Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Trust v. XTO Energy, Inc. ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
July 9, 2013
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
WALLACE B. RODERICK
REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST,
Trustee Amanda Roderick, on behalf
of itself and all others similarly No. 12-3176
situated,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
XTO ENERGY, INC., including
Predecessors, Successors, and
Affiliates,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. No. 6:08-CV-01330-JTM-KMH)
Stephen G. Masciocchi (and Marcy G. Glenn of Holland & Hart, L.L.P., Denver,
Colorado; James C.T. Hardwick and Mark Banner of Hall, Estill, Hardwick,
Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C., Tulsa, Oklahoma, on the briefs), for Defendant -
Appellant.
Rex A. Sharp (and Barbara C. Frankland of Gunderson, Sharp & Walke, L.L.P.,
on the briefs), Prairie Village, Kansas, for Plaintiff - Appellee.
Before KELLY, McKAY, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Defendant-Appellant XTO Energy Inc. (XTO) appeals from the district
court’s order certifying a class of Kansas royalty owners, represented by Plaintiff-
Appellee Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Trust (the Trust), who seek
recovery for XTO’s alleged underpayment of royalties. Specifically, the Trust
claims XTO violated Kansas law by improperly deducting costs associated with
placing the gas into “marketable condition.” The district court certified the class
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). The class includes thousands of
royalty owners, whose claims are based on approximately 650 leases that cover
over 300 wells. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e) and Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(f). After careful consideration, we vacate the district court’s certification
order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Background
XTO is an oil and gas company that produces natural gas and its constituent
products from wells. I App. 13. The class comprises “[a]ll royalty owners of
[XTO] . . . from wells located in Kansas that have produced gas and/or gas
constituents (such as residue gas or methane, natural gas liquids, helium, nitrogen
or condensate) from January 1, 1999 to present.” 1 Wallace B. Roderick
1
Initially, the Trust proposed certification of a class that included royalty
owners in Kansas, Oklahoma, and Colorado. See Wallace B. Roderick Revocable
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Revocable Living Trust v. XTO Energy, Inc., 281 F.R.D. 477, 479 (D. Kan.
2012). It includes “thousands of royalty owners,” approximately 650 leases, and
300-plus wells located across ten different well fields. Aplt. Br. 4–5; see II App.
462–72 (listing XTO accounts in Kansas). The Trust owns royalty interests in
eight of the wells and is a party to five leases. III App. 803–04.
On behalf of the class, the Trust brought suit against XTO for breach of
contract, unjust enrichment, and an accounting. I App. 34–35. All three causes
of action turn on the Trust’s central allegation: that XTO has systematically
underpaid royalties by deducting costs associated with placing gas (and its
constituent products) in marketable condition. I App. 101.
Under Kansas law, oil and gas lessees have an implied duty of
marketability (IDM), “[a]bsent a contract providing to the contrary.” Sternberger
v. Marathon Oil Co., 894 P.2d 788, 800 (Kan. 1995). Pursuant to that duty,
lessees are obligated to bear the full cost of production expenses, such as
gathering, compression, dehydration, treatment, and processing (“GCDTP”
services), which are “undertaken to transform gas into a marketable product.” Id.The Trust argues that all raw gas from class members’ wells must undergo
“one or more of the GCDTP Services to make the raw gas marketable.” Aplee.
Living Trust v. XTO Energy, Inc., 281 F.R.D. 477, 479 (D. Kan. 2012). The
Colorado claims were subsequently dropped, and the Oklahoma claims were
severed and transferred to the Chieftain Royalty Co. v. XTO Energy, Inc. action
in the Eastern District of Oklahoma. Id.-3-
Br. 10. 2 For instance, according to the Trust’s expert, “residue gas bound for the
interstate transmission system must meet the transmission line quality standards
before entering that market.” III App. 746. Both parties agree that “[n]either
XTO nor any affiliate owns or operates a gas gathering system or processing plant
in Kansas pertaining to the class wells.” Aplt Br. 13; see I App. 103 n.4. Instead,
XTO has marketing contracts with third parties. See I App. 103–04, 108–09.
