United States v. Hampshire ( 1996 )

PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Filed 9/11/96
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. No. 96-3007
RICKY L. HAMPSHIRE,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS
(D.C. No. 95-CR-10026)
Timothy J. Henry, Assistant Federal Public Defender (David J. Phillips, Federal Public
Defender, with him on the brief), Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellant.
David S. Kris, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Jackie N.
Williams, United States Attorney, and Brian R. Johnson, Special Assistant United States
Attorney, Wichita, Kansas), for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before KELLY, LOGAN and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Defendant-appellant Ricky L. Hampshire entered a conditional plea of guilty based
upon the failure to pay child support obligations in violation of the Child Support
Recovery Act of 1992 (“CSRA”), 18 U.S.C. § 228, after the district court rejected his
challenges to the CSRA and its application. See United States v. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp
1327 (D. Kan. 1995). He was sentenced to two years’ probation and ordered to pay
$38,804 in restitution. He now challenges his conviction on the basis that (1) the CSRA
violates the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment; (2) the state court order upon
which his federal conviction is predicated violates his rights under both the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause and the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act
(“SSCRA”); and (3) the order of restitution, which includes amounts of child support
incurred prior to the enactment of the CSRA, violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. We
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a), and affirm.
Background
In September 1985, Defendant Ricky Hampshire went “absent without leave”
(“AWOL”) from the military. In October 1985, his wife filed for divorce in Kansas. In
November 1985, Mr. Hampshire was apprehended, held in a civilian jail pending transfer
to military custody, and served with a summons to answer the divorce petition. He never
responded. The court granted the divorce, awarded custody to the mother of the couple’s
two children and ordered Mr. Hampshire to pay $350 per month in child support. After
his release from military prison, Mr. Hampshire moved from Kansas to New Mexico,
refused to make any payments and eventually was charged with violating the CSRA.
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Discussion
I. Commerce Clause
We review de novo challenges to the constitutionality of a statute. United States v.
Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 398 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 966 (1996). The
Commerce Clause provides that “[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. “A court may
invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear that there is
no rational basis for a congressional finding that the regulated activity affects interstate
commerce, or that there is no reasonable connection between the regulatory means
selected and the asserted ends.” Federal Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742, 754 (1982) (quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1981)).
The CSRA makes it a federal criminal offense for a person to “willfully fail[] to
pay a past due support obligation with respect to a child who resides in another State.” 18
U.S.C. § 228(a). “Past due support obligation” is defined as “any amount determined
under a court order or an order of an administrative process pursuant to the law of a State
to be due from a person for the support and maintenance of a child . . . that has remained
unpaid for a period longer than one year, or is greater than $5,000.” 18 U.S.C. §
228(d)(1).
The constitutionality of the CSRA presents a question of first impression in this
circuit. The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate three aspects of interstate
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commerce: (1) “the use of the channels of interstate commerce[;]” (2) “the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce[;]”
and (3) activities that have a substantial relation to or substantially affect interstate
commerce. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1629 (1995); see also Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971). In Lopez, relied upon in large part by Mr.
Hampshire, the Court struck down 18 U.S.C. § 922(q), part of the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990 (“GFSZA”), which made it a federal offense “for any individual knowingly
to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to
believe, is a school zone.” 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A). In Lopez, the Court dismissed as
inapplicable the first two categories of permissible interstate commerce regulation and
held that § 922(q) failed to satisfy the prerequisites of the third category because it
regulated an activity that did not “substantially affect[] interstate commerce.” 115 S. Ct.
at 1630-31. Of particular importance to the Court’s analysis was the fact that § 922(q)
was “a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of
economic enterprise” and “contain[ed] no jurisdictional element which would ensure . . .
that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce.” Id.
The Second Circuit recently held that the CSRA was a proper exercise of
Congress’s power to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce
because the Act “regulates the flow of payments on unfulfilled child support orders where
the child and parent reside in separate States.” United States v. Sage, 1996 WL 450640,
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*7 (2d Cir. 1996). Because the CSRA “addresses an obligation to make payments in
interstate commerce,” it regulates more than local activity and is constitutional. Id. The
Ninth Circuit also recently upheld the CSRA on a similar rationale:
The obligation of a parent in one state to provide support for a child in a
different state is an obligation to be met by a payment that will normally
move in interstate commerce--by mail, by wire, or by the electronic transfer
of funds. That obligation is, therefore, a thing in interstate commerce and
falls within the power of Congress to regulate. The frustration of
satisfaction of the obligation by the failure of the debtors to pay is an
impediment to interstate commerce that Congress can criminalize...
