United States v. Orona , 724 F.3d 1297 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
July 31, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
v. No. 12-2129
RAUL ROGER ORONA, JR.,
Defendant–Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico
(D.C. No. 5:11-CR-01385-BB-1)
Dennis James Candelaria, Esq., Office of the Federal Public Defender, District of New
Mexico, Las Cruces, New Mexico, for the Defendant-Appellant.
James Robert Wolfgang Braun (Kenneth J. Gonzales and Laura Fashing with him on the
briefs), Office of the United States Attorney, District of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New
Mexico, for the Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before BRISCOE, Chief Judge, SEYMOUR and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
Raul Roger Orona, Jr., appeals from his conviction and sentence for being a felon
in possession of a firearm. Orona was sentenced to 198 months’ imprisonment under the
Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). He argues that the use of a
juvenile adjudication as a predicate offense for ACCA purposes violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. We disagree. We
conclude that Orona has not established that a national consensus exists against the use of
juvenile adjudications to enhance a subsequent adult sentence. Further, because the full
punishment of a sentence imposed pursuant to a recidivist statute is related to the crime
of conviction rather than to any prior offenses, Orona’s reliance on precedent establishing
that juveniles are less culpable than adults is misplaced. We also reject Orona’s claim
that the residual clause of ACCA is unconstitutionally vague. Exercising jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I
Following a three-day jury trial, Orona was convicted of being a felon in
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). A pre-
sentence investigation report (“PSR”) prepared for Orona calculated a base offense level
of 24 pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2) because Orona had at least two previous felony
convictions for a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. The PSR noted that
Orona had been convicted of extortion and aggravated assault in December 2002, and of
aggravated fleeing a law enforcement officer in January 2009, both in New Mexico state
court. Because of his extensive criminal history, including three juvenile adjudications,
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eight adult convictions, and three other arrests, Orona had a criminal history category of
V. With an offense level of 24, Orona would be subject to an advisory Guidelines range
of 92 to 115 months’ imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. § 5, pt. A.
Based on Orona’s status as an armed career offender, however, the PSR
recommended that he be sentenced with a base offense level of 33 pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.4(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). In addition to the two state cases noted supra, the
PSR also identified a juvenile adjudication from 2000 in which Orona admitted to four
counts of aggravated assault with a firearm and one count of shooting at or from a motor
vehicle. Orona was arrested on these charges when he was seventeen years old. He was
represented by counsel before the Fifth Judicial District, Children’s Court Division, in
Roswell, New Mexico, and was committed to Children, Youth & Families Department
custody for a period of two years. As an armed career offender, Orona’s advisory
Guidelines range was 210 to 262 months’ imprisonment, with a statutory minimum of
180 months.
Orona objected to the PSR, arguing that the use of a juvenile adjudication as a
predicate conviction for ACCA purposes violates the Eighth Amendment. The probation
office responded that juvenile adjudications qualify as predicate offenses under
§ 924(e)(2). It also noted that even if the juvenile adjudication did not qualify, Orona
could nevertheless be sentenced as an armed career offender by substituting his 2002
adult conviction for shooting at or from a motor vehicle as the third predicate offense. In
addition to his juvenile adjudication contention, Orona argued that the residual clause of
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ACCA is unconstitutionally vague. And he requested a downward variance if the district
court rejected his constitutional arguments.
At sentencing, the district court concluded that a sentence under ACCA was
constitutional, but stated it was persuaded that “defendant has somewhat less culpability”
given that one of his predicate offenses occurred when he was a juvenile. The court
elected to vary downward one level and sentenced Orona to 198 months’ imprisonment
and five years of supervised release. Orona timely appealed.
II
We review de novo whether a criminal sentence violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. United States v. Williams, 576 F.3d
1149, 1165 (10th Cir. 2009). As the Supreme Court explained in Graham v. Florida, 130
S. Ct. 2011 (2010), the Eighth Amendment bars “the imposition of inherently barbaric
punishments under all circumstances” and punishments that are “disproportionate to the
crime” committed. Id. at 2021.
The Court’s cases addressing the proportionality of sentences fall within
two general classifications. The first involves challenges to the length of
term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances in a particular case.
The second comprises cases in which the Court implements the
proportionality standard by certain categorical restrictions on the death
penalty.
Id.
Although the second line of analysis had previously only been applied in the death
penalty context, the Court explained that the categorical approach was appropriate in
Graham, which concerned sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole for non-
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homicide crimes, because “a sentencing practice itself is in question.” Id. at 2022. That
is, the “case implicate[d] a particular type of sentence as it applies to an entire class of
offenders who have committed a range of crimes.” Id. at 2022-23.
