United States v. Suniga , 467 F. App'x 798 ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 14, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 11-5142
(D.C. No. 4:10-CR-00086-GKF-2)
EVERETT LEE SUNIGA, a/k/a Solo, (N.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, McKAY and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is, therefore,
submitted without oral argument.
This is a direct appeal by Everett Lee Suniga following his plea of guilty to one
count of conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than 500
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
grams of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). The
sole issue raised by Suniga on appeal is whether his sentence of 292 months of
imprisonment is substantively unreasonable. After applying an abuse of discretion
standard of review, we conclude that the sentence imposed was not substantively
unreasonable. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Suniga pled guilty to one count of conspiring to
distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). The district
court calculated the advisory guidelines range at 292 to 365 months, based in part on the
defendant’s extensive criminal history. Suniga’s criminal history resulted in more than
double the criminal history points necessary to qualify him for the highest criminal
history category. Suniga requested a five-level downward variance to a sentence of
fifteen years based on his “horrific times as a child” and his status as a “compassionate
caring man who takes care of his family.” Record on Appeal (ROA), Vol. 2 at 114. The
government opposed the motion. After considering the motion and the sentencing factors
set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the district court determined that a sentence of 292
months’ imprisonment was sufficient but not greater than necessary to achieve the
purposes of § 3553(a).
Suniga timely appealed, challenging only the substantive reasonableness of his
sentence. Specifically, Suniga contends that the district court failed to give sufficient
weight to Suniga’s experiences as a child and gave too much weight to the advisory
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guidelines.
We “consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed
under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Tatum, 518 F.3d 769, 770-71
(10th Cir. 2008) (citing Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007)). “A district
court abuses its discretion when it renders a judgment that is arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” United States v. Regan, 627 F.3d 1348, 1352
(10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “[A]s long as the
balance struck by the district court among the factors set out in § 3553(a) is not arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly unreasonable, we must defer to that decision even if we would
not have struck the same balance in the first instance.” United States v. Sells, 541 F.3d
1227, 1239 (10th Cir. 2008).
Further, in a case like this, where a sentence falls within the properly calculated
guideline range and is later challenged on appeal, we presume that the sentence is
substantively reasonable. United States v. Reyes-Alfonso, 653 F.3d 1137, 1145 (10th Cir.
2011). “The defendant may rebut this presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is
unreasonable in light of the other sentencing factors laid out in § 3553(a).” Id.
Section 3553(a) requires the court to impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in that section. Factors assessed in
making this determination include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
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(2) the need for the sentence imposed–
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
...;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established [by Congress
or the Sentencing Commission policies and guidelines for crimes of this
type];
...;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct . . . .
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
The district court did consider Suniga’s difficult childhood, ROA, Vol. II at
114–18, but found that the defendant’s childhood did not mitigate Suniga’s “violent
criminal history and his gang involvement.” Id. at 116. Further, the court considered the
other appropriate factors under § 3553(a) and found that “such a severe penalty is
warranted in this case to provide not only deterrence to this defendant and others, but to
adequately protect the public from the dangers posed by this defendant.” Id. Suniga has
failed to rebut the presumption that his within-guideline range sentence is substantively
reasonable. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a 292-month
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sentence.
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s sentence.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Chief Judge
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