Kolosha v. Bear , 645 F. App'x 655 ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS April 13, 2016
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
VITALY BORISOVICH KOLOSHA,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 15-5080
v.
(D.C. No. 4:12-CV-00465-JHP-PJC)
(N.D. Okla.)
CARL BEAR, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before HOLMES, MATHESON, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
Vitaly Borisovich Kolosha, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 seeks a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s denial of his
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He also moves us to
direct the district court to address the merits of the claims he raised in an
unsuccessful motion to amend or supplement his habeas petition, and to
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law
of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and
Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
1
Because Mr. Kolosha appears pro se, we construe his filings
liberally, see, e.g., Garza v. Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1201 n.2 (10th Cir. 2010), but
we do not craft arguments or otherwise advocate for him, see Yang v. Archuleta,
525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
reconsider his request to stay his appeal. Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291, we conclude that Mr. Kolosha has not made the required showing
for a COA to issue, and that his two motions are without merit. Accordingly, we
deny his application for a COA, deny his motions, and dismiss this matter.
I
A
An Oklahoma state jury found Mr. Kolosha guilty of four counts of lewd
molestation, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-seven years’
imprisonment. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) affirmed his
conviction and his sentence. Mr. Kolosha then filed a motion for postconviction
relief. The state district court denied his motion for postconviction relief, and the
OCCA affirmed.
On August 21, 2012, Mr. Kolosha filed a pro se petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Oklahoma. He asserted the following nine grounds for
relief: (1) the trial court erred in admitting testimony about incidents of sexual
abuse that were disclosed—but later recanted—by an additional possible victim;
(2) the same testimony, which constituted “other crimes evidence,” was not
established by “clear and convincing evidence” as required by Oklahoma state
law; (3) this “other crimes evidence” resulted in an excessive sentence; (4) trial
counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to hire a Russian interpreter;
2
(5) trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to call Mr. Kolosha to
testify after she told the jury that he would; (6) Mr. Kolosha was denied his right
to testify; (7) the trial court failed to state for the record what facts and
circumstances supported its finding that two victims’ hearsay statements were
reliable; (8) the trial court failed to provide a ruling regarding the admissibility of
a videotape of a victim’s interview; and (9) the trial court erred in allowing the
videotape to be sent to the deliberation room with the jury.
In a very thorough order issued on August 6, 2015, the district court
concluded that Mr. Kolosha was not entitled to habeas relief. Accordingly, it
dismissed the action and denied a COA. The district court denied Mr. Kolosha’s
first three claims on the merits, and found that his remaining claims were
procedurally defaulted. Specifically, regarding the first three claims, the court
concluded that: (1–2) Mr. Kolosha failed to show that the admission of the “other
crimes evidence” resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial; and (3) because Mr.
Kolosha’s sentence was within statutory limits and authorized by Oklahoma state
law, the court had no discretion to review it.
Regarding Mr. Kolosha’s six remaining claims for habeas relief—which he
had raised for the first time in his state application for postconviction relief—the
court concluded that they were procedurally defaulted because the OCCA had
found them barred on an independent and adequate state procedural ground, Mr.
3
Kolosha had provided no new evidence of his innocence, and Mr. Kolosha could
not demonstrate cause for the default or actual prejudice.
In reaching this procedural conclusion, the court rejected Mr. Kolosha’s
argument that the cause of his default was appellate counsel’s constitutional
ineffectiveness for failing to raise the claims on direct appeal because the court
determined that none of the remaining claims were so plainly meritorious that
appellate counsel was unreasonable for not raising them. The court explained its
determination with regard to each remaining claim in detail. In brief,
it concluded: (4) Mr. Kolosha failed to show a reasonable probability that, had
appellate counsel raised his interpreter claim, he would have been granted relief
because the record indicates that he did not need an interpreter; (5) Mr. Kolosha
failed to show that trial counsel was deficient for not calling him to testify
because she never told the jury that he would; (6) Mr. Kolosha failed to show a
reasonable probability that, had appellate counsel raised his waiver-of-his-right-
to-testify claim, he would have been granted relief because in an extensive
colloquy with the court, he waived that right; (7–8) Mr. Kolosha failed to show a
reasonable probability that, had appellate counsel raised claims relating to the
admission of two victims’ prior statements, he would have been granted relief
because the trial court’s failure to support its admissibility finding was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt; and (9) Mr. Kolosha failed to show a reasonable
probability that, had appellate counsel raised his video-in-deliberation-room
4
claim, he would have been granted relief because the video was admitted during
trial without objection, did not render the trial fundamentally unfair, and defense
counsel invited any error.
The district court then denied a COA. The court explained that its
application of the standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”), see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), to the OCCA’s decision regarding Mr.
Kolosha’s first three claims was not debatable among jurists of reason. The court
continued that Mr. Kolosha had failed to show that the court’s denial of his
remaining six claims on procedural grounds was debatable or incorrect. For these
reasons, the court entered judgment against Mr. Kolosha on August 6, 2015.