Orona asserts a categorical challenge rather than a proportionality claim based on
his particular facts and circumstances. He argues that the sentencing practice of using
juvenile adjudications as predicate offenses for ACCA violates the Eighth Amendment.
Such challenges are subject to the following analysis:
The Court first considers objective indicia of society’s standards, as
expressed in legislative enactments and state practice to determine whether
there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue. Next,
guided by the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and by the
Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s
text, history, meaning, and purpose, the Court must determine in the
exercise of its own independent judgment whether the punishment in
question violates the Constitution.
Id. at 2022 (quotations and citations omitted).1
A
As to the first prong of this test, “the clearest and most reliable objective evidence
1
It is unclear to us that a categorical challenge is viable for sentences other than
life imprisonment or death. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463 (2012) (noting
that in one line of Eighth Amendment precedent, the Court “has adopted categorical bans
on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of
offenders and the severity of a penalty”). But see id. at 2470 (“In considering categorical
bars to the death penalty and life without parole, we ask as part of the analysis whether
objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state
practice, show a national consensus against a sentence for a particular class of offenders.”
(quotations omitted)). However, the government does not challenge Orona’s categorical
argument on this basis, and thus we assume without deciding that a categorical challenge
may be leveled against a term-of-years sentence.
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of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country’s legislatures.” Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002) (quotation omitted). Orona argues that there is
“arguably” a national consensus against using juvenile adjudications as predicate
offenses. He relies on a law review note for this proposition:
[F]orty-one states had habitual offender statutes. Of those states, California
and Texas were the only states which permitted a juvenile adjudication to
qualify as a strike. Nineteen states explicitly prohibited the use of juvenile
adjudications as a strike, five by statute, and fourteen through judicial
determination. In the remaining twenty states that were silent on the issue,
each contained language in its criminal statutes indicating that prior
juvenile adjudications may not be used towards adult criminal sentences.
Joseph I. Goldstein-Breyer, Note, Calling Strikes before He Stepped to the Plate: Why
Juvenile Adjudications Should Not Be Used To Enhance Adult Sentences, 15 Berkeley J.
Crim. L. 65, 88 (2010). As Orona acknowledges, however, another note concludes that
“the mixed-bag of jurisdictions’ policies and practices on using juvenile-age convictions
for recidivism purposes demonstrates the lack of a national consensus regarding this
particular sentencing regime.” Christopher Walsh, Note, Out of the Strike Zone: Why
Graham v. Florida Makes It Unconstitutional To Use Juvenile-Age Adjudications as
Strikes To Mandate Life Without Parole under § 841(b)(1)(A), 61 Am. U. L. Rev. 165,
187 (2011).
Following an independent review of states’ sentencing practices, we agree with the
latter conclusion: states have not reached a meaningful consensus regarding the manner
in which juvenile adjudications may be considered in adult sentencing proceedings. The
Goldstein-Breyer quotation above relies on figures listed in an amicus brief submitted in
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People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946 (Cal. 2009). See Goldstein-Breyer, supra, at 88 &
nn.170-74 (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae Criminal Def. Clinic, Mills Legal Clinic of
Stanford Law Sch. on Behalf of Respondent, Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946 [hereinafter, “Clinic
Brief”]). However, the Clinic Brief looked only to state statutes that “closely parallel[]
the structure of California’s Three Strikes law” and explicitly excludes “context-specific
statutes that allow individual prior convictions or their equivalents to function as
enhancements for specific instant offenses.” Clinic Brief at 3 n.3.
ACCA, however, does not closely parallel the statute at issue in Nguyen. Nguyen
concerned California Penal Code § 667, which provided for lengthy mandatory minimum
sentences if a defendant with two qualifying prior felonies was convicted of any instant
felony. Cal. Penal Code § 667(e)(2)(A) (2008);2 see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.
63, 67 (2003) (“Under California’s three strikes law, any felony can constitute the third
strike, and thus can subject a defendant to a term of 25 years to life in prison.”). ACCA,
in contrast, provides for an enhanced sentence only with respect to an individual who:
(1) unlawfully possesses a firearm or ammunition; and (2) “has three previous
convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(e)(1),
922(g). In other words, ACCA is a “context-specific statute[] that allow[s] individual
prior convictions or their equivalents to function as enhancements for specific instant
2
The California statute has since been amended by Proposition 36, effective
November 7, 2012.
