Maughan v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 12, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CURTIS MAUGHAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 07-6198
(D.C. No. 5:06-CV-00705-R)
v. (W.D. Okla.)
ALASKA AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, PORFILIO, and BALDOCK, Circuit Judges.
Curtis Maughan appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of his former employer, Alaska Airlines, in this action under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because Maughan has presented some evidence that, if
believed, may show that Alaska’s proffered reason for terminating his
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
employment was a pretext for age discrimination, and Alaska has not presented
abundant and uncontroverted evidence that no discrimination occurred, we
REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings in the district court. 1
I.
Alaska Airlines employed Maughan as a Quality Control (QC)
Representative and Quality Control Supervisor/Representative from March 1,
2001, until April 20, 2005. The QC department is responsible for overseeing the
maintenance work that vendors perform on Alaska’s airplanes. Maughan’s duties
included supervising the QC Inspectors who monitored a particular Oklahoma
City vendor’s work. Beginning in mid-2003, his supervisor was Kelly Robinson,
Alaska’s Quality Control Manager.
In December 2004, Maughan applied for another position within Alaska,
Quality Assurance (QA) Auditor. 2 During Maughan’s interview, a panel member
asked him about his five-year goals. Then age 60, he stated that he planned to be
1
The district court indicated it was unclear whether Maughan intended his
lawsuit to challenge his December 2004 failure to receive a position in another
Alaska department, as well as the March 2005 termination of his employment
with Alaska. Maughan’s arguments on appeal focus solely on the propriety of
granting summary judgment with regard to the termination. Consequently, any
arguments concerning his failure to receive the other position have been waived.
See Lindstrom v. United States, 510 F.3d 1191, 1195-96 (10th Cir. 2007).
2
The record indicates that Quality Assurance and Quality Control are
different departments. Quality Assurance works on creating maintenance plans
for Alaska’s airplanes, in accordance with governmental and manufacturer’s
requirements and recommendations, while Quality Control is responsible for
ensuring that the plans created by Quality Assurance are implemented.
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retired within five years, and that he would be eligible for retirement in about
one-and-a-half years. He was not selected for the QA position.
He later asked Robinson why he had not been selected. On or about
March 15, 2005, Robinson told him that “word on the street” was that he did not
get the QA position because he told the panel that in five years he was going to be
retired. Aplt. App. I at 74. Within a day, Robinson asked Maughan if he really
was going to retire in a year, and Maughan said that was his plan. According to
Maughan, after that point, “the relationship changed drastically.” Id. at 69.
Maughan states that Robinson “became very aggressive and very controlling and
his whole attitude – his whole attitude changed towards me.” Id. at 81. Robinson
asserts that beginning in early 2005, after Maughan did not receive the QA
position, he began noticing “serious work performance issues with [Maughan’s]
work as a QCR and the work under his supervision.” Id. at 115.
On March 16, Robinson evaluated Maughan’s performance. 3 On a written
review form, Mr. Robinson marked Maughan as “Meeting most expectations” in
the category of Initiative and “Not meeting expectations” in the categories of
“Decision Making/Judgment” and “Problem Solving.” Id. at 196. According to
Robinson, he counseled Maughan about failures to meet expectations in certain
areas and gave him specific examples of when he failed to perform to Robinson’s
3
Robinson states that the March 2005 performance evaluation occurred on
March 2, 2005, but Maughan asserts that it occurred on March 16. We view the
record in the light most favorable to Maughan as the non-moving party.
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standards. Maughan disagrees, asserting that Robinson did not discuss any
specifics with him at the meeting.
In early April 2005, Robinson visited Oklahoma City to observe Maughan’s
performance. According to Robinson, several incidents that occurred during this
visit led him to conclude that Maughan failed to carry out his duties
appropriately. Robinson recommended to his supervisor, Vince Hasson, that
Maughan’s employment be terminated. Hasson agreed, and the two consulted
Scott Lautman, Alaska’s human resources manager. Lautman counseled Robinson
on how to handle the termination.