United States v. Mussari, 1996 WL 499163, *3 (9th Cir. 1996).
Numerous district courts have addressed the constitutionality of the CSRA.
Several have found it to be constitutional. See United States v. Ganaposki, 1996 WL
376351 (M.D. Pa. July 1, 1996); United States v. Nichols, 928 F. Supp. 302(S.D.N.Y.1996); United States v. Collins, 921 F. Supp. 1028 (W.D.N.Y.1996) (opinion
by magistrate judge); United States v. Kegel, 916 F. Supp. 1233 (M.D. Fla.1996)
(opinion by magistrate judge); United States v. Sage, 906 F. Supp. 84 (D. Conn.1995),
aff’d, 1996 WL 450640 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Hopper, 899 F. Supp. 389 (S.D.
Ind.1995) (opinion by magistrate judge); Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. 1327. These courts
generally upheld the constitutionality of the CSRA on the basis that (1) nonpayment of
child support involves payment of a debt and therefore constitutes economic activity or
commerce, Ganaposki, 1996 WL 376351, *7; Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 310-11; (2)
nonpayment of child support in the aggregate has a substantial impact on commerce,
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Ganaposki, 1996 WL 376351, *7; Nichols, 928 F. Supp. at 311-12, Sage, 906 F. Supp. at
90; Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1329-30; and (3) the CSRA’s requirement that the
delinquent parent and child reside in two different states constitutes the jurisdictional
requirement of an interstate nexus ensuring that the federal government will not intrude
upon matters with no relation to interstate commerce, Sage, 906 F. Supp. at 91-92;
Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1330.
By contrast, several other district courts have held the CSRA unconstitutional. See
United States v. Parker, 911 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa.1995); United States v. Bailey, 902 F.
Supp. 727 (W.D. Tex.1995); United States v. Mussari, 894 F. Supp. 1360,
reconsideration denied by, 912 F. Supp. 1248 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev’d, 1996 WL 499163(9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. 360, reconsideration denied by,
912 F. Supp. 1240 (D. Ariz. 1995), rev’d, 1996 WL 499163 (9th Cir. 1996). These courts
struck down the CSRA on the basis that (1) nonpayment of child support fails to
constitute an activity that substantially affects commerce or bears a substantial
relationship to commerce, Parker, 911 F. Supp. at 840-41; Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at
365-66; Mussari, 912 F. Supp. at 1255-56; (2) the CSRA’s requirement that the
delinquent parent and child reside in two different states does not satisfy the
constitutionally required jurisdictional requirement of an interstate nexus because the
delinquent parent often does not involve himself in any interstate activity that
constitutionally confers jurisdiction, Parker, 911 F. Supp. at 842-43; Mussari, 912 F.
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Supp. at 1251-52; (3) nonpayment of child support inherently is a state criminal issue in
which intervention by the federal government violates notions of comity and federalism,
Bailey, 902 F. Supp. at 730; Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 367-68; and (4) the definitional
requirements of the CSRA force federal courts to interpret and possibly modify state court
ordered decrees, Schroeder, 912 F. Supp. at 1246; Mussari, 912 F. Supp. at 1254-55;
Schroeder, 894 F. Supp. at 367-68.
In this case, Mr. Hampshire argues that Congress exceeded its authority under the
Commerce Clause because the CSRA: (1) regulates an activity that neither constitutes
nor involves commerce; (2) lacks the prerequisite interstate nexus sufficient to confer
federal jurisdiction; (3) is overbroad; and (4) represents an unconstitutional foray by the
federal government into domestic relations, a power traditionally reserved to states. The
government responds that the CSRA: (1) regulates both the channels of interstate
commerce as well as an economic activity bearing a substantial relation to interstate
commerce, and (2) requires that the delinquent parent reside in a different state from the
child, thus fulfilling the jurisdictional prerequisite of an interstate nexus. Because the
CSRA regulates a court-ordered obligation to pay money in interstate commerce, and
deals with an activity that is substantially related to and substantially affects interstate
commerce, we conclude that Congress constitutionally exercised the power bestowed
upon it by the Commerce Clause in enacting the CSRA.
Notwithstanding that state regulation is substantial or even predominant, it is well-
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settled that Congress may regulate interstate aspects of economic transactions. United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 551-52 (1944). We agree with
the Second Circuit that “[i]f Congress can take measures under the Commerce Clause to
foster potential interstate commerce, it surely has the power to prevent the frustration of
an obligation to engage in interstate commerce.” Sage, 1996 WL 450640, at *5 (2d Cir.
