United States v. Falls , 90 F. App'x 351 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 5 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 03-2137 and 03-2144
v. (D. New Mexico)
JESUS FALLS and BERNARDO (D.C. No. CR-01-1616-JP)
RODRIGUEZ,
Defendants-Appellants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY , HOLLOWAY , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
Co-defendants Jesus Falls and Bernardo Rodriguez appeal their convictions
for distribution of 50 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine base and
for conspiracy to commit that offense. Mr. Rodriguez also challenges the
enhancement of his sentence for possessing a dangerous weapon during a drug
trafficking offense. We AFFIRM both defendants’ convictions and Mr.
Rodriguez’s sentence.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
BACKGROUND
On October 30, 2001, Oscar Chacon got a phone call. The caller asked
whether Mr. Chacon could sell him nine ounces of crack. Mr. Chacon responded
that he could obtain that amount and would sell it for $5,000. Unfortunately for
Mr. Chacon, the caller was Arturo Gamboa, an undercover detective with the
Albuquerque Police Department.
Detective Gamboa called back later that day to confirm the terms of the
deal. Mr. Chacon assured him that the deal was still on. Mr. Chacon then told
the detective to come to Mr. Chacon’s house to make the exchange.
Detective Gamboa drove to Mr. Chacon’s house in Albuquerque. He
arrived after dark. A van containing a surveillance team of Albuquerque police
officers was parked out of sight nearby. The officers planned to execute a “buy-
bust” operation, meaning that they would immediately arrest the drug dealers
when they gave the drugs to the undercover officer. The surveillance team in the
van could hear Detective Gamboa’s words through a hidden transmitter, although
their understanding of Spanish was limited.
Mr. Chacon met Detective Gamboa outside his house. He told the detective
that he had to go inside to make a phone call. Mr. Chacon came back outside a
few minutes later and said, “Okay, I made a phone call; it should be here shortly.”
Rodriguez App. 68.
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The two men waited outside for about twenty minutes. Mr. Chacon then
asked to use Detective Gamboa’s cell phone. Mr. Chacon dialed a number, and
Detective Gamboa heard him say, “Okay, you’re almost here, where are you at?
We’re waiting, I’m getting impatient here.” Id. at 68-69. Mr. Chacon hung up,
and said to the detective, “Okay, it will be here in a little bit.” Id. at 69.
About five or ten minutes later, a green Ford Explorer pulled up to the
house. Mr. Chacon said, “Okay, it’s here.” Id. Detective Gamboa and Mr.
Chacon approached the passenger side of the Explorer. Defendant Jesus Falls
was driving, and Defendant Bernardo Rodriguez was the passenger. Mr. Chacon
pointed to Detective Gamboa and said to the defendants, “he’s the guy with the
money.” Id. at 70.
Detective Gamboa then introduced himself to the defendants. Both Mr.
Falls and Mr. Rodriguez immediately explained that they did not have the whole
nine ounces, but they had seven. The detective asked for a price quote on the
seven ounces. Mr. Rodriguez offered $600 per ounce. Detective Gamboa
countered with $4,000 for all seven. Mr. Falls rejected that offer, but offered to
get two more ounces for Detective Gamboa and give him a more favorable price
on those two. Detective Gamboa agreed.
Mr. Falls then said to Mr. Rodriguez, “Well, show it to him, give it to him,
let him see it.” Id. at 72-73. Mr. Rodriguez pulled a bag of crack cocaine out
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from underneath his sweater and handed it to the undercover detective. Detective
Gamboa then gave the “arrest signal” to the surveillance team in the van. Id. at
73.
As the van approached, the drug dealers appeared to Detective Gamboa to
get nervous. Mr. Rodriguez reached under the back of his shirt. Detective
Gamboa was concerned that he might be reaching for a gun. The detective asked
Mr. Chacon whether he knew who was in the van, in the hope that Mr. Chacon
would agree that he was familiar with the van and reassure Mr. Rodriguez. Mr.
