Harris v. Kammerzell , 440 F. App'x 627 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                        FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    September 27, 2011
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS               Clerk of Court
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    CHRISTOPHER L. HARRIS,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    No. 11-1206
    JOHN L. KAMMERZELL, U.S.                      (D.C. No. 1:11-cv-00435-LTB)
    Marshal, Against his Individual and                     (D. Colo.)
    Official Capacity,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before KELLY, HARTZ, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
    Plaintiff-Appellant Christopher L. Harris, proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the
    district court’s order dismissing his complaint as frivolous and imposing filing
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
    however, for its persuasive value consistent with Federal Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 32.1 and Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1.
    After examining the appellate record, this three-judge panel
    determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in
    the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R.
    34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    1
    Because Mr. Harris is proceeding pro se, we construe his filings
    liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 
    551 U.S. 89
    , 94 (2007) (per curiam); Van
    Deelen v. Johnson, 
    497 F.3d 1151
    , 1153 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007).
    restrictions. In filings that are difficult to understand, Mr. Harris appears to
    challenge his drug conviction and sentence based upon principles of contract
    and/or civil commercial law. In Harris v. Wands, 410 F. App’x 145, 148 (10th
    Cir. 2011), a panel of this court affirmed the dismissal of Mr. Harris’s 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
     petition, and cautioned Mr. Harris that “further frivolous filings may result
    in the imposition of filing restrictions.” We conclude that Mr. Harris’s latest case
    again presents only frivolous assertions. Accordingly, exercising jurisdiction
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    After pleading guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern
    District of Indiana to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and
    cocaine base, Mr. Harris was sentenced to 300 months’ incarceration to be
    followed by five years’ supervised release. Mr. Harris has used commercial-law
    theories in an effort to gain his release from prison in at least six previous
    actions. See Harris v. Wands, No. 10-cv-02735-LTB, 
    2010 WL 5339604
     (D.
    Colo. Dec. 10, 2010) (unpublished), aff’d, 410 F. App’x 145, 148 (10th Cir.
    2011); Harris v. Anderson, No. 10-03227-CV-S-RED (W.D. Mo. Nov. 2, 2010)
    (unpublished); Harris v. Anderson, No. 10-cv-03225-DW (W.D. Mo. Oct. 29,
    2010) (unpublished), aff’d, No. 10-3593 (8th Cir. Dec. 30, 2010) (summarily
    affirmed) (unpublished); Harris v. United States, No. 1:10-cv-00335-LJM-JMS
    (S.D. Ind. May 5, 2010) (unpublished), appeal dismissed, No. 10-2205 (7th Cir.
    -2-
    Aug. 9, 2010) (unpublished); Harris v. United States, No. 09-154C, 
    2009 WL 2700207
     (Fed. Cl. Aug. 26, 2009) (unpublished); Harris v. United States, No.
    1:08-cv-1315-DFH-TAB (S.D. Ind. Oct. 17, 2008), certificate of appealability
    denied, No. 08-3934 (7th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009) (unpublished).
    In this action, Mr. Harris’s complaint averments are similar to allegations
    that he has made in the cases listed above. In part, Mr. Harris asserts in Claim
    One:
    Upon being duly convicted for violation of Title 21 §§ 841, 846,
    which made Christopher L. Harris a slave and personal property
    of the United States under the U.S. Constitution, Mr. Harris was
    fined according to Title 21 § 841 the sum certain of $4,000,000,
    which was treated as a tax lien pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 3613
    (c).
    . . . On February 7, 2011, Mr. Harris delivered payment, in good
    faith, and in accordance with law for satisfying payee’s claim and
    discharging Mr. Harris pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 3206
    , from
    liability on Judgment No. 1:98Cr00121-00, and suspend the
    obligation in accordance with law pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 3201
    (d).
    R. at 24 (Am. Compl., filed Mar. 17, 2011) (emphasis omitted).
    And in Claim Two Mr. Harris asserts in part that:
    On or about February 15, 2011, plaintiff and defendant entered
    into a contract for full satisfaction of the claim referenced above
    in claim one of this complaint with the intent of extinguishing
    any alleged debt, duty, obligation, liability, and the like intended
    as obligating Christopher L. Harris for a valuable consideration.
    . . . Christopher L. Harris has duly performed all the terms and
    conditions of the contract on his part. . . . John L. Kammerzell
    breached the contract in that . . . he has failed or refused to: (1)
    prevent this account from damaging Mr. Harris in any way. (2)
    Confess judgment. (3) Discharge all debt(s) and judgments
    -3-
    ‘dollar for dollar’ with delivered Promissory Note No. CLH-
    02052011-CH.
    
    Id. at 25
     (emphasis omitted).
    DISCUSSION
    This Court reviews frivolousness dismissals for an abuse of discretion,
    unless the district court’s decision turns on an issue of law, in which case our
    review is de novo. Conkle v. Potter, 
    352 F.3d 1333
    , 1335 n.4 (10th Cir. 2003). It
    is patent that Mr. Harris’s complaint averments—through which he attempts to
    effect his release from prison under principles of contract and/or civil commercial
    law—are legally frivolous. Accordingly, the district court was correct to dismiss
    his complaint.
    As for the filing restrictions, we review the imposition of filing restrictions
    for an abuse of discretion. Tripati v. Beaman, 
    878 F.2d 351
    , 354 (10th Cir.
    1989).
    Injunctions restricting further filing are appropriate where (1)
    “the litigant’s lengthy and abusive history” is set forth; (2) the
    court provides guidelines as to what the litigant “must do to
    obtain permission to file an action”; and (3) the litigant received
    “notice and an opportunity to oppose the court’s order before it
    is instituted.”
    Ysais v. Richardson, 
    603 F.3d 1175
    , 1180 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Tripati, 
    878 F.2d at
    353–54).
    Here, the district court first issued an order to show cause why Mr. Harris
    should not be subject to filing restrictions in the district court, in which it detailed
    -4-
    Mr. Harris’s lengthy and abusive filing history. 2 After considering Mr. Harris’s
    response to the order to show cause, the district court imposed filing restrictions
    that (1) enjoined Mr. Harris from filing pro se any civil action in the District of
    Colorado in which he seeks release from prison based on contract law, the law of
    commercial transactions, or any other theory of law that is legally frivolous, and
    (2) set forth a procedure under which any future pro se pleadings submitted by
    Mr. Harris will be reviewed by a magistrate judge and then by a district court
    judge before any determination is made that a particular pleading should not be
    filed because it is the type of pleading that Mr. Harris is enjoined from filing.
    Based upon Mr. Harris’s filing history, we conclude that these restrictions are
    narrowly tailored and appropriate under Ysais.
    CONCLUSION
    Because Mr. Harris’s complaint presents only averments that are legally
    frivolous, and because, based on Mr. Harris’s filing history, the filing restrictions
    2
    In particular, in addition to reviewing the averments set forth in Mr.
    Harris’s complaint, the district court referenced three of Mr. Harris’s previously
    filed cases in which he advanced the same or similar averments.
    -5-
    imposed by the district court are legally appropriate, we AFFIRM. 3
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Jerome A. Holmes
    Circuit Judge
    3
    Mr. Harris’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED and
    we instruct him to make full and immediate payment of the unpaid balance of his
    appellate filing fees. All other pending motions are DENIED as moot.
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-1206

Citation Numbers: 440 F. App'x 627

Judges: Kelly, Hartz, Holmes

Filed Date: 9/27/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024