Woodward v. Sedgwick County Jail ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JAN 27 1997
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DAVID L. WOODWARD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 96-3202
(D.C. No. 93-CV-3228)
SEDGWICK COUNTY JAIL (D. Kan.)
ADMINISTRATOR MITCHELL
PAIGE; MELISSA DAY; MIKE
HILL,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, EBEL, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff-appellant David L. Woodward appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his civil rights action, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Because plaintiff’s claims are precluded by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), and by the statute of
limitations, we affirm.
On May 23, 1991, plaintiff attempted to commit suicide after being
identified as a suspect in a sexual molestation. While hospitalized, plaintiff made
inculpatory statements during police questioning, and his wife consented to a
search of their home which disclosed incriminating evidence. On May 25, 1991,
plaintiff was arrested and placed in an infirmary cell under suicide watch.
Between this date and June 5, 1991, plaintiff was handcuffed to the bed, clothed
only in a paper gown under cold conditions. Plaintiff made several inculpatory
statements during this time. On May 27, 1991, he was given a blanket and his
dentures. After June 5, 1991, plaintiff was taken off suicide watch, but remained
under observation in administrative segregation. He was permitted standard issue
clothing, bedding, a daily shower, exercise, and standard commissary and
visitation privileges.
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On May 29, 1991, a public defender was appointed to represent plaintiff,
and on September 6, 1991, plaintiff pled guilty to six felony counts, including
kidnapping, sexual exploitation of a child, rape, and felony murder. Plaintiff is
currently incarcerated in a state correctional facility. His convictions have not
been reversed.
On June 11, 1993, plaintiff filed this civil rights action against the
Sedgwick County Jail Administrator, the Sedgwick County Sheriff, and his former
attorney, alleging that defendants (1) conspired to deprive him of his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel; (2) conspired to coerce his
confessions and guilty pleas in violation of the Fifth Amendment; (3) illegally
searched his residence and submitted tainted evidence at the preliminary hearing
in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (4) subjected him to cruel and unusual
punishment by reason of jail conditions and deprivation of medical treatment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed the action on the
following grounds: (1) plaintiff’s claims that he was denied his right to effective
assistance of counsel and that his confessions and guilty plea were coerced were
barred by Heck, 114 S. Ct. at 2372-73; and (2) plaintiff’s claims of illegal search
and cruel and unusual punishment were barred by the statute of limitations. This
appeal followed.
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We review the dismissal of a complaint de novo, accepting well-pleaded
allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to plaintiff.
Fuller v. Norton, 86 F.3d 1016, 1020 (10th Cir. 1996). Where a complaint shows
on its face that the applicable statute of limitations has expired, dismissal for
failure to state a claim is appropriate. Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc.,
627 F.2d 1036, 1041 n.4 (10th Cir. 1980).
We conclude the district court properly dismissed plaintiff’s damages
claims premised on the deprivation of counsel and the use of coerced confessions
and a coerced guilty plea, because such claims directly challenged the validity of
his convictions. In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions
whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a
§ 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or
called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that
relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so
invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
114 S. Ct. at 2372 (footnote omitted).
The only injury identified by plaintiff is the fact of his convictions and
incarceration. To establish that he is entitled to compensation for this injury,
plaintiff necessarily must show that the convictions and incarceration are
unlawful, based on the deprivation of effective assistance of counsel and the use
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of coerced confessions and a coerced plea. This is exactly the situation addressed
by Heck, in which the Court held that such claims are not cognizable unless the
underlying convictions have been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or called
into question by issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. The fact that plaintiff is
now procedurally barred from raising these challenges to his convictions in a
habeas corpus petition does not change this result, because the focus of our
inquiry is on whether plaintiff has suffered a compensable injury, and not whether
plaintiff is foreclosed from any other avenue of challenging his convictions. 1
The district court also acted correctly in dismissing plaintiff’s cruel and
unusual punishment claim and his search and seizure claim based on the statute of
limitations. As 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a statute of limitations, we
look to the underlying state’s statute of limitations governing personal injury
claims. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 538, 540 (1989); Hamilton v. City of
Overland Park, 730 F.2d 613, 614 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying Kansas personal
injury limitation). In Kansas, a personal injury action must be brought within two
years after a cause of action accrues. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-513(a)(4) & (b). A
civil rights action accrues when the “facts that would support a cause of action
1
Plaintiff appears to argue that, in regard to his allegedly coerced
confessions, proof of a constitutional violation will not render his convictions
invalid because his convictions are based on a guilty plea. Although this may be
true, plaintiff has not alleged any damage resulting from the allegedly coerced
confessions other than his convictions and incarceration.
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are or should be apparent.” Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1995)
(quotations omitted).
Plaintiff’s cruel and unusual punishment claim rests on his treatment while
under suicide watch at the Sedgwick County Jail. This treatment was readily
apparent to plaintiff when it occurred. The record shows that plaintiff was taken
off suicide watch on June 5, 1991, and that, although he was still under
observation, he was given standard prisoner clothing and privileges on that date.
Exhibit 6 to Martinez Report, p.2. Although plaintiff alleges in his affidavit that
he was subjected to cruel and unusual conditions “until approximately June 20,"
R. I, doc. 2, he does not allege any facts to support this claim. Because plaintiff
was last subjected to the complained of conditions on June 5, 1991, his lawsuit
brought on June 11, 1993, fell outside the limitations period. The fact that
plaintiff may not have discovered the legal basis for his claim until later did not
extend the time in which he was required to bring his action. See Richards v.
Mileski, 662 F.2d 65, 71 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding “mere ignorance of the
law does not ordinarily toll the statute of limitations”); see also United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 123-24 (1979) (holding that medical malpractice accrued
upon knowledge of facts, regardless of whether plaintiff knew legal rights had
been invaded).
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Similarly, plaintiff’s search and seizure claim accrued when it occurred on
May 27, 1991, or at the latest, when he learned of the search within the next few
days. See Johnson v. Johnson County Comm’n Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1301 (10th
Cir. 1991) (holding that “[c]laims arising out of police actions toward a criminal
suspect, such as arrest, interrogation, or search and seizure, are presumed to have
accrued when the actions actually occur” unless plaintiff shows why he did not
know of the alleged injury when the actions occurred). His argument that he did
not know of the damage until the illegally seized evidence was used at the
preliminary hearing renders his claim one for damages resulting from his
conviction, which, as explained above, is precluded by Heck.
Finally, plaintiff’s claim that the statute of limitations was tolled while he
was incarcerated is without merit. State limitations statutes control whether a
plaintiff’s incarceration tolls the time to bring a civil rights action. Hardin, 490
U.S. at 539, 543. Here, section 60-515(a) of the Kansas Statutes specifically
states that the statute of limitations is not tolled for a prisoner who has access to
the court for purposes of bringing an action. Plaintiff has not alleged that he was
denied access to the court during the limitations period. Therefore, his
incarceration did not toll the statute of limitations.
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Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas is
AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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