Chacon looked at the van and said, “Oh, yeah, I know them, they’re my friends.”
Id. at 75. This caused Mr. Rodriguez to relax.
The doors of the van flew open, and police officers burst out shouting
“police!” in English and Spanish. Detective Gamboa saw Mr. Rodriguez reach
under his shirt again, and the detective walked away with the crack and the
money. The surveillance officers arrested Mr. Chacon, Mr. Falls, and Mr.
Rodriguez. The officers handcuffed the three men and laid them out face down
on the ground. Mr. Rodriguez began squirming around, trying to stand up. The
officers told him to stay still. Mr. Rodriguez complained that his arms were
hurting and that he needed to stand up. He asked the officers to take off the
handcuffs. The officers then rolled him over in order to help him up to a sitting
position. Upon doing so, the officers immediately spotted a gun on the ground
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directly underneath where Mr. Rodriguez’s stomach had been. The gun was a
loaded .38 caliber revolver. One of the officers said, “Oh, that’s why you wanted
me to take off your handcuffs.” Id. at 123. Mr. Rodriguez responded, “[T]hat’s
not mine.” Id. Another officer later found .38 caliber ammunition in the Ford
Explorer.
On December 13, 2001, a federal grand jury indicted Messrs. Chacon, Falls,
and Rodriguez on one count of conspiracy to distribute 50 grams or more of a
substance containing cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 21
U.S.C. § 846; and one count of distribution of 50 grams or more of a substance
containing cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A). The grand jury also charged Mr. Rodriguez with one count of
carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
Mr. Chacon absconded before trial. The trial of the two remaining
defendants began on December 11, 2002. Detective Gamboa was the first witness
for the United States. Defense counsel objected to Detective Gamboa’s testimony
regarding his conversations with Mr. Chacon about the crack deal on the ground
that testimony about Mr. Chacon’s statements was inadmissible hearsay. The
government responded that the statements were admissible as statements of a co-
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conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. The district court agreed with the
government and admitted the testimony.
Later in the trial, the prosecutor asked a DEA agent how he came to be
involved in the case. The agent responded that the Albuquerque police contacted
him after the arrest because they “knew that I was currently conducting an
investigation involving both Mr. Bernardo Rodriguez and Jesus Falls.” Id. at 198.
Defense counsel objected that this was improper testimony that the defendants
were suspected of other, uncharged crimes, and he demanded a mistrial on that
basis. The government responded that the evidence was proper because it was
offered to rebut an assertion that defense counsel had made during opening
argument that the case had been transferred to the DEA because of the
Albuquerque Police Department’s bias. The district judge asked defense counsel
what he meant by his reference to “bias.” Defense counsel responded that the
transfer to the DEA “shows a bias of APD” because “when you have Cubans and
you have guns and you have crack cocaine, those cases always come to DEA.” Id.
at 203. The trial judge denied the motion for a mistrial, saying that he did not
think the testimony “had a significant impact on the jury in terms of the
government’s obligation to prove guilt in this case.” Id. at 205. The district
judge also determined that the evidence would be “fairly responsive” to defense
counsel’s argument about bias if the defense continued to advance it. Id. at 207.
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The judge therefore instructed the prosecutor not to solicit additional testimony
about an ongoing investigation and not to refer to it in arguments to the jury,
unless defense counsel persisted in alleging bias. The prosecutor complied with
this instruction, and defense counsel did not subsequently pursue his bias
argument.
At the close of the government’s case, both defendants moved for a
judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy count. The trial judge denied the motion
and submitted the case to the jury. During deliberations, the jury sent a note to
the judge which inquired about the status and whereabouts of Mr. Chacon. The
trial judge decided to give the following written response, over the objection of
defense counsel: “You must decide the case on the basis of the evidence admitted
for your consideration during the trial and you must follow all of the court’s
instructions as a whole, including instruction 15.” Id. at 410. Instruction 15
stated, “The defendants are not on trial for any act or conduct or offense not
alleged in the indictment. Neither are you called upon to return a verdict as to the
guilt or innocence of any other person or persons not on trial as a defendant in
this case.” Id. at 335.
