
the resulting notice of discipline issued by Deputy Chief Zen8 told Officer Coyne that
his conduct was unacceptable:
8
Chief Gardner determined the discipline for Officer Coyne. Deputy Chief
Zen issued the notice of discipline, which Chief Gardner reviewed and approved
prior to issuance.
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First and foremost you are always a peace officer[.] . . . You knew or
should have known that [V.W.] was vulnerable. There simply is no
justification for your engaging in a relationship with her.
. . . Your behavior and the selfishness of it are astounding.
. . . Your behavior in this matter calls in to question your judgment and
you[r] ethics. . . . [Y]our lapse in judgment and failure to exercise
critical decision making, by consciously pursuing a relationship with a
person you knew or should have known as being vulnerable, is
shameful.
. . . Let this letter serve as a clear warning that should this type of
behavior occur again, the trust I [Deputy Chief Zen] have in you will be
irreparably damaged and there is no place in this department for
someone I cannot trust.
Aplt. App., Vol. 4 at 685, 687, 688.
We agree with the district court that summary judgment is proper because
there is no evidence that Chief Gardner disciplined Officer Coyne with deliberate
indifference.
ii. The City
The discipline claim against the City is based on Chief Gardner’s disciplinary
decision. Rarely if ever is “the failure of a police department to discipline in a
specific instance . . . an adequate basis for municipal liability under Monell,” Butler
v. City of Norman, 992 F.2d 1053, 1056 (10th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Having concluded that Chief Gardner did not act with deliberate
indifference in choosing a lesser discipline than dismissal, we also affirm judgment
in favor of the City on the discipline claim. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 415-16; see also
Brown v. Gray, 227 F.3d at 1289.
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e. Supervision
Ms. Schneider’s supervision claim named Chief Gardner, Interim Chief
Camper, Deputy Chief Zen, Sergeant Baker, and the City. This claim focuses on how
two GJPD policies—the Confidentiality Policy and the Command Staff Review
Policy—were applied to the V.W. complaint.
The first relevant policy is the Confidentiality Policy, which provides that
“[a]n Internal Affairs Investigation shall be kept strictly confidential as provided by
applicable procedure and law.” Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 560.
Per standing orders of the Chief of Police, if any employee is the subject
of or a witness in an Internal Affairs Investigation, the employee shall
not discuss any facts, details, circumstances, procedures, or any other
information about the complaint or the investigation with any person
except as allowed by policy or law.
Id. (emphasis omitted). In his deposition, Chief Gardner confirmed that he has
always directed his staff to keep the specifics of an investigation confidential. When
asked why, he responded, “[n]umber one, it’s for the liberty interests of the affected
employee. And then to maintain integrity of our investigative process.” Id. at 397.
He also stated that confidentiality was “a general police professional conduct” and
that “employees, victims, witnesses deserve the respect of confidentiality.” Id.
The second policy pertinent to this claim is the Command Staff Review
(“CSR”) Policy. The CSR Policy provides that upon completion of an internal
investigation, the deputy chief will convene a CSR “to review and discuss the
[investigation] reports and supporting documentation.” Id. at 565. “The CSR shall
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be responsible for recommending a disposition of any alleged violation(s) of
Department/City policy or procedures and any disciplinary action(s) or sanction(s).”
Id. The supervisor of the subject of the investigation participates in the CSR review.
In this case, what is relevant about the CSR is not the CSR Policy itself, but an
unwritten custom at GJPD of not holding a CSR in matters involving sexual
misconduct. In explaining this custom, Deputy Chief Zen said, “an incident
involving marital indiscretion . . . having an affair, these sorts of things . . . didn’t
necessarily need to be put out into the public in the form of a command staff review.”
Id. at 419. Consistent with this practice, Chief Gardner and Deputy Chief Zen
decided not to convene a CSR following the investigation of the V.W. complaint.9
Pursuant to the Confidentiality Policy and the CSR custom, the internal
investigation of the V.W. complaint was kept confidential, even from
Officer Coyne’s new supervisor, Sergeant Baker. The sergeant knew that
Officer Coyne was on probation, but not why he had been disciplined. His request
9
It is not clear that the GJPD’s custom of forgoing a CSR on allegations of
“sexual misconduct” would apply to V.W.’s allegations, which were far more serious
than the type of behavior Deputy Chief Zen referenced as falling under the custom,
such as “marital indiscretion.” Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 419. V.W.’s complaint that
Officer Coyne committed a non-consensual sexual assault alleged a criminal act. The
investigation determined that proof of this allegation was inconclusive, and
Officer Coyne was disciplined only for having a consensual sexual relationship with
V.W. Whether or not a CSR would have been held in this instance had it been
treated as involving a non-consensual sexual assault does not affect the outcome of
this appeal.
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for further information was denied on the ground that GJPD policy required the
information to be kept confidential.
Although we are troubled that Officer Coyne’s supervisor was not informed of
the V.W. complaint, we affirm the summary judgment in favor of the defendants for
lack of sufficient evidence of causation.
i. Individual Defendants
“Section 1983 imposes liability on a government official who ‘subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights.’” Martinez v.
Carson, 697 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting § 1983). Like deliberate
indifference, causation is an element of Ms. Schneider’s § 1983 claims. See id. at
1255; Dodds, 614, F.3d at 1199. Causation is generally a question of fact for the
jury. See Schwartz, at § 6.03[A][1]. But whether the plaintiff has presented
sufficient evidence of causation to defeat a motion for summary judgment is a legal
question. See Henry v. Merck & Co., Inc., 877 F.2d 1489, 1495 (10th Cir. 1989); see
also June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1253 (10th Cir. 2009) (Holloway,
J. concurring and dissenting) (collecting authorities).
As we have already explained, “causal connection is satisfied if Defendants set
in motion a series of events that Defendants knew or reasonably should have known
would cause others to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights.” Martinez,
697 F.3d at 1255 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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The premise of Ms. Schneider’s supervision claim is that the Confidentiality
Policy and the CSR custom prevented Sergeant Baker from learning about the V.W.
complaint, and that if he had known of the complaint, Sergeant Baker would have
supervised Officer Coyne more closely and prevented the attack on Ms. Schneider.
