Shabazz v. Cody ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
OCT 21 1997
PUBLISH PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
ISA ABDULLAH RAMADAN
SHABAZZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 97-6025
MICHAEL D. PARSONS; R.
MICHAEL CODY; PHIL GILSTRAP;
VINCENT KNIGHT,
Defendants-Appellees,
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 94-CV-1282)
Isa Shabazz, pro se.
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, PORFILIO and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
SEYMOUR, Chief Judge.
Isa Shabazz, a pro se prisoner, brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that defendant prison officials violated his rights under the First
Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act by denying him access to
certain issues of the magazine M UHAMMAD S PEAKS . The district court adopted
the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge and granted summary
judgment for defendants, holding that defendants did not violate Mr. Shabazz’
First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion by denying him access
to issues of the magazine which the prison determined would create a danger of
violence by advocating racial, religious, or national hatred. Mr. Shabazz
appealed. We affirmed in part but remanded for further proceedings to determine
whether defendants had denied Mr. Shabazz access to more material than was
necessary. See Shabazz v. Parsons, No. 95-6267, 1996 WL 5548 (10th Cir. Jan.
8, 1996).
On remand, the district court adopted the supplemental report and
recommendation of the magistrate judge and ruled that defendants had shown a
rational basis for withholding entire issues rather than redacting only the
offending portions. Mr. Shabazz filed his notice of appeal on December 27,
1996. 1 On January 31, 1997, the district court granted Mr. Shabazz permission to
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
1
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
(continued...)
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proceed in forma pauperis, but directed him to make partial payments of the filing
fee on appeal pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), 28
U.S.C.A. § 1915 (West Supp. 1997). Mr. Shabazz contends on appeal that the
prison’s indigency policy deprives him of his right of access to the courts, that the
fee provisions of the PLRA are unconstitutional, and that the withholding of
entire issues of MUHAMMAD S PEAKS violated his constitutional rights. 2 We
affirm.
1
(...continued)
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
2
Mr. Shabazz’ challenge to the prison indigency policy is raised for the
first time on appeal and we therefore do not consider it. See Vitkus v. Beatrice,
No. 96-1240, 1997 WL 631332, at *10 (slip op. at 22) (10th Cir. Oct. 14, 1997).
Mr. Shabazz also raises two issues that were resolved against him in the first
appeal. He again asserts that his rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act were violated. We held in the first appeal that the Act does not apply to his
claims. Moreover, the Supreme Court has recently declared the Act
unconstitutional, see City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), and we
therefore need not consider this claim further. Mr. Shabazz also challenges our
previous holding that the subject material could reasonably be viewed as leading
to racial, religious, or national hatred, and our holding that a policy of excluding
such material was rationally related to defendants’ legitimate interest in
maintaining order and safety. We expressly resolved these issues against Mr.
Shabazz in the first appeal and he has offered nothing that persuades us to revisit
those rulings. Accordingly, the only substantive issue presented in this appeal is
the propriety of defendants’ decision to withhold entire issues containing
objectionable material rather than redacting only the offending material.
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I.
We begin by addressing Mr. Shabazz’ challenges to the fee provisions of
the PLRA. Mr. Shabazz first appears to argue that the Act should not apply to
him because his action was filed in district court before April 26, 1996, the Act’s
effective date. In White v. Gregory, 87 F.3d 429, 430 (10th Cir. 1996), we held
that the Act’s fee provisions do not apply when the notice of appeal was filed
prior to the Act’s effective date. We had no occasion there to decide whether the
Act would apply when, as here, “the prisoner commenced his action in district
court before April 26, 1996, but filed notice of appeal after April 26, 1996.” Id.
at 430 n.1. Subsequently, however, we held that a prisoner proceeding in forma
pauperis on appeal who files his notice of appeal after the PLRA enactment date
“is required to comply with the filing fee requirements of § 1915(b), as amended
by the PLRA.” Schlicher v. Thomas, 111 F.3d 777, 778-79 n.1 (10th Cir. 1997).
In applying that holding here, we point out that the plain language of the Act
requires us to apply its fee provisions when a prisoner “files an appeal in forma
pauperis.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(b)(1). Because the PLRA was in effect at the
time the appeal was filed, the fee provisions are applicable and Mr. Shabazz had
notice that they would be applied to him.
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II.
Mr. Shabazz also challenges the fee provisions as violative of his
constitutional rights, asserting that he should not be forced to choose between
spending his limited prison account on the small amenities of life available to him
in prison and pursuing an appeal. We are not persuaded.