Under these marketing contracts, “XTO compensates the third party by (a) paying
a cash fee coupled with some in-kind transfer, (b) supplying a percentage of the
proceeds or an index price to pay for the gathering and process, or (c) using some
combination of these methods.” Roderick, 281 F.R.D. at 480; see III App. 747.
XTO also claims to sell some gas “directly to interstate pipelines without
processing.” Aplt. Br. 13.
Calculation of royalty payments to all class members is made using XTO’s
accounting system, Avatar. I App. 260. Each well is assigned a unique number
and name. Id. at 262. However, Avatar does not consider “anything . . . in
connection with the payment of [the] royalty owner that is based on . . . specific
language in a lease.” Id. at 273–75. Instead, “[r]emittances are determined by
the terms contained in XTO’s contract with the purchaser of the gas or gas-related
product.” Roderick, 281 F.R.D. at 480. The Trust claims that XTO improperly
2
The district court described the GCDTP services in general terms,
without making findings as to which services are applied to a particular stream of
gas. See Roderick, 281 F.R.D. at 479–80.
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deducts (i.e., “netbacks”) costs from royalty payments, effectively sharing with
royalty owners those costs associated with making gas marketable. See I App.
108–09 (“Distilled to its essence, [XTO’s] methodology is Starting Commercial
Price of each component minus Netback Charges set forth in gas marketing
contracts.”).
XTO opposes class certification on two key grounds. First, XTO claims
each lease must be examined individually to determine whether the IDM has been
negated. To demonstrate the necessity of a lease-by-lease inquiry, XTO sampled
one-fifth of the class’s leases, categorizing those leases by royalty type. 3 III App.
804, 904–16. According to XTO’s expert, the sample yielded twenty different
categories of royalty provisions, several of which negate the IDM completely or
in part (i.e., by providing for certain express deductions). Id. at 1031–60.
Second, XTO claims that pinpointing where a marketable product is obtained will
require “a well-by-well analysis.” Aplt. Br. 37. According to XTO, some gas
may be marketable at the well, while other gas may require GCDTP services to be
made marketable. Id. (citing Sternberger, 894 P.2d at 800). Thus, XTO argues
“there is no one universal point of marketability.” Id. at 36.
The district court concluded that the proposed class satisfied the
requirements of Rule 23(a) and certified the class under Rule 23(b)(3). Roderick,
3
According to XTO, “Plaintiff’s counsel declined XTO’s invitation to
review XTO’s lease files, and to the best of XTO’s knowledge has still not
reviewed XTO’s leases.” III App. 808 n.3.
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281 F.R.D. at 487. Although the Trust offered a number of questions allegedly
common to the class, the district court rested its certification decision on one
common issue: whether XTO’s uniform payment methodology breached the
implied duty of marketability under Kansas law. Id. at 479, 484 (declining to
address the “other common claims”). XTO timely filed a petition for permission
to appeal, which we granted. XTO Energy, Inc. v. Wallace B. Roderick
Revocable Living Trust, No. 12-602 (10th Cir. June 26, 2012). On appeal, XTO
argues the district court abused its discretion by concluding the proposed class
satisfied Rule 23(a)’s commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements, and
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.
Discussion
“The class action is an exception to the usual rule that litigation is
conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.” Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (quotation omitted). Rule 23
sets forth the prerequisites to class certification. Rule 23(a) requires the party
seeking certification to demonstrate that: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder
of all members is impracticable (numerosity); (2) there is a question of law or fact
common to the class (commonality); (3) the claims or defenses of the
representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class
(typicality); and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
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the interests of the class (adequacy). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
In addition, “[t]he party must also satisfy through evidentiary proof at least
one of the provisions of Rule 23(b).” Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426,
1432 (2013). Here, the class sought and was granted certification under Rule
23(b)(3), which requires the court to find that: (1) “questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members,” (predominance); and (2) “a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy”
(superiority). Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
“We review the standard the district court used in making its Rule 23
determination de novo and the merits of that determination for an abuse of
discretion.” Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259, 1264 (10th Cir. 2009).