The jury convicted both defendants of distribution of cocaine base and of
conspiracy. The jury found Mr. Rodriguez not guilty of the firearm charge.
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At sentencing, Mr. Rodriguez objected to the presentence report’s
recommendation that he receive a two-level sentencing enhancement for
possessing a dangerous weapon during the commission of a drug offense. See
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). The district court denied the objection and found that
Mr. Rodriguez possessed a weapon during the commission of the offense. After
applying the enhancement, the court determined that Mr. Rodriguez’s adjusted
offense level was 36, resulting in a sentencing range of 188 to 235 months. The
district court imposed a sentence of 188 months.
DISCUSSION
I.
The defendants argue that the district court erred in allowing Detective
Gamboa to testify about the content of Mr. Chacon’s out-of-court statements. The
district court admitted the testimony about the statements on the ground that they
were statements of a co-conspirator. We review the district court’s decision to
admit statements of a co-conspirator for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Eads , 191 F.3d 1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999).
The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that a statement is not hearsay if it
is “a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance
of the conspiracy.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Co-conspirator statements may
properly be admitted if the court finds that (1) a conspiracy existed; (2) both the
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declarant and the defendant against whom the declaration is offered were
members of the conspiracy; and (3) the statements were made in the course of and
in furtherance of the conspiracy. Eads , 191 F.3d at 1210. The party offering the
evidence must prove these facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Bourjaily v.
United States , 483 U.S. 171, 176 (1987). Such evidence may include the
statements themselves, but the statements alone are not sufficient to establish that
a conspiracy existed and that the declarant and the defendants were members of it.
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).
The defendants contend that the only evidence supporting the district
court’s finding that Mr. Chacon was their co-conspirator was the statements
themselves. It is true that the district court relied in part on the content of the
statements in making its findings. However, reliance on the out-of-court
statements is permissible as long as there is also independent evidence of
conspiracy. See Bourjaily , 483 U.S. at 181; United States v. Hernandez , 829 F.2d
988, 993-94 (10th Cir. 1987); Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). In this case, the
independent evidence is substantial. The fact that the defendants showed up at
Mr. Chacon’s house with crack for sale within ten minutes of Mr. Chacon’s
making a phone call is highly probative of the defendants’ involvement with Mr.
Chacon in a drug distribution conspiracy. In addition, the defendants immediately
told Detective Gamboa that they did not have “the nine ounces,” which shows that
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they had received information, presumably from Mr. Chacon, about how much
crack the detective wanted to buy. This independent evidence, when combined
with the statements themselves, is more than sufficient to support the district
court’s finding.
The defendants also claim that Mr. Chacon’s statements were not in
furtherance of the conspiracy. This is a difficult argument to make, because all of
Mr. Chacon’s statements either directed someone to come to his house to deliver
crack or reassured Detective Gamboa, the prospective buyer, that Mr. Chacon had
crack for sale that would arrive at his house. Thus, the statements were plainly
intended to facilitate the conspirators’ distribution of crack cocaine. The
defendants’ argument for why the statements were not in furtherance of the
conspiracy is that the statements were made to a government agent. The
defendants cite several cases from other circuits for the proposition that the “in
furtherance” requirement cannot be met by statements to government agents. See,
e.g. , United States v. Means , 695 F.2d 811, 818 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Miller , 664 F.2d 94, 98-99 (5th Cir. 1981). The cases cited by the defendants do
not even suggest such a principle. The relevant inquiry is not who the conspirator
was speaking to but what purpose he intended the statements to serve. United
States v. Perez , 989 F.2d 1574, 1578 (10th Cir. 1993). If the speaker intended to
promote the conspiracy’s objectives by making the statement, the statement is “in
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furtherance” of the conspiracy. Id. A statement, like a confession, whose sole
purpose is to disclose information to the government might not be in furtherance
of a conspiracy, but statements that are obviously intended to facilitate a drug
transaction do not cease to be “in furtherance” of a drug distribution conspiracy
merely because the conspirator was speaking to an officer of the government.