The fee provisions of the PLRA require that:
(2) A prisoner seeking to bring a civil action or appeal a
judgment in a civil action or proceeding without prepayment of fees
or security therefor,
. . . shall submit a certified copy of the trust fund account statement
(or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner for the 6-month period
immediately preceding the filing of the complaint or notice of appeal,
obtained from the appropriate official of each prison at which the
prisoner is or was confined.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(a)(2). The PLRA further provides:
(b)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a), if a prisoner brings a
civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis, the prisoner shall be
required to pay the full amount of a filing fee. The court shall assess
and, when funds exist, collect, as a partial payment of any court fees
required by law, an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the
greater of--
(A) the average monthly deposits to the prisoner’s
account; or
(B) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s
account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of
the complaint or notice of appeal.
(2) After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner
shall be required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the
preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s account. The
agency having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments from
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the prisoner’s account to the clerk of the court each time the amount
in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid.
Id. § 1915(b).
As the Sixth Circuit has explained,
although all prisoners are required to pay an initial partial filing fee,
payment of this fee is made only when funds exist. After payment of
the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner must make monthly
payments equal to 20 percent of the preceding month’s income
credited to the prisoner’s account, but payments will be extracted
only in months when the prisoner’s trust fund account exceeds ten
dollars ($10).
Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1284 (6th Cir. 1997). In addition to assessing
modest amounts as described above, the PLRA also provides that “[i]n no event
shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or
criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by
which to pay the initial partial filing fee.” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(b)(4). Finally, the
Act provides that a successful prison litigant may recover costs against defendants
other than the United States. Id. § 1915(f)(1).
Courts have considered a variety of challenges to the constitutionality of
the above provisions and have uniformly concluded that the provisions pass
constitutional muster. See Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1487-89 (11th Cir.
1997); Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 231-34 (4th Cir. 1997); Hampton, 106 F.3d
at 1283-88. We agree with those courts. We find persuasive the analysis of the
two circuits that considered and rejected the specific argument Mr. Shabazz raises
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here. In Roller, the court said:
To further ensure that prisoners need not “totally deprive themselves
of those small amenities of life which they are permitted to acquire in
a prison or mental hospital beyond the food, clothing, and lodging
already furnished by the state,” section 1915 allows payment to be
taken from the prisoner’s account only where “the amount in the
account exceeds $10. . . .”
Roller, 107 F.3d at 233 (citations omitted). Moreover,
[r]equiring prisoners to make economic decisions about filing
lawsuits does not deny access to the courts; it merely places the
indigent prisoner in a position similar to that faced by those whose
basic costs of living are not paid by the state. Those living outside
of prisons cannot file a lawsuit every time they suffer a real or
imagined slight. Instead, they must weigh the importance of redress
before resorting to the legal system. If a prisoner determines that his
funds are better spent on other items rather than filing a civil rights
suit, “he has demonstrated an implied evaluation of that suit” that the
courts should be entitled to honor.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Hampton, 106 F.3d at 1285.
Mr. Shabazz has offered no argument, and we have not discovered one, that
causes us to disagree with the above analysis or to conclude that we should not
apply it here. Accordingly, we reject his attack on the constitutionality of the
PLRA. 3
3
We deny Mr. Shabazz’ motion for reconsideration of our April 23, 1997,
order declaring him responsible for continuing payments on his filing fee in this
appeal until the fee is paid in full.
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III.
We now turn to Mr. Shabazz’ challenge to the adoption of the magistrate
judge’s report. On remand, the magistrate directed the parties to supplement the
record with regard to the narrow issue set out by this court in its remand order,
i.e., “whether any rational basis existed for denying entire issues of the magazine
Muhammad Speaks to the Plaintiff, rather than simply redacting the offending
portions.” Rec., vol. I, doc. 68 at 2. In assessing the issue in light of the record,
the magistrate correctly pointed out that the inquiry does not employ “a ‘least
restrictive alternative’ test,” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987), and that
courts must accord deference to a prison’s choice of regulations employed to
implement valid penological goals, id. Nonetheless, “if an inmate claimant can
point to an alternative that fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis
cost to valid penological interests, a court may consider that as evidence that the
regulation does not satisfy the reasonable relationship standard.” Id. at 91.
Here, defendants asserted that redacting offending portions of a magazine
rather than withholding the entire issue was not a reasonable alternative for two
reasons. They offered evidence showing that the costs to implement such a
procedure would be prohibitive, and that the procedure would prevent the prisoner
from obtaining meaningful administrative review. We have reviewed the record
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offered by defendants and we agree that defendants have adequately supported
their policy choice, particularly in view of Mr. Shabazz’ failure to offer an
alternative that addresses these legitimate concerns.
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
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