Hylok v. Ward ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 22 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DALE H. HYLOK,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 97-5077
(D.C. No. 96-CV-43-B)
RONALD WARD; ATTORNEY (N.D. Okla.)
GENERAL OF THE STATE OF
OKLAHOMA,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, McKAY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Hylok, appearing pro se, seeks to appeal from the district court’s
order dismissing without prejudice his petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We deny a certificate of probable cause and
dismiss the appeal. 1
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
1
Because petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition on January 22, 1996,
before the April 24, 1996 enactment date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
(continued...)
In September 1985, Mr. Hylok entered a plea of guilty to murder in the
first degree and received a sentence of life imprisonment. In 1994, he filed
various pro se motions in the state district court, including an application for
post-conviction relief, a motion to withdraw guilty plea, a motion for appointment
of counsel, and requests for a transcript and documents. Essentially, he sought to
withdraw his plea on the grounds that he had been denied (1) the right to appeal
his conviction, (2) the right to meaningful access to the Oklahoma courts, and
(3) the right to effective assistance of counsel, in that counsel provided improper
advice about the plea bargain, neglected to contact him during the ten-day period
in which he could have withdrawn the plea, and failed to advise him about his
right to appeal.
Petitioner was not permitted to be present at the state district court
post-conviction hearing. His former appointed counsel, however, appeared
and stated:
1
(...continued)
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), pre-AEDPA habeas corpus provisions apply to
this petition. See Demarest v. Price, No. 95-1535, 1997 WL 746288, at *1, *9
(10th Cir. Dec. 3, 1997). The relevant provisions, as in effect at the time the
petition was filed in district court, include the requirement of a certificate of
probable cause in order to proceed on appeal, rather than a certificate of
appealability, see United States v. Kunzman, 125 F.3d 1363, 1364 n.2 (10th Cir.
1997), and the requirement of exhaustion of available state remedies, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), see Demarest, 1997 WL 746288, at *9.
-2-
I represented Mr. Hylock [sic] many years ago in a murder case here
in Rogers County. If it please the court, I do not want to do that
anymore. He killed Don Reynold’s wife. Don is my friend. I did it
once and I don’t want to do it again.
....
I just wanted to make sure that everyone understood that I did not
want appointed again. It was almost more than I could stand the first
time. . . .
R., Doc. 2, Ex. A at 3-4 (Trans. of 10/6/94 proceedings). The state district court
made no inquiries of counsel. It construed counsel’s request as a motion to
withdraw and granted the motion. The court then denied all of petitioner’s
motions, without taking any evidence or hearing any argument.
In appealing to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, petitioner
obtained a transcript of the post-conviction hearing, read counsel’s in-court
statement, and, allegedly for the first time, learned of counsel’s relationship
with the victim’s family. Petitioner filed a copy of the transcript in the appellate
court and argued, in his reply brief, that counsel’s statement amounted to an
admission of a conflict of interest. The appellate court affirmed the denial of
post-conviction relief on the ground of procedural default. It did not mention the
alleged conflict of interest.
Petitioner then filed his pro se petition in federal district court, reasserting
his general ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and emphasizing the
perceived conflict of interest. The district court determined that petitioner had
-3-
failed to exhaust his state court remedies on the issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel based on the conflict theory and dismissed the petition without prejudice.
There is no question that the district court’s conclusion is correct. As we
have stated,
[t]he exhaustion doctrine requires a state prisoner to fairly present
his or her claims to the state courts before a federal court will
examine them. “Fair presentation” of a prisoner’s claim to the state
courts means that the substance of the claim must be raised there.
The prisoner’s allegations and supporting evidence must offer the
state courts “a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to
the facts bearing upon his constitutional claim.” Anderson v.
Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982).
Demarest, 1997 WL 746288, at *9 (additional quotations and citations omitted).
The conflict issue transforms petitioner’s general ineffective assistance of
counsel claim and places it in a significantly different legal posture than in the
state court proceedings. See id., at *9-*10, *12-*13. “An attorney has no
absolute duty in every case to advise a defendant of his limited right to appeal
after a guilty plea,” but he must provide notification of “a claim of error . . .
made on constitutional grounds, which could result in setting aside the plea.”
Laycock v. New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184, 1187-88 (10th Cir. 1989). The duty
arises “when ‘counsel either knows or should have learned of his client’s claim
or of the relevant facts giving rise to that claim.’” Hardiman v. Reynolds,
971 F.2d 500, 506 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Marrow v. United States, 772 F.2d
525, 529 (9th Cir. 1985)).
-4-
Counsel’s statement at the post-conviction hearing has raised an arguable
basis for an entitlement to advice about appeal. A defendant has a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel free from conflicts of interest, which “‘extends to
any situation in which a defendant’s counsel owes conflicting duties to that
defendant and some other third person.’” United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 393
(10th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Soto Hernandez, 849 F.2d 1325, 1328
(10th Cir. 1988)). Prejudice is presumed “if the defendant demonstrates that
counsel ‘actively represented conflicting interests’ and that ‘an actual conflict of
interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’” Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350, 348
(1980)).
The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel attributable to a perceived
conflict of interest is a constitutional claim that was not available to petitioner at
the time he initiated post-conviction proceedings in state court. The district court
properly dismissed the petition to allow the Oklahoma state courts the opportunity
to apply controlling legal principles to a record containing the facts relevant to
the claim. See Demarest, 1997 WL 746288, at * 9.
Accordingly, petitioner has failed to make a substantial showing that the
district court’s ruling resulted in a “denial of an important federal right by
demonstrating that the issues raised are debatable among jurists, that a court
-5-
could resolve the issues differently, or that the questions deserve further
proceedings.” Gallagher v. Hannigan, 24 F.3d 68, 68 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983)). Petitioner’s request for a certificate
of probable cause is therefore DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED. The
mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
-6-