United States v. Gaines ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 22 1997
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 96-5263
(D.C. No. 95-CR-45-1-B)
ARLAND DEON GAINES, a/k/a (N.D. Okla.)
Arland Deon Williamson,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Submitted on the briefs. **
Stephen C. Lewis, United States Attorney and Lucy O. Creekmore, Assistant
United States Attorney, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
C. Rabon Martin of Martin & Associates, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant-
Appellant.
Before PORFILIO, BRORBY and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The
case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
In August 1996, a jury convicted the Appellant, Mr. Gaines, on one count
of Possession of a Controlled Dangerous Substance (cocaine base) with Intent to
Distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and two counts of Possession of
a Firearm After Former Conviction of a Felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
Mr. Gaines now appeals his conviction, claiming the trial court erred when it
denied his motion to suppress evidence. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
On November 9, 1995, Tulsa, Oklahoma police officers secured a warrant
to search the residence at 3323 East Ute Street for "[f]irearms, ammunition, and
records indicating the sale or purchase of firearms, [and] papers showing
residency." Tulsa County District Court Judge, the Honorable Peter Messler,
issued the search warrant on the basis of Officer Spitler's affidavit recounting
information provided by a past proven reliable confidential informant, as well as
information garnered during Officer Yelton's and Officer Spitler's two- to three-
month surveillance of the East Ute Street residence prior to their application for
the search warrant.
With the search warrant in hand, together with an outstanding felony
warrant for Mr. Gaines' arrest for Possession of a Firearm After Former
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Conviction of a Felony, Tulsa Police Department officers returned to the East Ute
Street residence. While surveilling the residence, the officers observed Mr.
Gaines exit along with three other individuals. The officers then approached the
residence and arrested Mr. Gaines without incident. After serving Mr. Gaines
with a copy of the search warrant, the officers proceeded to the front door where
they knocked and announced their presence and their purpose. Upon receiving no
response, they entered and secured the residence and began their search. The
officers discovered a loaded Glock .9 mm. semi-automatic pistol underneath the
mattress of the bed in the southeast bedroom. Further search of the southeast
bedroom produced a purple "Crown Royal" bag which contained several
"suspected rocks of crack cocaine." The officers discontinued their search at that
point so they could apply for and obtain a narcotics search warrant. Upon
receiving the second warrant, the officers continued their search and recovered
several items from the residence pursuant to both search warrants.
After his arraignment and prior to trial, Mr. Gaines filed a Motion to
Suppress Evidence, which generally alleged the described search violated his
Fourth Amendment Rights. In his Post-Hearing Memorandum, Mr. Gaines more
specifically argued the first warrant was issued without probable cause; the first
warrant was overbroad and became a general warrant since it authorized a search
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for ammunition; the police exceeded the scope of the first warrant by looking
inside the "Crown Royal" bag; the seizure of the crack cocaine cannot be justified
as a plain view seizure; and, finally, the police illegally served the second warrant
after dark. The district court rejected each of these arguments, denied Mr.
Gaines' motion and allowed the prosecution to present evidence obtained during
the search to the jury.
On appeal, Mr. Gaines essentially repeats the arguments he presented to the
district court. He claims the district court erred in denying his Motion to
Suppress evidence obtained during the search of the East Ute Street residence
because: (1) the first warrant was issued without probable cause, (2) the first
warrant was a general warrant, (3) the seizure of the "Crown Royal" bag was
unauthorized by the warrant and did not satisfy the plain view exception, and (4)
the Tulsa police illegally served and unlawfully executed the second search
warrant after dark. We consider each of Mr. Gaines' arguments in turn, viewing
the evidence in a light most favorable to the district court's ruling. United States
v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426, 1429 (10th Cir. 1997). We must uphold the district
court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. However,
determinations as to the reasonableness of the search under the Fourth
Amendment or other conclusions of law are subject to de novo review. Id.
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We first consider Mr. Gaines' claim the original search warrant lacked
probable cause because officer Spitler's affidavit did not contain information that
Mr. Gaines actually possessed a firearm within the residence identified in the
search warrant and did not state when or where Mr. Gaines supposedly possessed
a firearm. Mr. Gaines further claims the information in officer Spitler's affidavit
concerning the existence of an outstanding warrant and Mr. Gaines' alleged gang
affiliation was irrelevant to a finding of probable cause to search the East Ute
Street residence.
The Fourth Amendment mandates that search warrants be supported by
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. U.S. Const. amend IV; United
States v. Cusumano, 83 F.3d 1247, 1249-50 (10th Cir. 1996). However, the
issuing judge's determination that probable cause exists is entitled to "great
deference." Id. at 1250. Upon review of that determination, we ask only whether,
under the totality of the circumstances presented in the affidavit, the issuing judge
had a "substantial basis" for finding a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime would be found upon execution of the warrant. Id.