Material misapplication of the Rule 23 factors constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Shook v. El Paso Cnty., 386 F.3d 963, 968 (10th Cir. 2004).
I. Rule 23(a)
Rule 23 is more than a pleading standard. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
Hence, the “party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his
compliance with the Rule—that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in
fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” Id.Further, the district court has an independent obligation to conduct a “rigorous
analysis” before concluding that Rule 23’s requirements have been satisfied. Id.-7-
(quotation omitted). Often that analysis requires looking at the merits of a
plaintiff’s claims. See id.Here, the district court’s analysis of Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement
is in tension with the rule that “actual, not presumed, conformance with Rule
23(a) remains . . . indispensable.” Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S.
147, 160 (1982). Specifically, the district court applied a less demanding
standard whereby “[c]lass certification requirements are liberally construed, and
doubts may be resolved in favor of certification.” Roderick, 281 F.R.D. at 480.
Further, the court may have altered the burden of proof by requiring XTO to
disprove commonality. Relaxing and shifting Rule 23(a)’s “strict burden of
proof,” Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1228 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotation
omitted), results in an abuse of discretion, see Vallario, 554 F.3d at 1267.
The Trust claims, and the district court agreed, that XTO’s uniform
payment methodology establishes the requisite Rule 23(a) commonality. See
Aplee. Br. 19 (“Either XTO’s uniform ‘netback’ royalty methodology is correct or
it is not.”). However, the mere raising of a common question does not
automatically satisfy Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement. Rather, the common
contention “must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide
resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an
issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.” Wal-
Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (emphasis added).
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XTO argues the legality of its uniform payment methodology is not capable
of classwide resolution. According to XTO, answering the “common question” in
this case actually requires two separate, individualized inquiries: (1) “Is there an
implied duty to obtain a marketable product under the terms of a particular
royalty owner’s lease?”; and (2) “If so, when has a marketable product been
obtained?” III App. 806.
The Trust claims there is an implied duty of marketability in every class
member’s lease. Aplee. Br. 26–28. The problem, however, is that the Trust has
not shown—and the district court did not specifically find—that the duty exists
classwide. The district court assumed the IDM was present in each lease because
XTO “failed to point to any lease provision unambiguously negating . . . the
existence of any implied duty of marketability.” Roderick, 281 F.R.D. at 483.
But given known variations in lease language, we think it was the Trust’s burden
to affirmatively demonstrate commonality on the implied duty of marketability.
See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551; Vallario, 554 F.3d at 1268–69 (citing Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23, 2003 Amendment advisory committee note (“A court that is not
satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met should refuse
certification until they have been met.”)). As our sister circuit has explained, “it
is not the defendant who bears the burden of showing that the proposed class does
not comply with Rule 23, but [rather] the plaintiff who bears the burden of
showing that the class does comply with Rule 23.” Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life
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Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311, 321 (4th Cir. 2006) (emphases omitted). 4
To be sure, the district court considered many of XTO’s arguments
regarding lease language variations. But from what we are told, there are roughly
430 leases which have yet to be examined by the Trust or the district court. Aplt.
Br. 39; cf. Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 340
(4th Cir. 1998) (“[P]laintiffs simply cannot advance a single collective breach of
contract action on the basis of multiple different contracts . . . . [where the
contracts] contain[] materially different [] language.”). On remand, the Trust
could, for example, create a chart classifying lease types, see, e.g., Foster v. Merit
Energy Co., 282 F.R.D. 541, 551 n.12 (W.D. Okla. 2012), and although we
express no opinion as to the merits, the district court could decide that no lease
type negates the IDM.