The statements were therefore admissible as statements of a co-conspirator in
furtherance of the conspiracy.
II.
The defendants contend that the district court erroneously denied their
motion for judgment of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence of
conspiracy. To review the denial of a motion for acquittal, we review the record
de novo , in the light most favorable to the government, to determine whether any
rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. United States v. Wood , 207 F.3d 1222, 1227-28 (10th Cir. 2000).
A conspiracy conviction requires proof of (1) an agreement with another
person to violate the law; (2) knowledge of the essential objectives of the
conspiracy; (3) knowing and voluntary involvement in the conspiracy; and (4)
interdependence among the alleged conspirators. United States v. Vaziri , 164
F.3d 556, 565 (10th Cir. 1999). Because “[s]ecrecy and concealment are essential
features of successful conspiracy,” Blumenthal v. United States , 332 U.S. 539,
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557 (1947), direct evidence of conspiracy is often hard to come by. Therefore,
conspiracy convictions may be based on circumstantial evidence, and the jury may
infer conspiracy from the defendants’ conduct and other circumstantial evidence
indicating coordination and concert of action. United States v. Hardwell , 80 F.3d
1471, 1482 (10th Cir. 1996).
The defendants contend that the government’s evidence showed at most
only a buyer-seller relationship between themselves and Mr. Chacon, and that this
is insufficient to establish the elements of conspiracy. But there was no evidence
that the defendants wanted to sell the crack to Mr. Chacon and there was
considerable, albeit circumstantial, evidence of mutual coordination between them
and Mr. Chacon from which the jury could reasonably have inferred a
conspiratorial agreement to distribute drugs. Mr. Chacon made a phone call and
then told Detective Gamboa that the nine ounces of crack would soon arrive.
Minutes later, the defendants drove up. Upon seeing them, Mr. Chacon told
Detective Gamboa that the drugs had arrived. Mr. Chacon then pointed to the
detective and explained to the defendants that he was the one with the money.
Both defendants immediately explained that they didn’t have “the nine ounces.”
After price negotiations, they then distributed seven ounces of crack to Detective
Gamboa.
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The defendants argue that their showing up at the opportune moment with
crack to sell was just an unfortunate coincidence. See Rodriguez Br. 20
(“Rodriguez arrived at Chacon’s residence spontaneously and not at the urging of
a phone call from Chacon.”). Perhaps so, but in light of all the circumstantial
evidence of coordination, the jury was certainly not required to believe the
defendants’ improbable coincidence story. The evidence was more than sufficient
to support the defendants’ conspiracy convictions, and the district court did not
err in denying their motion for judgment of acquittal.
III.
The defendants contend that the district court should have granted their
motion for a mistrial after a DEA agent testified that the reason why the
Albuquerque Police brought the agent into the case was because they knew that he
had been conducting an investigation involving Mr. Falls and Mr. Rodriguez. We
review a district court’s denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Kravchuk , 335 F.3d 1147, 1154-55 (10th Cir. 1994).
The defendants argue that the DEA agent’s testimony that he had been
conducting an investigation involving Mr. Falls and Mr. Rodriguez was
inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). That rule prohibits the
admission of evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” Fed. R. Evid.
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404(b). Alternatively, the defendants insist that the evidence should have been
suppressed under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, because its probative value was
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect on the jury.
