Lynch v. O'Dell , 163 F. App'x 704 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
January 18, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
NELSON R. LYNCH,
Petitioner - Appellant,
No. 05-6229
vs. (D.C. No. CIV-05–0150-HE)
(W.D. Okla.)
TIM O’DELL, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, O’BRIEN, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
Nelson R. Lynch, an inmate appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s denial of his habeas petition
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In order to merit a COA, Mr. Lynch must
make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). To make such a
showing, he must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district
court’s resolution of the constitutional issue contained in his motion debatable or
wrong. Id.; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Because Mr. Lynch
has not made that showing, we deny a COA and dismiss the appeal.
Upon negotiated pleas in four separate cases, Mr. Lynch was convicted of
trafficking in illegal drugs, possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute (two cases), and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. He received
fifteen years in each drug case, and ten years in the motor vehicle case. The state
applied to revoke the suspended sentences in all four cases based upon
commission of another offense, possession of a controlled dangerous substance
with intent to distribute. When a jury acquitted Mr. Lynch of this new offense,
the state district court nonetheless revoked the suspended sentences, ordering
them to run concurrently. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”)
affirmed. R. Doc. 15 at Ex. 2. Mr. Lynch filed for state post-conviction relief,
which the state district court denied, and the OCCA affirmed the denial. R. Doc.
15, Exs. 4 & 6.
In his federal habeas petition, Mr. Lynch raised the following grounds: (1)
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, (2) the evidence was
insufficient to revoke his suspended sentence, (3) the state was collaterally
estopped from relying on the same evidence of which a jury acquitted Mr. Lynch
in order to revoke, (4) the preponderance of the evidence standard for revocation
is unconstitutional, and (5) his sentence was excessive. R. Doc. 1. The
magistrate judge recommended denial of Mr. Lynch’s habeas petition, and after
considering Mr. Lynch’s objections, the district court adopted the magistrate’s
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findings and denied Mr. Lynch habeas relief. In his application for COA, Mr.
Lynch raises only three grounds for relief, (1) there was insufficient evidence to
revoke his suspended sentence, (2) the state was collaterally estopped from using
evidence from his acquittal to revoke his suspended sentence, and (3) his sentence
was excessive. Aplt. Form A-16, at 2.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Mr. Lynch, on application here, concedes that the applicable standard for
revoking his suspended sentence was a preponderance of the evidence. Pet.
Opening Br. (Part B) at 2; see United States v. Cantley, 130 F.3d 1371, 1376
(10th Cir. 1997) (recognizing Oklahoma’s preponderance of the evidence
standard); Bumgarner v. Middleton, No. 94-7003, 1995 WL 275718, at *2 (10th
Cir. May 10, 1995) (unpublished); Morishita v. Morris, 702 F.2d 207, 210 (10th
Cir. 1983) (probation revocation is based on a “preponderance of the evidence
rather than proof beyond a reasonable doubt”); Fleming v. State, 760 P.2d 206,
207 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) (proof required to revoke suspended sentence is
preponderance of evidence that accused violated terms of his suspension). The
OCCA held that sufficient evidence supported the revocation. Whether that
holding is reviewed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) or (2), we must uphold that
determination on collateral review because it is neither based on an unreasonable
factual determination in light of evidence presented in the state court proceedings,
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nor is it an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Boltz v.
Mullin, 415 F.3d 1215, 1230 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that Tenth Circuit has not
decided whether a sufficiency of the evidence claim presents a question of law
reviewed under § 2254(d)(1) or a question of fact reviewable under § 2254(d)(2)).
Here, Officer Query testified he stopped Mr. Lynch because his vehicle had
a severely cracked windshield. R. Doc. 15 at Ex. 11 (Tr. at 8). When the officer
asked Mr. Lynch to produce a driver’s license, Mr. Lynch was unable to do so.
Id. (Tr. at 9). Mr. Lynch was the only occupant of the vehicle. Id. (Tr. at 10).
After verifying that Mr. Lynch had no driver’s license, the officer placed him
under arrest and conducted an inventory search of Mr. Lynch’s vehicle. Id. (Tr. at
11-12). Officer Query testified that he found a small baggie with a white rock in
it under the driver’s seat. Id. (Tr. at 12-14). The white rock tested positive for
cocaine base, or crack. Id. (Tr. at 17; 38-41).
The magistrate concluded that under Oklahoma law and in light of this
standard, a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Mr. Lynch possessed
cocaine. We have reviewed the testimony of Officer Query, R. Doc. 13 at Ex. 11,
and find this conclusion is not reasonably debatable. See United States v. Cota-
Meza, 367 F.3d 1218, 1223-24 (10th Cir. 2004) (there was sufficient evidence to
find a driver of a vehicle who denied knowledge of contraband within that vehicle
guilty of possession with intent to distribute), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 276 (2004).
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B. Collateral Estoppel
Mr. Lynch argues that because he was acquitted of possession of a
controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, collateral estoppel
prevented the use of the evidence from that trial to revoke his suspended
sentence. The OCCA held that collateral estoppel did not apply because no
adjudication of guilt or innocence occurs upon revocation of a suspended
sentence. Rather, it is merely a determination that a violation of the suspended
sentence has occurred. R. Doc. 15 at Ex. 2 at 2 (citing Moore v. State, 644 P.2d
1079, 1081 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979)).
To the extent Mr. Lynch is claiming a double jeopardy violation, its lack of
merit is not reasonably debatable. Under Oklahoma law, acquittal of a charge
does not preclude use of the same evidence to revoke a suspended sentence, and
such use does not constitute double jeopardy. See Moore, 644 P.2d at 1080; see
also Morishita, 702 F.2d at 210. The Double Jeopardy clause protects against
subsequent criminal prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal has been
obtained–the revocation proceeding in this case simply is not criminal prosecution
to which Double Jeopardy protections apply. See Gillespie v. Hunter, 159 F.2d
410, 412 (10th Cir. 1947) (probation revocation did not constitute double
jeopardy); see also United States v. Grisanti, 4 F.3d 173, 176 (2d Cir. 1993);
United States v. Hanahan, 798 F.2d 187, 189-90 (7th Cir. 1986); Standlee v.
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Rhay, 557 F.2d 1303, 1305, 1307 (9th Cir. 1977).
C. Excessive Sentence 1
Sentencing issues are state law questions and are generally not cognizable
on federal habeas review unless it is shown the sentence is “outside the statutory
limits or unauthorized by law.” Dennis v. Poppel, 222 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir.
2000); Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279, 1281 (10th Cir. 1999). Mr. Lynch
does not challenge that his original sentences were within the statutory range.
Upon revocation, Mr. Lynch was to serve all four sentences concurrently,
amounting to a total of only fifteen years on a potential fifty-five year sentence.
Mr. Lynch has failed to show why this sentence is unauthorized by law or outside
the statutory limits. The burden is Mr. Lynch’s. See Dennis, 222 F.3d at 1258.
In addition, we do not fund Mr. Lynch’s sentence grossly disproportionate in
relation to his crimes. See Hawkins, 200 F.3d at 1282. The fact that the court
reinstated his original sentence as the result of a revocation does not amount to a
violation of a constitutional right.
We DENY Mr. Lynch’s application for a COA and dismiss the appeal.
Entered for the Court
1
Mr. Lynch identifies this as a ground for relief in his COA petition, but
makes no mention of it in his Opening Brief. For the sake of completeness, we
assume he intended to make this argument and therefore address it.
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Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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