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offenses,” Clinic Brief at 3 n.3, and falls outside the data set discussed in the Goldstein-
Breyer note. We accordingly reject Orona’s reliance on this piece of scholarship.3
Looking more broadly to states’ use of juvenile adjudications in adult sentencing
proceedings does not indicate a clear consensus. Two states treat juvenile adjudications
as convictions for purposes of broadly applicable habitual offender statutes. See Cal.
Penal Code § 667(d)(3); Tex. Penal Code § 12.42(f). At least seventeen others allow
prior juvenile adjudications to enhance a sentence in at least some circumstances. See
Del. Code tit. 16, § 4751B(2) (juvenile adjudications for certain crimes may be counted
as prior convictions resulting in aggravated sentences for drug possession); 720 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 5/24-1.6(a)(3)(D) (unlawful use of a weapon treated as an aggravated felony
if “the person possessing the weapon was previously adjudicated a delinquent minor . . .
for an act that if committed by an adult would be a felony”); Mich. Comp. Laws
§ 257.625(9), (25) (providing for increased sentences for driving under the influence if
the defendant has certain prior convictions, defined by Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.8a(a) to
include “a juvenile adjudication, probate court disposition, or juvenile disposition for a
violation that if committed by an adult would be a crime”); Tenn. Code § 40-35-
108(b)(3)(B) (providing that “a finding or adjudication that a defendant committed an act
as a juvenile that would constitute a Class A or Class B felony if committed by an adult
3
We also note that the Clinic Brief reached a definitive conclusion as to the
validity of using juvenile adjudications to enhance adult sentences in only twenty-one of
the forty-one states it considered. Clinic Brief at 4.
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shall be considered as a prior conviction for the purposes of” determining whether a
defendant is a career offender subject to enhanced sentencing); People v. Mazzoni, 165
P.3d 719, 722-23 (Colo. App. 2006) (“[A] sentencing court may determine, without
benefit of a jury finding, facts regarding juvenile adjudications and use them as a basis to
impose an aggravated range sentence.” (noting Col. Rev. Stat. § 19-1-103(2)); Nichols v.
State, 910 So. 2d 863, 864-65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam) (approving use of
prior juvenile dispositions in “calculating the lowest permissible sentence permitted by
the appellant’s scoresheet . . . [under] Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.704(d)(14)(B)”); Ryle v. State, 842 N.E.2d 320, 321 (Ind. 2005) (“Since nearly the
beginning of our present criminal code, Indiana courts have recognized that criminal
behavior reflected in delinquent adjudications can serve as the basis for enhancing an
adult criminal sentence.”); State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 885-86 (Iowa 2009)
(discussing Iowa Code § 901A.1(f)(2), which defines “prior conviction” to include
adjudications of delinquency for purposes of imposing enhanced recidivist sentencing
under Iowa Code § 901A.2(3), but remanding for an evidentiary hearing on defendant’s
as-applied Eighth Amendment challenge); State v. Harris, 269 P.3d 820, 832 (Kan. 2012)
(rejecting argument that “prior juvenile adjudications must have been pleaded in the
charging document and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt because they were
facts increasing the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum”);
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 963 N.E.2d 704, 717 (Mass. 2012) (“By adopting the
definition of ‘violent crime’ in [Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 121], in the sentencing
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enhancement provisions of [Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 269, § 10G], with its reference to acts
of delinquency, the Legislature reflected its intention to define a juvenile adjudication as
a ‘conviction,’ as that term is used in § 10G [which is similar to ACCA].”); State v.
McFee, 721 N.W.2d 607, 613-14 (Minn. 2006) (en banc) (“While originally juvenile
adjudications could not be used in any other proceeding, the legislature has now provided
for use of juvenile adjudications as predicate offenses and as enhancements in a variety of
criminal contexts.” (citation omitted)); State v. Leeper, 565 S.E.2d 1, 7-8 (N.C. 2002)
(affirming death sentence imposed upon jury finding of statutory aggravating factor “that
defendant had been previously adjudicated delinquent in a juvenile proceeding for an
offense that would have been a felony involving the use of or threat of violence to the
person had defendant been a[n] adult”); State v. Adkins, 951 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Ohio
2011) (Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.08 “made clear that for enhancement purposes, courts
could consider a juvenile adjudication as a conviction” subject to certain exceptions);
State v. Harris, 118 P.3d 236, 243-44 (Or. 2005) (en banc) (the legislature may “choose[]
to designate, inter alia, a prior nonjury juvenile adjudication as an element that increases
the seriousness of a crime or lengthens a criminal sentence, so long as the existence of
that prior adjudication is proved to a jury, or such a requirement is knowingly waived”
(footnotes omitted)); Commonwealth v. Moore, 937 A.2d 1062, 1068 (Pa. 2007) (“[A]
juvenile adjudication may be considered as a ‘conviction’ for purposes of establishing
that a defendant has a significant history of felony convictions pursuant to the [Pa. Cons.