The government responds that Rule 404(b) is inapplicable because the
evidence was not offered as evidence of a prior crime to show action in
conformity therewith. Rather, the evidence was offered to rebut an assertion that
defense counsel made during opening argument about the Albuquerque Police
Department’s bias in transferring the case to the DEA. The government contends
that the evidence was also admissible under Rule 403 because a defendant who
raises a subject in an opening statement “opens the door” to admission of
evidence on that same subject by the government. See United States v. Chavez ,
229 F.3d 946, 952 (10th Cir. 2000).
We do not think the district court’s resolution of this question was an abuse
of discretion. The district judge seemed to acknowledge that defense counsel had
“opened the door.” It would have been within his discretion to admit the
evidence on that basis. Id. Nevertheless, he also seems to have concluded that
both the defense’s bias argument and the prosecution’s evidence about an ongoing
DEA investigation were of dubious value to the jury in determining whether the
defendants were guilty of the crimes charged. He therefore instructed the
prosecution not to elicit any further testimony about the investigation and not to
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refer to it during arguments unless the defense persisted in its bias argument.
Both parties prudently complied, and nothing more was said about the DEA
investigation or Albuquerque Police Department bias for the remainder of the
trial. In this context, it was well within the district judge’s discretion to conclude
that a single isolated statement by a DEA agent that he had been investigating the
defendants prior to their arrest did not have a sufficiently prejudicial effect on the
jury to warrant a mistrial. See United States v. Behrens , 689 F.2d 154, 162 (10th
Cir. 1982) (“Whether a motion for mistrial should be granted is within the
discretion of the trial judge because he is in the best position to evaluate the
effect of the offending evidence on the jury.”) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
IV.
The defendants’ next argument is that the district court’s response to the
jury’s question about the whereabouts of Mr. Chacon was improper and
misleading, and therefore requires reversal of their convictions. While we review
the jury instructions as a whole to determine whether they correctly state the
governing law and provide an ample understanding of the issues, the submission
of supplemental jury instructions after the jury has retired is a matter committed
to the trial court’s discretion. United States v. Arias-Santos , 39 F.3d 1070, 1075-
76 (10th Cir. 1994).
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The district judge may respond to a jury’s question by referring to a
specific jury instruction if the instruction is a correct statement of the law and is
responsive to the question. See id . at 1076. The district judge’s response to the
jury’s question about the status of Mr. Chacon was that the jury should follow all
of the court’s instructions, including Instruction 15. That instruction stated, “The
defendants are not on trial for any act or conduct or offense not alleged in the
indictment. Neither are you called upon to return a verdict as to the guilt or
innocence of any other person or persons not on trial as a defendant in this case.”
Rodriguez App. 335. There is nothing legally incorrect about this instruction. It
is also responsive to the jury’s inquiry, as it instructs them to concern themselves
only with determining the guilt or innocence of the defendants as to the crimes
charged rather than speculating about the current whereabouts of Mr. Chacon.
The defendants claim that emphasizing Instruction 15 in this context
suggested to the jury that it could find the defendants guilty of conspiracy based
only on their own unilateral actions. This is not a plausible inference from the
judge’s response, particularly in light of the other jury instructions that correctly
set forth the elements of conspiracy. Therefore, the judge’s reference to
Instruction 15 was proper; the instruction was legally correct, helpful to the jury,
and not materially misleading.
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V.
The defendants claim that the district court erred when it failed to instruct
the jury that the specific type of cocaine base was an element of the offense. The
defendants contend that the term “cocaine base” as used in the jury instructions
was too broad, because there are certain forms of cocaine base that differ
chemically from “crack cocaine” and the defendants were convicted under a
statutory provision that applies only to crack. The defendants did not raise this
objection at trial, and we therefore review their claim for plain error. United
States v. Lujan , 268 F.3d 965, 967 (10th Cir. 2001).
