United States v. Veleta-Dominguez ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 4, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 12-2031
v. D. New Mexico
PABLO JAVIER VELETA- (D.C. No. 2:11-CR-02519-WJ-1)
DOMINGUEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HOLMES, HOLLOWAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel granted the
Appellee’s unopposed motion to submit this matter on the briefs. See Fed. R.
App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore submitted without
oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
I. Introduction
Appellant, Pablo Javier Veleta-Dominguez, was charged in a one-count
indictment with illegally reentering the United States. He pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to a forty-six-month term of imprisonment. Veleta-Dominguez appeals
his sentence, arguing the district court erred by increasing his base offense level
by sixteen levels based on the conclusion his 2007 Georgia conviction for the
state crime of trafficking in cocaine is a “drug trafficking offense” as that term is
used in U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b). Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), we reverse Veleta-Dominguez’s sentence and remand
for resentencing.
II. Background
After Veleta-Dominguez pleaded guilty to a one-count indictment charging
him with illegally reentering the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)
and (b), a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) was prepared by the United
States Probation Office. The PSR applied a sixteen-level enhancement to Veleta-
Dominguez’s base offense level of eight, based on Veleta-Dominguez’s 2007
Georgia conviction for trafficking in cocaine. The PSR characterized this
Georgia conviction as a drug trafficking offense for which the sentence imposed
exceeded thirteen months. See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(i). Veleta-
Dominguez’s criminal history score of seven placed him in Criminal History
Category IV. Based on the criminal history category and total offense level of
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twenty-one, 1 the PSR calculated an advisory guidelines range of fifty-seven to
seventy-one months’ imprisonment.
Veleta-Dominguez filed a written objection to the PSR, arguing his Georgia
conviction was not a drug trafficking offense for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b).
Specifically, he asserted the Georgia statute he was convicted under prohibits
simple possession of illegal drugs in addition to their sale, manufacture, and
delivery. See Ga. Code Ann. § 16-13-31(a)(1) (“Any person who knowingly sells,
manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state or who is knowingly in possession
of . . . cocaine . . . commits the felony offense of trafficking in cocaine . . . .”).
Thus, Veleta-Dominguez argued, his Georgia conviction is not categorically a
drug trafficking offense and the proper approach is to review the indictment and
judgment under the modified categorical approach. See United States v. Torres-
Romero, 537 F.3d 1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 2008) (“When an examination of the
statute . . . reveals that it reaches a broad range of conduct, some of which merits
an enhancement and some of which does not, courts resolve the resulting
ambiguity by consulting reliable judicial records, such as the charging document,
plea agreement, or plea colloquy.” (quotations omitted)).
The Georgia state indictment charged that Veleta-Dominguez “did
knowingly possess four hundred (400) grams or more of a mixture containing at
1
The PSR also decreased Veleta-Dominguez’s offense level by three levels,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b), based on his acceptance of responsibility.
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least ten percent (10%) Cocaine.” The judgment disclosed that Veleta-
Dominguez pleaded guilty to the lesser included offense of possession of 28-200
grams of cocaine. These documents supported Veleta-Dominguez’s argument that
he was convicted under the part of the Georgia statute that criminalizes simple
possession and, thus, his Georgia conviction does not qualify as a drug trafficking
offense for purposes of the § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) sixteen level enhancement. See id.
at 1157 (“Simple possession is not a drug trafficking offense.”). The district
court, however, rejected Veleta-Dominguez’s argument, concluding it could infer
from the amount of cocaine Veleta-Dominguez possessed in the Georgia matter
that he was “a distributor.” The court also concluded the structure of the Georgia
statute supported the conclusion Veleta-Dominguez was distributing cocaine
because his conduct resulted in the imposition of a lengthy mandatory minimum
sentence. Accordingly, the court applied the sixteen-level enhancement and
sentenced Veleta-Dominguez to forty-six months incarceration. 2 Veleta-
Dominguez appeals the sentence.
III. Discussion
Veleta-Dominguez argues his sentence is procedurally unreasonable
because the district court incorrectly calculated his advisory guidelines range.
2
Because the district court concluded a criminal history category IV
overstated Veleta-Dominguez’s criminal history, the court varied downward to a
criminal history category III.
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See United States v. Hildreth, 485 F.3d 1120, 1127 (10th Cir. 2007) (“To impose
a procedurally reasonable sentence, a district court must calculate the proper
advisory Guidelines range . . . .” (quotation omitted)). Specifically, Veleta-
Dominguez asserts his 2007 Georgia conviction is not a drug trafficking offense
and thus the court erred by applying the sixteen level increase to his base offense
level. “We review de novo a district court’s determination that a prior offense is
a crime that can trigger a sentence enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b).”
Torres-Romero, 537 F.3d at 1157 (quotation omitted).
The Government concedes, and we agree, that the district court erred by
applying the sixteen-level enhancement. In United States v. Herrera-Roldan, this
court rejected the Government’s argument that a district court, applying the
modified categorical approach, was permitted to infer an intent to distribute
illegal drugs from the defendant’s underlying conduct even though the state
statute at issue made no mention of an intent to distribute. 414 F.3d 1238, 1240
(10th Cir. 2005) (reviewing whether the defendant’s Texas conviction for
possession of marijuana was a drug trafficking offense meriting a twelve-level
enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)). We concluded the inquiry was
confined “to the terms of the statute of conviction” and did not extend to the
defendant’s conduct. Id. at 1241 (“The focus is not on the defendant’s conduct,
but on what the state law prohibits.”). Like the statute at issue in Herrera-
Roldan, the portion of the Georgia statute under which Veleta-Dominguez was
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convicted prohibits the possession of cocaine, not possession with the intent to
manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense. See Ga. Code Ann. § 16-13-
31(a)(1); U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.1(B)(iv); Herrera-Roldan, 414 F.3d at 1240.
Because the district court considered Veleta-Dominguez’s underlying conduct to
arrive at the conclusion he possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute it, the
court erred. Correctly applying the modified categorical approach leads to the
conclusion that Veleta-Dominguez’s Georgia conviction was for simple
possession and, thus, the conviction is not a drug trafficking offense. See Torres-
Romero, 537 F.3d at 1157.
IV. Conclusion
The district court’s order is reversed and the matter remanded to the
district court for resentencing.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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