Stat. § 9711(d)(9)] aggravating factor.”); Carter v. Commonwealth, 562 S.E.2d 331, 335
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(Va. Ct. App. 2002) (construing mandatory minimum sentence under Va. Code § 18.2-
308.2 to apply if a defendant is shown to have certain prior juvenile adjudications); State
v. Weber, 149 P.3d 646, 650, 653 (Wash. 2006) (en banc) (concluding that juvenile
adjudications need not be proven to a jury even though inclusion of “juvenile
adjudications in [a defendant’s] offender score would undeniably increase his maximum
sentence above the sentence supported by the jury’s verdict”).
At least twenty-three additional states permit the sentencing court to consider prior
juvenile adjudications in selecting a sentence within a statutory range. See Alaska Stat.
§ 12.55.155(c)(19) (sentencing outside a presumptive range, but within a statutory range,
permissible if “the defendant’s prior criminal history includes an adjudication as a
delinquent for conduct that would have been a felony if committed by an adult”); Ky.
Rev. Stat. § 532.055 (“Juvenile court records of adjudications of guilt of a child for an
offense that would be a felony if committed by an adult . . . may be used during the
sentencing phase of a criminal trial; however, the fact that a juvenile has been adjudicated
delinquent of an offense that would be a felony if the child had been an adult shall not be
used in finding the child to be a persistent felony offender . . . .”); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 15,
§ 3308(2) (“[A]ny court subsequently sentencing the juvenile after the juvenile has
become an adult may consider only murder and Class A, Class B and Class C offenses
committed by the juvenile . . . .”); Md. Code Regs. § 14.22.01.10(B)(2) (including certain
juvenile delinquency adjudications in calculating the offender score for purposes of state
sentencing guidelines); N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 381.2(2) (notwithstanding the general rule
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barring juvenile adjudication records, “another court, in imposing sentence upon an adult
after conviction may receive and consider the records and information on file with the
family court, unless such records and information have been sealed”); N.D. Cent. Code
§ 27-20-33 (“The disposition of a child and evidence adduced in a hearing in juvenile
court may not be used against the child in any proceeding in any court other than a
juvenile court, whether before or after reaching majority, except for impeachment or in
dispositional proceedings after conviction of a felony for the purposes of a presentence
investigation and report.”); Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 982 (presentence investigation reports to
include “prior juvenile and criminal records”); R.I. Gen. Laws § 14-1-40(b) (“Any
finding of delinquency based upon acts which would constitute a felony, if committed by
an adult, shall be available to the attorney general for use in its recommendations to any
court in sentencing and that record may be taken into consideration for the purposes of
sentencing.”); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-27A-2 (in considering death sentence, jury
shall consider “prior criminal or juvenile record of the defendant”); Vt. Stat. tit. 33,
§ 5117(b)(1)(C) (permitting the use of juvenile adjudication records by a “court in which
a person is convicted of a criminal offense for the purpose of imposing sentence upon or
supervising the person”); Wis. Stat. § 938.35 (prior juvenile adjudication records may be
considered “[i]n sentencing proceedings after conviction of a felony or misdemeanor and
then only for the purpose of a presentence investigation”); Ex Parte Thomas, 435 So. 2d
1324, 1326 (Ala. 1982) (per curiam) (“[A] prior youthful offender adjudication is
properly considered in determining the sentence to be imposed within the statutory range
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for a later crime for which the defendant has been convicted. That same youthful
offender determination, however, may not be considered a prior felony conviction, as
contemplated by the Habitual Offender Act, so as to bring the defendant within the
purview of the higher sentence categories of that Act.”); Vanesch v. State, 16 S.W.3d
306, 310 (Ark. Ct. App. 2000) (“The Arkansas Code clearly permits the introduction of
evidence of juvenile adjudications in the sentencing phase of trial when the requirements
of Ark. Code Ann. § 16-97-103(3) are satisfied.”); State v. Christensen, 828 P.2d 332,
333 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992) (affirming sentence based in part on the fact that defendant
“had committed various offenses as a juvenile which were equivalent to first degree
burglary, grand theft, probation violation and other crimes”); State v. Stanton, 929 So. 2d
137, 142 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (although Louisiana Supreme Court has held that a juvenile
adjudication may not be used as a predicate offense under the habitual offender statute,
“[t]here is nothing in the law that prohibits a trial court judge from considering the fact
that a convicted felon had a criminal record as a juvenile in determining what sentence to
impose”); Callins v. State, 975 So. 2d 219, 229 (Miss. 2008) (en banc) (noting that
defendant’s sentence was based in part on consideration of juvenile adjudications);
Mason v. State, 368 S.W.3d 182, 185 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (certain juvenile offenses must
be included in presentence investigative report under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 211.321.1); State
v. Phillips, 159 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Mont. 2007) (stating that “juvenile records may be
noted in a [presentence investigation report], and considered at sentencing”); State v.