The defendants’ claim seems to be that the jury instructions should have
said “crack” instead of “cocaine base.” It is hard to see why this should be so
when the instructions’ use of the term “cocaine base” mirrors the language of the
indictment and the relevant statute. The indictment alleged that the defendants
distributed 50 grams or more of a substance containing “cocaine base” in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Rodriguez App. 19. That statute prohibits
and provides a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for distribution of 50
grams or more of a substance containing “cocaine base.” 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A). The jury instructions in turn required that the jury find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendants distributed and conspired to distribute 50
grams or more of “cocaine base.” Rodriguez App. 324. The jury instructions’
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reference to “cocaine base” is therefore correct on its face, because this is the
term used in the indictment and the statute.
Nevertheless, the defendants contend that the instructions must refer
specifically to “crack,” because the term “cocaine base” in § 841(b)(1)(A) is
limited to crack and the jury might have understood the term as used in the
instruction to refer to types of cocaine base that are not crack. We find this
argument unpersuasive. Even if the defendants’ interpretation of “cocaine base”
as it appears in § 841(b)(1)(A) is correct, the fact remains that the jury
instructions used the same term that appears in the statute. There is no need for
the instructions to further limit the statutory term “cocaine base” to “crack” unless
there is some risk that the jury might have found that the defendants were
distributing some form of cocaine base that was not crack. However, in this case,
there was no evidence that the substance that the defendants distributed was
anything but crack. Detective Gamboa and Mr. Chacon referred repeatedly to
“crack” in their negotiations; it was clear that they were negotiating a deal for
crack, not some other form of cocaine base. In addition, the government offered
unrebutted testimony of a DEA forensic chemist who stated that he performed
laboratory tests on the drugs recovered from the scene and concluded that “it was
cocaine base, commonly referred to as crack cocaine.” Rodriguez App. 230. In
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this context, it was not plain error for the district judge to fail to instruct the jury
that “cocaine base” means only “crack.”
VI.
Mr. Rodriguez alone appeals the enhancement of his sentence under
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possessing a dangerous weapon during a drug
trafficking offense. We review the district court’s legal interpretation of the
Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United
States v. Vaziri , 164 F.3d 556, 567 (10th Cir. 1999).
Section 2D1.1(b)(1) provides: “If a dangerous weapon was possessed
(including a firearm), increase by 2 levels.” The application notes explain that
“[t]he adjustment should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is clearly
improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1,
cmt. n.3. The government bears the initial burden of proving possession by a
preponderance of the evidence, and may do so by showing mere proximity to the
offense. United States v. Smith , 131 F.3d 1392, 1400 (10th Cir. 1997). Once the
government meets this burden, the enhancement applies unless the defendant
proves that it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the
offense. Id.Mr. Rodriguez argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the
district court’s finding that he possessed the gun. However, the district court’s
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finding was well supported by record evidence. Detective Gamboa testified that
he twice saw Mr. Rodriguez reach under his shirt when the situation appeared
dangerous. The officers found the gun on the driveway directly underneath where
Mr. Rodriguez’s waistband had been just seconds before. They also found
ammunition matching the caliber of the gun in the Ford Explorer. Given this
evidence, the district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous.
Mr. Rodriguez also argues that the enhancement cannot be applied to him
because the jury acquitted him of the charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) of carrying
a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. This argument is
foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Morehead , 959 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir.
1992). In Morehead , we upheld the application of the enhancement for
possessing a dangerous weapon despite the defendant’s acquittal on a 924(c)
charge because “the standard to convict on § 924(c) ‘is much higher than that
necessary for an enhancement under the Guidelines.’” Id. at 1512 (quoting
United States v. Goddard , 929 F.2d 546, 549 (10th Cir. 1991)).
Morehead is therefore precisely on point and mandates our rejection of Mr.
Rodriguez’s argument. In response, Mr. Rodriguez submits that Morehead was
wrongly decided and invites us to revisit it, on the ground that it is manifestly
unconstitutional for a defendant’s sentence to be enhanced on the basis of conduct
for which the jury has acquitted him. Even if it were permissible for this panel to
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overrule the decision of a previous panel, Mr. Rodriguez’s argument would fail
because the constitutional principle he relies on has been squarely rejected by the
Supreme Court. See United States v. Watts , 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (holding, in
a case where a defendant was acquitted on a 924(c) charge but given an
enhancement for weapon possession, that a sentencing court may consider
conduct of which a defendant has been acquitted).