To prevail, Ms. Schneider must show that the policy and custom set into motion a
series of events that the individual defendants—Chief Gardner, Interim Chief
Camper, Deputy Chief Zen, and Sergeant Baker—knew or should have known would
result in Officer Coyne committing an intentional, criminal assault.
The district court determined that causation for the supervision claim “is a
closer question than is apparent with regard to hiring and training. Logically, it
would make sense that if Officer[] Coyne’s supervisor had known about the reasons
for his probation, that some restrictions might have been imposed.” Aplt. App., Vol.
5 at 1078. But the district court ultimately concluded that, at the time of the attack,
Officer Coyne was off-duty and not under official supervision. Therefore, “even if
Officer Coyne’s supervisors knew of the prior incident with [V.W.], there is no
evidence that any supervision would have prevented Officer Coyne from committing
an intentional, criminal assault while off-duty.” Id.
We agree that Ms. Schneider’s supervision claim is stronger than her hiring
and training claims. In particular, the GJPD custom of omitting the CSR, a standard
tool in GJPD’s disciplinary investigations, in cases involving sexual misconduct, is
concerning. The defendants’ stated desire to protect the privacy of misbehaving
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officers and third parties likely could have been served by other means, without
relaxing the investigative process.
Nevertheless, we cannot say that Sergeant Baker’s lack of knowledge of the
specific details of the V.W. complaint set in motion a series of events that caused the
constitutional violation. To establish this, Ms. Schneider would need to show that if
Sergeant Baker had known the relevant details, he would have taken specific actions
and that these actions would have prevented Officer Coyne’s attack. She has not
provided such evidence.
The evidence seems to cut the other way. If Sergeant Baker had been
informed of the reason for Officer Coyne’s probationary status, he would have been
told that an investigation of Officer Coyne determined (1) he had consensual sex with
a woman he had met while on duty and (2) proof of her allegation that the consensual
sex had become non-consensual was inconclusive, based at least in part on V.W.’s
credibility issues and Officer Coyne’s passing a polygraph test. We cannot say that
keeping these details from the sergeant put into motion a series of events that any of
the individual defendants knew or should have known would result in Officer Coyne
committing a violent felony.
There is no evidence the sergeant would have responded differently to this
information. Ms. Schneider has not pointed to any particular action the sergeant
would have taken. Nor has she shown how any particular action on the sergeant’s
part would have prevented his attack on Ms. Schneider. Officer Coyne was already
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on probation from the V.W. investigation. He had received a pay cut and a stern
warning in the notice of discipline from commanding officers more senior to him
than Sergeant Baker. Yet he still committed a violent, criminal act against Ms.
Schneider. There is no evidence that additional controls or sanctions from Sergeant
Baker would have had any more deterrent effect than the already-present threats of
discharge and criminal punishment.
Mere speculation that something would have been done to prevent
Ms. Schneider’s injury is not sufficient to establish causation.
ii. The City
As with the individual defendants, to proceed against the City, Ms. Schneider
must present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
causation.10 See Monell, 436 U.S. at 692 (“Congress did not intend § 1983 liability to
attach where . . . causation was absent.”); City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391 (requiring
the identified deficiency to “be closely related to the ultimate injury”); Brown,
520 U.S. at 404 (requiring the plaintiff to “demonstrate a direct causal link between
the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights”); see also Schwartz, at
§ 6.03[A][2] (“The various phrases employed by the Court . . . emphasize[] that the
10
As mentioned earlier, as to Ms. Schneider’s claims against the City, we have
assumed without deciding the existence of a policy or custom sufficient for municipal
liability. We note that the supervision claim involved a formal written GJPD policy
(the Confidentiality Policy) as well as the City’s custom not to hold a CSR in matters
involving sexual misconduct.
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§ 1983 claimant must show a close relationship between the enforcement of a
municipal policy or custom and the plaintiff’s injury.”).11 For the same reasons
discussed above, we agree with the district court that Ms. Schneider has failed to
satisfy the burden of presenting sufficient evidence of causation on her supervision
claim against the City.
B. Defendants’ Cross-Appeal (No. 12-1115)
Because we have affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
defendants on each of Ms. Schneider’s claims, we dismiss defendants’ cross-appeal
as moot. See, e.g., Holmes v. Utah, Dep’t of Workforce Servs., 483 F.3d 1057, 1070
(10th Cir. 2007) (deeming defendant’s cross-appeal of discovery order to be moot
when this court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
defendant); Carpenter v. Boeing Co., 456 F.3d 1183, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006)
(dismissing defendant’s cross-appeal of class certification as moot when this court
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendant).
11
Schwartz further notes:
The Supreme Court . . . has not resolved whether the § 1983 municipal
liability causation requirement is equivalent to common law proximate
cause or is a more rigorous standard. There are indications that, at least
for some types of municipal liability claims [including claims regarding
training and hiring], the causation requirement is more rigorous than
common law proximate cause.
Schwartz, at § 7.12[B].
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III. CONCLUSION
Four of Ms. Schneider’s claims fail on the element of culpable state of mind,
and her fifth claim fails on the element of causation. In No. 12-1086, Ms.
Schneider’s appeal, the grant of summary judgment to all of the defendants is
therefore affirmed. No. 12-1115, the defendants’ cross-appeal, is dismissed as moot.
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