Albers, 758 N.W.2d 411, 418 (Neb. 2008) (affirming sentence based in part on
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defendant’s numerous juvenile dispositions); State v. Bieniek, 985 A.2d 1251, 1256 (N.J.
2010) (per curiam) (approving trial court’s consideration of the fact that “defendant had a
juvenile record going back to when he was sixteen years old” in setting a sentence for an
adult); State v. Moreno, 113 P.3d 992, 994 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) (sentence informed by
presentence investigation report that includes information regarding defendant’s juvenile
adjudications); State v. Tyler, 565 S.E.2d 368, 375 (W. Va. 2002) (per curiam) (“[T]he
lower court had rightfully considered the violent and dangerous nature of the crimes
committed, as well as the pre-sentence report which included information concerning the
defendant’s juvenile larceny charge, a history of substance abuse, and a dishonorable
discharge from the Navy.”); Wayt v. State, 912 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Wyo. 1996) (“A
defendant’s juvenile record and his adult record, including dismissed charges, are
important clues to his character and are worthy of consideration for sentencing
purposes.”).
As the foregoing indicates, states vary tremendously in the degree to which they
permit a prior juvenile adjudication to impact sentencing following a subsequent adult
conviction. The vast majority of states—at least forty-two by our count—allow a trial
court to consider prior juvenile adjudications in fashioning a sentence. And in more than
a third of states, prior juvenile adjudications increase the statutory penalties available for
an adult defendant in a subsequent case in certain instances.
Although there is no consensus regarding whether prior juvenile adjudications
may be considered at sentencing following an adult conviction, the question is
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significantly closer if we frame the issue as whether a juvenile adjudication may be used
to increase a statutory sentencing range following an adult conviction. See generally
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000) (distinguishing between factors that a
judge may consider “in imposing sentence within statutory limits in the individual case”
and those that alter the statutory range (emphasis omitted)). As the Court noted in
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), it has found a national consensus against
execution of the mentally ill and one against execution of juvenile offenders based in part
on the fact that thirty states barred each practice. Id. at 425 (citing Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304, 313-15 (2002), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005)). These
numbers are quite similar to those uncovered by our research: including those that are
silent on the issue, it appears that thirty-one states do not enhance statutory sentencing
ranges based on prior juvenile adjudications.
However, the Atkins Court relied “not so much the number of these States” but
upon “the consistency of the direction of change.” 536 U.S. at 315. Between 1990 and
2001, the Court noted, sixteen states prohibited the execution of the mentally ill while no
state moved in the opposite direction. Id. at 314-15. The Court further relied on the fact
that execution of the mentally retarded was exceedingly rare in states that permitted the
practice; only five states had executed such defendants in recent years. Id. at 316.
Similarly, in Roper, the Court noted that only six states had executed a juvenile offender
since 1989, and only three since 1995. 543 U.S. at 564-65. And the Court relied on
“significant” change in the number of states permitting the practice: “The number of
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States that have abandoned capital punishment for juvenile offenders . . . is smaller than
the number of States that abandoned capital punishment for the mentally retarded . . . yet
we think the same consistency of direction of change has been demonstrated.” Id. at 566.
The Court adopted a similar line of analysis in Graham, in which it concluded a national
consensus counseled against the imposition of life without parole sentences on juvenile
offenders despite the fact that thirty-seven states permitted the practice. Noting that
“[a]ctual sentencing practices are an important part of the Court’s inquiry into
consensus,” Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2023 (citation omitted), the Court relied on the
infrequency with which such sentences were actually imposed, id. at 2024 (only 123 such
sentences were being served nationwide, with a majority imposed by a single state).
Orona does not offer any evidence regarding the frequency with which juvenile
adjudications are used to enhance subsequent adult sentences, although it is his burden to
establish that a national consensus exists. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373
(1989) overruled on other grounds by Roper, 543 U.S. at 574. Unable to conclude that a
national consensus exists on the matter, and given our determination that approximately
two-thirds of states do not appear to use juvenile adjudications to increase the statutorily
available sentencing ranges for subsequent adult convicts, we will proceed to the second
prong of the categorical analysis.
