United States v. Collins , 172 F. App'x 242 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
March 24, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 05-8056
(D. of Wyo.)
DONNIE COLLINS, (D.C. Nos. 05-CV-52-CAB and
00-CR-176-03-CAB)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before TACHA, Chief Judge, HARTZ, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. **
In 2001, a jury convicted Donnie Collins of conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(B). The district court sentenced him to 84 months imprisonment. His
appeal was denied. He subsequently brought a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C.
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders; nevertheless, an order may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
§ 2255 challenging his sentence, which was denied by the district court.
Having jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we deny a certificate of
appealability (COA) and dismiss this matter.
I. Procedural Background
At sentencing, the district court determined that Mr. Collins’s relevant
conduct, involving between 50 and 500 grams of methamphetamine, placed him at
the base offense level of 26 under the then-mandatory Sentencing Guidelines.
The court enhanced this sentence by two levels after finding Mr. Collins’s
conduct evidenced obstruction of justice. We affirmed this sentence on direct
appeal. United States v. Collins, 97 F. App’x 818 (10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished).
Following the Supreme Court’s opinion in United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005), Mr. Collins brought the instant action: a § 2255 motion alleging
the court enhanced his sentence in violation of Booker. The district court ordered
the government to file a response within 20 days. Twenty-three days later the
government filed a motion for extension of time. The court granted the motion,
allowing the government an additional 30 days to respond. When that deadline
passed without a response, Mr. Collins filed a motion for entry of a default
judgment. The court denied the motion. The government’s response was
received 20 days after the extended deadline expired.
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II. Analysis
Before this court can review the merits of a § 2255 habeas appeal, we must
grant a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). A COA may issue only if “jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
A. Default Judgment
Mr. Collins argues the district court should have entered a default judgment
following the government’s failure to file a timely response. He identifies two
lapses by the government: (1) its failure to request an extension of time before the
court-ordered response deadline had expired; and (2) following the court’s 30-day
extension, its failure to file a response until an additional 20 days passed after the
expiration of the extended deadline.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(e), a default judgment shall not be entered against
the government “unless the claimant establishes a claim or right to relief by
evidence satisfactory to the court.” In particular, this court has held that a default
judgment may be appropriate in a habeas case where the delay itself rises to the
level of a due process violation. Stines v. Martin, 849 F.2d 1323, 1324 (10th Cir.
1988).
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Here, the district court clearly explained its reasons for denying the
motion—the unexpected and substantial number of habeas motions following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Booker. The government’s delayed response,
although not desirable, was understandable in light of the circumstances and
certainly not so extensive or egregious as to violate Mr. Collins’s due process
rights. Nor did the additional delay result in any substantial harm to Mr. Collins.
B. Booker Error
Mr. Collins additionally argues the district court used judge-found facts to
impose a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice in violation of Booker.
His § 2255 motion, however, was filed after Booker became final. Since our
cases have held that Booker does not apply retroactively to an initial § 2255
motion challenging a conviction that became final prior to Booker, we need not
address the merits of this allegation. See United States v. Bellamy, 411 F.3d
1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that “Booker does not apply retroactively to
initial habeas petitions”). Nor can Mr. Collins avoid this rule by suggesting that
because Booker merely clarified Apprendi, the retroactivity rule is inapplicable to
his motion. Without Booker, Mr. Collins would have no claim. See United States
v. Price, 400 F.3d 844, 846 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that because the Booker line
of cases created a new procedural rule, initial § 2255 motions are subjected to a
retroactivity analysis before they may be reviewed). Had Mr. Collins sought to
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make an Apprendi argument, the proper avenue for relief would have been on
direct appeal. See United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002)
(holding that Apprendi is not retroactively applicable to initial habeas
proceedings).
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, because Mr. Collins has failed to make a substantial showing
of the denial of a constitutional right, we deny a COA and dismiss this matter.
Entered for the court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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