On April 20, 2005, Robinson informed Maughan that his employment was
terminated effective immediately. He offered Maughan a severance package in
exchange for a release. Maughan refused to sign the release and contacted
Lautman. He informed Lautman that he believed he had been discriminated
against and harassed because of his age. Alaska never conducted an investigation
into Maughan’s complaint of age discrimination and harassment.
After Maughan brought suit under the ADEA, Alaska moved for summary
judgment. Applying the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach, 4
the district court held that Maughan had failed to establish a prima facie case of
age discrimination because he did not present evidence that he had been replaced
by a younger person or under circumstances leading to an inference of
4
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
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discrimination. It further held that, even assuming he presented a prima facie
case, Alaska had proffered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for his
discharge, namely, poor performance. The district court concluded that he failed
to proffer evidence tending to show that Alaska’s proffered reason was a pretext
for discrimination. Accordingly, it granted summary judgment to Alaska.
II.
A. Standard of review
We have often stated the standard of review for summary judgment cases:
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same standard used by the district court. Summary
judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. In making this determination, we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to . . . the non-moving party, and draw all
reasonable inferences in [his] favor.
Riggs v. AirTran Airways, 497 F.3d 1108, 1114 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations,
quotation, and alteration omitted).
B. Application of McDonnell Douglas Framework
Maughan first argues that he presented direct evidence of age
discrimination, and so the district court erred in applying the McDonnell Douglas
burden-shifting scheme. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S.
111, 121 (1985) (“[T]he McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where the
plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination.”). We have recognized that
an employment discrimination plaintiff may prove his or her case with direct or
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with circumstantial evidence, with the McDonnell Douglas framework coming
into play where a plaintiff relies on circumstantial evidence. Adamson v. Multi
Commun. Diversified Servs., Inc., 514 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th Cir. 2008).
“Direct evidence is evidence, which if believed, proves the existence of a
fact in issue without inference or presumption. [It] requires proof of an existing
policy which itself constitutes discrimination or oral or written statements on the
part of a defendant showing a discriminatory motivation.” Hall v. U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, Admin. Review Bd., 476 F.3d 847, 854-55 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 489 (2007) (quotations and citations omitted). “Our precedent makes
clear that evidence is not ‘direct’ if an inference of discrimination is required.”
Riggs, 497 F.3d at 1118. “A statement that can plausibly be interpreted two
different ways—one discriminatory and the other benign—does not directly
reflect illegal animus, and, thus, does not constitute direct evidence.” Hall,
476 F.3d at 855 (quotation omitted).
Each piece of evidence that Maughan cites (Robinson’s report about the
reason he did not get the QA position, his inquiry about whether Maughan
planned to retire, certain notes that Lautman wrote before the termination, and an
e-mail message that Hasson wrote after the termination) requires an inference of
discrimination or plausibly can be interpreted in two different ways. Because this
evidence is not direct evidence of discrimination, the district court did not err in
proceeding under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting procedure.
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C. Prima Facie Case
The district court first held that Maughan failed to establish a prima facie
case “because he has failed to present evidence that the position from which he
was terminated remained open or was filled by a younger person, or that he was
terminated under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful age
discrimination, the fourth essential element of a prima facie case.” Maughan v.
Alaska Airlines, Inc., CIV-06-705-R, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 24, 2007).
But Maughan did present some such evidence, as his affidavit stated that he was
replaced by a man who was forty years old. While the assertion otherwise is
unsupported, Alaska did not controvert this evidence, so it stood unrebutted.
Given that Maughan’s burden at the prima-facie-case stage is de minimis, see
Plotke v. White, 405 F.3d 1092, 1101 (10th Cir. 2005), we conclude that Maughan
established a prima facie case of age discrimination.