B
“Community consensus, while entitled to great weight, is not itself determinative
of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.” Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quotation
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omitted). Instead, courts must apply their independent judgment in interpreting the
Eighth Amendment. Id. In doing so, we must consider “the culpability of the offenders
at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the
punishment in question” and “whether the challenged sentencing practice serves
legitimate penological goals.” Id.
Orona argues that the practice of using a juvenile adjudication as a predicate
offense under ACCA conflicts with the Supreme Court’s holdings regarding juvenile
offenders in Roper and Graham. In the former case, the Court concluded that the
imposition of the death penalty upon juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 560. It reached this conclusion based in large part on the differences
between juveniles and adults. Juveniles, the Court held, have “a lack of maturity and an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility.” Id. at 569 (alteration and quotation omitted).
They “are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures,
including peer pressure.” Id. And the “personality traits of juveniles are more transitory,
less fixed.” Id. at 570. These differences “render suspect any conclusion that a juvenile
falls among the worst offenders.” Id. Juvenile offenders must be considered less
culpable because they “have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to
escape negative influences in their whole environment,” and “a greater possibility exists
that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.” Id. The Graham Court extended
this logic, prohibiting the imposition of mandatory life without parole sentences for non-
homicide juvenile offenders. 130 S. Ct. at 2034. This holding was again based on the
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“fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.” Id. at 2026. And in Miller,
the Court held that mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles are entirely
impermissible for the same reasons. 132 S. Ct. at 2464.
Orona argues that the use of a juvenile adjudication as a predicate offense under
ACCA similarly violates the Eighth Amendment because juveniles are less morally
culpable. The problem with this line of argument is that it assumes Orona is being
punished in part for conduct he committed as a juvenile. This assumption is unfounded.
The Supreme Court “consistently has sustained repeat-offender laws as penalizing only
the last offense committed by the defendant.” Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738,
747 (1994) (quotation omitted). “When a defendant is given a higher sentence under a
recidivism statute . . . 100% of the punishment is for the offense of conviction. None is
for the prior convictions or the defendant’s status as a recidivist.” United States v.
Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 386 (2008) (quotation omitted).
Unlike the defendants in Roper and Graham, Orona is being punished for his adult
conduct. As we recently explained in rejecting a substantive due process challenge to
ACCA’s use of juvenile adjudications, the cases upon which Orona relies “involve
sentences imposed directly for crimes committed while the defendants were young. In
the case before us, an adult defendant faced an enhanced sentence for a crime he
committed as an adult.” United States v. Rich, 708 F.3d 1135, 1140 (10th Cir. 2013). A
juvenile’s lack of maturity and susceptibility to negative influences, see Roper, 543 U.S.
at 569, cannot explain away Orona’s decision to illegally possess a firearm when he was
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twenty-eight years old. And the third factor identified by the Court as differentiating
juvenile and adult offenders, the greater likelihood “that a minor’s character deficiencies
will be reformed,” id. at 570, cuts against Orona’s argument. Unlike defendants who
receive severe penalties for juvenile offenses and are thus denied “a chance to
demonstrate growth and maturity,” Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029, ACCA recidivists have
been given an opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation, but have elected to continue a
course of illegal conduct, see Rich, 708 F.3d at 1141 (“[A]dults facing enhanced
sentences based, only in part, on acts committed as juveniles have had the opportunity to
better understand those consequences but have chosen instead to continue to offend.”).
In United States v. Banks, 679 F.3d 505 (6th Cir. 2012), the Sixth Circuit reached
a similar conclusion in holding that a conviction committed by a juvenile who is tried as
an adult could be used under ACCA consistent with the Eighth Amendment. It
distinguished Graham’s culpability rationale, noting that the defendant, “33 years old at
the time of his felon-in-possession offense, remained fully culpable as an adult for his
violation and fully capable of appreciating that his earlier criminal history could enhance
his punishment.” Id. at 508. The Eighth Circuit has applied the same reasoning. See
United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1018 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Scott was twenty-five years
old at the time he committed the conspiracy offense in this case. . . . The Court in
Graham did not call into question the constitutionality of using prior convictions, juvenile
or otherwise, to enhance the sentence of a convicted adult.”). And several pre-Graham
cases rejected the argument that juvenile conduct should not be counted as an ACCA
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predicate offense. See United States v. Salahuddin, 509 F.3d 858, 864 (7th Cir. 2007)
(“[T]he Eighth Amendment does not prohibit using a conviction based on juvenile
conduct to increase a sentence under the armed career criminal provisions.”); United
States v. Wilks, 464 F.3d 1240, 1243 (11th Cir. 2006) (reaching the same conclusion).