The Trust also argues that the marketability issue can be resolved
classwide. According to the Trust, either “all of the gas is in marketable
condition at the wellhead . . . or none of it is in marketable condition at the
4
Relying on Farrar v. Mobil Oil Corp., the district court concluded that
individual testimony regarding parties’ intent or the circumstances of lease
formation would be unnecessary. See Roderick, 281 F.R.D. at 483, 486 (citing
234 P.3d 19, 30 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010)). The district court did not, however,
consider whether language within the four corners of each lease would need to be
examined individually. And while Farrar appears to have disclaimed the “need
for individualized examination of lease . . . language,” 234 P.3d at 31, Farrar is
not dispositive. First, Farrar did not involve Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Second, Farrar’s
conclusion must be evaluated in light of Wal-Mart and Comcast, particularly
given the fact that Farrar upheld certification despite finding some leases
“expressly abrogate[d] the implied covenant.” Id.- 10 -
wellhead.” Aplee. Br. 19. XTO, on the other hand, claims “there is no one
universal point of marketability.” Aplt. Br. 36. According to XTO, resolving the
issue of marketability will require a well-by-well analysis. Id. at 37–38 (“These
issues cannot be decided in one stroke for all class members as to all [300 plus]
wells.”).
Once gas is in marketable condition, the IDM is satisfied—regardless of
whether a market exists at that location. See Sternberger, 894 P.2d at 800. And
the Kansas Supreme Court has recognized that gas may be marketable at the well.
See id. Thus, if gas is in marketable condition at the mouth of “Well A” but not
“Well B,” XTO’s deductions likely would be proper for Well A’s royalty owners,
but a breach of the IDM for Well B’s royalty owners. In other words, the
propriety of XTO’s deductions might vary by well, depending on gas quality. On
remand, the district court should consider whether and to what extent
marketability affects commonality. 5
Finally, because the commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements of
Rule 23(a) “tend to merge,” see Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 n.5 (quoting Falcon,
457 U.S. at 157 n.13), the district court on remand should consider whether the
5
To the extent the district court concluded that XTO “conceded the
existence of a . . . uniform policy of charging royalty owners deductions for
rendering gas marketable,” Roderick, 281 F.R.D. at 482, we are not so sure.
While XTO has not challenged the existence of a uniform payment policy, it has
consistently denied taking deductions (at least classwide deductions) for
rendering the gas marketable. See, e.g., I App. 70–76, III App. 813–15.
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issues we have identified have any effect on its typicality or adequacy findings.
II. Rule 23(b)
Rule 23(b) also demands a “rigorous analysis.” See Falcon, 457 U.S. at
161. As the Supreme Court recently emphasized in Comcast v. Behrend, the
district court has a “duty to take a close look at whether common questions
predominate over individual ones.” 133 S. Ct. at 1432 (quotation omitted).
Further, the Comcast Court made clear that it may be necessary for a district court
to probe behind the pleadings before deciding whether Rule 23(b)’s requirements
have been met. Id. at 1432–33 (district court abused its discretion by failing to
entertain arguments regarding damages, “simply because those arguments would
also be pertinent to the merits”).
Here, the district court found Rule 23(b)’s predominance requirement
satisfied because “[c]ommon issues as to royalty charges predominate over
individual matters.” Roderick, 281 F.R.D. at 486. In its brief discussion, the
district court reasoned that “the focus of the present action is upon the actions of
XTO, and substantial evidence as to individual issues is unlikely.” Id.
Every proposed class action “must be decided on its own facts, on the basis
of practicalities and prudential considerations.” Reed v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1307,
1309–10 (10th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted). At this point, predominance is not
established simply by virtue of a uniform payment methodology. See Sacred
Heart Health Sys., Inc. v. Humana Military Healthcare Servs., Inc., 601 F.3d
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1159, 1170 (11th Cir. 2010) (“A plaintiff may claim that every putative class
member was harmed by the defendant’s conduct, but if fewer than all of the class
members enjoyed the legal right that the defendant allegedly infringed, or if the
defendant has non-frivolous defenses to liability that are unique to individual
class members, any common questions may well be submerged by individual
ones.”); see also Gene & Gene LLC v. BioPay LLC, 541 F.3d 318, 326–29 (5th
Cir. 2008) (trial court must look beyond defendant’s common course of conduct
to consider “how a trial on the merits would be conducted if a class were
certified” (quotation omitted)).
Without limiting the scope of the district court’s predominance inquiry, we
advise the district court to consider in its predominance analysis the same issues
discussed supra relating to Rule 23(a) commonality (i.e., lease language and
marketability). We note that Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance criterion is “far more
demanding” than Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement. Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623–24 (1997).
