Truitt v. Ramsey ( 1997 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 17 1997
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
SHELBY L. TRUITT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-6227
(D.C. No. CIV-96-1864)
DOLORES RAMSEY, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON, HENRY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. Therefore, the case is
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Shelby Truitt, an Oklahoma state prisoner appearing pro se,
appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of
defendant Dolores Ramsey in this § 1983 civil rights action. We dismiss the
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
On June 5, 1980, Truitt began serving seven concurrent sixty-year
sentences for robbery with firearms after a felony conviction. On August 30,
1983, he received a misconduct report charging him with participating in a plan to
take a correctional officer hostage. As a result of a disciplinary hearing, he was
found guilty and punished with the loss of 365 days of earned credit. On review,
a hearing examiner recommended reversal of the decision and expungement of the
incident because of failure to comply with procedures regarding consideration of
confidential witness testimony, but the disciplinary review board rejected the
recommendation, stating: “Errors were corrected and policy was followed--delay
was not excessive.” Truitt wrote to the director of the Oklahoma Department of
Corrections on July 8, 1996, asking for reconsideration and the letter was
forwarded to Ramsey for response. Ramsey wrote to Truitt on August 5, 1996,
stating: “The decision of the Review Committee on 10-21-83 is final. The
disciplinary procedures in effect on that date were followed.”
Truitt filed this § 1983 civil rights action on November 4, 1996, claiming
Ramsey (the sole defendant) violated his constitutional rights by failing to
“conduct at least a minimal investigation to determine whether there was any
merit” to his allegations. He sought declaratory relief, expungement of the
charge, and damages in the amount of $30,000. After requiring the filing of a
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Martinez report and after both parties filed motions for summary judgment, the
magistrate judge recommended that summary judgment be granted in favor of
Ramsey. The district court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation and granted
summary judgment for Ramsey on May 28, 1997.
We have reviewed the record on appeal and agree that Truitt has no cause
of action against Ramsey. Although Truitt’s complaint makes the cursory
allegation that Ramsey failed to properly investigate the disciplinary proceeding,
we are not convinced Ramsey was under any constitutional obligation to
investigate Truitt’s allegations. More important, the heart of the complaint is that
the procedures utilized during the disciplinary proceeding were improper.
Because Ramsey clearly had no personal involvement in that proceeding, she is
simply the wrong defendant. See Moore v. Pemberton, 110 F.3d 22, 23 (7th Cir.
1997) (“[T]he right defendants in a § 1983 suit are the persons whose wrongful
acts harmed the plaintiff.”).
Because Ramsey was the only named defendant in this action, we conclude
Truitt’s appeal is legally frivolous and properly dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i). For the same reasons, we conclude this appeal will be counted
as a “prior occasion” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
In passing, we emphasize that Truitt has no cognizable § 1983 claim
against any member of the 1983 disciplinary committee (or anyone else personally
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involved in the 1983 disciplinary proceedings) and, thus, cannot simply refile this
action against a different defendant. The underlying basis for Truitt’s claim is his
assertion that the disciplinary committee failed to comply with disciplinary policy
OP-060401, which required determination of the reliability of the confidential
informant prior to consideration of his testimony. If established, the procedural
defect alleged by Truitt would “necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation
of his [earned] credits.” Edwards v. Balisok, 117 S. Ct. 1584, 1588 (1997); see
Taylor v. Wallace, 931 F.2d 698, 702 (10th Cir. 1991) (findings of prison
disciplinary committee could not be upheld absent indication that disciplinary
committee made independent finding regarding reliability of testimony of
confidential informants); Brown v. Smith, 828 F.2d 1493, 1495 (10th Cir. 1987)
(statement elicited from confidential informant should not have been given any
weight by disciplinary committee absent determination of informant’s reliability).
In turn, restoration of the earned credits would necessarily entitle Truitt to an
earlier release (albeit one that would not occur for some time due to the length of
his sentences). Accordingly, Truitt does not have any cognizable
§ 1983 claim based on the alleged procedural defect in the disciplinary
proceedings absent a successful habeas petition declaring those proceedings
unconstitutional. Edwards, 117 S. Ct. at 1589; Clarke v. Stalder, 121 F.3d 222,
226-27 (5th Cir. 1997); Stone-Bey v. Barnes, 120 F.3d 718, 721-23 (7th Cir.
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1997).
The appeal is DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) as
frivolous. This appeal will also be counted as a “prior occasion” under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g). The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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