Orona also argues that the use of juvenile adjudications under ACCA does not
serve “legitimate penological goals.” Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. We disagree. The
Court has repeatedly held that retribution and incapacitation are legitimate penological
goals. See, e.g., id. at 2028. Both are served by ACCA. The government “is justified in
punishing a recidivist more severely than it punishes a first offender.” Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 296 (1983). This is because “an offense committed by a repeat offender is
often thought to reflect greater culpability and thus to merit greater punishment.”
Rodriquez, 553 U.S. at 385; see also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 29 (2003) (“In
weighing the gravity of Ewing’s offense, we must place on the scales not only his current
felony, but also his long history of felony recidivism. Any other approach would fail to
accord proper deference to the policy judgments that find expression in the legislature’s
choice of sanctions.”).
ACCA’s consideration of juvenile adjudications also serves the government’s
interest in incapacitating recidivist offenders who possess firearms illegally. “[A] second
or subsequent offense is often regarded as more serious because it portends greater future
danger and therefore warrants an increased sentence for purposes of deterrence and
incapacitation.” Rodriquez, 553 U.S. at 385; see also United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d
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738, 751 (10th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he lengthy sentences mandated by § 924(c) were intended
by Congress to (a) protect society by incapacitating those criminals who demonstrate a
willingness to repeatedly engage in serious felonies while in possession of firearms.”).
Orona argues that a Guidelines sentence of 92-115 months, which would apply
absent ACCA’s fifteen-year mandatory minimum, would be sufficient to meet these
penological goals. But our review of Congress’ decision as to the adequacy of
punishment is quite circumscribed. “[I]f the punishment has some connection to a valid
penological goal,” the question is whether “the punishment is . . . grossly
disproportionate in light of the justification offered.” Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029. “[T]he
point at which a recidivist will be deemed to have demonstrated the necessary
propensities and the amount of time that the recidivist will be isolated from society are
matters largely within the discretion of the punishing jurisdiction.” Rummel v. Estelle,
445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980).
Orona has not shown that ACCA’s statutory minimum, which is approximately
five years longer than his already lengthy advisory Guidelines range, is grossly
disproportionate. ACCA addresses the very serious danger of recidivist felons in
possession of firearms. See Angelos, 433 F.3d at 751 (affirming a fifty-five-year
sentence under § 924(c) despite Eighth Amendment challenge based in part on the need
to “protect society by incapacitating those criminals who demonstrate a willingness to
repeatedly engage in serious felonies while in possession of firearms”). By enacting
ACCA, Congress intended to “infuse federal law enforcement into efforts at curbing and
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‘incapacitating’ ‘armed, habitual (career) criminals.’ Only persons who are illegally in
possession of a firearm and who have been convicted previously of three violent felonies
or serious drug offenses are subject to its minimum fifteen-year sentence.” United States
v. Gilliard, 847 F.2d 21, 26 (1st Cir. 1988) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1073, at 2 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3661, 3662)). Other circuits have held that mandatory
ACCA sentences are not grossly disproportionate to the offense of being a felon in
possession of a firearm. See, e.g., United States v. Presley, 52 F.3d 64, 68 (4th Cir. 1995)
(“[A] fifteen-year sentence under ACCA is neither disproportionate to the offense nor
cruel and unusual punishment, and thus does not violate the Eighth Amendment.”);
United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 674, 683 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Under the totality of the
circumstances, the fifteen-year sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.”). Having rejected Orona’s argument that he is less culpable for his present
offense based on the juvenile predicate offense, we see no reason to depart from that view
with respect to Orona’s specific Eighth Amendment challenge.4 We accordingly hold
4
Orona also argues that juvenile adjudications are less reliable because they do
not include the right to a jury under the Fourteenth Amendment. See McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion). This argument seems to
raise due process rather than Eighth Amendment concerns. However, Orona cannot rely
on the rule announced in McKeiver because his juvenile adjudication occurred in New
Mexico, where juveniles have the right to a jury under the state constitution. See Peyton
v. Nord, 437 P.2d 716, 725 (N.M. 1968) (per curiam) (“A juvenile charged with violation
of a state law, as therein provided, is entitled to a trial by jury in juvenile court . . . if the
offense was one which would be triable by jury if committed by an adult.”); see also
State v. Eric M., 925 P.2d 1198, 1200 (N.M. 1996) (“We confirm the holding of [a prior
case] that a child has a constitutional right to a trial by jury and is to be accorded that
Continued . . .
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that the use of Orona’s juvenile adjudication as a predicate offense for ACCA purposes
does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.
