United States v. Mullen , 160 F. App'x 711 ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 22, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 05-4148
(D.C. Nos. 04-CV-1014-TC and
v.
2:02-CR-53-TC)
(D. Utah)
DANA HOWARD MULLEN
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Dana Mullen, acting pro se, requests a certificate of appealability (“COA”)
to appeal the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition. For substantially the same
reasons set forth by the district court, we DENY Mullen’s request for a COA and
DISMISS.
A jury convicted Mullen of being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The district court sentenced him to 120 months
in prison. He brings three contentions for our consideration on appeal: (1) the
district court below did not have federal subject matter jurisdiction; (2) counsel
was ineffective in entering into a stipulation of fact and law regarding
transportation in interstate commerce of the gun in question without having
conducted an investigation into the facts stipulated to; and (3) the district court
erred under United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) in sentencing Mullen on
the basis of facts not found by the jury. 1 Each of these arguments is without
merit.
In support of the first contention, Mullen argues that the district court did
not have jurisdiction to hear the case because the government did not establish
that the gun in question had been in interstate commerce. Federal district courts
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear federal criminal cases. 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
Because § 922(g) is a federal offense, the district court had subject matter
jurisdiction regardless of whether the gun had been in interstate commerce.
Section 922(g)’s requirement that the gun involved in the offense have been
shipped or transported in interstate commerce is merely an element of the crime.
Because Mullen’s petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective
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date of the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), AEDPA’s
provisions apply to this case. See Rogers v. Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1282 n.1
(10th Cir. 1999). AEDPA conditions a petitioner’s right to appeal a denial of
habeas relief under
§ 2255 upon a grant of a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). A COA may be issued
“only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” § 2253(c)(2). This requires Mullen to demonstrate “that
reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotations omitted).
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See United States v. Tush, 287 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2002) (analogous provision
in 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) is an element of the crime and not jurisdictional) (quotation
and citation omitted). If Mullen had been able to prove that the gun had not been
shipped or transported in interstate commerce, he would have been found not
guilty under § 922(g), but the district court would have retained jurisdiction over
the case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
Next, Mullen claims that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to
investigate whether the gun had ever been in interstate commerce and yet
stipulated to that fact. He claims that the gun was manufactured and sold in Utah,
and had been taken across state lines on only one occasion when the gun’s owner
took it with her on a vacation to Wyoming.
To establish that his counsel was ineffective, Mullen must demonstrate that
“his attorney’s representation was deficient and that he was prejudiced by that
deficiency.” James v. Gibson, 211 F.3d 543, 555 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). In evaluating a claim of
ineffective assistance, we “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the
defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S.
at 689 (quotation omitted).
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A firearm is deemed to have been in interstate commerce if it has been
transported across state lines. United States v. Snow, 82 F.3d 935, 940 (10th Cir.
1996). Because interstate commerce is not limited to interstate trade, the fact that
the crossing took place when the gun was taken by its owner to Wyoming while
on vacation did not render the stipulation improvident. See Archambault v.
United States, 224 F.2d 925, 928 n.3 (10th Cir. 1955) (“movement of people
across state lines . . . is commerce.”) Nor does the distance traveled affect the
analysis as long as one state line has been crossed. See International Text-Book
Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 107 (1910) (“[i]mportation into one State from another
is the indispensable element, the test, of interstate commerce.”) Although
Mullen’s attorney did not conduct an independent investigation, he relied on a
statement given by the gun’s owner to police that she had taken the gun to
Wyoming. Given the attorney’s strategic choice to focus at trial on whether the
gun was in Mullen’s possession, his decision to stipulate that the gun had traveled
in interstate commerce does not constitute deficient performance.
Finally, Mullen argues that the district court erred under Booker and
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), by sentencing Mullen on the basis
of facts not found by a jury. Mullen presents no evidence suggesting that his
sentence was increased by judicial fact-finding. This failure, however, is of no
consequence because Booker and Apprendi do not apply retroactively to habeas
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petitions. United States v. Bellamy, 411 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2005). Thus, the
district court committed no error.
Petitioner’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. His
request for a COA is DENIED and his case is DISMISSED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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