In this case, officer Spitler's affidavit stated a confidential informant,
proven to be reliable on at least five previous occasions, advised officer Spitler
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that Mr. Gaines was in possession of a chrome plated 9 mm. semi-automatic
pistol. The confidential informant further advised officer Spitler he/she had been
inside the East Ute Street residence within the past seventy-two hours and had
observed Mr. Gaines' roommate with a semi-automatic pistol. Officer Spitler
affirmed he personally had surveilled the East Ute Street residence, and had
observed Mr. Gaines at that residence, occasionally in the company of several
known member of the "Bloods" gang. Officer Spitler also had personal
knowledge that Mr. Gaines previously had been convicted for Possession of
Controlled Dangerous Drugs, and had an outstanding felony warrant for
possession of a firearm. This evidence, viewed as a whole, is relevant to and
provided substantial support for Judge Messler's conclusion there was a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the East Ute
Street residence.
Given the nature of the property to be seized, additional information
pinpointing when and where the confidential informant observed Mr. Gaines in
possession of a semi-automatic pistol was not critical to Judge Messler's finding
of probable cause. Firearms and ammunition are reasonably expected to be kept
at an individual's home or on their person for an extended period of time. See
United States v. Shomo, 786 F.2d 981, 984 (10th Cir. 1986). Thus, it was enough
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the confidential informant had observed a semi-automatic pistol in Mr. Gaines'
residence only days before the execution of the warrant. We find no error in the
district court's determination the original warrant was amply supported by
probable cause.
We move next to Mr. Gaines' claim the first search warrant was overbroad
and constituted a "general" warrant in contravention of the Fourth Amendment
requirement that a search warrant describe the things to be seized with
particularity. Mr. Gaines specifically argues since it is not illegal for him to
possess ammunition "the search warrant which allowed for the search of
ammunition became overbroad when it allowed or gave the officers discretion to
open bags which they knew did not contain ammunition."
It is true, a warrant may leave nothing to the officer's discretion as to what
is to be seized and must prevent the executing officer from generally rummaging
through a person's belongings. Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1478 (10th Cir.
1997). However, the test applied to determine whether the description of property
to be seized was sufficiently particular is a practical one: Does the description
enable the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things authorized to
be seized? Id. The warrant at issue easily passes this test.
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The warrant directed officers to search for and seize: "Firearms,
ammunition, and records indicating the sale or purchase of firearms, papers
showing residency." This description was sufficiently narrow to proscribe a
general exploratory search of Mr. Gaines' residence. Moreover, the presence of
ammunition would be indicative of the presence of firearms -- the ultimate goal of
the search. The described property therefore was directly related to the alleged
criminal activity, even if the possession of ammunition, alone, was not illegal.
Finally, the testimony at the suppression hearing does not support Mr. Gaines'
claim the officers knew the "Crown Royal" bag did not contain ammunition. To
the contrary, Corporal Young specifically stated he did not feel the bag to
determine its contents prior to opening it. For these reasons, we hold the first
warrant to search the East Ute Street residence was not an invalid "general"
warrant, and the officers were justified in searching the "Crown Royal" bag and
any other location where ammunition, ownership papers, or firearms themselves
might be found.
Mr. Gaines' further argues the seizure of the cocaine was not allowed under
the "plain view" exception to the Fourth Amendment because the officer had
determined the "Crown Royal" bag did not contain a firearm or ammunition
before he opened it, and because without testing the contents of the bag the
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officer could only suspect the bag contained a controlled drug. This argument is
totally without merit.
As stated above, Corporal Young unequivocally testified he did not feel the
bag to determine its contents prior to opening it. Given that the bag could have
contained objects described in the search warrant, Corporal Young had no
obligation to feel the bag prior to opening it. Corporal Young also stated that
upon opening the bag, his five years as a narcotics investigator as well as training
and observation of narcotics on the street led him to believe the bag contained a
controlled substance. Because the police officers were lawfully inside Mr.
Gaines' residence to search for firearms, had lawful access to the "Crown Royal"
bag to search for ammunition, and the incriminating character of the bag's
contents was immediately apparent to Corporal Young -- i.e., Corporal Young had
probable cause to believe the bag contained contraband -- the officers were
authorized to seize the bag and its contents under the "plain view" doctrine. See
United States v. Sanchez, 89 F.3d 715, 719 (10th Cir. 1996).
Having held the search and seizure of the "Crown Royal" bag was
authorized under the "plain view" doctrine, without the necessity of obtaining the
second warrant, we need not address Mr. Gaines' claim the second search warrant
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was unlawfully executed after dark. For the foregoing reasons, we hold the
district court did not err in denying his Motion to Suppress and AFFIRM Mr.
Gaines' conviction.
Entered for the Court
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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