Fowlke v. Commissioner , 537 F. App'x 783 ( 2013 )


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  •                                                               FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS       Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        August 16, 2013
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    ERNEST JAN FOWLKE,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.                                                           No. 13-9000
    (T.C. No. 24767-10)
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL                                     (Tax Court)
    REVENUE,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    Before HOLMES, HOLLOWAY, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
    Mr. Ernest Jan Fowlke appeals the Tax Court’s assessment of additional taxes
    and imposition of sanctions. Mr. Fowlke admits that he earned money, but denies a
    duty to pay income tax. We affirm.
    Background
    Mr. Fowlke did not file federal income tax returns from 2004 to 2008. Based
    on substitute returns, the Internal Revenue Service assessed tax deficiencies under
    
    26 U.S.C. § 6651
    (a)(1) (failure to file timely tax returns), § 6651(a)(2) (failure to
    *
    This order and judgment does not constitute precedent. See Tenth Cir. R.
    32.1(A).
    timely pay taxes), and § 6654 (failure to make estimated tax payments). Mr. Fowlke
    challenged these assessments by petitioning the Tax Court.
    The Commissioner of Internal Revenue moved for judgment on the pleadings,
    and Mr. Fowlke moved to dismiss. With these filings, the Tax Court held a hearing
    and found that the claims involved a meritless protest against the federal income tax
    system. Thus, the court granted the Commissioner’s motion, denied Mr. Fowlke’s
    motion to dismiss on grounds of mootness, and sanctioned Mr. Fowlke for making
    frivolous arguments. This appeal followed.
    Tax Court’s Alleged Delay in Filing Documents
    According to Mr. Fowlke, the Tax Court delayed filing his motion to dismiss
    and response to the Commissioner’s motion. With this contention, Mr. Fowlke
    asserts that the Tax Court ruled without the benefit of his response brief. These
    representations are incorrect.
    Mr. Fowlke states that the Tax Court “entered” the motion to dismiss and
    response brief on March 6, 2012, conducted a hearing six days later, and issued a
    decision over a month later. Appellant’s Informal Br. at 4-5. Thus, even under
    Mr. Fowlke’s chronology, the Tax Court would have had the benefit of the motion to
    dismiss and response brief at the time of the hearing. This sequence is confirmed in
    the record, for the judge in Tax Court referred to Mr. Fowlke’s motion to dismiss and
    response brief. Tr. at 3. Because the judge had the motion to dismiss and response
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    brief when she conducted the hearing, any delay in filing the documents would not
    have affected the outcome.
    The Commissioner’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
    We conduct de novo review over the Tax Court’s grant of judgment on the
    pleadings. See Nelson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 
    419 F.3d 1117
    , 1119
    (10th Cir. 2005) (a motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed de novo).
    In challenging the Tax Court’s judgment, Mr. Fowlke argues that he is not
    subject to taxation, that the income tax falls on earnings from “privileges” but not
    “rights,” that the tax falls only on “United States persons” and he is not one, that the
    Tax Examiner lacked authority to issue a notice of deficiency, and that the Tax Court
    lacked jurisdiction. These arguments are invalid.
    First, Mr. Fowlke argues that the tax is imposed on income, but is not directed
    to any person or entity. We rejected this argument in Charczuk v. Commissioner of
    Internal Revenue, 
    771 F.2d 471
    , 473 (10th Cir. 1985), and must follow that decision.
    The second argument is that the Constitution confines the taxation power to
    privileges, rather than rights (such as the right to earn a living). We rejected this
    argument, as well, in Charczuk, 
    771 F.2d at 472-73
    , and characterized the argument
    as frivolous in Lonsdale v. United States, 
    919 F.2d 1440
    , 1447-48 (10th Cir. 1990).
    Again, we must follow these precedents and reject Mr. Fowlke’s argument.
    Third, Mr. Fowlke denies that he is a “United States person” because that
    phrase is used elsewhere to refer to foreign corporations. This contention is
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    frivolous. The tax code defines the term “United States person” to include citizens or
    residents of the United States. 
    26 U.S.C. § 7701
    (a)(30) (2006). Because Mr. Fowlke
    does not deny that he is a citizen or resident of the United States, he is considered a
    “United States person” under the tax law.
    Fourth, Mr. Fowlke contends that the notice of deficiency was issued by a Tax
    Examiner, who exceeded his authority under the Internal Revenue Manual. But, the
    Manual does not give rights to the taxpayer. See Armstrong v. Commissioner of
    Internal Revenue, 
    15 F.3d 970
    , 975 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that the Internal
    Revenue Manual is directory rather than mandatory and lacks the force and effect of
    law). Thus, we reject Mr. Fowlke’s argument based on the Internal Revenue Manual.
    Mr. Fowlke’s fifth argument is that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction because
    he is not a “taxpayer.” This argument is circular because it turns on his contention,
    rejected elsewhere, that he is not subject to the income tax.
    The Tax Court has jurisdiction over cases begun by “taxpayers.” Tax Court
    Rule 13(a)(1). Under federal law, the term “taxpayer” includes “any person subject
    to any internal revenue tax.” 
    26 U.S.C. § 7701
    (a)(14) (2006). As discussed
    elsewhere, Mr. Fowlke is subject to the income tax; as a result, the Tax Court had
    jurisdiction.
    Sanctions
    In addition to challenging the Tax Court’s finding of a deficiency, Mr. Fowlke
    challenges its imposition of sanctions. We reject this challenge. The Tax Court is
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    authorized to impose sanctions up to $25,000 when a taxpayer suit is frivolous or
    intended to create delay. 
    26 U.S.C. § 6673
    (a)(1)(A)-(B) (2006). The court applied
    this authority here, sanctioning Mr. Fowlke $5,000 because it viewed Mr. Fowlke’s
    claims as groundless. Tr. at 10.
    We review these sanctions for an abuse of discretion;1 and in doing so, we
    conclude that the Tax Court acted within its discretion. Like the district court, we
    believe that Mr. Fowlke’s underlying arguments are groundless because they are
    plainly foreclosed by governing case law or statutes.
    Conclusion
    As a result, we affirm the Tax Court’s judgment.
    Entered for the Court
    Robert E. Bacharach
    Circuit Judge
    1
    See Lewis v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service, 
    523 F.3d 1272
    , 1274
    (10th Cir. 2008) (“Tax Court sanctions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.”).
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