Friedman v. Barajas ( 2012 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 22, 2012
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
CHARLES D. FRIEDMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 11-4192
v. (D.C. No. 2:09-CV-00227-TC)
(D. Utah)
JOEY BARAJAS, individually and in
his official capacity as Deputy United
States Marshal,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. **
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff-Appellant Charles Friedman, a federal inmate proceeding pro se,
appeals from the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of
Defendant-Appellee, a deputy U.S. marshal. Friedman v. United States, No.
2:09–CV–227 TC, 2011 WL 5118300 (D. Utah Oct. 27, 2011). The parties are
familiar with the facts and we need not restate them here. On appeal, Mr.
Friedman argues that the district court erred in dismissing his Fifth Amendment
due process claim and First and Fifth Amendment court access claim, all arising
from the loss of his property which occurred incident to a prison transfer.
We affirm the district court’s judgment on the grounds that the summary
judgment evidence, even in the light most favorable to Mr. Friedman, could not
support a finding that the deputy marshal intentionally deprived him of his
property. 1 Nor could it support a judgment that Mr. Friedman was denied access
to the courts based upon the loss of his legal materials, as he cannot prove actual
injury or substantial prejudice in pursuing contemplated legal action. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252–56 (1986).
1
The district court also concluded that Mr. Friedman has an adequate post-
deprivation remedy under the Federal Tort Claims Act. Friedman, 2011 WL
5118300, at *6. As the government recognizes, the FTCA does not provide an
adequate remedy. Aplee. Br. at 14 (citing Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S.
214, 217–19, 227–28 (2008) (holding that the FTCA excepts from its waiver of
the federal government’s sovereign immunity any property claim against law
enforcement)). In light of our disposition, we need not pursue this theory further.
-2-
We take as true, as we must, that the deputy marshal, upon repeatedly being
asked for an itemized property receipt by Mr. Friedman while he was being
transported to the Salt Lake County jail, stated “How about I just dump this crap
in the trash and we won’t have to worry about it?” 1 R. 381–82. Further, we
accept that the deputy marshal asked Mr. Friedman “So, what’s your beef with
Aramark and the jail here?” and Mr. Friedman explained his theory that he was
being fed non-kosher food. Id. at 380. We also take as true that, weeks later, the
deputy marshal returned two volumes of the Sentencing Guidelines to Mr.
Friedman’s lawyer. Id. at 389. Because it is uncontroverted, we assume that Mr.
Friedman’s property, including his papers, was delivered to the U.S. Marshals
Service (“USMS”) office where it was stored and apparently went missing. Id. at
69 (Prisoner Property Sheet); 212–13 (Barajas); 231–32 (Charters). No
significantly probative evidence suggests that the deputy marshal (who had no
further responsibility for Mr. Friedman’s property) personally participated in
intentionally destroying his legal papers. 2 See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
328 (1986); Simkins v. Bruce, 406 F.3d 1239, 1242 (10th Cir. 2005). Mr.
Friedman admits, as he must, that he simply was not present when the material
went missing. 1 R. 285. That the procedures concerning storage and disposal of
2
Mr. Friedman, with the assistance of the USMS, was able to replace 14 of
the 18 categories of lost property. See 1 R. 288, 292–93.
-3-
personal property may have been wanting does not move this case beyond
negligence.
Insofar as the access to the courts claim, we must disagree with the district
court that Mr. Friedman has shown prejudice. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,
351 (1996). While Mr. Friedman certainly need not show that he would prevail,
we are at a loss as to how Mr. Friedman’s potential lawsuit was actually hindered
as he alleged, 1 R. 19. See Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1191 (10th Cir.
2010); Peterson v. Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 1998). As set out in
his declaration, Mr. Friedman knows the facts of his claims (as did his lawyer, 1
R. 388) and that certainly would be sufficient to file a lawsuit and then seek
discovery. See id. at 383–84. The fact that Mr. Friedman might not be able to
substantiate all of his claims at the outset, id. at 384, due to the loss of his legal
materials misunderstands the legal process. Moreover, claims of this nature have
been frequently litigated and nothing suggests that Mr. Friedman or his counsel
could not re-access such cases. Finally, as discussed above, evidence of
intentional and deliberate conduct by this defendant (required to state a denial of
access to the courts claim) is wanting. See Bruce, 406 F.3d at 1242.
-4-
AFFIRMED. We GRANT Mr. Friedman’s motion to proceed IFP, but we
remind him that he is obligated to make partial payments until the filing fee is
paid in full.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
-5-