On August 31, 2015, Mr. Kolosha moved for permission to amend his
habeas petition and to vacate the district court’s order; then, on September 3,
2015, he filed a notice of appeal and an application for a COA. In a single order
issued on September 22, 2015, the district court dismissed Mr. Kolosha’s motion
and denied his application for a COA. First, the court construed the motion as a
motion to alter or amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) because it was filed within twenty-eight days of the entry of judgment.
However, because Mr. Kolosha’s motion challenged the substance of the court’s
resolution of his claims rather than some defect in the integrity of the federal
habeas proceedings, the court treated it as an unauthorized second or successive
5
petition under § 2254(b), and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. 2 Next, the
court denied Mr. Kolosha’s request for reconsideration of its prior denial of a
COA because he had presented nothing indicating that the court had erred.
B
On appeal, Mr. Kolosha filed a combined opening brief and application for
a COA on October 6, 2015. He challenges the denial of his habeas petition, the
denial of his motion to amend his petition, and the denial of a COA. Mr. Kolosha
simply reasserts, however, the claims he raised before the district court, and
argues: “Clearly these ground[s] proved ineffective assistance of counsel at
pretrial, trial, and direct appeal, which trial court and state admitted when they
ruled all claims should have been raised in direct appeal.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 6.
With regard to a COA, Mr. Kolosha contends that he can “make a
‘substantial’ showing of the denial of more than one constitutional
right”—specifically, that he can show that: (1) “The issues are debatable among
jurist[s] as jurist[s] in 3 other federal circuits have ruled on same issues,
differently than this court has in this case”; (2) “The questions and issues on
appeal could, and do[,] present matters that deserve further proceedings, because
other federal circuits have determined they did (do) in their circuits”; and (3)
“Three (3) other federal circuit[] courts have, and could[,] resolve the issues
2
The court also declined to transfer the second or successive petition
to this court in the interest of justice because it concluded that there was no risk
that a meritorious successive claim would be lost.
6
differently than this court did.” Appl. for COA at 1–2. In support of these
claims, Mr. Kolosha cites several habeas cases; however, most of them are either
overruled, impossible to find with the cites provided, or are district court cases
not binding on us. Moreover, he offers no analysis to support his belief that the
district court erred. 3
In addition, on February 25, 2016, Mr. Kolosha filed a motion to stay his
appeal “to allow [the] lower court to rule” on his “Amended/Expanded and
Supplemented First 2254 Application,” which he had recently submitted to that
court. 4 Notice-&-Mot. to-Stay Appeal to Allow Lower Ct. to Rule on the
Attached 1 (filed Feb. 25, 2016). That same day, we issued an order denying Mr.
Kolosha’s motion to stay as moot because the district court had already denied his
application for an extension of time to file an amended habeas petition.
Nevertheless, on March 7, 2016, Mr. Kolosha filed a motion pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), asking us to reconsider our order denying his
3
Mr. Kolosha also asserts in his application for a COA that his many
unspecified disabilities constitute extraordinary circumstances requiring a
hearing. Mr. Kolosha cites four cases to support this proposition, but none of the
cases mention disabilities, two of them are overruled, and only one—an overruled
case—concerns AEDPA.
4
On February 12, 2016, Mr. Kolosha filed an “Application for
Extension of Time to File Supplemental/Amended Habeas Petition” in the district
court. The district court denied his application on February 19, 2016, finding that
Mr. Kolosha’s filing of an appeal divested the district court of control over the
matter, and reiterating that Mr. Kolosha may not file a second or successive
habeas petition without authorization. Dist. Ct. Order at 2 (dated Feb. 19, 2016).
7
motion to stay. Mr. Kolosha argues that our order denying his motion to stay
erroneously assumed that the district court had denied his motion to amend his
habeas petition on the merits, when the district court had only “declin[ed]
jurisdiction to grant an exten[s]ion of time to file the amended, expanded, and
supplemented first 2254 application.” R. 60(B) Mot. 1 (filed Mar. 7, 2016) (first
emphasis added).
Finally, on March 18, 2016, Mr. Kolosha filed a motion asking us to direct
the district court to address the merits of the claims he raised in his amended
habeas application. In this motion, Mr. Kolosha argues that he “is from a foreign
nation,” that he has “a disability impeading [sic] his ability to know, understand,
or comply with rules he does not have any assistance in understanding or
complying with,” and that the district court order prevented “this court [from]
consider[ing] the appeal of any district court order in this case.” Mot. to Direct
Lower Ct. to Address Merits of Claims Raised in Suppl./Am./Expanded 2254 First
Appl. 1, 2 (filed Mar. 18, 2016).
II
A
A COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to our adjudication of the merits of
an appeal from the district court’s denial of a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); Davis v. Roberts, 425 F.3d 830, 833 (10th Cir.
