United States v. Carrillo ( 2021 )

Appellate Case: 21-1153 Document: 010110614722 Date Filed: 12/06/2021 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 6, 2021
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 21-1153
(D.C. No. 1:99-CR-00300-MSK-1)
MANUEL GUILLERMO CARRILLO, (D. Colo.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before McHUGH, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
In 2001, Manuel Guillermo Carrillo was convicted of seventeen drug-related
counts involving the large-scale distribution of methamphetamine, cocaine, and
cocaine base (i.e., crack cocaine). He was sentenced to concurrent sentences on all
charges, with sixty-year sentences imposed for Count 1 (conspiracy to distribute
cocaine, methamphetamine, and crack cocaine) and Count 17 (possession with intent
to distribute crack cocaine), and shorter sentences for the other counts.
After Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018, Carrillo filed a motion for
sentencing relief under the Act, requesting a reduced sentence on Counts 1 and 17.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 21-1153 Document: 010110614722 Date Filed: 12/06/2021 Page: 2
The district court concluded the Count 1 sentence was eligible for sentencing relief,
but the court declined to exercise its discretion to reduce this sentence, noting, inter
alia, that the advisory guidelines range remained the same due to the large amount of
methamphetamine involved in the offense. After rejecting Carrillo’s request for a
reduction on Count 1, the court declined to consider Carrillo’s request for a reduction
of his sentence on Count 17. In support of this decision, the district court cited to our
holding in United States v. Mannie, 971 F.3d 1145, 1153 (10th Cir. 2020), that “a
live controversy is not present, and the court does not have jurisdiction” under
Article III, if a requested sentence reduction will “not have the effect of actually
reducing the offender’s length of incarceration” due to the existence of a coextensive,
concurrent sentence on another count. The district court then concluded: “If and
when Mr. Carrillo is in a position to obtain a sentence reduction on Count One, the
Court could address any reduction in the sentence on Count Seventeen under the First
Step Act at that time.”
On appeal, Carrillo does not challenge the district court’s denial of his request
for a sentence reduction on Count 1, but he argues the court erred in declining to
consider Count 17. He contends Mannie is distinguishable because the district court
in Mannie lacked the authority to reduce the total length of the defendant’s sentence
from the onset of the case, see 971 F.3d at 1154, but here the district court had
jurisdiction to reduce both of his sixty-year concurrent sentences and simply declined
to do so.
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The district court did not err in declining to consider Carrillo’s Count 17
argument. Unlike the defendant in Mannie, Carrillo initially had standing to bring a
First Step Act motion to challenge both of his sixty-year sentences. Once the district
court denied relief on Count 1, however, Carrillo was in the same situation as the
defendant in Mannie—the requested reduction of the Count 17 sentence would “not
have the effect of actually reducing [his] length of incarceration,” and thus his
alleged injury was no longer redressable as required by Article III. Id. at 1153. The
distinction Carrillo highlights between Mannie and his case is the difference between
standing and mootness, but this difference does not affect Mannie’s jurisdictional
import. Standing and mootness are “closely related doctrines” that both address the
question of Article III standing by asking whether the party seeking relief has
suffered a concrete injury that can “be redressed by action of the court.” Utah
Animal Rights Coal. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1263 (10th Cir. 2004)
(McConnell, J., concurring). “The Supreme Court has described the doctrine of
mootness as ‘the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: The requisite personal
interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must
continue throughout its existence (mootness).’” Id. (McConnell, J., concurring)
(quoting Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 68 n.22 (1997)). If
it becomes impossible at any point for a court to grant effective relief, then the injury
is no longer redressable, and the court loses jurisdiction over the claim. Abdulhaseeb
v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1311 (10th Cir. 2010).
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Carrillo argues the district court could not deprive itself of jurisdiction by
resolving one issue in a manner that mooted the other issue. However, he cites no
authority for this proposition, and we note that courts regularly decline to address
issues mooted by the disposition of different issues. See, e.g., Sharp v. CGG Land
(U.S.) Inc., 840 F.3d 1211, 1214 n.1 (10th Cir. 2016) (“Because we affirm the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of CGG, Employees’ argument that CGG
waived its other affirmative defenses is moot and we refrain from addressing that
argument.”); Coherent, Inc. v. Coherent Techs., Inc., 935 F.2d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir.
1991) (“Having reached the conclusion that the district court did not err in holding
Coherent failed to establish the likelihood of confusion, the remaining issues
presented for review are moot.”); Navarro v. N.M. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, No. 2:16-cv-
1180-JMC-CG, 2018 WL 2770134, at *3 (D.N.M. June 8, 2018) (exercising
discretion to grant motion to amend, then denying motions for summary judgment as
moot based on that discretionary decision).
Carrillo also argues the district court’s decision is improper because it will bar
him from ever obtaining review of his Count 17 sentence under the First Step Act,
which provides that a prisoner is not eligible for a sentence reduction if “a previous
motion made under this section to reduce the sentence was, after the date of
enactment of this Act, denied after a complete review of the motion on the merits.”
Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(c), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222 (2018). This concern is
unfounded: the district court made clear that it was declining to consider Carrillo’s
Count 17 argument, and thus his motion for a reduction of his Count 17 sentence was
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not “denied after a complete review of the motion on the merits.” Id. Additionally,
Mannie clarifies that the dismissal of a First Step Act request for a sentence reduction
based on the existence of a concurrent sentence “is without prejudice because [it is a]
ruling on a jurisdictional point rather than on the merits of [the] claim.” 971 F.3d at
1154 n.12. Thus, as the district court stated, “[i]f and when Mr. Carrillo is in a
position to obtain a sentence reduction on Count One, the Court could address any
reduction in the sentence on Count Seventeen under the First Step Act at that time.”
We therefore affirm the district court’s disposition of Carrillo’s First Step Act
motion.
Entered for the Court
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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