Additionally, the district court should consider the extent to which material
differences in damages determinations will require individualized inquiries.
Although “individualized monetary claims belong in Rule 23(b)(3),” Wal-Mart,
131 S. Ct. at 2558, predominance may be destroyed if individualized issues will
overwhelm those questions common to the class, see Ward v. Dixie Nat’l Life Ins.
Co., 595 F.3d 164, 180 (4th Cir. 2010) (“To be sure, individualized damage
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determinations cut against class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).”); Steering
Comm. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 602 (5th Cir. 2006); see also
McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 231 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated in
part on other grounds by Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639(2008) (“[W]hile the fact that damages may have to be ascertained on an
individual basis is not, standing alone, sufficient to defeat class certification . . . it
is nonetheless a factor we must consider in deciding whether issues susceptible to
generalized proof ‘outweigh’ individual issues.” (citations omitted)).
That said, there are ways to preserve the class action model in the face of
individualized damages. See, e.g., Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1437 & n.* (Ginsburg,
J. and Breyer, J., dissenting) (“A class may be divided into subclasses for
adjudication of damages. Fed. R. Civ. Pro[]. 23(c)(4)–(5). Or, at the outset, a
class may be certified for liability purposes only, leaving individual damages
calculations to subsequent proceedings.”). But we believe the district court is in
the best position to evaluate the practical difficulties which inhere in the class
action format, and is especially suited to tailor the proceedings accordingly.
III. Collateral and Judicial Estoppel
Finally, we reject the Trust’s invitation to apply collateral or judicial
estoppel. The Trust argues XTO should be estopped from litigating class
certification issues here based on XTO’s previous settlement in another royalty
class action. Aplee. Br. 49–53 (citing Fankhouser v. XTO Energy, Inc., No. CIV-
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07-798-L, 2010 WL 5256807 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 16, 2010) (order certifying class),
and No. CIV-07-798-L, 2012 WL 4867715 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 12, 2012) (final
order approving class action settlement)).
“[J]udicial estoppel is ‘an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its
discretion.’” Kaiser v. Bowlen, 455 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting
New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001)). Likewise, the decision to
apply offensive collateral estoppel lies within the court’s “broad discretion.”
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 (1979). It “is not available as a
matter of right.” Rodriguez-Garcia v. Miranda-Marin, 610 F.3d 756, 772 (1st Cir.
2010) (quoting 18A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure §
4465 (2d ed. 2010)).
First, we do not believe the Trust has met its burden of showing the issues
in this case are identical to those in the Fankhouser action. 6 See Dodge v. Cotter
Corp., 203 F.3d 1190, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2000) (collateral estoppel requires
identity of issues). Therefore, collateral estoppel is not appropriate, nor is
judicial estoppel. See Johnson v. Lindon City Corp., 405 F.3d 1065, 1069 (10th
Cir. 2005) (judicial estoppel requires party’s current position to be “clearly
6
For example, unlike the present action, Fankhouser involved the
Timberland Gathering System, which is “[t]he only gathering system owned or
operated by Defendant and its affiliates in Kansas.” I App. 103. In fact, the
Fankhouser court relied upon “the contention that defendant improperly paid
royalties based on a sale between affiliated companies,” as the “single issue
common to the class.” Fankhouser, 2010 WL 5256807, at *3 (emphases added).
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inconsistent” with its earlier position). Further, the Trust has not addressed the
stipulation contained in the Fankhouser settlement, which prohibits use of the
settlement “for any purpose in any subsequent litigation against XTO.” Supp.
App. 187.
Finally, we believe the district court should have the opportunity to
consider the certification issues in light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Wal-
Mart and Comcast. See Spradling v. City of Tulsa, 198 F.3d 1219, 1222–23 (10th
Cir. 2000). Although the Fankhouser settlement was not approved until October
2012, the court certified the Fankhouser class in March 2009, well before Wal-
Mart and Comcast were decided. Thus, we decline to exercise our equitable
power to estop XTO’s opposition to class certification in the present case.
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the district court’s class
certification order and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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