D. Pretext
The district court further held that, even assuming that Maughan
established his prima facie case, he failed to proffer evidence that tended to show
that Alaska’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for his discharge was a
pretext for age discrimination.
“Pretext can be shown by such weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered
legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find
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them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the
asserted non-discriminatory reasons.” Riggs, 497 F.3d at 1118 (quotation
omitted). “‘The factfinder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant
(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may,
together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional
discrimination.’” Plotke, 405 F.3d at 1102 (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)). Evidence of pretext “‘may take a variety of
forms,’” including evidence tending to show “‘that the defendant’s stated reason
for the adverse employment action was false’” and evidence tending to show
“‘that the defendant acted contrary to a written company policy prescribing the
action to be taken by the defendant under the circumstances.’” Id. (quoting
Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1230 (10th Cir. 2000)).
“The plaintiff’s evidence can also allow for an inference that the employer’s
proffered non-discriminatory reasons were either a post hoc fabrication or
otherwise did not actually motivate the employment action.” Id. at 1102-03
(quotation and alteration omitted). Affording all reasonable inferences to
Maughan, as we are required to do at the summary-judgment stage, there are
several pieces of evidence favorable to Maughan.
Robinson’s affidavit avers that he began noticing “serious work
performance issues” with Maughan’s work in early 2005. Aplt. App. I at 115.
Robinson further admitted in his deposition that the termination “was solely based
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on my observations between April 5th and 9th. It had nothing to do with previous
job performance, because he had met expectations on all his performance
appraisals.” Id. II at 300. The record contains no documentation of performance
problems in 2005, however, other than the March 2005 review, which occurred
just after Robinson inquired about Maughan’s retirement plans. While “many
courts have recognized that an employer may make reasonable inquiries into the
retirement plans of its employees,” Cox v. Dubuque Bank & Trust Co., 163 F.3d
492, 497 (8th Cir. 1998), this retirement inquiry did not stand alone; it came in
conjunction with Robinson’s statement that “word on the street” was that he had
not received the QA job because of his retirement plans and, according to
Maughan, with a change in Robinson’s attitude towards him.
In addition, Alaska’s summary judgment brief and Robinson’s supporting
affidavit highlight a particular incident as an example of Maughan’s performance
problems in early 2005. In his response brief, Maughan asserted that the incident
actually occurred in October 2004, when, according to Robinson’s evidence, he
was performing acceptably. While Maughan’s supporting affidavit does not
address the timing of the incident, the March 2005 review states it occurred in
October 2004. Alaska’s reliance on a 2004 incident to help justify Maughan’s
termination, in the face of Robinson’s testimony that the performance problems
began in early 2005 and the termination led directly from the events of April 5-9,
2005, may lead to an inference of post hoc justification.
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With regard to the March 2005 review, Maughan testified that he was
presented with an eight-page review that he eventually signed and faxed back.
Alaska has presented a nine-page review, however, with a signature that Maughan
testified was not his, and copies of the review in the record appear to contain
different signatures. We have identified falsifying or manipulating criteria as a
disturbing procedural irregularity that may constitute evidence of pretext.
See Jaramillo v. Colo. Judicial Dep’t, 427 F.3d 1303, 1308 (10th Cir. 2005).
Further, the ninth page, which Maughan testified was not attached at the review,
sets forth specific examples of performance problems. If that page were not a
part of the original review form, its addition may be viewed as a post hoc attempt
to justify the termination. See Plotke, 405 F.3d at 1103 (stating that evidence that
allows for an inference that the employer’s proffered reason was a “post hoc
fabrication” may establish pretext). 5 In addition, the March 2005 review
criticizes Maughan’s initiative, while Robinson praised his initiative in a
December 2004 review submitted in connection with Maughan’s application for
the QA position. “[W]e have noted that memoranda from supervisors praising the
plaintiff on an issue later claimed to be the reason for the adverse action may be
5
Maughan also presented other evidence that may lead to inferences of post
hoc justifications, including e-mail messages from Hasson and Lautman
concerning a post-termination meeting and post-termination documentation of
Maughan’s performance.