1996). Accord Mussari, 1996 WL 499163, at *3. Regarding the latter, the Court has
invalidated application of state laws that prevented enforcement of contracts in interstate
commerce. See Allenberg Cotton Co., Inc. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 34 (1974); Dahnke-
Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 292-93 (1921). Likewise, Congress may prevent
the circumvention of child support obligations by regulating what is essentially
nonpayment of a debt where the judgment creditor and judgment debtor are in different
states. See Mussari, 1996 WL 499163, at *3.
The CSRA also may be upheld because it regulates activities that are substantially
related to and substantially affect interstate commerce. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
In enacting the CSRA, Congress made explicit findings concerning the impact of
delinquent parents on interstate commerce. In 1989, approximately $5 billion of $16
billion in child support obligations were not honored. H.R.Rep. No. 771, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 5 (1992) (Judiciary Committee). See also Statement by President Upon Signing S.
1002, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2908 (Nov. 2, 1992). About one-third of the unpaid child
support obligations involved a delinquent father who lived in a different state than his
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children. Delinquent parents used the multistate system to evade enforcement efforts by
individual states. H.R.Rep. No. 771 at 5-6; see also 138 Cong. Rec. H7326 (daily ed.
Aug. 4, 1992) (statement of Cong. Hyde). Accordingly, in enacting the CSRA, Congress
sought “to strengthen, not to supplant, State enforcement.” Id.In order to conclude that Congress acted within the confines of the Commerce
Clause, all we must find is a rational basis for Congress’ finding that the regulated
activity substantially affects interstate commerce. See Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm’n, 456 U.S. at 754. Congress clearly considered the economic impact of
delinquent parents and, in its discretion, concluded that the impact substantially affects
interstate commerce. Congress had a rational basis for so concluding and, as a result,
acted within the power bestowed upon it under the Commerce Clause in enacting the
CSRA.
II. Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment provides that “the powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const. amend. X. “‘In a case . . . involving the
division of authority between federal and state governments,’ the inquiries under the
Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment ‘are mirror images of each other.’” Kelley
v. United States, 69 F.3d 1503, 1509 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1566(1996) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992)). “If a power is
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delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any
reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty
reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not
conferred on Congress.” New York, 505 U.S. at 156. To successfully demonstrate a
violation of the Tenth Amendment, a claimant must show that the challenged statute or
regulation regulates “states as states;” it addresses matters that are indisputably attributes
of state sovereignty; and compliance with it would directly impair the State’s ability to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional state functions. Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981).
In light of our holding that congressional enactment of the CSRA does not violate
the Commerce Clause, Mr. Hampshire’s Tenth Amendment argument fails. See Mussari,
1996 WL 499163, *5 (“If . . . Congress acts under one of its enumerated powers--here its
power under the Commerce Clause--there can be no violation of the Tenth
Amendment.”). Moreover, the CSRA does not displace any approach taken by the state
in addressing the problem of delinquent parents but rather supplements such state
initiatives by fortifying law enforcement efforts and existing state penalties. Sage, 1996
WL 450640, *8.
III. Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act and Due Process
Mr. Hampshire claims that the state court’s refusal to appoint counsel for his
defense in the underlying divorce action violated both the Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil
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Relief Act (“SSCRA”) as well as his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
by denying him meaningful access to the court to challenge the child support order. Both
claims present questions of law that we review de novo. See Patton v. TIC United Corp.,
77 F.3d 1235, 1243 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2525 (1996).
The SSCRA temporarily suspends enforcement of civil liabilities against people on
active duty in the military “until after the court shall have appointed an attorney to
represent the defendant and protect his interest.” 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 510, 520(1). The
district court found that the state court did violate the SSCRA by failing to appoint
counsel for Mr. Hampshire but that such failure did not rise to the level of a due process
violation. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1332.
We cannot agree that Mr. Hampshire was entitled to an attorney under the SSCRA.
The language of the SSCRA is clear. “Military Service” is defined as “Federal service on
active duty,” and “active duty” is defined as including “the period during which a person
in military service is absent from duty on account of sickness, wounds, leave, or other
lawful cause.” 50 U.S.C. App. § 511(1); see also Betha v. Martin, 188 F. Supp. 133, 134-
35 (E.D. Penn. 1960) (“military service” means active duty in the federal armed services).
An AWOL soldier is not absent due to “sickness, wounds, leave, or other lawful cause”
and may not avail himself of the benefits under SSCRA. Harriott v. Harriott, 511 A.2d
1264, 1266 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1986). Mr. Hampshire’s child support liability results from
divorce proceedings filed against him in October 1986; he concedes that he was AWOL
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from the military at this time. Hampshire, 892 F. Supp. at 1331. Because he was AWOL
at the time of filing and throughout the divorce proceedings, Mr. Hampshire was not on
“active duty” and is definitionally precluded by the plain language of the SSCRA from
availing himself of its benefits. See 50 U.S.C. App. § 511(1). Because the state court did
not violate Mr. Hampshire’s rights under the SSCRA, we need not reach Mr. Hampshire’s
due process claim predicated on such a violation.