III
In addition to his Eighth Amendment claim, Orona contends that the residual
clause of ACCA is unconstitutionally vague. We review whether a statute is
unconstitutionally vague de novo. United States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 1122, 1135 (10th
Cir. 2006). “The void-for-vagueness doctrine provides that a penal statute must define
the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.” Id. (quotation omitted).
ACCA defines “violent felony” as including any crime that is “burglary, arson, or
extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” § 924(e)(2)(B). In Begay v. United
States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), the Supreme Court held that felony driving under the
influence did not qualify because it was not “roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree
of risk posed” to the listed examples. Id. at 143-44. In particular, the Court noted that
the “listed crimes all typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.” Id.
right absent a waiver.” (quotation omitted)). “As a general rule, if there is no
constitutional defect in the application of the statute to a litigant, he does not have
standing to argue that it would be unconstitutional if applied to third parties in
hypothetical situations.” Cnty. Court of Ulster Cnty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 155 (1979).
Because Orona had the right to a jury trial in his juvenile adjudication, we need not
consider the hypothetical defendant who lacked such a right.
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at 144 (quotation omitted). “[U]nlike the example crimes, the conduct for which the
drunk driver is convicted (driving under the influence) need not be purposeful or
deliberate.” Id. at 145.
Just a few years later, the Court held that the crime of fleeing from a law
enforcement officer qualified as a predicate offense under ACCA. See Sykes v. United
States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011). The Court rejected the defendant’s argument, based
largely on Begay, that “ACCA predicates [must] be purposeful, violent, and aggressive in
ways that vehicle flight is not.” 131 S. Ct. at 2275. “Begay involved a crime akin to
strict liability, negligence, and recklessness crimes,” the Court explained, “and the
purposeful, violent, and aggressive formulation was used in that case to explain the
result.” Id. at 2276. The Court dismissed the importance of the “purposeful, violent, and
aggressive” language that appeared dispositive in Begay, noting that the phrase “has no
precise textual link to the residual clause.” Id. at 2275. Instead, the Court held that the
crime at issue qualified because it was “not a strict liability, negligence, or recklessness
crime” and was “similar in risk to the listed crimes.” Id. at 2276.
Orona argues that the Court’s shifting jurisprudence on the proper test used to
determine whether a crime qualifies under the residual clause renders the statute
impermissibly vague. In James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192 (2007), Justice Scalia
argued in dissent that ACCA’s residual clause was incomprehensible based on the
manner in which the Court had interpreted it. Id. at 214 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The
majority rejected this conclusion:
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While ACCA requires judges to make sometimes difficult evaluations of
the risks posed by different offenses, we are not persuaded by Justice
Scalia’s suggestion—which was not pressed by James or his amici—that
the residual provision is unconstitutionally vague. The statutory
requirement that an unenumerated crime “otherwise involv[e] conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” is not so
indefinite as to prevent an ordinary person from understanding what
conduct it prohibits. Similar formulations have been used in other federal
and state criminal statutes.
Id. at 210 n.6 (citations omitted). Although this statement was dicta, “we are bound by
Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings, particularly
when the dicta is recent and not enfeebled by later statements.” United States v.
Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1122 (10th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted).
Further, the Court reiterated in Sykes that the residual clause “states an intelligible
principle and provides guidance that allows a person to conform his or her conduct to the
law.” 131 S. Ct. at 2277 (quotation omitted). And in 2011, Justice Scalia dissented from
the denial of certiorari on this specific issue. See Derby v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2858
(Scalia, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). Several circuit courts have held the
residual clause is not unconstitutionally vague. See United States v. Cowan, 696 F.3d
706, 708 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Jones, 689 F.3d 696, 704 (7th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Hudson, 673 F.3d 263, 268-69 (4th Cir. 2012). Orona does not direct us
to any opinion holding the opposite.
Although we have previously noted that “[t]he Supreme Court’s holding in Sykes
is not a model of clarity,” United States v. Sandoval, 696 F.3d 1011, 1017 n.8 (10th Cir.
2012), we have nevertheless distilled a comprehensible test from the Court’s residual
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clause cases: “[A]fter Sykes, it is not necessary to reach Begay’s purposeful inquiry
when the mens rea of the offense requires intentional conduct. In such cases, we ask
instead whether the crime is similar in risk to the listed crimes in the ACCA.” United
States v. Maldonado, 696 F.3d 1095, 1103 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotations, citation, and
alteration omitted). We are persuaded by the Court’s consistent rejection of Orona’s
vagueness argument and the unanimous conclusion of our sibling circuits, and hold that
the residual clause is not impermissibly vague.
IV
For the foregoing reasons, Orona’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.
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