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evidence of pretext.” Green v. New Mexico, 420 F.3d 1189, 1193 (10th Cir.
2005).
Maughan also disputes Robinson’s account of the events of early
April 2005 that Robinson testified led up to Maughan’s dismissal. When
analyzing a contention of pretext, this court examines “the facts as they appear to
the person making the decision to terminate plaintiff.” Kendrick, 220 F.3d at
1231. The relevant inquiry is whether the information reasonably believed by the
decision-maker justified the action taken, not whether there might have been some
error in the information. Salguero v. City of Clovis, 366 F.3d 1168, 1176 (10th
Cir. 2004). To the extent that Maughan argues that Robinson acted on incorrect
information or was wrong, his disputes fail under these standards. In some
respects, though, his disputes go beyond showing that Robinson’s criticisms of his
performance were unreasonable or based on mistakes, instead challenging the
objective facts that Robinson says he relied on. For example, Maughan’s and
Robinson’s descriptions of the incident that Robinson identified as his final straw
differ. Further, it was Robinson’s subjective evaluation of Maughan’s
performance that led to the termination. “Courts view with skepticism the use of
subjective evaluations in making termination decisions.” Plotke, 405 F.3d at
1106. “[T]he existence of subjective criteria alone is not considered evidence of
pretext; rather, the existence of other circumstantial evidence may provoke a
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stronger inference of discrimination in the context of subjective evaluation
standards.” Riggs, 497 F.3d at 1120.
Maughan also presented evidence that Alaska acted contrary to its written
anti-harassment and discrimination policy, which provides for investigations of
complaints. The record supports Maughan’s assertion that he complained to
Lautman that the termination of his employment was due to age discrimination
and harassment. Lautman admitted that Alaska undertook no investigation of the
complaint, but the record does not explain why.
This is a close case. Although the evidence described above may tend to
undermine Alaska’s proffered reason for the termination, it is not greatly
persuasive. But even if Maughan has created “only a weak issue of fact as to
whether the employer’s reason was untrue,” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000), Alaska has not presented the corollary
“abundant and uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had
occurred,” id., that would entitle it to judgment as a matter of law.
There is little “uncontroverted independent evidence” in this case. Alaska
argues that Maughan was fifty-six years old, well within the protected category,
when Alaska hired him in 2001. Robinson (age 44 in 2005) and Lautman (age 53
in 2005) also were in the ADEA-protected age group at the time of the
termination. Robinson was Maughan’s supervisor since mid-2003, and Maughan
admits that they had a good relationship. During that time, the only age-related
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comments he ever heard Robinson utter were the statements, “Come on, you old
fart. Let’s go to lunch,” when the two would go to lunch, which they did
frequently. Aplt. App. I at 100. Further, during the summer of 2004, Alaska
offered a voluntary separation program, and Robinson told Maughan that he
hoped he did not take it, because Robinson needed him in Oklahoma City.
This evidence does help negate an inference of pretext, but we cannot
characterize it as “abundant.” Consequently, Alaska is not entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.
III.
“‘[I]f a plaintiff advances evidence establishing a prima facie case and
evidence upon which a factfinder could conclude that the defendant’s alleged
nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment decisions are pretextual, the case
should go to the factfinder.’” Bryant v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 432 F.3d 1114, 1125
(10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Ingels v. Thiokol Corp., 42 F.3d 616, 622 (10th Cir.
1994)). “In short, at the summary judgment stage, the inference of discrimination
permitted by evidence of pretext must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff.” Id.In this close case, Maughan’s proffer is sufficient to establish his prima facie case
and to establish an inference of pretext to defeat Alaska’s motion for summary
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judgment. The judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the case is
REMANDED for further proceedings.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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