Mr. Hampshire also argues that his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights
were violated because he had no meaningful opportunity as an AWOL soldier in a
civilian prison to be heard in state court to challenge the divorce and child support actions
that form the basis of his CSRA conviction. The Due Process clause, incorporated by the
Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the states, only “applies when government action
deprives a person of liberty or property.” Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal
and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Mr. Hampshire fails to articulate how
the government prevented him from meaningfully defending himself while in prison or to
identify a state law that prevented him from doing so. See Lynk v. LaPorte Superior
Court No. 2, 789 F.2d 554 (7th Cir. 1986) (state law required physical presence, even of
incarcerated person, to obtain divorce). The district court properly rejected this claim.
IV. Ex Post Facto
Mr. Hampshire asserts that his restitution order, which includes amounts accrued
prior to the passage of the CSRA, runs afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause by punishing
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him for conduct that occurred prior to the passage of the CSRA. An ex post facto law is
one that (1) criminalizes conduct that was legal when done; (2) inflicts greater
punishment for an offense than was inflicted by the law in existence at the time the
offense was committed; or (3) eliminates a defense available according to law at the time
the offense was committed. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990); see also
United States v. Gerber, 24 F.3d 93, 96 (10th Cir. 1994). Mr. Hampshire’s ex post facto
challenge to the restitution order presents a question of law that we review de novo.
United States v. Guthrie, 64 F.3d 1510, 1514 (10th Cir. 1995).
The CSRA provides that “the court shall order restitution under section 3663 in an
amount equal to the past due support obligation as it exists at the time of sentencing.” 18
U.S.C. § 228(c). “Past due support obligation” is defined as “any amount . . . determined
under a court order . . . that has remained unpaid for a period longer than one year, or is
greater than $5,000.” 18 U.S.C. § 228(d)(1). The district court invoked 18 U.S.C. §
3663, the Victim Witness Protection Act (“VWPA”), to order Mr. Hampshire to pay
restitution in an amount of approximately $38,000, of which approximately $25,000
accrued prior to the passage of the CSRA.
Although Mr. Hampshire’s restitution order takes into account amounts resulting
from his failure to pay before the passage of the CSRA, he has not been charged or
sentenced under the CSRA for any acts or omissions that occurred prior to its passage.
Rather, Mr. Hampshire was indicted and convicted for his willful failure to pay past due
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child support from January 1993 until December 1994, i.e., for his conduct after the
passage of the CSRA. I R. at 1. The restitution ordered pursuant to the VWPA covered
the amount of back child support owed on the date of sentencing. The fact that a
component of that amount accrued prior to the enactment of the statute is not
determinative. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 559-60 (1966) (considering past
criminal conduct in determining the sentence for the offense of conviction); United States
v. Cabrera-Sosa, 81 F.3d 998, 1001 (10th Cir.) (same), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. July
16, 1996) (No. 96-5205); United States v. Cusack, 901 F.2d 29, 32 (4th Cir. 1990). What
is determinative is whether the defendant was given fair notice of what his potential
punishment would be for a violation of the statute in question. Weaver v. Graham, 450
U.S. 24, 30 (1981). Thus, even if we consider restitution to be punishment, there is no ex
post facto problem.
Moveover, under the clear import of the CSRA, restitution is not a “punishment,”
although it is hardly surprising that a recalcitrant parent would so consider it. We have
previously indicated in other contexts that restitution orders issued pursuant to the VWPA
are predominantly compensatory in nature, the purpose of which “is not to punish
defendants . . . but rather to ensure that victims, to the greatest extent possible, are made
whole for their losses.” See United States v. Arutunoff, 1 F.3d 1112, 1121 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. DeVries v. United States, 510 U.S. 1017 (1993); see also United
States v. Salcedo-Lopez, 907 F.2d 97, 99 (9th Cir. 1990). Unlike a forfeiture statute, the
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VWPA seeks to compensate victims rather than punish defendants. See United States v.
Dudley, 739 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir.1984). The Constitution's explicit prohibition against
ex post facto laws applies only to those laws that inflict criminal punishment. United
States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 n. 13 (1977); see also United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 174-75 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106(1989). Mr. Hampshire’s restitution order does not implicate the Ex Post Facto Clause
because it does not inflict punishment upon him but rather seeks to compensate his child
for his failure to pay his past due support obligation.
AFFIRMED.
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