VII.
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM both defendants’ convictions and
Mr. Rodriguez’s sentence .
Entered for the Court
Michael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 13 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 03-2137
v. District of New Mexico
JESUS FALLS, (D.C. No. CR-01-1616-JP)
Defendants-Appellants.
ORDER *
Before MURPHY , HOLLOWAY , and McCONNELL , Circuit Judges.
This matter comes before the Court on the motion by Jesus Falls to recall
the mandate in his case, No. 03-2137, which was entered on March 29, 2004. See
United States v. Jesus Falls and Bernardo Rodriguez, 2004 WL 407039 (10th
Cir., Mar. 5, 2004) (unpublished). Mr. Falls argues that the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), and United States v.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), “demonstrate that he was correct in his sentencing
argument raised on direct appeal and that this court erred in denying relief on that
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
argument.” Appellant’s Mot., at 3. Be that as it may, the decision in this case
was final when the judgment was affirmed and the time for seeking certiorari
passed. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n.6 (1987) (“By ‘final,’ we
mean a case in which a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability
of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition
for certiorari finally denied.”). The proper means for challenging confinement
pursuant to an allegedly unconstitutional sentence is not a motion to recall the
mandate, but a habeas corpus proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Nothing in the statutes or rules governing the proceedings of the Courts of
Appeals authorizes those courts to recall their mandates, but the Supreme Court
has held they have such “inherent” authority. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S.
538, 549 (1998). The Court has cautioned, however, that “the power can be
exercised only in extraordinary circumstances.” Id. at 550. “The sparing use of
the power demonstrates it is one of last resort, to be held in reserve against grave,
unforeseen, contingencies.” Id.Mr. Falls points to prior decisions of this Court recalling the mandate, but
those decisions are easily distinguishable. In Gomez v. New Mexico, 937 F.2d
616 (10th Cir. 1991) (table), 1991 WL 132445, this Court issued its mandate on
June 27, 1991, remanding to the district court for further proceedings. On June
24, 1991, however, the United States Supreme Court handed down a decision
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inconsistent with this Court’s ruling, and indicated that the decision should be
applied retroactively. The appellee filed a motion to recall the mandate “several
days later,” on July 3, 1991. The court granted that motion, explaining that “[t]o
hold otherwise would be to engage in an exercise in futility, requiring the district
court to apply a legal analysis which has now been repudiated by the Supreme
Court.” Id. at 1. This case is different in three ways: (1) the supervening
Supreme Court decision(s) came down after the mandate had issued; (2) the lapse
of time between the mandate and the motion to recall in this case is almost a year,
as opposed to “several days”; and (3) this case would not entail a district court
proceeding pursuant to an erroneous legal analysis. The other cases cited by Mr.
Falls are even farther afield.
It may be unfortunate, but it is not “grave,” “unforeseen,” or
“extraordinary,” that the Supreme Court renders decisions that are inconsistent
with prior final decisions of the lower courts. The proper avenue for
reconsideration, in cases involving continuing confinement, is via habeas.
Whether relief is available via habeas depends, in part, on whether the Supreme
Court’s supervening rulings are intended to apply retroactively. We have no
occasion to decide, in this case, whether collateral relief is available on a Booker
claim. In United States v. Price, — F.3d —, 2005 WL 535361, (10th Cir., Mar. 8,
2005), at 5, this Court has held that “Blakely does not apply retroactively to
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convictions that were already final at the time the Court decided Blakely, June 24,
2004.”
The motion to recall this court’s March 29, 2004 mandate is DENIED.
Entered for the Court,
PATRICK FISHER, Clerk
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