United States v. Gutierrez-Moran ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 2 1997
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-2018
(D.C. No. CR-95-625-HB)
EUGENIO GUTIERREZ-MORAN, (District of New Mexico)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Submitted on the Briefs.
_________________________________
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, PORFILIO, Circuit Judge, and BRORBY, Circuit
Judge.
The parties have requested this case be submitted on the briefs. We have honored
that request, and this matter has been submitted without oral argument.
Defendant Eugenio Gutierrez-Moran argues that: (1) the district court erred in
denying his motion for severance; and (2) the government failed to present sufficient
evidence to sustain his conviction. Believing the evidence is insufficient, we reverse.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Eugenio Gutierrez-Moran is the brother of Jose Gutierrez-Moran, a codefendant
whose conviction is before us in another matter. For the purpose of this disposition, we
merely need point out this case involves 293 pounds of marijuana that was found behind
the panels of a van which Jose was driving and in which Eugenio was riding. Eugenio
and Jose were arrested together, indicted for possession with intent to distribute more than
100 kilograms of marijuana together, tried together, and convicted together.
Defendant argues the government failed to present sufficient evidence upon which
a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew Jose’s van was transporting
marijuana. He points out the government’s only evidence of his knowledge of the
marijuana consisted of the facts his hands were shaking when he was stopped at the
border checkpoint and a border patrol agent could smell marijuana near the back of the
van. Defendant argues this evidence is clearly insufficient because: (1) the van did not
belong to him and crossed the Mexican border at times when he could not have been
present; (2) no evidence of drug-trafficking was found at his home; and (3) his ignorance
of the marijuana was confirmed by Jose’s testimony at trial.
We review a district court’s determination that sufficient evidence exists to support
a conviction de novo. United States v. McDermott, 64 F.3d 1448, 1457 (10th Cir. 1995).
Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if, considering both direct and
circumstantial evidence in a light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury
could find the defendant guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. United
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States v. Clark, 57 F.3d 973, 976 (10th Cir. 1995). To support a guilty verdict, the
evidence presented “need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothesis and
need not negate all possibilities except guilt.” United States v. Parrish, 925 F.2d 1293,
1297 (10th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d
1453 (10th Cir. 1996). Accord Clark, 57 F.3d at 976; United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d
1526, 1531 (10th Cir. 1986). Moreover, a criminal conviction may be sustained on
circumstantial evidence alone. Hooks, 780 F.2d at 1529.
Applying those principles, and viewing the evidence of Eugenio’s knowledge of
the marijuana in a light most favorable to the government, we nonetheless must conclude
it is insufficient to convict him of knowing possession of marijuana beyond a reasonable
doubt. Missing from the evidentiary matrix is any evidence of his actual or constructive
possession.
To support a conviction of possession with intent to distribute, “the evidence must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the following elements: ‘(1) the defendant knowingly
possessed the illegal drug; and (2) the defendant possessed the drug with the specific
intent to distribute it.’” United States v. Reece, 86 F.3d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1996),
quoting United States v. Gonzales, 65 F.3d 814, 818 (10th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
Although possession may be inferred when a defendant has exclusive possession of the
area where drugs are found, when
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possession is not clear, such as when the contraband may be attributed to
more then one individual, constructive possession requires some nexus,
link, or other connection between the defendant and the contraband. The
jury may draw reasonable inferences from direct or circumstantial evidence,
yet an inference must amount to more than speculation or conjecture.
Reece, 86 F.3d at 996 (citations omitted).
Although the government relied upon constructive possession here, its evidentiary
support for that reliance is only spacial proximity and the defendant’s angst. Conjecture
cannot substitute for nexus, however. Id. “Constructive possession means that
Defendant has ‘some appreciable ability to guide the destiny of the drug.’” United States
v. Hanif, 1 F.3d 998, 1003 (10th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). The case made by the
government does not meet that measure.1
Having concluded the evidence does not support the conviction, we need not
address the issue of severance. The judgment of the district court is REVERSED, and
the mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
John C. Porfilio
Circuit Judge
Defendant was also charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2. The government does not
1
address this factor; however, we can see no evidentiary support for the offense in any
event.
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