Dowdy v. Jones ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
October 12, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TER RY DO WD Y ,
Petitioner-A ppellant, No. 06-6218
v. (W .D. of Okla.)
JUSTIN JONES, (D.C. No. CV-04-399-H)
Respondent-Appellee.
OR DER DENY ING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY *
Before TA CH A, Chief Judge, HA RTZ, and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges. **
Terry Dow dy, an O klahoma state prisoner appearing pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge the district court’s denial of his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. For substantially the same
reasons set forth by the magistrate judge, we find that Dowdy has failed to make
the requisite showing for a COA and therefore DENY his request.
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders; nevertheless, an order may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
I. Background
Terry Dowdy is a state prisoner in Lawton, Oklahoma. In 1993, Dowdy
pled guilty to marijuana possession and was sentenced to fifteen years
imprisonment, with three years suspended. After two unsuccessful post-
conviction actions in state court and shortly before his 12-year prison term was
set to expire, Dowdy initiated federal habeas proceedings. He claimed his
sentence was illegal because it contained a suspended sentence for which he was
ineligible, 1 and that his guilty plea w as involuntary as a result. The district court
agreed and in 2001 granted conditional habeas relief unless the State gave Dowdy
an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. The State promptly provided this
opportunity and, against the advice of counsel, Dowdy withdrew his plea. On
M ay 3, 2001, the district court entered an order and judgment denying Dowdy’s
habeas petition because the State had complied with the mandate set forth in the
conditional writ.
The State elected to reprosecute Dowdy. At a bench trial in state court on
December 11, 2001, Dowdy was convicted of unlawful possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute after former conviction of one or more drug related
felonies and sentenced to twenty years. On direct appeal, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed Dowdy’s conviction and sentence but
1
Under Oklahoma law, Dowdy was ineligible for a suspended sentence
because of a previous felony conviction. W hy this fact was unknown or
disregarded during Dowdy’s sentencing hearing is unclear from the record.
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remanded the case to the trial court with directions that Dowdy be given credit for
the time he served on his original conviction. Dowdy’s subsequent application
for post-conviction relief was denied. The OCCA affirmed, holding that
consideration of all issues raised on direct appeal were res judicata and that
Dowdy had waived all other issues that could have been previously asserted.
M oreover, the OCCA disposed of Dowdy’s jurisdictional, double jeopardy, and
ineffective assistance of counsel claims on the merits.
Dowdy’s current § 2254 petition asserts the following five grounds for
habeas relief: (1) the trial court was without jurisdiction to retry him because he
had discharged his original sentence before the State gave him the opportunity to
withdraw his plea; (2) his subsequent twenty-year sentence violates state and
federal constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy; (3) trial and appellate
counsel were ineffective for failing to argue the lack of jurisdiction and double
jeopardy issues; (4) trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to
argue the Fourth Amendment search and seizure issue raised on direct appeal; and
(5) trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to investigate and
challenge the use of invalid prior convictions to enhance his present sentence. In
a 30-page report and recommendation, the magistrate judge rejected all of
Dowdy’s claims. Upon de novo review , the district court adopted the magistrate
judge’s recommendation and dismissed Dowdy’s petition.
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II. Discussion
To appeal the district court’s denial of his § 2254 petition, Dow dy must
obtain a COA by making “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). He may make this showing by demonstrating that
“reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional
claims debatable or wrong.” M iller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003).
“[A] claim can be debatable even though every jurist of reason might agree, after
the COA has been granted and the case has received full consideration, that [the]
petitioner w ill not prevail.” Id.
For substantially the same reasons set forth by the magistrate judge, we
find that Dowdy has failed to make the requisite showing for a COA. The
magistrate judge’s 30-page report and recommendation thoroughly analyzes the
record and is supported by the applicable law. W ith respect to D ow dy’s first
claim that the state trial court lacked jurisdiction to retry him, the magistrate
judge properly concluded that this is a state law question that is not cognizable
under § 2254, which is confined to alleged errors of federal law. M orris v.
Burnett, 319 F.3d 1254, 1268 (10th Cir. 2003). Regarding Dowdy’s double
jeopardy claim, we agree that the OCCA’s rejection of the claim involved a
reasonable application of federal law:
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects against successive prosecutions
for the same offense after acquittal or conviction and against multiple criminal
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punishments for the same offense. “It has long been settled, however, that the
Double Jeopardy Clause’s general prohibition against successive prosecutions
does not prevent the governm ent from retrying a defendant who succeeds in
getting his first conviction set aside, through direct appeal or collateral attack,
because of some error on the proceedings leading to the conviction.”
M agistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation at 12 (quoting Lockhart v.
Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 38 (1988)). 2 The magistrate judge’s analysis of Dowdy’s
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims w as likewise correct,
and we agree that none of the grounds asserted rises to the level of a substantial
showing of a denial of a constitutional right as required for a COA to issue.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons above we DENY Dowdy’s application for a COA and
DISM ISS this appeal.
Entered for the Court,
Timothy M . Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
2
See also District Court Order at 3–4 (“The record in this case reflects
that [Dowdy] made certain critical, tactical decisions in the course of
proceedings. One was to pursue (against the advice of his counsel) the
withdrawal of his guilty plea under circumstances where his initial sentence, later
determined to be illegal, was substantially served. That he ended up with a longer
sentence after retrial and resentencing is unfortunate for him, but does not render
the resulting conviction or sentence infirm under the applicable standards.”
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