Collins v. Furlong , 3 F. App'x 886 ( 2001 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 8 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
RICHARD D. COLLINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 99-1458
(D.C. No. 96-WM-487)
ROBERT FURLONG; IRVING
(D. Colo.)
JAQUEZ; LLOYD WAIDE; ENDRE
SAMU; JULIE JOFFE,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, EBEL and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
Richard Collins is an inmate in a Colorado state prison. On September 2,
1995, he was attacked by James Pickle, another inmate, in a blind spot of the
prison yard nicknamed “the thunderdome.” Collins received a laceration, a bruise,
and superficial abrasions on his face, and a fractured little finger. He and Pickle
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This Order and Judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
were charged with fighting, and after being found guilty, Collins was given 20
days’ punitive segregation, which was probated, and 30 days’ loss of good time.
Defendant Waide presented the case for the department of corrections and
Defendant Samu was the hearing officer.
Collins brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Only two issues remain
in the case. First, Collins argues that the evidence at his hearing did not support
the conviction for fighting. 1 The district court dismissed this part of the complaint
under former 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) as frivolous. Second, Collins argues that
Defendants Furlong and Jaquez, the Warden and Assistant Warden of the
correctional facility respectively, violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing
to protect him from the attack by Pickle. The district court granted summary
judgment for the Defendants on this issue. 2
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
We review a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint under former
§ 1915(d) 3 for abuse of discretion. See Green v. Seymour, 59 F.3d 1073, 1077
1
In his briefs, Collins asserts that Defendants falsified evidence against
him. Because this is not alleged in his complaint, we decline to address it. Cf.
Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 908 n.5 (10th Cir. 2000) (declining to review the
merits of an issue not alleged in the complaint but raised in the appellate brief).
2
The court also granted summary judgment to Defendants Waide and Joffe
on this issue. Collins has not appealed this aspect of the ruling.
3
This provision has since been amended and is now codified at
-2-
(10th Cir. 1995). “[T]he requirements of due process are satisfied if some
evidence supports the decision by the prison disciplinary board to revoke good
time credits.” Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst., Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445,
455, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356 (1985) (citation and quotation marks
omitted) (emphasis added). Here, Collin’s complaint alleges that he “sought to
defend himself” against Pickle and “attempt[ed] to hold” him. On the basis of this
allegation, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to find that there
was some evidence of fighting. Collins argues that uncontradicted evidence
established that he was acting in self-defense. The prison’s penal code provides
that self-defense is an affirmative defense to the charge of fighting; however, the
hearing officer was entitled to disbelieve all of the evidence establishing it. Cf.
United States v. 121 Allen Place, 75 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that
“assessment of the credibility of witnesses is peculiarly within the province of the
trier of fact” who is “entitled to credit or disbelieve any or all of [one side’s]
testimony”). 4 We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of this issue.
(...continued)
3
§ 1915(e)(2).
4
We see no reason to believe that Waide’s alleged stipulation that Pickle
started the fight could itself establish self-defense. Self-defense generally also
requires that the defender believes use of force is necessary. See, e.g., Model
Penal Code § 3.04(1).
-3-
II. Eighth Amendment Claim
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Simms v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d
1321, 1326 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 815, 120 S. Ct. 53, 146 L. Ed. 2d
46 (1999). “[P]rison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the
hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833, 114 S. Ct. 1970,
128 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1994) (alteration omitted). To prove a violation of the Eighth
Amendment, Collins must show that (1) prison conditions posed a substantial risk
of serious harm and (2) officials knew of and disregarded this risk. See id. at 834,
837.
Affidavits of inmates submitted by Collins establish that “thunderdome”
was a dangerous location, the site of at least three to four violent attacks each
month. At least one of these attacks resulted in a near fatality. The question,
therefore, is whether Furlong and Jaquez actually knew of this risk. In its order
granting summary judgment, the district court found evidence that they did, and
Defendants have not challenged this. Reviewing the issue de novo, we agree
Collins has presented evidence that Defendants actually knew of the risk. “[A]
factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the
very fact that the risk was obvious.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. Defendants
-4-
admitted that the area “has been the site of several incidents” since the prison was
opened. In addition, several affidavits note that prison officials were aware of the
assaults in the area and its nickname.
The district court granted summary judgment because there was no
evidence that Defendants were aware of a specific threat to Collins from Pickle.
However, a prison official may not escape liability
by showing that, while he was aware of an obvious, substantial risk
to inmate safety, he did not know that the complainant was
especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who
eventually committed the assault. . . . [I]t does not matter whether
the risk comes from a single source or multiple sources, any more
than it matters whether a prisoner faces an excessive risk of attack
for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation
face such a risk.
Farmer , 511 U.S. at 843. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s grant of
summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment issue and REMAND for further
proceedings.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
-5-