2005); see also Gonzalez v. Thaler, --- U.S. ----, 132 S. Ct. 641, 649 (2012)
8
(citing the “‘clear’ jurisdictional language . . . in § 2253(c)(1)”). We will not
issue a COA unless “the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right.” Harris v. Dinwiddie, 642 F.3d 902, 906 (10th Cir. 2011)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2)). An applicant “satisfies this standard by
demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s
resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues
presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El
v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003); accord Dulworth v. Jones, 496 F.3d 1133,
1136–37 (10th Cir. 2007). In addition,
[w]hen the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural
grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional
claim, a COA should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court
was correct in its procedural ruling.
Harris, 642 F.3d at 906 (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000));
see Coppage v. McKune, 534 F.3d 1279, 1281 (10th Cir. 2008) (“If the
application was denied on procedural grounds, the applicant faces a double
hurdle.”).
The Supreme Court has instructed that the threshold determination of
whether a COA should issue “does not require full consideration of the factual or
legal bases adduced in support of the claims”—“[i]n fact, the statute forbids it.”
Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336. Instead, the statute “requires an overview of the
9
claims in the habeas petition and a general assessment of their merits”;
specifically, we must “look to the District Court’s application of AEDPA to
petitioner’s constitutional claims and ask whether that resolution was debatable
amongst jurists of reason.” Id.; see also Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 937
(10th Cir. 2004) (noting that the Court has made “clear” that “our COA decision
is to be based on a review of the district court’s application of AEDPA”). In
accord with Miller-El, this court has emphasized “that in determining whether to
issue a COA, a ‘full consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in support
of the claims’ is not required.” United States v. Moya, 676 F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th
Cir. 2012) (quoting Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336). 5
B
Pursuant to the analytical framework that the Supreme Court has
established, we have reviewed Mr. Kolosha’s opening brief, his application for a
COA, and the record. Based on our review, which includes our “general
assessment of the[ ] merits” of Mr. Kolosha’s stated grounds for relief, Miller-El,
537 U.S. at 336, we conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate the
correctness of the district court’s decisions on the merits of Mr. Kolosha’s first
three claims. We further conclude that Mr. Kolosha has not demonstrated that
5
Notably, this court has also emphasized that “the § 2255 motion must
‘state facts that point to a real possibility of . . . error.’” Id. (citation omitted);
see also United States v. Fisher, 38 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting that
conclusory allegations alone, without supporting factual averments, are
insufficient to state a valid claim under § 2255).
10
any of these claims is adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. In
addition, we conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate the correctness of
the district court’s decisions dismissing Mr. Kolosha’s remaining six claims on
procedural grounds. Mr. Kolosha has failed to provide any argument—much less
precedential support indicating—that the district court erred in dismissing his
claims. To the contrary, the district court’s reasoning appears thorough and, in
material respects, legally sound. Accordingly, we deny Mr. Kolosha a COA.
Next, we deny Mr. Kolosha’s motion to direct the district court to address
the merits of the claims he raised in his “supplemental/amended/expanded 2254
application.” Mr. Kolosha does not dispute the district court’s characterization of
his motion as one brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), its finding
that the motion challenged the substance of the resolution of his habeas claims
rather than some defect in the integrity of the habeas proceedings, and its
conclusion that the motion was therefore an unauthorized second or successive
petition. Mr. Kolosha also does not dispute that the district court lacks
jurisdiction to grant unauthorized second or successive petitions; thus, he has
effectively conceded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant his motion.
Mr. Kolosha argues instead that he “is from a foreign nation,” that he has “a
disability impeading [sic] his ability to know, understand, or comply with rules,”
and that the district court order prevented “this court [from] consider[ing] the
appeal of any district court order in this case.” Mot. to Direct Lower Ct. to
11
Address Merits of Claims Raised in Suppl./Am./Expanded 2254 First Appl. 1, 2.
But these arguments are not relevant to the district court’s lack of jurisdiction, so
they cannot avail him. Accordingly, we deny his motion.
Finally, we deny Mr. Kolosha’s motion to reconsider our order denying his
motion to stay this appeal. The sole basis of Mr. Kolosha’s motion for a stay was
“to allow [the] lower court to rule on” his application to amend his habeas
petition. Notice-&-Mot. to-Stay Appeal to Allow Lower Ct. to Rule on the
Attached 1 (filed Feb. 25, 2016). Once the district court ruled on Mr. Kolosha’s
application to amend his habeas petition—and denied it—Mr. Kolosha’s request
to stay this appeal became moot. 6 Accordingly, we deny Mr. Kolosha’s motion to
reconsider our order denying his motion for a stay.
III
Based on the foregoing, we DENY Mr. Kolosha’s request for a COA,
DENY his motion based on the district court’s refusal to address the merits of his
his amended or supplemental habeas petition, and DENY his motion to reconsider
6
Mr. Kolosha argues that our order denying his motion for a stay
erroneously assumed that the district court had denied his motion to amend his
habeas petition on the merits, instead of on jurisdictional grounds. But all that
matters is that the district court denied his request to amend his habeas
petition—the basis for that rejection is irrelevant to mootness.
12
our order denying a stay. This matter is hereby DISMISSED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
13